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John C. Green, Series Editor

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The State of the Parties
The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties

Third Edition

edited by
JOHN C. GREEN
and
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Notes

I gratefully acknowledge the help of Andrea Lubin, who performed the content analyses of party platforms included in this essay.
1. The phrase is from Walter Baghot's (1928: 1) classic analysis of the realities of British politics.
3. Each sentence, or distinct clause within these sentences, constituted the unit of analysis. Because of its great length, only alternate sentences in the Republican platform were included. No selection bias is evident or, given the repetitive character of the platforms, likely. In total, there are 426 units of analysis in the Democratic platform, 758 in the Republican. For further details on the techniques used, see Pomper and Lederman (1980: 235-48). To avoid contamination or wishful thinking on my part, Lubin did the analysis independently. My later revisions tended to classify the platform sentences as less specific and meaningful than hers, contrary to any optimistic predisposition.
4. The "useful" categories are policy approval and policy criticism, candidate approval and candidate criticism, and future policy promises classified as pledges of continuity, expressions of goals, pledges of action, and detailed pledges.
6. Using the same content categories, Carolyn Shaw (1996), of the University of Texas, lists 150 presidential campaign promises of 1992 in the more specific categories. In regard to fulfillment, she employs the methods of Fishel (1985). With this method, she finds that there was "fully comparable" or "partially comparable" action on 69 percent of Clinton's proposals. This record is higher than that found by Fishel for any president from Kennedy through Reagan.
7. Even this figure underestimates the impact of the Contract with America. I have counted the failure to pass term limits as a defeat, although the Republicans actually promised no more than a floor vote, and I have not given the party credit for achievements in the following Congress.
8. These data are drawn from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 54 (December 21, 1996): 3461-67.
12. The parties spent $628 million directly, plus at least $263 million and up to $400 million in soft money. For detailed figures, see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 55 (April 5, 1997): 767-73.
13. For an excellent discussion of 1996 election spending, see Corrado (1997).
14. The only exception to the trend away from inner party selection or compromise since 1924 is Alf Landon's designation at the Republican candidate in 1936. The last president "voluntarily" to decline a second term was Lyndon Johnson in 1968.

Moderate Party Factions in the U.S. House of Representatives

Robin Kolodny

The elections of 1994 and 1996 reveal a critical destabilization in the political bases of the two major parties in the United States. In a Downsian political world, political parties orient their policy positions toward the center of the ideological spectrum (Downs 1957). When that center point shifts, as it seems to have done to the right in the 1990s, both parties adjust accordingly. This movement can pose problems for specific segments of the parties that had staked out positions near the system's previous center. This chapter describes two significant party factions caught in the crossroads of party transformation: liberal Republicans (mostly from the Northeast and Midwest) and conservative Democrats (mostly from the South). These groups have formed party caucuses, the Tuesday Group among liberal/moderate Republicans, and the Coalition among moderate/conservative Democrats.

The Logic of Party Factions in the 1990s

Once candidates are elected to a body such as the U.S. Congress, it is natural that they would join forces with other like-minded officeholders to achieve their common goals of reelection, power in the chamber, and good public policy (Fenno 1978; Aldrich 1995). This tendency is the minimal explanation for why officeholders create party organizations in government. But what if the party conference/caucus cannot help members attain all of their goals, specifically their reelection and policy goals? At this point, officeholders have two options. They may abandon their initial party affiliation and join the other major party if the other party's actions seem especially well matched to their ideal points (Prinz and Larson 1996). Although such switching does occur, the drawback to this strategy is that party switching due to national-level forces may not be well appreciated at the local level and can cause officeholders to lose their seats. The second option is to join
or create a faction within their party, usually in the form of a caucus organization. Organized factions within parties have tremendous value for members. They allow members to ally with their party if that seems prudent and to oppose their party as part of a bloc when necessary—a strategy that is often preferable to being a lone maverick bucking the party.

Hence, it is logical for moderates both to remain within one of the two major parties and at the same time to join a factional group that allows members to identify their differences with the larger party. But not all moderate factions assume the same stance vis-à-vis their parties. Factors that affect this relationship include whether the faction is in a majority or minority party, the absolute difference between majority and minority status in the major parties, and the salient issue cleavages that distinguish the factions from the major parties. Factions either can protest their marginalization by openly opposing the dominant party, or they can emphasize their commonalities with the dominant party and try to influence its direction.

The Democratic and Republican Parties have long had a variety of factions manifested in voting coalitions (which deviate from the majority of the party in Congress). Such factions have been discussed by many others looking to explain party unity (or disunity) in congressional voting (Rae 1989; Sinclair 1989; Rohde 1991; Connelly and Pitney 1994; Koopman 1996). When the Democrats enjoyed their substantial majority in Congress from the 1940s to the 1990s, conservative Democratic members were often found defecting from the majority position of their party and voting with Republicans to form majorities on certain issues (Shelley 1983; Sinclair 1989). This “Conservative Coalition” greatly disturbed the majority of liberals in the Democratic Party and led to the reforms in Congress in the 1970s (Rohde 1991). Since these reforms stripped senior conservative Southern Democrats of their institutional power bases, these members were left with important choices to make about their political futures. Some of the more moderate members in this group became part of organizations such as the Democratic Leadership Council, and some made moves toward Republican conversion.

While the Democratic Party was becoming more liberal, the influence of the “New Right” was pulling the Republican Party in a more conservative direction. Though Republicans had always had a more conservative wing from the South and West, that wing was relatively small until the mid-1970s (Rae 1989). As the political fortunes of Ronald Reagan brought activist conservatives into the Republican Party, the liberal wing still held a significant presence. One advantage of the liberal wing was their seniority in Congress and solid reputations, which contrasted with the more activist methods of newer conservatives (Connelly and Pitney 1994; Koopman 1996). Some liberal Republicans became active members in such groups as the Ripon Society, the Wednesday Group, and in the late 1980s, the 92 Group. Virtually no Republican officeholder switched his or her party affiliation to Democrat, though some became enchanted with the political candidacy of Ross Perot and flirted with forming a third party (e.g., Warren Rudman, Pete DuPont, and Lowell Weicker).

The historic importance of the 104th Congress, which followed the dramatic 1994 election, is just beginning to be understood. Once discussions of a “tsunami” of political attachments and behaviors subsided, sober reflection showed that such a political configuration had been coming. Aside from the evidence that Americans were applying their presidential voting behavior to congressional elections (Jacobson 1996), scholars also had to admit that the Republicans had been accepted by mainstream society as a viable governing party and not simply the permanent minority (Connelly and Pitney 1994). Though the question of Republican acceptability is a complex one, we can see that the popularity of Ross Perot’s candidacy in the presidential election of 1992 allowed a critical view of both parties’ performance, resulting in a more negative assessment of the Democratic Party in Congress relative to the Republican Party.

While there is no disputing that the Republican Party did become more conservative with the 1994 elections, there was no conservative “revolution.” The size of the Republican margin in the House was quite thin, and like it or not, the president was a Democrat—and one who had moved his party toward the right as well. These realities spurred the two groups at the center fringes of each party to mobilize themselves both inside and outside Congress. The efforts of the moderate/liberal Republican Tuesday Group and the moderate/conservative Democratic Blue Dog Coalition demonstrate a desire on the part of some officeholders to preserve their position in a major party and to secure the support of the median voters whom they believe only they truly represent.

Though both groups’ members are sympathetic to the third-party discussions of several of their former colleagues, they have organized themselves in Congress in an effort to protect their position in the party (and the attendant advantages that brings both inside and outside the legislature—see Aldrich 1995) rather than to abandon the party for a new, untried party. Some Blue Dogs clearly used the Coalition as a signal to the Republican Party and their constituents that a switch to the Republican Party would be in the best interest of all, although only a few actually became Republicans. In contrast, no Tuesday Group members have used their organization as a device to convert to the Democratic Party. One thing that both groups have in common is that they are staking out the moderate position in their parties to force the party leadership to respond to, or at least acknowledge, their concerns.

The Tuesday Group and the Blue Dog Coalition

Both the Tuesday Group and the Blue Dog Coalition are informal caucuses of moderates in the Republican and Democratic Parties in the House
of Representatives, respectively. Both groups meet all the criteria specified by Hammond (1997) as defining a party caucus: they operate outside the formal structures of Congress, are voluntary, have an organizational structure, and have continued for more than one Congress. Hammond lists both the Tuesday Lunch Bunch (Tuesday Group) and the Blue Dog Coalition as intraparty (or just party) caucuses. Intraparty caucuses are normally based on an ideology. Both groups claim moderation as their ideology and stress their goal of creating workable solutions to public policy problems, even if that means compromise with other factions or parties. Finally, Hammond lists three general activities of caucuses: information gathering and exchange, influencing agendas, and other floor-oriented activities (Hammond 1997: 281–88). Each of these functions, as well as campaigning, will be described here in turn.

Information Gathering and Exchange

The Tuesday Group

The initial reason for the creation of the Tuesday Group was for the sharing of information. The group originally met weekly on Tuesdays at noon for lunch. Congressman Steve Gunderson (R–Wisconsin), one of the co-founders of the group, described it this way:

Our Tuesday lunches are very casual, but the attendance is strictly limited. Only members of the lunch bunch are invited, and any given member’s staff people are welcome only if that member is present. Lobbyists, guests, and reporters are not allowed. We do ask various people to come in and speak to us. ... But mainly we talk policy, hashing out our agenda for the week. (Gunderson and Morris 1996: 189)

Throughout the 104th Congress, the group met on the average every week, although many additional meetings were scheduled at times when matters of particular concern to group members were imminent. Each Monday, key staff members of Tuesday Group co-chairs met to suggest agenda items for the upcoming meeting. Normally, topics for discussion concerned impending floor business. More frequent meetings coincided with the floor consideration of issues most important to the group such as welfare reform, social spending priorities during the appropriations process, and reconciliation throughout the fall. Occasionally, individuals would be invited to address the group. The most frequent guest was Speaker Newt Gingrich. Other guests included Majority Leader Armey, members of the Blue Dog Coalition, and representatives of various conservative Republican groups.

The Blue Dog Coalition

Like the Tuesday Group, the coalition met weekly to share information, focusing their attention on impending floor activities. Their meeting day of choice was Wednesday; their meal was breakfast. The coalition also allowed members to bring a staff member with them. Occasionally, members considering coalition membership would join the meetings, but they did not tend to have guest speakers as the Tuesday Group did. Although the coalition’s discussions naturally centered on the current floor activities, they were more likely to focus on long-range planning, especially concerning initiatives they might be able to develop to introduce as Blue Dog Coalition bills at some point in the session.

In their statement of purpose, the Blue Dog Coalition says that it “is in a position to define the center of the spectrum in the House of Representatives” rather than the center of the Democratic Party. The purpose of stressing the ideological center of the House is to prevent a forced choice between extreme liberal and conservative perspectives and also to form working relationships with moderate Republicans. Indeed, the Blue Dog Coalition hoped for “the possibility of forming a united, bipartisan group” (Blue Dog Coalition 1996a). However, the idea of working with moderate Republicans may be undermined by the coalition’s assertion that they would avoid taking positions on social issues. The preamble to their articles of organization emphasizes the coalition’s goals of fiscal restraint, small government, and local determinism. The Blue Dog Coalition also embraces a more restrictive view of membership than the Tuesday Group. Members can petition the group for membership, but that petition is subject to a group vote. Once membership is established, the coalition selects a variety of leaders with specific responsibilities: three co-chairs, three vice-chairs, and a chief whip. The articles of organization also call for weekly group meetings when the House is in session and more frequent meetings of the steering committee (composed of the seven officers). The articles go on to describe procedures for procuring endorsements by the coalition on policy positions and how particular task forces may be formed (Blue Dog Coalition 1996b).

Influencing Agendas

The Tuesday Group

Hammond (1997: 281) states that most caucuses influence agendas by either setting agendas or maintaining agendas. The Tuesday Group, however, because of its size, its situation of being in a new majority, and the zealotry of the majority of their party is most effective at limiting items most objectionable to them. In one sense, the Tuesday Group is maintaining their agenda by asserting that the status quo is preferable to any change in an
undesirable direction. But the Tuesday Group's mission was not so much to hurt the majority party's agenda or position but to protect their party from being embroiled in controversial issues that would obscure the core set of issues that united them all. Congressman Gunderson's insights are again telling:

I insist on calling us "governing Republicans." It's the term I like to use rather than "moderate Republicans," because I think ideological labels are increasingly difficult to define and, I think, increasingly irrelevant. . . . (we) want to work through government to get something accomplished. We're not driven by some narrow ideology; we're not willing, as some are, to throw political hand grenades in order to make an ideological point. . . . We believe in the institution of Congress and believe in two parties working together to fulfill the obligations of a governing Congress. (Gunderson and Morris 1996: 188--89)

Thus, group members pursued activities in reaction to controversial proposals from the majority of the Republican Party, rather than generating new proposals themselves.

The Blue Dog Coalition

Though the coalition has less than half the membership of the Tuesday Group, their formation sent a signal of independence from either party to their fellow members. This allowed them to play a broker role between the two parties, rather than just within the Republican Party. By positioning themselves this way, the coalition hoped to shape public policy by making their support available to both parties (Kahn 1995b), even at the expense of their relationship with the Democratic Party.

Other Legislative Activities

The Tuesday Group

As would any other caucus, the Tuesday Group developed legislation, offered amendments, and mobilized colleagues to achieve their ends. Since the group often focused on preventing items they object to from being considered, blocking tactics were often used. If the group could not convince the leadership to table discussion of a controversial issue, they tried several other strategies such as lobbying the rules committee for a rule to allow them to present alternative amendments, opposing the rule if no concessions were made, supporting the Democrats' motion to recommit, or opposing final passage of a bill. The Tuesday Group lobbied, and received, a seat at leadership meetings, though the leadership stipulated that the position must rotate among various Tuesday Group members.²

The Blue Dog Coalition

While the Tuesday Group focused on blocking tactics, the coalition focused on drafting legislative proposals on several controversial issues in which the parties' median positions seemed most at odds. Examples include the "takings" bill (private property rights versus environmental concerns), welfare reform, unfunded mandates, the balanced budget amendment, and the budget itself. In addition, the Blue Dog Coalition earned some recognition from the leadership in two ways. First, coalition cofounder Charlie Stenholm (D-Texas) was named to the Leadership Advisory Group formed early in the 104th Congress. Second, Chet Edwards, a moderate Democratic congressman from Texas, was named a chief deputy whip and given the task of reaching out to the coalition and other conservative and moderate Democrats (Kahn 1995b). Third, coalition cofounder Gary Condit was named to the conference committee on unfunded mandates by the Republicans after being snuffed by his own party despite his considerable leadership on the issue (Kahn 1995c).

Issues

The Tuesday Group

The Tuesday Group most often defects from their party on environmental issues, followed by abortion and family planning issues, civil rights/civil liberties matters, and arts policy (Klodny 1998). Since their party unity scores were relatively high, it is not difficult to pinpoint the source of the defections. However, because the goal of the Tuesday Group is to avoid conflict, the major successes of the Tuesday Group are much harder to measure because the Group prefers not to have divisive votes than to have them. That is, the Tuesday Group has convinced the leadership not to hold votes on some welfare and affirmative action matters under threat of group defection.

The Blue Dog Coalition

In contrast, the coalition prefers to construct their own alternative proposals to legislative problems. Their brokering role was critical to initiatives in several key areas: unfunded mandates, welfare reform, "takings" legislation, product liability, regulatory reform, environmental policy, and budget matters. On several of these matters, specifically the Clean Water Act and "takings" legislation, the Blue Dog Coalition compensated for some of the defections by the Tuesday Group, helping the Republican majority circumvent members of their own party. On some of the other issues, such as unfunded mandates and welfare reform, the coalition and the Tuesday Group had similar positions and moderated the legislation ultimately signed into
law so that it better reflected the median position in the House. One material issue difference between the groups is their willingness to address social issues. The Blue Dog Coalition avoids them entirely, while the Tuesday Group often finds them at the center of their differences with the majority of their party.

### Campaign Activities

#### The Tuesday Group

The Tuesday Group has not formed their own PAC, but this does not mean they lack a campaign strategy. One of the group’s core members keeps the group abreast of the activities of many of the “independent-minded” organizations affiliated with the Republican Mainstream Committee. Such organizations include MODRN PAC, the RIPON Society, Republicans for Choice, WISH List, the John Quincy Adams Society, the Log Cabin Republicans, and the Main Street Coalition (Republican Mainstream Committee 1997). This gave the Tuesday Group a potentially strong network of PACs, educational foundations, and research arms to work with. Unfortunately, many of these organizations are very small operations. Nevertheless, better structures are in place for the Tuesday Group than for the Blue Dog Coalition to institutionalize themselves in campaigning.

### The Blue Dog Coalition

About six weeks after the coalition formed, a Blue Dog PAC was launched. Several reasons were cited for the PACs’ creation. First, several moderate southern Democrats had been defeated in preceding elections. Second, there was concern that the group’s open defiance of Democratic leadership would make DNC or DCCC support less forthcoming (Kahn 1995a). This second concern seems to have hung over the coalition. Four of its members (all of whom ultimately switched parties) resigned their positions on the DCCC in June 1995. When these members switched parties, the DCCC indeed asked them to return funds the DCCC had given to them in the last election cycle (Kahn 1995d).

### Participation in Moderate Party Caucuses

#### Membership: A Tale of Different Mores

#### The Tuesday Group

I identified Tuesday Group members in the 104th Congress from a fax list used to notify members of upcoming group meetings and agendas. Because they want to preserve their position in the party, Tuesday Group membership is not publicly advertised; fifty-four members asked to be apprised of Tuesday Group meeting times and information, though fewer members were regular participants. Table 16.1 shows the distribution of the Tuesday Group members of the 104th Congress by region. Virtually all of the New England Republicans (87.5 percent) are members of the Tuesday Group. Nearly one-half of the Mid-Atlantic Republicans and 40 percent of the midwestern Republicans are in the group. Although one-fifth of the Tuesday Group’s membership comes from the Great Lakes region, only 26.2 percent of all Great Lakes Republicans are Tuesday Group members. The southern and western regions account for only a very small part of the Tuesday Group and also a very small proportion of the Republican Party’s delegation from these areas.

#### The Blue Dog Coalition

As of January 1996, the Blue Dog Coalition made their statement of purpose, articles of organization, and membership list available on the In-

<table>
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<th>Democrat</th>
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<th>Republican</th>
<th>Tuesday Group</th>
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ternet. This pattern is a stark contrast to the Tuesday Group’s secrecy and stresses the open defiance of the coalition to their party. In the first session of the 104th Congress, the group had twenty-four members (whose names were listed in *Roll Call*). Table 16.1 shows that coalition membership is more regionally concentrated than that of the Tuesday Group. No Democrats from New England or the Mid-Atlantic belong, while 62.5 percent of the coalition comes from the South. The next most represented regions are the Midwest and the border states, each having three coalition members. Interestingly, the proportion of these coalition members to all Democrats is relatively close: 29 percent of all southern Democrats and 21 percent of all Midwest and border state Democrats. We might expect a greater number of southern Democrats in this group, but reapportionment resulted in a considerable number of southern Democrats representing more liberal districts, and Republicans had victories in many areas where conservative southern Democrats might have been expected to succeed.

**Partisanship and Ideology**

The ideological composition of congressional parties has long been a subject of discussion. Although recent scholars of House Republicans have emphasized the multidimensionality of Republican factionalism, other analyses have confirmed the regional division of Republican ideology. Rohde (1991: 120–27) has commented on the liberalism of northeastern Republicans compared with the rest of the Republican Party, demonstrated by lower party unity scores for northeastern Republicans. Recently, Cover, Pinney, and Serra (1997: 228–34) have found great distinction between eastern Republicans and the remainder of the Republican Party based on their ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores measuring liberalism. Likewise, conservative Democratic scores have deviated from the Democratic norm as noted by Rohde (1991), Rae (1994), and Sinclair (1989). Here, I look at both these measures of ideological dispersion in the 104th Congress.

At first glance, it would seem that any Republican divisions evaporated in 1995, though some division seems to have returned in 1996. Party unity scores for Republicans are very tightly clustered together (91.19 in 1995 and 86.62 in 1996), whereas Democrats are more widely dispersed (80.36 in 1995 and 80.13 in 1996). Table 16.2 presents these party unity scores. As expected, Blue Dog Democrats and Tuesday Group Republicans deviate the most from the rest of their party. The same goes for Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores. The level of Republican conservatism is notable. The mean ADA scores are exceptionally low for all Republicans. Still, the Tuesday Group Republicans are significantly more liberal than the remainder of their party, confirming Cover et al.’s (1997) earlier findings. With the Republicans now in the majority, the range of options for the most marginal party members are necessarily proscribed. In other words, we should expect that Republican control of Congress, at least in year 1, would polarize voting patterns of both parties, and the numbers indeed bear this out.

With that said, it remains the case that members of the Tuesday Group are significantly more liberal and less partisan than the majority of their party. Table 16.2 shows that the mean party unity and ADA scores are substantially different for Tuesday Group members and the remainder of the Republican conference. Tuesday Group members are less likely to vote with their party almost 10 percent of the time in both years and had four to six times the ADA score of their nongroup colleagues. The standard deviations of both these measures show how much more varied Tuesday Group members are than their nongroup colleagues. Analysis of variance tests for both
sets of group comparisons (between Tuesday Group and nongroup Republicans and within categories of the Tuesday Group) were found to be statistically significant. This finding demonstrates that the Tuesday Group does indeed consist of ideological outliers.

Despite the Blue Dog Coalition's expressed ideological similarity to moderate Republicans, their ADA scores do not bear them out. Their mean ADA score is 47.37 in 1995 and 45.26 in 1996, more than double the mean ADA score for the Tuesday Group. However, their standard deviation is also much higher than that of the Tuesday Group, which suggests that the coalition is more ideologically diverse than the Tuesday Group. Where the coalition is really a significant outlier is in their party unity scores. The mean coalition score is only 52.37 in 1995 and 55.00 in 1996, considerably less than the Tuesday Group at 84.55 and 78.36 and than non-Blue Dog Democrats at 83.34 and 82.79. Clearly, Blue Dogs are more likely to vote against their party to illustrate their dissatisfaction than the Tuesday Group is to vote against theirs.

Predicting Caucus Membership

These ideological measures beg the question of why liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats choose to form groups for the purpose of opposing the mainstream of their party. Clearly, regional and ideological factors contribute to this choice. Also, close observers of Congress suggest that other hard-to-measure factors such as a willingness to get things done (pragmatic versus ideological orientation), a suspicion of the power of an opposing factional group within the party, and a fear that one's district could prove electorally inhospitable to the general trend of the party overall can push members to seek political relief in a centrist group. The last of these factors may be measurable. Two questions arise: are the members in these groups electorally marginal, and is the normal vote in their district potentially marginal? Table 16.3 looks at these factors in a number of ways. First, what is the average Democratic congressional vote for each of these members in 1994? It does seem that members of these factional groups are more threatened by the strength of the other party than their copartisans. However, ANOVA analysis performed for both parties only shows that these differences were significant for the Blue Dogs, but not for the Tuesday Group.

The second measure, support for Perot in the 1992 presidential race, yields similar results. Although both Blue Dogs and Tuesday Group members represent districts giving more support for Perot than the rest of their partisan colleagues, only the Blue Dogs have significant results. Lastly, district marginality was assessed by adding the vote for Clinton to the vote for Perot in 1992 to see whether this "opposition to Republican" score had any differential effect on these groups. This measure was indeed significant in

| Table 16.3 Means and Standard Deviations of Vote Measures by Group Membership |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Congressional district vote | Democratic vote 1994       |
| Democratic vote 1994       | 16.49 (6.61)                | 16.21 (6.55)                |
| Congressional district vote | 16.49 (6.61)                | 16.21 (6.55)                |
| Clinton vote 1992          | 68.52 (8.88)                | 69.91 (8.27)                |
| Perot vote 1992            | 68.52 (8.88)                | 69.91 (8.27)                |
| Non-Blue Dog Democrats     | 64.43 (12.20)               | 65.08 (12.68)               |
| All Democrats              | 64.43 (12.20)               | 65.08 (12.68)               |
| Non-Tuesday Group Republicans | 29.94 (15.32)            | 31.06 (13.69)               |
| Tuesday Group Republicans  | 20.42 (4.15)                | 20.34 (5.00)                |
| All Republicans            | 20.34 (5.00)                | 20.34 (5.00)                |
both parties. For non–Blue Dog Democrats, this combined measure had a mean of 69.91 percent, but coalition members had a mean of only 58.08 percent. These data put the average Blue Dog in the marginal category and show more vulnerability than the congressional district vote measure for 1994 shows. For the Republicans, non–Tuesday Group members had a 56.65 percent Republican opposition vote in their districts in 1992, while Tuesday Group members had a 59.76 percent opposition vote. Thus, although the average Tuesday Group experienced 10 percent less opposition in their congressional district vote in 1994, they still appear to come from more marginal electoral districts than the rest of their party.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has described the origins and motivations of two moderate party caucuses representing factions of the contemporary congressional parties: the liberal/moderate Republican Tuesday Group and the conservative/moderate Blue Dog Coalition. Both groups are on the center fringe of the party system’s cleavage, but rather than leave their parties they choose to organize in an effort to demonstrate the limits of the ability of their party’s leadership to represent them, while providing them with an outlet for dissent acceptable to their constituencies. Interestingly, both groups’ proposals more closely resemble passable products than the positions championed by the majorities in their parties. That is, as one Tuesday Group staffer put it, conservative Republicans were upset with the Tuesday Group’s success (a surprise to the Tuesday Group whose initiatives usually lose in the House) because the Tuesday Group’s position was always close to the position that came out of the Senate and was acceptable to the White House. Congressman Gunderson’s pronouncements in this regard rang true: the Tuesday Group position often was the governing position. Likewise, the Blue Dog Coalition has shown remarkable compromise abilities in this regard, especially on the welfare bill and a number of budget issues. This fact may be why region and ideology do not neatly explain membership in these moderate organizations. The real variable of import may be the willingness to work toward a tenable solution that does not dramatically disrupt current political arrangements and solves the public policy issues on the immediate agenda.

If current political trends continue, we must pronounce both these species headed for extinction. Northeastern support for Republicans seems to be waning, and southern support for Democrats is also shifting. This shift prompted a number of southern Democrats to change their party allegiance to Republican, many while holding office as elected Democrats (the RNC claims almost three hundred party switchers at all levels of government from 1993 to the present). The reverse trend, of Republicans becoming Demo-

Notes

1. This information was obtained from a background interview with a Blue Dog Coalition member staffer.
2. Similar representation is given to the Tuesday Group’s effective counterpart CATs (Conservative Action Team).
3. Though the Tuesday Group had fifty-five at the end of the 104th Congress, Tom Campbell (California-15) was sworn in on December 15, 1995, and thus did not vote on most issues in 1995, the year under examination. Therefore, he is excluded from this part of the analysis.
4. The $F$-statistic was 4.377, significance was .038.
5. The $F$-statistic was 2.749, significance was .099.