New Majority
or
Old Minority?

The Impact of Republicans on Congress

Edited by

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Lanham • Boulder • New York • Oxford
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CHAPTER EIGHT

Moderate Success:
Majority Status and the
Changing Nature of Factionalism
in the House Republican Party

ROBIN KOLODNY

INTRODUCTION

Recently, William F. Connelly, Jr., and John J. Pitney, Jr., commented on the House GOP's Civil War (Connelly and Pitney 1997). They explain that the first one hundred days of the 104th Congress was a unique time in the history of House Republicans (or really, of any congressional party) because of the remarkable unity and cohesion demonstrated by the House Republican Conference. However, Connelly and Pitney are quick to point out that the heady time of the Contract with America, based as it was on clear consensus issues, could not hide the fractious nature of the House Republicans for long. Their recent observations echo their earlier characterization of the Republican Party in Congress (Connelly and Pitney 1994). Along with works by Rae (1989) and Koopman (1996), Connelly and Pitney have illustrated the complexity of the Republican Party. Political scientists no longer make blanket statements about the Republican Party being homogeneous, and have come to appreciate how majority status exacerbates existing cleavages in the party.

In this research, I focus on the role of the moderate faction of the Republican Party in the 104th Congress. Moderate Republicans have always played an important role in their party's success, but the more decidedly conservative bent of the recent Republican majority initially made observers dismiss their influence. The slight majorities in the 104th and 105th Congress make the moderates' policy input more significant than their conservative counterparts, because as Connelly and Pitney say, “if Democrats are united, any Republican faction with more than ten members can deprive the party of a victory on a floor vote"
(Connelly and Pitney 1997, 701). Because moderate Republicans are more likely to ally with Democrats than conservative Republicans, the moderates' ability to prevail on ultimate policy outcomes is enhanced.

This research focuses on the work of the Tuesday Group (formerly known as the Tuesday Lunch Bunch) in both sessions of the 104th Congress. This group of relatively senior moderate to liberal Republicans exercised considerable negative influence on the congressional agenda championed by the majority of the Republican Conference. That is, they removed or blocked controversial proposals (normally regarding social issues) from final consideration by the House of Representatives, or voted against the party's position when such divisive issues did come up for a vote. As illustrated during the Contract period, this meant that many potentially divisive proposals were never publicly voted on, leaving mostly consensual measures among Republicans (usually economic in nature) on the public agenda. Such tabling of issues created artificially high records of party-line voting during the first session of the 104th Congress, giving the impression that Republicans were more highly unified than was in fact the case. Indeed, earlier in this volume Peters makes reference to the considerable ideological divide in the Conference. That controversial social issues could be displaced from the agenda demonstrates that Republicans are in fact quite divided on several significant aspects of the public-policy agenda.

**CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS**

This research builds on a growing body of literature about the Republican party in the United States, especially the Republican Party in Congress. Much of this literature emphasizes the factional nature of the Republican Party. Nicol Rae (1989) argues that the previously dominant liberal wing of the Republican Party has given way to far more conservative factions at the national level. Rae demonstrates that factions in the Republican Party have formed in three divisions: sectional, ideological, and purists versus professionals. This latter division was also recognized by Charles O. Jones (1970) when he demonstrated that a minority party in Congress can either try to achieve majority status or to participate in the policy-making process in a constructive manner. It cannot do both credibly. But this does not mean that all members of that party agree on which strategy to pursue. This problem has been well documented by Connelly and Pitney (1994) and Koopman (1996). Indeed, Connelly and Pitney spend a considerable amount of time documenting the many cleavages of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives. Despite the number of cleavages they identify, the matter of style, of "grandstanding" versus "governing," remains the fundamental distinction (see Connelly and Pitney 1994, 19-40). In the years between the Jones and Connelly/Pitney studies, few political scientists tried to capture the internal dynamics of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives. This omission is understandable because of the belief for most of the past forty years that the Republicans would not be able to attain majority status.

In 1996, Douglas Koopman documented the House Republicans' move from "a passive opposition accepting permanent minority status to an activist opposition, and ultimately to a majority" (p. 6). Koopman's focus is on seven factions he identifies in the House Republican Party: moralists, enterprisers, patricians, moderates, stalwarts, provincials, and placeholders. These factions are not based on a straightforward ideological scale, but rather a more complex combination of ideologies, views of the institution of Congress, and interpretations of the proper role of lawmakers (p. 84). Koopman's rich interpretation of the internal tensions of the House Republican Party illuminates the long-standing problems that the party had in the minority, and speculates that such tensions will not be ameliorated by majority status. In short, the party has made a turn away from moderation that may spell trouble for its future.

The sense that congressional Republicans are homogeneous and highly disciplined comes from studies of roll-call votes. But analyses based on votes cast on final passage of legislation really only tell part of the story (Koopman 1996, 17-21; see also Peters, this volume, chapter 3). The power of moderate Republicans to limit the consideration of controversial items has great significance in both understanding the heterogeneity of the Republican Party and in appreciating a powerful tool used to control public policy. Every congressional majority has factional problems, but what is noteworthy about the moderate wing of the contemporary House Republican Party is that they are committed to the ideal of party in a way that regionally factionalized Democrats were not. Peters explains this as a party culture difference. Republicans seem more intractable over ideological divisions than their Democratic predecessors, but the Democratic cleavages are more discernable (Peters, this volume, chapter 3). So, moderate Republicans tried to table action on issues where they reckoned that the divisions among the House Republicans were probably insurmountable, rather than subject the party to public division. They opposed initiatives on social policies that the conservative majority preferred (such as limits on abortion and environmental protections), but worked constructively with conservatives to promote change on policies at the core of the party, specifically issues of fiscal conservatism. Their approach was different from their moderate Democrat counterparts, the Blue Dog Coalition, which expressed its differences with the majority of their party primarily by introducing alternative legislation without regard to the long-term divisions it might cause (Kolodny 1997).

The Tuesday Group is not the first significant congressional organization of moderate Republicans. Many of its members also belong to the House Wednesday Group (which dates to the 1950s) as well as to the 92 Group, the Tuesday...
Group's predecessor (see Peabody 1976; Rae 1989; Conelly and Pitney 1994; Koopman 1996). What distinguishes the Tuesday Group is its establishment under conditions of Republican-majority control and the thrust of its legislative agenda. Both the Wednesday Group and the 92 Group worked on alternative issue proposals relating to public policy, part of the strategy they pursued to be considered as junior partners in the policy process. However, in a majority environment, members of the Tuesday Group, who tend also to be relatively senior members holding positions of responsibility in committees or subcommittees, must now respond to initiatives from various factions of their own party, and are less concerned with initiatives from the opposing party (unless, of course, such proposals serve the Tuesday Group's needs).

This group, originally named for its meeting day, hour (noon), and subsidiary purpose (pizza), is unique because its minority veto power is not easily measured. They can block objectionable items from the common party agenda by pressuring the leadership (by threatening to oppose procedural motions or making speeches on the floor against the party's position), offering motions or amendments on the floor to counter objectionable measures, and voting against the party if all else fails. The consequence of this united action by a group of senior, policy-oriented members is that they exercise internal influence on both the congressional agenda and the substance of specific proposals far beyond what their numbers warrant. Indeed, many observers of the Tuesday Group credit their success for the founding of the Conservative Action Team (CATs), a group of conservative Republicans that operates much as the Tuesday Group has. If the conservatives' position was secure, they would not feel compelled to form their own party caucus.

This research is based on the author's observations as a 1995 APSA congressional fellow in the office of one of the House's key moderate Republicans. Six elite interviews were conducted with former members and high-level staff involved with the Tuesday Group to ascertain information about the group's members, strategies, and concerns. The Tuesday Group has always been very protective of the full extent of its membership list and out of respect for their wishes, I do not reveal the full slate of names of Tuesday Group members. Their identities are not nearly as important as the role they play in the success of the House Republican leadership, especially in producing consensus victories that result in enacted laws.

**What is the Tuesday Group/Tuesday Lunch Bunch?**

The Tuesday Group is an informal caucus of moderate-to-liberal Republican members of the House of Representatives who generally represent constituencies in regions traditionally associated with moderate Republicanism such as the Northeast and the Midwest. When asked to characterize the Tuesday Group, elite respondents chose words such as "caucus," "faction," and "coalition." Though the term "caucus" might not satisfy all those involved, I will use it to describe the Tuesday Group because it meets all the criteria specified by Susan Webb Hammond (1997). That is, the Tuesday Group operates outside the formal structures of Congress, it is voluntary, it has an organizational structure that includes three co-chairs, and it has continued from one Congress (the 104th) to the present one. Hammond lists the Tuesday Group as an intraparty (or just party) caucus. Intraparty caucuses are normally based on an ideology, which is true generally for the Tuesday Group (although some participants eschew ideological labels and call themselves "governing Republicans" to emphasize that Tuesday Group members' common link is creating workable solutions to public-policy problems even if that means compromise with other factions or parties). Finally, Hammond lists these general activities of caucuses: information gathering and exchange; influencing agendas; and other floor-oriented activities (1997, 281–82). Each of these functions will be dealt with in turn.

**Information Gathering and Exchange**

The initial reason for the creation of the Tuesday Group was for the sharing of information. Representative Steve Gunderson (R-Wis.), one of the co-founders of the group, described it this way:

> Our Tuesday lunches are very casual, but the attendance is strictly limited. Only members of the lunch bunch are invited, and any given member's staff people are welcome only if that member is present. Lobbyists, guests, and reporters are not allowed. We do ask various people to come in and speak to us... But mainly we talk policy, hashing out our agenda for the week. (Gunderson and Morris 1996, 189)

Throughout the first session of the 104th Congress, the group met on average every week, although many additional meetings were scheduled at times when matters of particular concern to group members were imminent. As the legislative session stretched into the fall, group meetings took place less regularly, and very often on Wednesdays. The Tuesday Group's meetings were not as frequent in the second session, reflecting the less frenetic pace of legislative activity.

Each Monday, key staff members of Tuesday group co-chairs met to suggest agenda items for the upcoming meeting. Normally, topics for discussion concerned impending floor business. More frequent meetings coincided with floor consideration of issues most important to the group such as welfare reform, social spending priorities, and reconciliation. Occasionally, individuals would be invited to address the group. The most frequent guest was Speaker Newt Gingrich. Other guests included Majority Leader Richard Armey, members of
the Democratic Blue Dog Coalition, and representatives of various conservative Republican groups.

**Influencing Agendas**

Hammond (1997, 281) states that most caucuses influence agendas by either setting agendas or maintaining agendas. The Tuesday Group, however, because of its size, its situation of being in a new majority, and the zealotry of the majority of the House Republican Party is most effective at limiting objectionable items. In one sense, the Tuesday Group is maintaining their agenda by asserting that the status quo is preferable to any change in an undesirable direction. But as many interview respondents indicated, the Tuesday Group’s mission was not so much to hurt the majority party’s agenda or position but to protect their party from being embroiled in controversial issues that would obscure the core set of issues that united them all. Of course, concerns about how their party’s activities would play out in the electoral arena motivated Tuesday Group members to advocate workable policy positions over vague (and potentially unpopular) political principles. Representative Gunderson’s insights are again telling:

> I insist on calling us “governing Republicans.” It’s the term I like to use rather than “moderate Republicans,” because I think ideological labels are increasingly difficult to define and, I think, increasingly irrelevant . . . we want to work through government to get something accomplished. We’re not driven by some narrow ideology; we’re not willing, as some are, to throw political hand grenades in order to make an ideological point. . . . We . . . believe in the institution of Congress and believe in two parties working together to fulfill the obligations of a governing Congress. . . . (Gunderson and Morris 1996, 188–89)

Thus group members pursued activities in reaction to controversial proposals from the majority of the Republican Party (especially in the first session), rather than generating new proposals themselves. This is consistent with their general belief that they must be supportive of the party leadership as much as possible to preserve their majority position. The Tuesday Group would prefer to have family feuds be private rather than public matters.

**Activities**

As with any other caucus, the Tuesday Group developed legislation, offered amendments, and mobilized colleagues to achieve their ends. The group often used blocking tactics to prevent further consideration on controversial issues. If the group cannot convince the leadership to table discussion of a controversial issue, they then try several strategies such as lobbying the Rules Committee for a rule to allow them to present alternative amendments, opposing the rule if no concessions are made, supporting the Democrats’ motion to recommit, or opposing final passage of a bill. The Tuesday Group lobbied, and received, a seat at leadership meetings, though the leadership stipulated that the position must rotate among various Tuesday Group members. In 1996, the Tuesday Group was asked to send representatives to “Unity Dinners” held by Majority Leader Armey, in an effort to smooth tensions between the Tuesday Group and CATS (Elperin 1997).

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**NO ORDINARY CAUCUS?**

How is a party caucus different from a party faction? What difference does it make that the Tuesday Group operates as a party within a party? What binds Tuesday Group members and how is this cohesion manifested?

**Who Is in the Group?**

Group members in the 104th Congress were identified from a fax list used to appraise members of upcoming group meetings and agendas. Fifty-four members asked to be appraised of Tuesday Group meeting times and information, though fewer members were regular participants. This fax list provided relatively little information about the core membership of the group (many press accounts cite Tuesday Group co-chairs as stating the real membership number as closer to forty). To ascertain the activity levels of group members, I asked six individuals with firsthand knowledge of the Tuesday Group in the 104th Congress to rank members by their level of activity. An averaging of the judges’ evaluations was used to help identify key members of the Tuesday Group.

Table 8.1 shows the distribution of members of the 104th Congress by region, party, and Tuesday Group membership. Virtually all of the New England Republicans (87.5 percent) are members of the Tuesday Group. Nearly half of the Mid-Atlantic Republicans and 40 percent of the Midwestern Republicans are in the group. Although one-fifth of the Tuesday Group’s membership comes from the Great Lakes region, only 26.2 percent of all Great Lakes Republicans are Tuesday Group members. The southern and western regions account for only a very small part of the Tuesday Group and a very small proportion of the Republican Party’s delegation from these areas.

Though region does a good job of characterizing the overall contours of group membership, it is less successful at explaining group activism. Table 8.2 categorizes Tuesday Group members by region and activism in the group as assessed by the six judges. Here we see that the Mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes regions are slightly overrepresented in the “core” and “supporting” categories, but this is probably due to their absolute numbers in the group. It appears that region is limited in explaining the activity levels of Tuesday Group members.
TABLE 8.1
MEMBERS BY PARTY (AND TUESDAY GROUP) AND REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregions</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>(Tuesday Group)</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border States</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific States</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fox list given to author.
*Due to a special election, there were five Pacific-state members in 1996, bringing the group’s total to 55.

Great Lakes: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
Midwest: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota.
South: Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.
Border States: Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.
Regional labels are mine; coding follows that of Foole and Rosenthal.

MEASURES OF PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

The ideological composition of congressional parties has long been a subject of discussion. Although recent scholars of House Republicans have emphasized the multidimensionality of Republican factionalism (as cited above), other analysis has confirmed the regional division of Republican ideology. David Rohde (1991, 120–27) has commented on the liberalism of Northeastern Republicans compared to the rest of the Republican Party, demonstrated by lower party-unity scores for Northeastern Republicans. Recently, Cover, Pinney, and Serra (1997, 228–34) have found great distinction between Eastern Republicans and the remainder of the Republican Party based on their ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores measuring liberalism. Here, I look at both these measures of ideological dispersion in the 104th Congress.

TABLE 8.2
TUESDAY GROUP MEMBERS BY ACTIVITY LEVEL AND REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregions</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Atlantic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border States</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29 (30)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54 (55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from interviews by author.
The coding of activity levels was explained to the judges as follows:
(1) Core Member: this is an individual who was critical to the decision of the group, who was active in generating ideas and carrying forth the work of the group;
(2) Supporting Member: this is an individual who regularly attended group meetings, who voted with the group when asked or spoke up for the group, but who did not warrant the status of Core Member; and
(3) Peripheral Member: this is an individual who received information on group activities and occasionally attended group meetings, but whose support was not consistently expected.

At first glance, it would seem that any Republican divisions evaporated in 1995. Party-unity scores for Republicans are very tightly clustered together while Democrats are widely dispersed. Table 8.3 presents these party-unity scores. As expected, Southern Democrats and Northeastern Republicans deviate the most from the rest of their party, but the high means and low standard deviations of all Republicans’ party-unity scores are truly remarkable. The same goes for ADA scores. Table 8.4 presents these scores for both parties. Again, the level of Republican conservatism is notable. The mean ADA scores are exceptionally low for all Republicans (indeed, the party’s high scorer in 1995 was Connie Morella of Maryland with only a 45). Still, the Eastern Republicans are significantly more liberal than the remainder of their party, confirming Cover, Pinney, and Serra’s earlier findings. But the degree of this liberalism fell dramatically in the first session of the 104th Congress. Included in the ADA’s 1995 ratings is a special notice that liberal Republicans are now an “endangered species.” The ADA explains that they normally consider members with a score in the 40- to 60-percent range to be a “moderate” of either party, and that Republicans who once had this distinction have since lost it (ADA 1996). The ADA commentary does not take into account the influence of the party structure on roll-call votes,
### TABLE 8.3
**Party Unity by Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Democratic Party Unity by Region</th>
<th>St. Dev. of Party Unity Score</th>
<th>Minimum Party Unity Score</th>
<th>Maximum Party Unity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Republican Party Unity by Region</th>
<th>St. Dev. of Party Unity Score</th>
<th>Minimum Party Unity Score</th>
<th>Maximum Party Unity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 8.4
**Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Scores by Party and Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Democratic ADA Score Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev. of Democratic ADA Score</th>
<th>Republican ADA Score Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev. of Republican ADA Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
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</table>


An observation made by Koopman. With the Republicans now in the majority, the range of options for the most marginal party members are necessarily proscribed. In other words, we should expect that Republican control of Congress, at least in year one, would polarize voting patterns of both parties. For 1996, Table 8.3 shows that the party unity scores for Democrats remained relatively stable, but Republicans lost much of the cohesion they demonstrated the previous year. The overall Republican unity mean for 1995 was 91.19, but only 86.62 for 1996. Though the decline in party unity was found throughout the party’s regions, clearly the Eastern Republicans’ decline in party unity was the most significant. When considering the 1996 ADA scores, both parties seem less polarized. The Democratic ADA scores fell, while Republican ADA scores rose, especially for Eastern and Midwestern Republicans, though the magnitude of the difference is not great. This should reinforce the idea that the rarified environment in 1995 significantly skewed normal voting behavior in both parties.

We know that region does not perfectly correspond with membership in the Tuesday Group. Table 8.5 shows that the mean party-unity and ADA scores are substantially different for Tuesday Group members and the remainder of the Republican conference in both sessions of the 104th Congress. Tuesday Group members are less likely to vote with their party almost 10 percent of the time and had six times the ADA score of their nongroup colleagues in 1995 (about three times as high in 1996), although the standard deviations of both these measures show how much more varied Tuesday Group members are than their nongroup colleagues. Even more interesting is the data for Tuesday Group members when divided by activity level. On both measures, core members of the Tuesday Group were much less likely to vote with their party and far more likely to have a higher ADA score. Analysis of variance tests for both sets of group comparisons (between Tuesday Group and nongroup Republicans and within categories of the Tuesday Group) were found to be statistically significant. This demonstrates that the Tuesday Group does indeed consist of ideological outlifiers. The propensity of the Tuesday Group to defect from their party increased in 1996. Both the means and standard deviations of party-unity scores of Tuesday Group members reflect significantly increased defections from the previous year. The ADA scores for 1996 are even more revealing. The means and standard deviations for Tuesday-Group ADA scores are higher for core and supporting members, and the maximum score for a Tuesday Group member rose from 45 in 1995 to 55 in 1996.
### Table 8.5
**Party-Unity and ADA Scores for the Tuesday Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tuesday Group Members and Nongroup Republicans Compared</th>
<th></th>
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<td>Mean Party-Unity Score</td>
<td>St. Dev. of Party-Unity Score</td>
<td>Mean ADA Score</td>
<td>St. Dev. of ADA Score</td>
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<td>Tuesday Group Members (N=54)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>84.37</td>
<td>78.36</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>19.11</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>11.28</td>
<td>15.35</td>
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<td>Nongroup Republicans (N=181)</td>
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<td>92.22</td>
<td>89.14</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.43</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Activity Level</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Party-Unity Score</th>
<th>St. Dev. of Party-Unity Score</th>
<th>Mean ADA Score</th>
<th>St. Dev. of ADA Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Core Member</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>81.00</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>14.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting Member</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>84.90</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>18.29</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>16.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peripheral Member</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89.63</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>8.63</td>
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The coding of activity levels was explained to the judges as follows: (1) Core Member: this is an individual who was critical to the mission of the group, who was active in generating ideas and carrying forth the work of the group; (2) Supporting Member: this is an individual who regularly attended group meetings, who voted with the group when asked or spoke up for the group, but who did not warrant the status of Core Member; and (3) Peripheral Member: this is an individual who received information on group activities and occasionally attended group meetings, but whose support was not consistently expected.

While only four Republicans scored in the 40-60 ADA "moderate" range, ten did so in 1996. Not surprising, all Republicans scoring in the moderate range in 1995 and nine of the ten in 1996 are Tuesday Group members.

### Measuring Tuesday-Group Influence

Although one of my purposes is to critique the over-reliance of political scientists on roll-call voting data, I analyze Tuesday-Group roll-call votes in the 104th Congress by looking at the unity within the group and between this subgroup and the larger majority party. One approach I have taken is to consider the way the Tuesday Group votes when the Republican Party experiences defections of ten or more. Part of the reason that moderates have any say at all is that the size of the Republican majority is so thin that virtually any defection by party members is potentially quite harmful. In the 104th Congress, the majority had a 12- to 18-vote margin (taking into account the gradual change of several southerners from Democrats to Republicans). Therefore, half of the 18-vote margin plus one would theoretically be enough to defeat any Republican proposal (conservative Democrats often compensated for Republican defections, though they did not go to the trouble of switching parties themselves—see Cooper and Young [1997] for discussions of this cross-partisanship). In short, I am investigating when the Tuesday Group accounted for significant proportions of the Republicans' defections and what effect this might have had on the conduct of majority business in the House.

Votes were analyzed for both sessions. In the first session, there were 136 votes where roughly half of all Republican dissenters (that is Republican members who voted against the majority of their party) were Tuesday Group members. There were 71 such votes for the second session. I selected votes with at least ten defectors, and then looked at each vote to determine if Tuesday Group members were about half that number. The reason for examining these votes is to find out on what issues the leadership experienced Tuesday Group defections. This will help us understand which issues define the division between the Tuesday Group and the majority of the Republican Conference.

First, there is the type of vote. The overwhelming number of Tuesday Group defections were on amendment votes. In the first session, amendments constitute 101 of the 136 votes (74 percent) analyzed; there were 46 amendments among the 71 second-session votes (65 percent). The next highest category was votes on final passage of legislation, but there were only twelve of these in 1995 and six in 1996. There were six defecting votes on passage of the rule in 1995, but only three in 1996. Motions to recommit legislation comprised six defecting votes in 1995 and five in 1995. The remaining defections are reported in Table 8.6. The small number of defection votes that had extremely serious consequences for the party leadership (final passage, adoption of rule, motion to recommit) is truly noteworthy. This confirms the assertion of Tuesday Group insiders that such actions will only be used as a last resort. Additionally, relatively few Tuesday Group members engaged in those defections. The largest number of Tuesday Group defectors on a rule in 1995 was 34 (HR 1833: Partial Birth Abortions) and 1996 was 28 (HR 125: Assault Weapons Ban Repeal). The largest number of defections on final passage in 1995 was 22 (HR 961: Clean Water Act Revisions) and was 42 in 1996 (HR 1227: Employee Commuting Act/Minimum Wage).
**TABLE 8.6**

**VOTE DEFECTIONS BY TYPE AND SUCCESSES OF SUCH DEFECTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Vote</th>
<th>Number in 1995</th>
<th>Number of Successes</th>
<th>Number in 1996</th>
<th>Number of Successes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Passage</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motion to Recommit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motion to Instruct Conference</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of Conference Report</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motion to Order Previous Question</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Amendment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Override</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, there is the success of these defections. That is, how often were Tuesday Group defectors on the winning side (defeating their party's majority)? On 30 of the 136 votes in the first session, Tuesday Group defectors joined with Democrats and other Republican defectors to defeat the majority of the Republican Party's position. Twenty-five of these defeats were on amendments, two on motions to recommit, and one each on a motion to instruct, motion to move the previous question, and final passage. In 1996, 15 of the 71 votes found Democrat–moderate–Republican victories. Eleven of these were on amendments, one on final passage, one on a constitutional amendment (Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment) and two miscellaneous matters (suspension of the rules and question of consideration). Clearly, the Tuesday Group's greatest effectiveness on the floor is in the support or defeat of amendments to legislation. Amendments provide Tuesday Group members with opportunities to tone down the legislation's most controversial aspects and allow them to signal to their supporters that they can exercise some independence from the party. However, once they have tinkered with a bill's points, they find it harder to vote against final passage, for fear their leadership will not give them much consideration in the future.

Next we turn to the specific issues championed by the Tuesday Group as expressed through these vote defections. The votes were about evenly split between authorization and appropriation measures in both sessions. However, the group's successes (where their defections resulted in a defeat for the majority)

Republican position) were twice as likely to occur on appropriations bills (20) than on authorization bills (10) in 1995, but just slightly more likely in 1996 with nine appropriations victories and six authorization victories. This confirms the sentiments of several of the interviewees that the Tuesday Group's efforts were particularly effective during the appropriations' process. One reason for this is that some conservative initiatives were formulated to end "status quo" programs by proposing significant cuts to their funding. This led to vocal defenses by Tuesday Group members of programs important to them (such as environmental programs and family-planning initiatives). Lastly, I examined each of the votes to determine the issue categories where Tuesday Group members defected from their party. In 1995, 32 of the 136 votes (roughly 24 percent of the total) were related to the environment; in 1996, 13 of 71 votes were (roughly 18 percent). This is where the group had the largest proportion of its successes (eight out of thirty) in 1995. Environmental issues accounted for only two of the fifteen successes in 1996. Abortion and family-planning matters comprised about 24 votes (18 percent) in 1995, but resulted in only two victories; in 1996, it accounted for 9 votes (13 percent) but only one victory. Civil-liberties/individual-freedom issues received about 18 percent of the votes in 1995, with six of the group's victories; only 7 percent came from this category in 1996, accounting for no victories. Defense and foreign-policy-related issues were about 12 percent of the total, and resulted in four victories in 1995, mostly concerning support of the president's positions (in 1996, they comprised only 7 percent of defeating votes and two victories). Perhaps the most effective issue area for the group in 1995 was the arts. Although only 5 percent of these votes were on arts policy, the group's position prevailed 71 percent of the time, accounting for five of their thirty victories (by contrast, only two arts defeating votes and one arts victory occurred in 1996). The remaining 19 percent of votes included housing, homeless, infrastructure, science, fiscal, agricultural, welfare, and labor policy. This miscellaneous group accounted for five of the thirty victories combined in 1995. The biggest difference in vote type between the two years was the increase in labor-policy votes in 1996. Labor policy, mostly votes concerning the Tuesday Group's greatest victory—the minimum wage—comprised 10 percent of all defeating votes, all resulting in Tuesday Group victories.

Another interesting point is the relative distribution of these votes. In 1995, 91 of the 136 votes were part of a series of clustered initiatives on only thirteen bills. In 1996, 36 of the 71 votes were on only eight bills. Figure 8.1 lists these bills (each with at least 3 group votes) and the number of Tuesday Group votes associated with each. This gives some sense of where the group finds action prudent (though several bills cited cover a wide range of issues such as the Interior Appropriations bill). It also gives us a sense of what issue dimensions (social in particular) their blocking tactics are most often targeted towards.
FIGURE 8.1 Legislation of great interest to the Tuesday Group (and number of votes where they contested the majority Republican position).

OMISSIONS FROM ROLL-CALL VOTES

There are at least two cases where Tuesday Group members actively lobbied on issues that did not surface in roll-call votes. One is on welfare-reform legislation (HR 4) and the other is affirmative-action legislation. There were virtually no roll-call votes on welfare-reform legislation where Tuesday Group members defected from the majority of their party. However, the Tuesday Group met frequently in the first week of March, when it was anticipated that welfare legislation would soon make it to the floor. The Tuesday Group worked behind the scenes to make changes to the bill prior to floor consideration. This included changes inserted into the chairman's en bloc amendment and several other amendments approved by voice vote. Before that point, several Tuesday Group members were on the Speaker's task force on welfare reform and the limits of Tuesday Group support were clearly spelled out to the leadership. None of this can be captured by roll-call analysis.

The group also met regularly in the summer of 1995. These meetings included much discussion of the impending appropriations bills, but also included discussion of a potential rider to the Defense Appropriations Bill (to be offered by Representative Gary Franks of Connecticut) to put an immediate end to affirmative action. Though the leadership had promised Franks a vote, the Tuesday group lobbied the leadership to delay such a tactic for the division it would cause in the party and the potential public-relations nightmare it would cause (ending affirmative action without any committee consideration or public hearings was considered unwise by many Tuesday Group members). When the leadership saw the level of potential party defection on this issue, they pulled the amendment and no vote was held.

In 1996, many Tuesday Group members joined forces with Democrats to enact an increase in the minimum wage from $4.25 an hour to $5.15 an hour over the wishes of their party's leadership. Press accounts at the time cite the efforts of Tuesday Group member Jack Quinn (along with many other Republican moderates) breaking ranks with the leadership over the consideration of the rule on the bill, and ultimately final passage, as being critical to the measure's success in the House (Clymer 1996; Stoddard 1996). The success of this rebellion prompted some conservatives to complain that moderates' rebellions did not result in any sanctions from party leaders, while conservative defections often exacted swift and clear rebuffs (Stoddard 1996).

The critical position of moderates in the Republican Party was confirmed in the summer of 1997 when a prominent Tuesday Group member, Representative Jim Greenwood (R-Pa.) was named chair of the Leadership Action Team, a position vacated by Representative Bill Paxon (R-N.Y.). This was a permanent appointment for Greenwood in one of the leadership's elite groups and is quite different from the revolving seat at leadership meetings that the Tuesday Group currently enjoys. Though Greenwood denies his moderate position was the reason for his selection, his discussion of his new role on CNN echoes many of the Tuesday Group goals described here:

[ Bernard Shaw asks if the party will run from the abortion issue. ]

Greenwood: No, no. Abortion will be with us for the foreseeable future. I don't see a party planning its agenda around an issue that's a fault line for the party. We know that as long as any issue that can possibly have an abortion element attached
to it, it will be. We'll debate that. That's secondary to the major issues, like tax reform, like looking at the cultural decline in our country, like planning for the retirement of the baby-boom generation. There are big mega-issues that we have to address in the next four years.

Shaw: Are you afraid Republicans could lose control of the House?

Greenwood: Oh, I think we should be afraid of that everyday. If we don't make sure that we're in touch with the agenda that the American people are looking for, with the values that the American people are looking for, we could go into the minority. But I think planning, making sure that as we tee-up major issues before the Congress and we communicate with the American voters, so they know what we're doing and why and that we want to go where they want to go, I think we'll stay in the majority. (CNN 1997)

Greenwood articulates the Tuesday Group's central goal: to keep the agenda focused on consensual issues that will stabilize the Republican Party's majority status. Though the moderates may owe their majority positions to conservatives, the shift in the agenda and public opinion from 1995 to 1996 (and beyond the 1996 elections) shows that Republicans need the policy stewardship of the moderates to produce tangible successes that allow them to claim legitimacy as a governing party. The issues the Tuesday Group focuses on are also the only way of saving the party from a number of political problems that might stem from taking strident positions on no-win issues (such as abortion).

Conclusions

The Republican Party in the House of Representatives is indeed heterogeneous and the moderate Northeastern and Midwestern wing of the party is often in disagreement with the majority of House Republicans. These members formed the Tuesday Group, a party caucus formed to prevent action on issues of high volatility within the Republican Party. As the preceding evidence shows, the Tuesday Group's purpose was to promote high party unity by removing items from consideration, while still acting to preserve the status quo on the issues on which they differed most from the remainder of the caucus. Unlike similar factions on the Democratic side, the Tuesday Group seeks to table dissent by preventing controversial votes rather than invite tensions by introducing their own legislation. While in the minority, Republican moderates were more likely to engage in aggressive moves against their brethren. But the lesson to be taken from the 104th Congress is that moderates did not disappear in the new majority, but found a new role for themselves as brokers of a governing position both within their party and between parties.

Majority Status and the Changing Nature of Factionalism

After the unique atmosphere of 1995 subsided, party leaders realized that they could not succeed as a governing party by championing conservative agenda items. Indeed, one staff aide I interviewed said conservatives complained that the Tuesday Group always got their way. Since moderates normally lose votes on their agenda items in the House, the staffers wondered how conservatives held that view until it was explained to him that they saw moderates getting their way in the end, once the Senate and the president had done their work. A quick look at events in the 105th Congress confirms this.

The Tuesday Group continued to be outspoken on the Fiscal Year 1999 budget plan (including a protest that the House leadership would not allow a vote on the Blue Dog Coalition's alternative budget, see National Journal 1998a), and particularly the Fiscal Year 1999 Labor-HHS Appropriations Bill (especially concerning LIHEAP—a program for heating and energy subsidies for low-income individuals, see National Journal 1998b). Moderate Republicans continued to disagree with the majority of their party over funding for the National Endowment of the Arts, the Legal Services Corporation, educational block grants, various environmental programs, and the proposed elimination of the Departments of Energy and Commerce.

In 1998 Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) led moderate Republicans (with some conservatives) and a majority of Democrats to the successful passage of a comprehensive campaign-finance bill in the House of Representatives. The extent to which moderates can help define a consensus agenda, both within their party and between parties, should be a prime area of future research, given that the Republican majority in the House narrowed after the 1998 elections, and we can expect competitive House elections (resulting in small majorities) for the foreseeable future. Republican moderates have shown that consensus positions can be developed, and that bipartisanship can be humane. Perhaps that will be their lasting legacy to the new Republican congressional majority.

Notes

1. The name Tuesday Group has been adopted in the 105th Congress. Though a name change has been discussed almost constantly, the Tuesday Lunch Bunch was used throughout the 104th Congress.

2. Similar representation is given to the Tuesday Group's effective counterpart CATS (Conservative Action Team).

3. Though the Tuesday Group had 55 members at the end of the 104th Congress, Tom Campbell (Calif.-15) was sworn in on 15 December 1995 and thus did not vote on most issues in 1995, the year under examination. Therefore, he is excluded from this part of the analysis.
The judges, six high-level staffers and former members of Congress, were asked to indicate group members as "Core," "Supportive," or "Peripheral" members.

5. These numbers also indicate a significant difference in the absolute number of roll-call votes held in each session. The first session had a historic 885 recorded roll-call votes compared to 455 in the second session.

CHAPTER NINE

The House Republicans:
Lessons for Political Science

WILLIAM F. CONNELLY, JR., AND
JOHN J. PITNEY, JR.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the key academic works on Congress came out during the unprecedented forty-year Democratic dominion over the House (1955-1995). According to Richard Fenno (1997, 2), political scientists assumed that House politics meant Democratic politics. "We wrote extensively about the House Democrats, and we became the victims of our Democratic diet." Two intellectual problems thus arose. First, the House GOP largely escaped the discipline's attention. Scholars mistakenly saw the House Republicans as a homogeneous lot, enlivened only by some nihilistic troublemakers. Second, political scientists failed to anticipate what would happen to both sides—and to the institution—when the majority and minority swapped roles.

The Republican takeover of the House is thus a gift to political science. It should encourage scholars to look at the House GOP's ideas, interests, individuals, and institutional arrangements. It should also shed new light on theories of congressional behavior. Certain ideas hold up quite well, including some that date from James Madison. Others appear to have been time-bound artifacts of a specific historical period.

Although the perspective of future years will tell us more about the implications of GOP control, it is already possible to draw preliminary lessons for political science.