Any understanding of the relation between rhetoric and poetics will depend on how each category is conceived. The term “rhetoric” can mean “rhetorical discourse”; or the suasive practices observable in any given piece or kind of discourse; or the art or theory of rhetorical performance. Further, “rhetorical discourse” may be defined narrowly or broadly – for example, as any discourse that intends or causes persuasion. “Persuasion” too may be defined narrowly, as the inducement of belief and the promotion of action; or broadly, as the production of any effect in an audience’s psyche (Persuasion; Rhetoric, Argument, and Persuasion). Likewise, “poetics” can mean the art or theory of poetic discourse, while “poetic discourse” may mean anything from poetry to “literature” very generally conceived. Thus, any discussion of rhetoric and poetics is working with labile terms.

A persistent tradition in modern western culture tends to regard rhetorical and poetic discourse as virtual opposites that may, however, exert some influence on each other. This way of thinking played a formative role in the early twentieth-century revival of rhetoric as a modern academic discipline (Communication as a Field and Discipline; Rhetorical Studies). Scholars tended to conceptualize rhetoric as primarily an art of practical public discourse, and to regard the subject matters of rhetorical and literary studies as distinct. In North American universities, for example, rhetoric and literature were the provinces of Speech and English departments, respectively. At the same time, however, historians of rhetoric have become conscious of what Florescu (1971) has called letteraturizzazione –

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the tendency of rhetorical forms to become or interpenetrate with literary forms – so that rhetoric becomes literary, and literature becomes rhetorical.

Another way of viewing the rhetoric–poetic relation is to regard rhetorical and poetic (or “literary”) discourse as intimately related to each other, as sister arts, or even to view one as a subset of the other: poetic discourse as a particular type of rhetoric, or rhetoric as a particular (“applied”) type of poetic discourse. Such views have both ancient and modern warrants. There are, for example, well-known connections between Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, suggesting that he views them as “counterparts,” just as he does rhetoric and dialectic – or, that he views rhetoric, dialectic, and poetics, along with other verbal arts (such as logic), as overlapping genres or sub-components of a more general art of discourse, each resembling (and differing from) the others in certain ways (→ Genre; Rhetoric and Dialectic; Rhetoric, Greek). Notably, Aristotle insists that poetry must represent a “plot” (mythos) that is a probable and logically coherent sequence of events – that is, a persuasive, cause-and-effect portrayal of how things probably would happen in a given set of circumstances – thereby revealing “universal” truths, leading the audience to insight, and provoking emotion (pity and fear, in tragedy). All of this is clearly related to his discussions of argument by example and the arousal of → emotion in the Rhetoric (→ Excitation and Arousal). Aristotle also says that the “speeches” in a drama (or, for that matter, in a novel, film, or short poem) belong to the art of rhetoric (→ Logos and Rhetoric; Pathos and Rhetoric).

There is a persistent tendency in ancient thought to divide the realm of rhetoric into practical and epideictic kinds, and to view poetic discourse as a type of epideictic rhetoric (Walker 2000; → Rhetoric, Epideictic). “Practical” rhetoric is typically represented as discourse of the law court and the forum, where juries or assemblymen vote, while “epideictic” ranges from civic celebration and commemoration to performance for the sake of entertainment, edification, philosophical reflection, praise/blame, and display. As early as the archaic poet Hesiod we find poetic “song” and civic “speech” portrayed as epideictic and practical types of eloquence, both derived from the same source (the Muses) and both exerting the same kind of persuasive, even hypnotic power. Indeed, for Hesiod, the civic orator is practicing an “applied” kind of poetic-epideictic discourse, transposed from verse to prose and serving the pragmatic purposes of everyday politics. Many early poets treat poetic discourse as a medium of epideictic persuasion and argumentation, and this idea recurs in the early sophists associated with the “birth” of rhetoric as an art, especially Gorgias and Isocrates (→ Rhetoric, Pre-Socratic). It persists as well into late antiquity: for example, Hermogenes of Tarsus, in his treatise On types of style, classifies poetry, along with history, philosophy, and civic ceremonial speech, as types of epideictic (or “panegyric”) rhetoric.

Modern difficulties in following this ancient line of thought have much to do with a reticence to view poetic discourse as argumentative or persuasory (which is part of the general tendency to view rhetoric and poetics as opposites; → Argumentative Discourse). However, modern expansions of the idea of “rhetoric” have also made the ancient view more intelligible (→ Rhetorics: New Rhetorics). Richards’ (1926, 1936) notion of the radically metaphorical nature of all language goes far toward breaking down that opposition, as does Burke’s (1950) extension of the concept of persuasion to what he calls “identification.” Indeed, with Burke all forms of discourse are rhetorical, from the
classical oration to the inward workings of thought and ideology in individuals and whole societies (a view that puts Burke close to the perspective of the early sophists and Isocrates). If all forms of discourse are rhetorical, so must be poetic discourse too. Notably, Burke associates poetic (or “literary”) discourse with what he calls “pure persuasion” – a kind of epideictic persuasion for persuasion’s sake (and the unsettling of ossified ideologies). Richards’ and Burke’s thought is reflected in the important rhetorical-literary theorizing of Booth (1961), and other more recent scholars (e.g., Fish 1989). Finally, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) have argued that epideictic discourse is not peripheral but central to the realm of rhetoric, insofar as epideictic serves to establish and sustain (or sometimes revise) the communal agreements about general values and beliefs that necessarily underlie judgment, motivation, agreement, and action in practical civic discourse. If that is so, and if poetic discourse is a type of epideictic, then poetic discourse must also be a “central” type of rhetoric.


References and Suggested Readings


Rhetoric and Politics

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The study of rhetoric and politics examines the role of → persuasion in the political process. The study of rhetoric most commonly begins with readings from ancient Greece and Aristotle’s handbook, *On rhetoric*. Classical scholars conceived of rhetoric as a practical art involving the performance of public oratory in the contexts of politics, law, and ceremonial occasions, separated from the philosophy of knowledge. As Isocrates’ words
expressed during the classical period: “Speech is responsible for nearly all of invention. It legislated in matters of justice and injustice, in beauty and baselessness. . . . With speech we fight our contentious matters, and we investigate the unknown” (Antidosis 254–256, in Mirhady 2000; → Rhetoric, Greek; Rhetoric, Roman). While twentieth-century rhetorical scholars continued to address the role of persuasion in the → public sphere, its study has more recently expanded beyond public oratory to include other persuasive texts, including advertisements, autobiographies, → cartoons, films, manifestoes, memorials, photographs, → television and print news, and many other forms of → discourse circulating in public spaces (→ Advertising; Cinema; Newspaper; Photography). Rhetoricians of today also recognize the epistemological contributions of rhetoric, which accentuate its role in creating knowledge and constituting perceptions of political reality (→ Media and Perceptions of Reality; Rhetoric and Epistemology).

Scholarship that intersects rhetoric and politics includes not only the study of electoral politics, but other forms of political persuasion involving institutions (e.g., governments, corporations) and individuals and/or groups working to disrupt such institutional power (e.g., activist leaders and social movements; → Election Campaign Communication; Political Communication; Social Movements and Communication; Rhetoric and Social Protest). Such scholarship often relies on humanistic methodologies yet also utilizes social scientific measurements. The study of rhetoric and politics often centers on three broader areas of examination: the consideration of history in the study of rhetoric and politics, an examination of how political messages make meaning, and an assessment of message impact.

THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL RHETORIC

The study of rhetoric is often attuned to the history of ideas and how public texts contribute to the evolutionary understanding of political and cultural conflicts and norms. A public text, thus, functions as a historical artifact, which reflects the political and cultural ideas of the moment in which it was created. For some, an understanding of the historical and political context represents a necessary component in the comprehension of textual meaning. Of course, even as rhetoricians turn to history to inform rhetorical practice, rhetoricians also are mindful of rhetoric’s role in creating historical narratives, which are likewise dependent on arguments and evidence (→ Argumentative Discourse).

Regardless of its rhetorical dimensions, history serves as a key component in the study of rhetoric and politics. Rhetorical analyses cognizant of history demonstrate how rhetoric helps enact, empower, and constrain human behavior over time, excavating the “rhetorical climate of an age” (Zarefsky 1998, 31; → Rhetoric and History). For some, understanding the relationship among history, rhetoric, and politics necessitates an examination of archival resources that inform the meanings of the public discourse, allowing for a more insightful and informed interrogation of text and context.

An appreciation of the generic features of political discourse represents one scholarly focus of those sensitive to the contributions of history to rhetoric and politics (→ Rhetorical Criticism). Campbell and Jamieson (1990, 8) explain that a generic approach to political discourse “emphasizes continuity within change” and assumes that “symbolic institutional
needs” are integral to understanding “the force of events in shaping the rhetoric of any historical period.”

Historically, the public speakers who attracted the attention of scholars of rhetoric and politics were white men in positions of political leadership. More recently, however, scholars have worked to expand the rhetorical canon by writing more leaders of marginalized groups into history. Zaeske (2003), for example, examines women’s petitions housed in the Library of Congress to exhibit the role of women’s signatures as expressions of their political participation during the US antislavery debates (→ Rhetoric and Gender). Focusing on issues of race and politics during the historical era of Reconstruction, Wilson (2002, xvii) illuminates the “social meanings of race and civil rights as these concepts were negotiated by the period’s national politicians,” revealing the gradual erosion of equality (→ Rhetoric and Race). Such scholarship often requires the use of archival depositories to uncover seldom studied political texts and to gain a greater appreciation of the political context in which the texts were produced.

While political texts often feature an examination of the written or spoken word, an exploration of the visual turn in rhetoric is gaining widespread scholarly attention (→ Rhetoric and Visuality). Olson (2004, 16–17) argues that more traditional forms of discourse are insufficient for capturing the historical political climate as “those without political power and economic privilege often resorted to types of rhetorical appeals in various mundane objects . . . used for persuasion in public life.” Recognizing that such visual images are historically situated, such scholars presume that visual meanings are complex and variable yet have held significant rhetorical power throughout history.

While some of the historically minded rhetorical research is concerned with broader theoretical issues, much of the scholarship is classified as theory grounded in practice, where the particulars of the case inductively invoke general theoretical principles that transcend the case. As David Zarefsky (1998, 25) explains, isolated case studies “suggest models, norms, or exemplars . . . and they sometimes yield a ‘theory of the case.’” Other rhetorical scholars, however, question such grounded theorizing, expressing concern that the particulars of the historical and the individual inhibit a more theoretical examination of the political persuasion process. Such differing views reveal the pluralism at work in the scholarship of rhetoric and politics, which also attends to the ways that messages create → meaning.

**POLITICAL MESSAGES AND THE CREATION OF MEANING**

Rhetorical scholars attending to political messages often rely on social scientific and critical-historical perspectives in their scholarship (→ Political Persuasion). Utilizing social scientific methods, Hart (2000), for example, demonstrates his concern for broader theoretical conclusions about political messages with his creation of a computer program, DICTION, which examines the “unconscious language choices people use when talking to one another” (Hart 2000, 4). Beginning with US political messages from the 1948 presidential election, Hart and his researchers downloaded over 20,000 public texts into DICTION in order to draw more general conclusions about political discourse through an analysis of variance (ANOVA) study. The data revealed, Hart contends, that political campaigns ideally reinvigorate the country, involving a “conversation” among candidates,
the media, and the public. Citizens also typically look for a “middle ground” and dislike the negativity of campaigns. In the end, Hart offers an optimistic assessment of campaigning and its democratizing tendencies.

Other scholars of rhetoric and politics, however, opt to forgo social scientific methods and interrogate instead the nuances of meanings, utilizing, among others, rhetorical, political, and media theories as critical lenses by which to analyze public discourse. With such critical perspectives, objectivity is often shunned in favor of a rhetorical critic’s insights that offer new and provocative ways in which to understand the meanings expressed in discourse. Many rhetorical critics assume, as Medhurst (1996, 219) explains, that “the truly important questions in life seldom lend themselves to clear-cut answers that can be held with absolute certainty,” especially in a political world full of volatility, change, and conflict.

Questions of ideology and thus power are often foundational to rhetorical studies focused on political meaning. McGee (1980, 5), for example, argued that “ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with a capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and behavior.” Such a perspective views rhetoric as a “theory of social and political power” that can help unite or divide communities (Lucaites & Condit 1990, 24; → Rhetoric and Social Thought). Ideologically grounded studies often are foundational to the examination of media texts (→ Rhetoric and Media Studies). Popular culture in particular is attracting increased attention by researchers interested in the political meanings created by fictionalized discourse. Dow (1996) explains that → popular culture completes “some of the cultural work” previously produced by public oratory; television works “rhetorically to negotiate social issues: to define them, to represent them, and ultimately, to offer visions of their meanings and implications” (Dow 1996, xv). For postmodern scholars, the lines between reality and → fiction are blurred, especially in a mediated world, which draws attention to the ideological struggles over issues of gender, race, and class more so than questions of truth (→ Postmodernism and Communication).

The news media are also, of course, the target of many scholars’ critical interrogations (→ Journalism; News). Framing theories are commonly used to examine the news. Press frames, Jamieson and Waldman (2003, xii–xiii) explain, “shape what citizens know, understand, and believe about the world” as conceptions of truth and falsehood “pass through news frames,” featuring particular journalistic interpretations. In the process, certain information is included while other details are excluded because of the “fixed borders” of press frames (Jamieson & Waldman 2003, xiii). More specifically, press frames group important words, phrases, and visual images to emphasize particular interpretations of political history, events, or people. While journalistic coverage can certainly provide alternative perspectives, often such frames inspire more stereotypical coverage, particularly of marginalized groups and individuals (→ Framing Effects; Framing of the News).

Even though attention to mediated texts is a popular focus for scholars of rhetoric and politics, other researchers, however, continue to examine the meanings created in public speeches, with some focused on the discourse of institutional leaders. The connection between the discourse of governmental officials and theories of nationalism is becoming increasingly popular. Such political discourse, Beasley (2004, 3–4) maintains, helps foster
“feelings of shared national identity within a wildly diverse democracy.” Depictions of citizenship are commonly featured; political discourse often renders visible or invisible those groups that are privileged or marginalized in a political culture.

Other scholars, however, are more concerned with those who combat institutional forces to effect political change. Morris and Browne (2006, 1) contend that social protest scholars “understand that words are deeds, that language has force and effect in the world.” The social movement scholar generally eludes the focus on the single text and single leader in favor of a diversity of textual forms produced by multiple members of a movement. Such texts include the written and spoken words (e.g., speeches, songs, manifestoes, poems, autobiographies), the nonverbal symbols of a movement (e.g., gestures, emblems, signs), and different types of mediation (e.g., Internet, marches, performances) used by leaders and members (Rhetoric, Vernacular). The focus, though, is often centered on questions of meaning regarding the discursive action of social protest – meanings that invoke questions of effectiveness for scholars of rhetoric and politics.

**AN ASSESSMENT OF RHETORICAL IMPACT**

One of the more contentious issues involving political rhetoric over the past few decades evolves around questions of effect. Instigating a debate, political scientist Edwards (1996, 214) asserted: “we do not know nearly enough about the impact of rhetoric, and we should not assume its importance” without the presence of “systematic evidence” often omitted from rhetorical analyses (217). In response to Edwards’ charge, Medhurst (1996) explained that rhetoricians and social scientists often ask different research questions, with scholars of rhetoric concerned about matters of stylistic eloquence, source intent, rhetorical strategy and meaning, and argument, which often defy the measurement of hypothesis testing.

Regardless of the dispute, notions of effect are often categorized as more instrumental or constitutive by rhetorical scholars. An instrumental approach locates the scope of effect in the immediate context and assesses the text’s impact on the intended audience. A constitutive approach, however, suggests that “discursive action constitutes the concepts that shape a social world so as to enable and constrain subsequent thought and action” (Jasinski 1998, 80). Such discourse, though, is viewed as one component of a much larger mosaic of political discourse that collectively creates or erodes a sense of community. Instrumental notions of effect, thus, are viewed more causally; constitutive notions of impact, rather, are viewed as reflective of, and contributing to, the rhetorical culture in which the texts circulate in more abstract ways.

The role of public opinion polling is often viewed as a more instrumental assessment of effect, whose history is rooted in the nineteenth century (Polls and the Media). Such polling, though, has received considerable critical attention from scholars of rhetoric and politics. Hauser (1999, 5) is skeptical of the news media’s reporting of public opinion polling because it typically “creates the impression of ‘the public’ as an anonymous assemblage given to volatile mood swings likely to dissipate into apathy and from which we personally are disengaged.” The result, Hauser contends, is that individuals “seldom experience” such polling data as reflective of their own opinions, exacerbating feelings of alienation (Hauser 1999, 5).
The tendency of polling to reduce the individual to an aggregate leads other scholars to rely on focus groups to assess questions of impact. Some of the more robust focus group research in rhetoric and politics relates to the longitudinal research of DebateWatch, a program directed by Diana B. Carlin from the University of Kansas and sponsored by the Commission on Presidential Debates. Initiated in 1996, DebateWatch brings together citizens to watch the presidential debates and answer specific questions about those debates in small groups. Based on such research, Levasseur and Carlin (2001) note the importance of talking to “ordinary citizens” about politics, shifting attention toward what the American people have to say instead of attending to the words of the nation’s political leaders or the percentages of their responses. Such studies, though, occasionally provide less favorable impressions of the electorate than anticipated. Reporting on the 1996 DebateWatch data, for example, Levasseur and Carlin (2001, 408–409) report that the electorate was more focused on “egocentric arguments,” where “personal concerns” were assumed to represent “common affairs.”

Such attention to issues of civic engagement represents for many the foremost outcome of scholarship associated with the study of rhetoric and politics. Scholars often return to rhetoric’s roots when detailing notions of civic engagement, recognizing the contributions of Aristotle and Cicero, in particular, to notions of citizenship and rhetorical practice (Gronbeck 2004). In part, scholars write and teach about exemplars of civic engagement whose political involvement altered political practices in substantive ways. The scholarship in turn is designed to help promulgate civic engagement ends among citizens, particularly students in the earliest stages of civic consciousness, strengthening the relationship between democratic practice and rhetorical principles.


References and Suggested Readings


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**Rhetoric, Postmodern**

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Postmodern rhetoric is a set of discursive and critical practices that diverge from persuasion by means of ethos, pathos, and logos (→ Rhetoric, Greek). Where classical rhetoric addresses a known and identifiable audience, postmodern rhetoric puts into question the identities of the speaker, the audience, and the messages that pass between them, interrupting and displacing senders, receivers, and messages by realigning the networks through which they pass (→ Postmodernism and Communication).
PRECURSORS OF POSTMODERN RHETORIC

The most important precursors to postmodern rhetoric are Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche proposed that language is the result of a series of transformations, where bodily mechanisms are transformed into sensations and feelings that we express in sounds. Sounds become words when they designate things that are similar in certain respects, and they communicate the perspective of a community as if they referred to an independently existing reality (→ Realism). Logical categories are the result of equivocation and synecdoche, since they posit identities where there are only similarities, and they take as universal what is only a partial view. “Language is rhetoric,” says Nietzsche, “because it desires to convey only a doxa [opinion] not an epistêmê [knowledge]” (Nietzsche 1989, 23; → Rhetoric and Epistemology; Rhetorics: New Rhetorics).

Heidegger, by contrast, takes rhetoric to be a matter of discourse rather than language, and discourse is rooted in shared moods (pathe), practices, and institutions. For him, rhetoric is originally an art of listening because speaking is a response to what has already moved us, and, as the capacity for being moved, pathos plays the leading role (Heidegger 2002; → Pathos and Rhetoric). Furthermore, Heidegger (2002) says pathos is ontological, for it reveals the being of beings in their totality. In Being and time, he declares Aristotle’s rhetoric to be “the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another” (1962, 178; → Hermeneutics), and he emphasizes the pathos of anxiety in the ontology of human experience. In developing this ontology, Heidegger introduces many neologisms and unusually literal interpretations of keywords (e.g., Dasein as “being there”), because, he says, when it comes to grasping being “we lack not only most of the words, but, above all, the ‘grammar’” (1962, 63). Traditional grammar, which privileges declarative statements about entities, cannot disclose being itself because being is articulated in the totality of relations entities have with one another, particularly in relation to the human being. Hence, there is an inherent strangeness to his discourse, which attempts to disclose relational totalities rather than to objectify entities as subjects and predicates in grammatical propositions.

POSTMODERN THINKING

Lyotard

Jean-François Lyotard develops an explicitly postmodern account of language and discourse in The postmodern condition (1984). Although influenced by Heidegger, Lyotard stresses the heterogeneity and multiplicity of discourses. For him, the relational totalities within which statements or phrases occur are not subject to any overriding unity or ontological reference. The pathos of this condition is not anxiety but something akin to the sublime described by Immanuel Kant, where the imagination is overwhelmed with intuitions that cannot be presented as a whole. The postmodern sublime is the sense that discourse is irreducibly and unpresentably multiple. Taking concepts from speech act theory (→ Linguistic Pragmatics) and from the later Wittgenstein (see Wittgenstein 1958), Lyotard portrays language as a plurality of genres, where senders, addressees, and referents shift as we move from one genre to another. Since all statements are acts,
however, genres are types of linguistic performance specified by differences in their pragmatic rules. However, since there is no rule for linguistic performance per se, it is always possible to invent new messages and new genres of discourse, as is evident in the new codes and statements at the leading edge of science and technology. Lyotard valorizes this inventiveness as *paralogy*, which he advocates as a strategy of resistance against the demand for communicative totality animating the flow of capital (information) in the postmodern age.

In *The differend* (1988), Lyotard addresses the absence of a common idiom for settling disputes between genres and phrases. A “differend” occurs when there is no rule according to which such disputes can be settled. While the situation may seem to call for persuasion tailored to each particular case, a differend demands something else. Here, the disputants are not human subjects but phrases and genres of discourse, which, says Lyotard, “are strategies – of no-one” (1988, 137). On this account, a phrase “happens” and must be linked onto by another phrase, even if in silence. Lyotard bears witness to differends by finding idioms for them, but these idioms keep open the question of linkage so that any final phrase is infinitely deferred. To bear witness to the differend is not to communicate a message, but to evoke the feeling that something incommunicable (the multiplicity of phrases) demands to be said (1988, xvi, 13).

**Foucault**

Michel Foucault also focuses upon discourse as a set of concepts and practices that are not reducible to systems of signs or rules of grammar. In *The archeology of knowledge* (1972), Foucault notes that discourse neither expresses the intentions of a subject nor extends the contents of a concept nor designates objects already given. Instead, discourse consists of statements, and “a statement is always an event that neither the language (*langue*) nor the meaning can exhaust” (1972, 28). Furthermore, the unity of discourse is historical rather than logical, rhetorical, or conceptual, and its history is marked by breaks and discontinuities, as illustrated in the *History of madness* (2006).

In his studies of discursive formations, Foucault uses a genealogical method modeled after Nietzsche. “What is found at the historical beginning of things,” he declares, “is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity” (1977, 142). In the *History of madness*, he shows that the concept of madness as mental illness can be traced back to the transitional period between the Middle Ages and modernity, where the mad were first allowed to roam free, then deported aboard ships, and finally confined in lazar houses after leprosy disappeared from Europe. By showing current concepts and practices to be the result of historical accidents and contingencies, Foucault reveals their lack of necessity or inevitability, and shows that we do not have to accept their objectionable consequences. This critical function of genealogy and archeology opens the way for new possibilities for “subjectivation,” as he remarks in *The history of sexuality* (1985). Here, he studies “the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject” (1985, 6). In this respect, he valorizes a freedom of invention similar to that in Lyotard, although for Foucault it is a freedom to constitute and empower ourselves as subjects rather than to invent new discourses in
which subjects are shifted, dissolved, and displaced. Nevertheless, both find a precedent in Nietzsche, who saw subjectivity as a grammatical-social construction and as a dimension of transformative power.

**Derrida**

In his deconstructive writings, Jacques Derrida dismantles the notion that communication is primarily a transmission of meaning between speaking subjects, particularly as conceived in speech act theory. In *Limited Inc.* (1988), for example, Derrida challenges J. L. Austin's assumption that speech acts are fully determinable by context, and that nonconventional speech is parasitical upon conventional norms (Austin 1975). Derrida protests that “a context is never absolutely determinable” (1988, 3) due to the structure of the sign, which characterizes all language. By virtue of its iterability, says Derrida, every sign presupposes a certain absence, since it functions in the absence of senders and addressees. In writing, for example, a mark is infinitely repeatable beyond the moment of its inscription; it is a “machine” functioning independently of the author (1988, 18). The context of such marks is a text without specifiable boundaries, for signs function only in relation to one another and generate their own difference (*différance*), which shifts them out of any limited context, e.g., through self-reference, or citation.

Derrida notes that Austin's distinction between serious and non-serious speech cannot be finalized because speech acts asserting this distinction are subject to citational doubling, which interrupts and displaces their intentional aim and opens them to “non-serious” uses they would presume to exclude. For Derrida, any theorizing about language or communication must itself be stated in language, and therefore cannot perform the theoretical gesture of a science, since the theory itself would be part of the field it investigates. In *The philosophical discourse of modernity* (1987), → Jürgen Habermas accuses Derrida of reducing critical discourse to (mere) rhetoric by denying its contextual limits. However, Derrida replies that he is not making such a reduction, a position he criticizes as “rhetoricism” (1988, 156), but is demonstrating a structural necessity of signs, which defers final separation between the rhetorical and nonrhetorical functions of language.

**Vattimo and Perniola**

In contrast to their French counterparts, Italian postmodernists emphasize aesthetic, rhetorical, and historical continuity in their work. Gianni Vattimo and Mario Perniola, for example, characterize the postmodern as a dissolution of progressive history, where past and present are contemporaneous as simulacra produced and reproduced by the media. As a result, advanced cultures experience a dissolution of their identity and foundations, in which their differences with what is “other” are suspended in a repetitive passage of “the same.” For Vattimo, interpreting this experience requires a narrative in which Nietzsche's overturning of foundations is joined to Heidegger's destruction of the history of ontology (Vattimo 1988). Such a narrative distorts or twists the tradition back upon itself, so that being becomes a moment in which all of its interpretations are present.
at once. This marks the end of the concept of progress, since technological advancement has created conditions in which only “further progress” is possible, much like the state of contemporary art (1988, 101). Perniola, on the other hand, stresses the absence of a message in the communication of networks and contacts the new technology is spreading around the globe. For him, postmodern experience is best interpreted in terms of the Italian baroque, or the enigma of a passage into a realm between life and death, spirit and body, subject and object (Perniola 1995). He takes this movement as a kind of persuasion (*peitho*), which he interprets to mean trust in the present, without anticipating a future that will give it meaning and without reference to an origin in the past. Persuasion, then, has nothing to do with convincing someone of something, but is a way of living completely in the present, a passage through the intermediary spaces of communicative networks, where identities and differences are suspended in the passage itself.

Hence, where French postmodernists tend to characterize these networks as spaces of difference and alterity, the Italians, by contrast, characterize them as spaces of “sameness” and continuity in both the spatial and temporal senses. However, sameness is not identity, but a passage between identity and difference, and in this respect there is agreement on both sides as to the active non-identity at work in postmodern discourse. Rhetorically, this requires strategies of displacement, interruption, and delay in the transmission of messages between speaking subjects. Such strategies, both would agree, are afforded by the technological and linguistic mechanisms already at work in the postmodern world.


**References and Suggested Readings**


Pre-Socratic rhetoric is an overarching concept that captures not only the traits of Hellenic rhetoric that were demonstrated by the sophists who immediately preceded Socrates, but also the antecedent forces that shaped sophistic views on thought and its relationship to expression. The dialogues of Plato and the development of the Socratic movement have often been considered the seminal events in recognizing rhetoric as a formal discipline or technê (→ Rhetoric, Greek). Yet, the dramatic date of these dialogues—particularly such dialogues as Plato’s Gorgias and his later Phaedrus—reveal that sophists were already established and teaching rhetoric within and throughout Hellenic culture well before Plato (apparently) abstracted and coined “rhetoric” as a discipline worthy of scrutiny. Gorgias, a sophist who was clearly older than Plato’s mentor and primary dialogue-character, Socrates, professed to be an established teacher of rhetoric, claiming a pedagogical ancestry dating back to his fellow Sicilians Corax and Tisias. Of course, the debates over the “founding” of rhetoric, whether abstracted as a discipline or long practiced as a craft, continue even today. Yet, what is clear is that several forces were at work prior to the sophists and Plato, which contributed greatly to rhetoric’s evolution into a discipline, regardless of when historians of rhetoric wish to select the moment when rhetoric became recognized as an area of study.

While we may not resolve with certainty the disagreement over rhetoric’s origin, we can both appreciate and (better) evaluate characterizations of rhetoric’s origin if we consider the confluence of forces that contributed to the nascent features of rhetoric’s evolution into a discipline. That is, we are aided in understanding the emergence of rhetoric as a discipline by considering long-established social and intellectual forces. There is, of course, little doubt that the synthesis of these forces came about during the early decades of the fifth century BCE, in what is commonly called the pre-Socratic period of rhetoric, but our understanding of the development of pre-Socratic rhetoric will be better realized if we are sensitive to such forces and their history. The four primary forces shaping
pre-Socratic rhetoric are: the Homeric tradition, the rise of logography, the emergence of pre-Socratic philosophy, and the evolution of the *polis* or Hellenic city-state. From this perspective, the emergence of Gorgias and his fellow sophists in Plato's dialogues is not the beginning, but rather the consequence, of important developments in Greek thought and expression.

**HOMERIC ANTECEDENTS**

The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* represent the earliest body of sustained Hellenic discourse. Now recognized as inscribed oral discourse, *Homerica* reveal emerging notions of rhetoric in two dimensions. The composition patterns of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* reveal systemic formulae that served as both an aid to memory for early bards (*aoidoi*) and later for the more formal guild of rhapsodes (*Homeridae*). Research on the composing processes of Homeric discourse done by Milman Parry, Albert B. Lord, and others reveals that such patterned heuristics demonstrate a consciousness about thought and its relationship to expression. Further, an internal examination of the works of Homer reveals that the characters themselves demonstrate techniques of persuasion and the manipulation of language that would one day be formalized by sophists and theorized by rhetoricians. The wily exploits of Odysseus to trick the cyclops Polyphemus in book 9 of the *Odyssey*, for example, reveal deliberate attempts to persuade and deceive through carefully crafted speech. Odysseus may have had little or no awareness of rhetoric as it was later understood by fifth-century BCE sophists, but the conscious awareness of structuring language for persuasive effect is unmistakably present among Homer's characters.

**THE RISE OF LOGOGRAPHY**

Greece's evolution in writing from Bronze Age syllabaries to an alphabet provided a technology both for preserving the spoken word that was much more efficient than the heuristics of oral composition and, eventually, for facilitating abstract thought and prose composition. The rhythmical structure of oral poetry offered a technology for preserving discourse by stable patterns of cadence. Writing made such a technology unnecessary, freeing discourse from the necessity of mnemonic devices for rhythmical meaning and allowing for unfettered prose composition. That is, just as writing mathematics – as opposed to doing such problem-solving orally – greatly facilitates abstract thought with the manipulation of numbers, so also does writing prose stabilize narrative (logoi) in a manner that facilitates abstract thought and makes the need for rhyming and poetic composition obsolete (→ Medium Theory; Rhetoric and Orality-Literacy Theorems).

As writing grew in popularity to the extent that a city such as Athens could be literate, the shift in composition from poetry to prose, particularly the use of writing for functional civic purposes, became clear. The multiple benefits of prose writing (logography) became readily apparent, extending this new art far beyond a recording device to a facilitator of abstract thinking. Logography branched out from the mere recording of speech to more specialized sub-genres of history and forensic argument; this shift from
exclusively oral (momentary) communication to oral and literate communication enabled rhetors not only to freeze discourse but also to reflect on stable communication. Many scholars, such as Eric Havelock, believe this ability to freeze words helped to nurture abstract thought and philosophical inquiry.

THE EMERGENCE OF PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

Another pre-Socratic source contributing to the development of rhetoric was the early development of philosophy. Pre-Socratic thinkers such as Empedocles began to reflect not only on the nature and function of the universe, but also on human understanding and expression. Fragments of their work reveal the belief that knowledge was constrained by the limitations of our own sense perceptions and that inferences that could be advanced were both probable and interpretive. In addition to Empedocles, other pre-Socratic philosophers of the Eleatic school – such as Parmenides and Zeno – viewed concepts in antithetical and dissociative syntactic constructs (dissoi logoi).

Structuring knowledge on a polar continuum reflects itself in not only a correlative balancing of style and cadence but an epistemology of degree and relativism. That is, concepts such as dissoi logoi have obvious stylistic and syntactic patterns that make them attractive features in euphonic composition, but they also echo epistemologies that nurture a balancing of perspectives that result in probability as a dominant model of thought and expression. Pre-Socratic thinkers such as Empedocles stressed human understanding and probability over earlier Homeric notions of divine inspiration and myth, marking a departure from the Homeric tradition. The insights of pre-Socratic philosophy provided a foundation for sophistic rhetoric that would be based on oppositional thought, sense perception, relativism and opinion (doxa), formulaic composition, and the power of literacy in moving discourse from momentary expression to stabilized communication that facilitates abstract thinking. It is little wonder that, when we trace the rhetorical genealogy of sophists, we see direct and indirect relationships with pre-Socratic philosophers (→ Rhetoric and Philosophy).

THE RISE OF CIVIC ACTIVITY

The emergence of the polis has long been recognized as an important feature in Greek history. Focus on the rise of the city in Hellenic culture has centered on the development of imperialism, the enhanced activity of commerce and trade, as well as the political dynamics that resulted in the exposure to, and interaction with, rival Hellenic cultures. The rise of the Greek city also played an important role in the emergence of rhetoric, particularly pre-Socratic rhetoric. The archaic and classical periods of Greece witnessed the emergence of powerful political city-states, which aggressively promoted their hegemony through kinship ties and military conquest. In all such cities, rhetoric was an active and dynamic feature of civic operations (→ Rhetoric and Politics). One of the most important features of pre-Socratic rhetoric is that judgments about the validity of discourse were adjudicated by listeners and readers. That is, pre-Socratic rhetoric has the consistent feature of being constructed toward, and evaluated by, audiences.
Effective communication in a *polis* – democratic or otherwise – is directed to and judged by audiences. Having the validity of discourse based on the audience was a powerful force contributing to sophistic rhetoric, because effective discourse became a pragmatic and powerful civic force. As the *polis* developed, the role of effective expression increased in importance – whether that rhetoric was received by a tyrant or a democrat. What was reasonable and/or desirable became the standard for attaining agreement. Relative judgments of value and preference were made by the audience, which meant that effective methods of establishing what was most desirable varied according to the circumstances and wishes of the time. Pre-Socratic thinkers refined methods of probabilities, and these heuristics lent themselves well to the pragmatics of daily social problems that could be resolved by argument that stressed warrants for expressed values and opinions (→ Logos and Rhetoric).

In a democracy such as Athens, where securing conviction from the (male) populace determined policy and judgment, rhetoric would be a source of civic power. Yet, in other city-states, ones that had political systems rivaling Athens, rhetoric also was active, albeit that activity was manifested in different ways. In tyrannies such as Syracuse, rhetoric was often demonstrated in the arts of aesthetic performance, as well as with rhetors who functioned as formal representatives or *presbyters* of their rulers. Even in Sparta, famous for its militaristic orientation and (alleged) nonliterate bias, systems of effective communication were imperative for effective civic government. Sophists throughout Greece provided approaches to rhetoric in virtually every type of government, which variously treated rhetoric as an art, an ambassadorial function, a topic for advanced education, and (of course) for political and jurisprudential deliberation.

Pre-Socratic rhetoric thrived throughout Hellenic culture because the malleability of its systems and the range of its benefits cut across and met virtually every sort of orientation that required effective communication. Rhetoric’s plasticity made it a pervasive and powerful force and a rival paradigm to Socratic thought. The fact that rhetoric adapted to existing conditions as it evolved through the classical and Hellenistic periods and into the Roman empire is testimony to the attractiveness of rhetoric, which is present in even its nascent, pre-Socratic forms (→ Rhetoric, Roman).

SEE ALSO: ➤ Logos and Rhetoric ➤ Medium Theory ➤ Memory and Rhetoric ➤ Persuasion ➤ Rhetoric and Epistemology ➤ Rhetoric, Greek ➤ Rhetoric and Orality-Literacy Theorems ➤ Rhetoric and Philosophy ➤ Rhetoric and Poetics ➤ Rhetoric and Politics ➤ Rhetoric, Roman ➤ Rhetorical Studies

References and Suggested Readings


This entry examines the fields of rhetoric and psychology, each from the perspective of the other, and both from the meta-perspective of a psychologist-turned-rhetorician who retains equal measures of respect (and disrespect) for both. Rhetoric and psychology each study persuasion but from radically different approaches that reflect their contrasting origins in the humanistic and scientific traditions of communication studies (→ Communication Theory and Philosophy). With a view toward advancing consideration of the issues that divide rhetoric and psychology, we can imagine their representatives as engaged in a conversation of sorts on questions of relative worth to their students, to the general advancement of knowledge, and to each other (→ Psychology in Communication Processes; Rhetorical Studies).

PSYCHOLOGIST: I don’t know what I’m doing here. You’re not even an academic discipline.

RHETORICIAN: What’s that you say?

PSYCHOLOGIST: To qualify as an academic discipline requires a clearly defined and distinctive area of inquiry, and a method or methods capable of adding to the stock of knowledge. You fail on all these counts, and I’ll sit with you just long enough to tell you why (→ Communication as a Field and Discipline).

RHETORICIAN: I’m all ears. Indeed, I’m honored that you’ve taken the time from your busy schedule to converse with me.

PSYCHOLOGIST: Busy indeed! These days we psychologists are active on many disciplinary fronts, both pure and applied. And that leads me to my critique of rhetoric as something less than a discipline. I’ll start with the related problems of incoherence and lack of distinctiveness. From reading Kenneth Burke’s “Traditional principles of rhetoric,” I gather that rhetoric has accrued a great many meanings over the centuries, from the clearly self-celebrative to the pejorative, including among the latter the “art of proving
opposites.” Applied to itself, this definition is potentially self-damning. Assuming a reasonable
definition of “proving” as demonstrating that something is the case, rhetoric would forever
be undermining its own truth claims. What could possibly be the value of that?

**Rhetorician:** Interesting that you lead with so misleading a definition. But perhaps we
can profit from it nonetheless. Let me ask you, are there not issues on which reasonable
individuals might legitimately differ?

**Psychologist:** Of course. But . . .

**Rhetorician:** And are there not disputes within your own hallowed discipline of
psychology on which even the experts take opposing views? Don’t you psychologists
continue to argue over the very definition of psychology, for example – without consensus
as to whether psychology is the study of mind or of behavior?

**Psychologist:** I’ll concede the point for now. But . . .

**Rhetorician:** My larger point is that not all differences can be resolved, even in your
own field, by way of appeal to pure logic or indisputable fact. Indeed, the most interesting
questions are of this sort, are they not?

**Psychologist:** I suppose.

**Rhetorician:** I could go on with this line of questioning, but I think I’ve said enough
to suggest that continuing controversy is not necessarily a bad thing, nor premature
consensus a good; furthermore, that not all issues, even scientific issues, lend themselves
to demonstrative proofs, if by “demonstration” is meant proof beyond a shadow of the
doctrine.

**Psychologist:** Are you saying, then, that you rhetoricians don’t really “prove
opposites”?

**Rhetorician:** Yes and no. Rhetoric isn’t about issues of pure fact or pure logic. Its
concerns are with issues of judgment rather than certainty, and on these issues it offers
instruction in how to argue opposing views, much of it time-tested and richly illustrated
by way of critical accounts of rhetorical practices. It’s in this sense that rhetoric “proves
opposites,” providing thereby wonderful preparation for law, politics, and for analysis of
persuasion in the guise of objectivity in such fields as your own. That is surely one of our
distinctive contributions. Rhetorical proofs are different from demonstrative proofs; they
are extra-factual and extra-logical, but not necessarily counter-factual or illogical. And
while rhetoric is an advantage-seeking art, it needn’t disadvantage those persuaded by it.
Over the centuries, we rhetoricians have learned a good deal about how to persuade and
also about how to defend against the con artists who sully our good name. If we had time,
I’d “prove” to you how precisely these sorts of proofs are used by psychologists when they
are not preoccupied with proving what is trivially true (→ Logos and Rhetoric; Rhetoric
and Epistemology; Rhetoric and Logic).

**Psychologist:** I think you’ve spoken long enough. Indeed, until now I barely have
been able to get a word in edgewise. You’ve said that you rhetoricians have learned a good
deal about how to persuade. I’m willing to go toe to toe with you on that issue, pitting
what meager tools you rhetoricians use for accumulating knowledge about persuasion
against those in our scientific arsenal. Won’t you concede that even your own field’s
textbooks on persuasion borrow heavily from social psychological theory and research?
Applied fields of persuasion such as → advertising, → public relations, → marketing, and
political consulting do likewise (→ Political Consultant). They turn to us because our
methods are scientific, enabling us psychologists to develop falsifiable theories of persuasion and to exercise controls over potential sources of error in research, such that we can be surprised by our data. That’s the defining feature of a modern discipline; its hallmark is objectivity (→ Objectivity in Science). Some say that you rhetoricians are too wedded to the theorizing of the ancients; others that you are congenitally ill disposed to generalizing, preferring to wallow in the idiosyncratic particulars of every new case. You had a promising beginning back in Aristotle’s day, but you haven’t advanced very far since. Aristotle put forward some interesting hypotheses – about the effects of demographic variables in the use of emotional appeals, for example. We’ve tested them. You haven’t!

Rhetorician: For a psychologist you aren’t too bad at persuasion, albeit the sophistic persuasion of hyperbole. I take it that you haven’t read our research on forms and genres of persuasion and on the situations that give rise to them (→ Rhetorical Criticism). That scholarship surely moves beyond “idiosyncratic particulars,” as you put it. But it is true that we rhetoricians tend to prefer “muddleheaded anecdotalism” over “simpleminded empiricism,” the former case-driven and storied in its telling; the latter typified by a “variable-effects” approach to the study of persuasion (→ Idiographic vs Nomothetic Science). If we had more time, I’d love to tell you more about it.

Psychologist: Since you rhetoricians are so good at proving opposites, perhaps the next time we meet you’ll do a better job of representing my views.


References and Suggested Readings

One of the most persistent problems of persuasion in the modern era has been the domination and subordination of racial “others,” yet race has received little attention from rhetoricians until relatively recently (Rhetorical Studies). Not until the second half of the twentieth century were sustained explorations of race and racism pursued by rhetorical scholars in either Speech or English departments. Since 1999, however, numerous studies that link rhetoric and race have emerged, not only in the fields of communication and composition, but also in a variety of other areas of social and symbolic action and significance. While it would be impossible to consider all of this research in the limited space of this entry, an overview of those studies that link rhetoric and race reveals a powerfully interdisciplinary field of inquiry.

Early studies of race and rhetoric focused on literary and discourse analyses and tended to emphasize black communication (Rhetorical Criticism). Over time, research on rhetoric and race expanded to address gender and sexuality, white power and privilege, and cultural studies. Rhetorical studies of race and racism offer important opportunities for examining the symbolic and social dimensions of identification and division, and, perhaps most importantly, the potential for discourse to promote social transformation and change. Rhetorical studies of race and racism pose provocative challenges to a society that has struggled throughout its history to overcome what W. E. B. Du Bois presciently coined “the problem of the color line,” the struggle for racial equality and social justice.

**RHETORIC AND RACE IN BLACK AND WHITE**

*Before the 1960s*, few studies in either composition or communication addressed issues of race either directly or indirectly, with the exception of Kenneth Burke’s considerations of race in several of his early works (Crable 2003). Discussions of rhetoric and race were “an unlikely tandem” in composition studies (Campbell 1999), and in speech communication scholarship before the 1950s, much of the research that appeared in print focused mainly on “Negro” language practices. In the 1960s, both European and African-American scholars began to focus their research efforts on the relationship between rhetoric and race, and in doing so, they began to transform the ways in which language and social identity were understood and conceptualized.

*During the 1960s*, numerous essays and books appeared that examined and explicated rhetorics of black protest. By the 1970s, scholars began to question the efficacy of rhetoric for addressing racial issues, and theorized the need to reconceptualize and redefine rhetoric’s traditional preoccupation with persuasion and argumentation (Asante 1971; Communication Modes, African). This redefinition called for an enlarged and enhanced understanding of discourse that addressed the social realities of racial difference and identity in the United States, and would be echoed later by other scholars, who hoped
to establish less oppositional rhetorical theories and practices in the areas of gender, composition, and other realms of social and symbolic action.

The 1980s witnessed a continued expansion of research extending rhetoric and race beyond traditional critical analyses of African-American discourse and public address, and shifting to descriptive studies of the language of oppression as well as more theoretically complex explorations of the language of white racism (van Dijk 1987, 1993). This expansion continued into the 1990s, during which discourse studies and research influenced by symbolic and modern racism scholarship became much more prevalent. The focus on white identity and privilege continued to increase in the 1990s, as research began to attend to issues of power, ideology, and domination in areas such as critical legal studies, critical race studies, and media studies (Olmstead 1998). These studies signaled a shift toward enlarged conceptualization of rhetoric and race that would influence significantly the shape and trajectory of scholarship at the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.

BEYOND BINARIES: RETHINKING RHETORIC AND RACE

In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers began to take rhetoric and race in new critical and theoretical directions. In areas where little research had been conducted, such as diversity studies (Fernandez & Davis 1999) and composition (Gilyard 1999), relationships between race and rhetoric became central concerns. Studies in the social construction of equality (Condit & Lucaites 1993), commemorative discourse (Browne 1999), and civil rights rhetoric (Jensen & Hammerback 1994) revealed an expansion of traditional critical approaches, and rhetorical theorists increasingly recognized race as a collaboratively constructed rhetorical phenomenon (McPhail 1994; Gresson 1995). Scholars also began to offer theoretically driven examinations of the social and symbolic construction of whiteness and racial privilege (Nakayama & Martin 1999). The momentum established at the end of the twentieth century, which saw a rethinking of rhetoric informed by emerging ideological and epistemological concerns, invigorated thinking about rhetoric and race as the twenty-first century began.

Indeed, since 2000, intellectual currents in the study of rhetoric and race have both returned to their roots and also moved in powerful and provocative new directions. While studies of black nationalism and black identity have returned the discussion of race and rhetoric to the early emphasis on African-American discourse (Gordon 2003; Terrill 2004), emerging explorations of the rhetorics of whiteness and anti-racism have established fertile new grounds for addressing the problems and possibilities of racial reconciliation (Watts 2005). Race remains central to discussions of political rhetoric (Frank & McPhail 2005; Rhetoric and Politics), and has emerged as well in studies of visual rhetoric (Gallagher & Zagacki 2005). Rhetorical scholars have expanded the conceptualization of race well beyond the boundaries of black and white identity, and connections between race, class, gender, and sexuality continue to enlarge the terrains upon which issues of discourse and identity can be explored (Identities and Discourse; Rhetoric and Class; Rhetoric and Gender).

Rethinking the relationship between rhetoric and race has returned researchers to one of the earliest questions raised by scholars: whether or not racial conflict and division are,
in fact, problems that can be remedied by rhetoric. Two areas of inquiry in which this question has become a central consideration are studies of reparations and reconciliation. Research on reparations questions the potential of rhetoric to erase the color line (Bacon 2003), while scholarship on reconciliation continues to look to the promise of rhetoric to bring about significant social transformations in the area of race relations (Hatch 2006). John Hatch’s hopeful conclusions provide a salient representative anecdote for the future study of rhetoric and race: “The tragic reality of unequal and conflictual race relations might have to go from bad to worse before reconciliation’s call to atonement becomes compelling” (2006, 271). Hatch’s observation offers a guardedly optimistic assessment of the potential of rhetoric to reconcile what Ashley Montague (1964) over 40 years ago described as “man’s greatest myth: the fallacy of race.”


References and Suggested Readings

The relationship between rhetoric and religion is fourfold: (1) rhetoric is a tool used by religious groups; (2) political rhetoric draws upon religious language; (3) religious systems contribute to the discursive constructions of their adherents’ worldviews; and (4) religious traditions contribute to rhetorical theory and practice.

Religious systems use rhetoric as a tool for interfacing with outside groups and communicating with adherents. Interfacing with outsiders includes efforts to share the message of the faith but also to create relationships with other groups. In the case of Christianity, the imperative to evangelize is especially strong, and Christian groups have been innovative in their rhetorical practices. Long a staple of Christian rhetoric, the sermonic genre has become indispensable in the American context — used by the evangelists of the First and Second Great Awakenings, including Jonathan Edwards and Charles Finney, as well as twentieth-century evangelists, such as Aimee Semple McPherson, Oral Roberts, and Jimmy Swaggart. These twentieth-century preachers were among the first to appropriate media technologies — film, radio, television, and the Internet — for religious purposes (Cinema). In the Catholic church, the pastoral letter remains an important tool for communicating with believers, and Carol Jablonsky (1989) explains that American bishops have used these letters to instruct members in the doctrine and practices of the faith.

Rhetoric and religion interact in the political context as political leaders draw upon religious language, but also as religious leaders assert influence over public policy matters (Rhetoric and Politics). Roderick Hart (1977) has argued that in the United States, church and state have arrived at an implicit contract, which he calls “civic piety,” that is held stable by rhetorical practice. Civic piety rhetoric calls upon a nonsectarian God who watches over the United States, but it otherwise maintains a distinction between church
and state. Presidential inaugurals typically demonstrate civic piety, such as Franklin Roosevelt’s use of religious language calling for a “holy war” against recession and John F. Kennedy’s statement that “on Earth, God’s work must truly be our own.” Steve Goldzwig (1987) has countered that in addition to this “official” civic piety, there are “unofficial” public theologies that explicitly use the language, imagery, and values of specific religious traditions to influence public policy. He cites Jerry Falwell and Archbishop Oscar Romero as examples, but that list could also include William Wilberforce, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, Jr, and Caesar Chavez (→ Rhetoric and Social Protest). Similarly, Erik Doxtader (2001) claims that Christian rhetoric, specifically the Kairos Document, contributed to bringing about the reconciliation that ended the system of apartheid in South Africa.

Religious systems also have rhetorical value as they discursively constitute worldviews for their adherents. Kenneth Burke (1961) notes that because words for the natural world are commonly used to explain the supernatural and because the reverse is also true, the ways that we see our natural world are always influenced by our theologies. For instance, Burke argues that the cycle of guilt, sacrifice, and redemption that is central to the Christian Bible also inheres in our discourse. The existence of the hortatory negative in language (the “thou-shalt-not”) makes sin possible, which leads to guilt and the need for redemption and sacrifice. In their analysis of Hindu nationalism in India, Roy and Rowland (2003) suggest that this type of mythic structure is not unique to cultures influenced by Christianity. They note how Hindu nationalist identity is premised on a mythic structure that pits the great heroes of that tradition against the evils it identifies as inherent to Islam.

Finally, religious traditions contribute to rhetorical theory and practice. Rhetorical critics have acknowledged the contributions made by the scriptures themselves, as well as the writings of religious thinkers such as St Augustine, St Anselm, Søren Kierkegaard, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. James Darsey (1997), for instance, argues that the practice of radical rhetoric in the United States has been influenced by the prophetic tradition. The prophets of the Hebrew scriptures and contemporary radicals share a sense of mission, an attempt to hold listeners to a sacred principle, and an uncompromising posture. In a related vein, scholars have noted the persistence of the “jeremiad” in the tradition of American public address. The contemporary political jeremiad, which is heir to Puritan preaching as well as the prophetic tradition, holds up principles that are sacred to the community, expresses disappointment in the community’s failure to live according to these principles, and then calls audience members to return to principled living (Murphy 1990; → Religion and Popular Communication; Rhetorical Criticism). Rhetoric scholars have primarily attended to the contributions that the Jewish and Christian traditions make to rhetorical theory, but other religions have much to offer as well.

SEE ALSO: ► Cinema ► Genre ► Internet ► Radio ► Religion and Popular Communication ► Rhetoric and Politics ► Rhetoric and Social Protest ► Rhetorical Criticism ► Rhetorical Studies ► Television

References and Suggested Readings

Roman rhetoric aims to present practical and theoretical guidelines for effective verbal → persuasion. In ancient Rome such precepts found an application most regularly in speeches made in the criminal and civil courts, but they were relevant also to debates on political policy in the senate and at popular assemblies. All of these oratorical activities were traditionally restricted in ancient Rome to men of the elite classes. The main principles of Roman rhetoric derive largely from earlier Greek rhetorical theory, which achieved impressive levels of sophistication during the fourth century BCE, and which formed the major focus of formal education in the Hellenistic world (→ Rhetoric, Greek). As these Greek-speaking communities were gradually incorporated into the Roman Empire from the second century BCE onwards, the value of rhetorical training came to be appreciated by members of the ruling elite, although the process of acceptance and integration took considerable time. The first teachers of rhetoric in Rome essentially reproduced the existing Greek system; it is not until 92 BCE that we hear of Latin being used as a language of rhetorical instruction in the city. Over the next 50 years or so, formal training in rhetoric finally became established as a central feature of upper-class Roman education.

RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM

The three most influential works of Roman rhetoric are Rhetorica ad Herennium (“Rhetorical precepts addressed to Herennius,” author unknown), Cicero’s De Oratore (“On the orator”), and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (“The education of the orator”). The first takes the
form of an instructional manual or handbook, probably written sometime between 88 and 82 BCE, and presents many of the conventional tenets of ancient rhetoric (Gaines 2007). Oratory is thus divided into three broad types (1.2): legal (iudiciale), deliberative (deliberativum), and epideictic (demonstrativum). Similarly the orator’s job is viewed as consisting of five main tasks (officia; 1.3): deciding on the most appropriate arguments and subject matter (inventio); arranging these arguments effectively (dispositio/ordo); casting them in a suitable linguistic style (elocutio); memorization of the final text (memoria); and finally the persuasive delivery of the speech (pronuntiatio/actio; → Arrangement and Rhetoric; Delivery and Rhetoric; Invention and Rhetoric; Memory and Rhetoric; Style and Rhetoric). Some of these aspects receive greater emphasis than others. Greek intellectuals had been particularly interested in analyzing and categorizing types of argument, especially those applicable in legal contexts, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* reproduces this bias (see 2.1; → Logos and Rhetoric). Similarly, linguistic style is discussed in great detail, with some 80 stylistic devices (such as anaphora, tricolon, metaphor, and so on) catalogued, defined, and illustrated by example (4.19–4.46).

As a whole, the work is closely modeled on contemporary Greek works, although it does demonstrate the advances made in forging a new Latin terminology to match the technical vocabulary of Greek rhetoric (see, e.g., Pernot 2005, 102–104). Such handbooks placed a strong emphasis on systematization and practical utility, and the work illustrates well the main methodological hallmark of ancient rhetoric: the extensive use of categorization and taxonomy. (See, for example, the discussion at 1.8 of the four possible ways of gaining a jury’s goodwill.) This kind of approach has the pedagogical virtues of clarity and order, and introduces into the study of persuasion an impressive logical rigor. Indeed, at its best, this form of analysis represents one of the most remarkable intellectual achievements of Greek and Roman scholars. It can also, however, encourage a rather formulaic approach to speech-making. As successful practitioners of oratory such as Cicero recognized, these “rules” of rhetoric offered only an initial framework for a speaker’s attempts at persuasion. The realities of each specific rhetorical challenge usually called for some adaptation or variation to be introduced. As Cicero stresses, rhetorical precepts should be viewed primarily as a codification of oratorical “best practice” rather than an infallible and sacrosanct intellectual system (see De Oratore 1.146; 2.81–2.84; 2.131).

**CICERO**

Cicero’s *De Oratore* (written in 55 BCE) is a more complex and ambitious work that combines features of the standard rhetorical handbook with elements of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical dialogue. Especially noteworthy is Cicero’s attempt to raise the social and intellectual prestige of rhetoric. A longstanding challenge to the discipline was that it presented little more than a slick system of verbal tricks to be cynically applied by the orator for often immoral ends (Wisse 2002; the criticisms derive largely from Plato’s *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*). Cicero responds by asserting that a training in rhetoric ideally provides a well-rounded education, in which the orator learns to analyze and debate a wide range of subjects and gains a deep understanding of the world through the accompanying study of law, literature, and philosophy (De Oratore 1.72–1.73; 2.68; 3.143). This argument has its own biases and self-interested elements, but no less so perhaps than Plato’s (Vickers 1988, 83–147). This
controversy over rhetoric’s ethical status was to be rehearsed in various forms in the Renaissance and beyond (Vickers 1988, 178–213; → Rhetoric and Ethics; Rhetoric and Philosophy).

De Oratore also reasserts the importance of the orator’s exploitation of ethos (character) and pathos (strong emotion), aspects given prominence by Aristotle but often underplayed by the standard handbooks (Wisse 1989; → Ethos and Rhetoric; Pathos and Rhetoric). Cicero’s own oratorical practices, which made considerable use of emotional pleas, may have been a further factor in his decision to stress these aspects (Hall 2007). De Oratore expands the traditional horizons of Roman rhetorical handbooks in another way too, through its inclusion of an analysis of oratorical humor (2.217–2.290). Although earlier Greek treatises on wit and humor existed, Cicero’s incorporation of the topic into his framework of rhetorical theory seems to be an innovative step (Rabbie 2007). His discussion of the subject was influential enough to convince Quintilian to include humor as a topic for analysis in his own treatise written over a century later.

**QUINTILIAN**

Quintilian’s treatise, a massive undertaking that took several years to complete (c. 93–95 CE), is the most comprehensive and detailed discussion of rhetoric to come down to us from the ancient world (Fernández López 2007). The work addresses all the features regularly found in the handbooks, and extends its discussion to include the very earliest stages of the orator’s training (Book 1). Its level of scholarship is impressive: Quintilian frequently summarizes the contrasting views expressed on a topic over the centuries by various (often otherwise unknown) rhetoricians and displays sound judgment in his handling of them. He seizes shrewdly on the decisive issues that bear upon a particular debate and cuts through fussy, over-complicated elaborations of theory. He also presents sensible, humane views on the challenges of educating and motivating young students.

In many ways, Quintilian serves as an authoritative guide to virtually every issue in Roman rhetoric. He is more, however, than just a synthesizer of earlier scholars’ views. His discussion of oratorical delivery in particular seems to have addressed the subject with far more rigor and detail than earlier treatments. Rhetorical theory had previously shown only limited interest in the performative elements of oratory such as hand gestures and facial expression; Quintilian by contrast treats the subject in considerable detail, documenting some 30 or so hand gestures available for use by the orator (Institutio Oratoria 10.3; Hall 2004). This discussion influenced Andrea de Jorio’s pioneering study of nonverbal communication in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Naples (de Jorio 2000), and thus has in turn influenced more recent analyses of body language (e.g., Kendon 1986). Quintilian’s observations regarding the orator’s need for careful image management also anticipates several other lines of approach in modern social studies. He urges the speaker, for example, to pay attention to his gait, dress, and overall bearing (or, to use Bourdieu’s term, habitus); and several modern studies have identified ways in which Roman rhetoric’s precepts regarding self-presentation and image management encode societal norms of masculinity (e.g., Gleason 1995; Richlin 1997; → Rhetoric, Nonverbal).

Quintilian’s treatise as a whole demonstrates the extent to which rhetoric by this time had been embraced by the Roman elite as a central part of the educational system. (Suetonius’ work De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus [“On grammarians and rhetoricians”]...
provides brief biographies of some of the renowned teachers of this period.) It was to retain this place until the fragmentation of the Roman Empire around the fifth century CE, and, during the Renaissance, rhetorical handbooks such as Rhetorica ad Herennium enjoyed a renewed prominence as they came to form the basic educational texts of the elite classes learning Latin for both administrativce and broader cultural purposes (Ward 2007).

THE LITERATURE ON ROMAN RHETORIC

Several other discussions of Roman rhetoric survive from the classical period: Cicero’s De Inventione, Brutus, Orator, De Partitio Oratoria, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, and Topica (written between 91 and 44 BCE); Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus (c. 96–102 CE); and Iulius Victor’s Ars Rhetorica (probably fourth century CE). Also extant are some 50 speeches by Cicero from legal trials, senatorial debates, and political assemblies, which provide illuminating examples of rhetorical theory put into practice.

Useful surveys of the main features of Roman rhetoric and its historical development can be found in Kennedy (1972), Clarke (1996), and Pernot (2005). Lausberg (1998) presents a compendious treatment of the technical elements of Greek and Roman rhetoric. Dugan (2007) provides an excellent synopsis of recent scholarly trends in the study of Roman rhetoric. These range from analyses of the influence of rhetorical training on Roman poets and historians, to the role played by educational declamatory exercises (such as the suasoria and controversia) in shaping upper-class social attitudes and ideals. All these approaches testify to the tremendous impact of rhetoric on the lives of the Roman elite. By the first century CE, the young men of this class were highly trained in analyzing moral, legal, and political issues from an essentially rhetorical perspective, and could deploy with great facility a formidable arsenal of persuasive techniques.


References and Suggested Readings


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**Rhetoric of Science**

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The rhetoric of science is the application of the resources of the rhetorical tradition to the texts, tables, and visuals of the sciences. It is a relatively new form of → rhetorical criticism that began over half a century ago with studies in science policy, shifted in the past quarter century to studies of science itself, and, in the past decade has evolved methodologically from case studies to forms more amenable to wide generalization.

**PRECURSORS**

Rhetoric of science begins with studies of science policy, an area that involves deliberative issues that fall readily within the traditional concerns of those trained in rhetorical analysis. Nevertheless, so strong was the traditional focus of the emerging discipline of
speech on political oratory that the first rhetorical analysis of science policy was not made until 1953 (Rhetorical Studies; Speech Communication, History of). In this study, Richard Weaver is concerned with an early climax in a continuing conflict in American public education, the place of evolution in the public-school biology curriculum. The focus of Weaver’s study is the Scopes trial. In that trial, he concludes, the prosecution and the defense argued at cross-purposes. The issue at hand was not the law against teaching evolution, but the legality of Scopes’s conduct under the law. Given this issue, the scientific testimony in favor of evolution was irrelevant. Indeed, even in the legislature the question was not the truth of evolution but the right of the state to exclude from the curriculum what was, for the people of Tennessee, academic knowledge perhaps, but religious heresy certainly. This area of rhetoric of science has not remained dormant; it has been pursued, for example, by Jeanne Fahnestock, Alan Gross, John Lyne, Carolyn Miller, and Arthur Walzer.

A FIRST GENERATION OF STUDIES: EMERGING RHETORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The focus of rhetoricians on science itself rather than science policy, a focus initiated a quarter-century ago, represents a definite break with traditional rhetorical criticism. Among those who have devoted their attention to science itself are Charles Bazerman, Carol Berkenkotter, John Angus Campbell, Jeanne Fahnestock, Alan Gross, Randy Allen Harris, Greg Myers, Jean Dietz Moss, and Larry Prelli. From this group, I select Campbell as representative. In the study of science itself, he is the pioneer. Originally focused on the Origin of species, his work has since moved forward and backward in time, forward to Darwin on orchids, backward to Darwin’s Notebooks. In all of his work, Campbell’s message is the same: Darwin is the master rhetorician, willing even to distort and disguise his religious and scientific views if he believes that distortion and disguise will attain conviction on some issue central to evolutionary theory. Indeed, Darwin is a master rhetorician even in his Notebooks, whose audience is only Darwin himself. Campbell (1990) shows that these notebooks are a proving-ground for Darwin’s theories, tested against the imaginary audience of such important potential objectors as his geological mentor and friend, Charles Lyell. Of the relationship between the Origin and the Notebooks, there is, Campbell says: “an unbroken continuity . . . From his jotting in his first notebook through the sixth and final edition of the Origin, scientific discovery and rhetorical invention, technical and social reason, so effectively unite in Darwin’s thought that one can only say that each is an aspect of a single logic of inquiry and presentation” (1990, 86). While this conclusion shies away from implicating rhetoric in the content of science, it clearly asserts its integral relationship to scientific discovery.

In the 1990s, a new climate of opinion emerged, signaled by the linguistic turn in philosophy, exemplified by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin, and popularized in 1979 by Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Accordingly, it is no accident that the 1980s, which saw the creation of rhetoric of science, also saw a rhetorical consciousness emerge in disciplines unconnected with the rhetorical tradition. Participating in this activity were the literary scholar Wilda Anderson; the economist Deirde (formerly Donald) McCloskey; the anthropologist Emily Martin; the philosophers Marcello Pera, Philip
Kitcher, and Ernan McMullin; the linguists John Swales, M. A. K. Halliday, and Ken Hyland; the historians Bruce Hunt and Evelyn Fox Keller; the sociologists Ricca Edmundson and Richard Harvey Brown; and the library scientists Bryce Allen, Jian Qin, and F. W. Lancaster. For illustration, I selected Allen, Qin, and Lancaster as representative of less radical and McCloskey as representative of more radical claims.

In Allen et al. (1994), the authors trace both the pattern and content of the citations in the *Philosophical Transactions*. The authors also infer from citation analysis that the primary medium of scientific communication shifted from books in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to journal articles in the nineteenth, and to journal articles, conference proceedings, and technical reports in the twentieth. The authors then trace the shift in scientific productivity from Europe to America, and track the rise of Soviet science. In addition, they follow the eighteenth-century shift in the language of science from Latin to the various vernaculars. In the latter part of the twentieth century, they note a further shift to English as the international language of science. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by treating citations as rhetorical features, they are able to measure the rate of change of persuasive communities; slow in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and rapid in the nineteenth and twentieth. In connection with this trend, they venture a cautious prediction concerning the increased tendency toward obsolescence in scientific publications: “if the present trend continues, the median age of the persuasive community may overtake the time required for review and publication of traditional printed communications media. This would lead to increased pressure to adopt speedier means of formal communication in science” (1994, 304).

In a ground-breaking essay entitled “The rhetoric of scientism,” McCloskey (1985) provides an example of her mastery of rhetorical technique. After a plain English summary of Muth’s important article, McCloskey gives us parallel columns: in the left, she reproduces key sentences from his article, all written in the “scientistic” patois of economists; in the right, she turns this patois into plain English. It is a dazzling performance, demonstrating that nothing of substance is lost in the translation. Next, McCloskey infers that, if nothing of substance is lost, “the appeals to the methods of science are mainly matters of style, arising out of a modernist conversation” (97). Nonetheless, McCloskey avers, Muth *needs* these scientistic trappings: how else is he going to meet the expectations of economists, who would not be persuaded unless an argument is fitted out with appropriate jargon and decked out with appropriate mathematical formulae?

In a finale to this fireworks display of rhetorical proficiency, McCloskey compares argument in economics with argument in three apparently disparate fields. Under their respective disciplinary skins, she finds, arguments in paleontology, mathematics, and literary history *parallel* those in economics. No interesting epistemological differences exist.

**A SECOND GENERATION: NEW APPROACHES**

In an attack on the positions represented by Campbell and McCloskey, Gaonkar (1993) contends that *rhetoric is constitutionally unsuited to the analysis of science*: it makes no sense to turn a system designed to teach oratory in ancient Greece and Rome into a system for the analysis of the texts produced by a social structure as complex as modern science.
Gaonkar’s essay represents a reflective moment in which to meditate on the methodological limitations of the first generation of rhetoric of science, limitations that a second generation of scholarship will address: Jeanne Fahnestock, Leah Cecarelli, Celeste Condit, and Alan Gross, Joseph Harmon, and Michael Reidy.

Fahnestock (1999) undermines our comfortable sense that, aside from metaphor, the figures can be safely ignored by rhetorical critics, that the study of such schemes as antithesis, incrementum, gradatio, antimetabole, ploche, and polyptoton is the preserve only of pedants. She tells us why, while particular figures have been identified in great numbers over the centuries, a definition of figuration has eluded us. Her wide range of examples – from the Bible, from public address, and, most prominently, from science – suggest that the figures exercise their powers regardless of subject matter; the wide range of languages that are the origin of these sources – classical Greek, Latin, French, German, and English – suggest that they exercise their powers regardless of language (→ Style and Rhetoric). Most importantly, the attention she pays to the visual as well as the verbal strongly suggests that the figures are not linguistic, but conceptual, in nature, and that, as such, they can serve as a resource for invention and an index of conceptual change. This book also gives the lie to the pessimistic implication that many have drawn from Gaonkar’s assertion that the rhetorical tradition lacks the hermeneutic wherewithal adequate to a robust criticism.

Cecarelli (2001) is also innovative methodologically; she transforms three biological case studies – of Dobzhansky, Schrödinger, and Wilson – into an argument concerning the effectiveness of interdisciplinary persuasion in the sciences. In Cecarelli’s view, Dobzhansky convinced geneticists and naturalists that they shared the same object of study; Schrödinger convinced physicists and biologists that their individual perspectives had a contribution to make to the study of the gene; Wilson, on the other hand, failed to persuade either scientists or humanists to embrace his reductionist vision. Cecarelli thinks she can explain why. In her view, the two successful scientist-authors convince through intelligent rhetorical design that avoids confrontation. Wilson fails to persuade because he refuses the conciliatory gestures that come naturally to Dobzhansky and Schrödinger. Instead of promoting the language of compromise, Wilson gives us metaphors drawn from conquest. Instead of encouraging readings appropriate to each interest group, he clearly signals his intention to reduce the humanities and the sciences to a single material base subject to exceptionless laws.

While Fahnestock and Cecarelli implicate rhetoric in the constitution of knowledge (→ Rhetoric and Epistemology), two other books – Condit (1999) and Gross et al. (2002) – do not engage epistemic issues. Each is innovative in its combination of rhetorical analysis with methods derived from the social sciences. Condit’s intellectual quarry is the public perception of eugenics and genetics. But a successful hunt requires a grounding in sampling and statistical techniques: “the backbone of this study . . . consisted of 653 magazine articles drawn from the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature from 1919 to 1995” (1999, 260; → Sampling, Nonrandom; Sampling, Random). The content of these – and of supplemental sources – was coded and analyzed (→ Content Analysis, Quantitative). In following these procedures, Condit is concerned with matters of statistical significance and inter-rater reliability. But statistical analysis is not the end-point of her task. She also asks what her data mean, a task requiring both critical intelligence and rhetorical analysis. She
makes her methodological claim explicit: “all critics can be assisted by → quantitative methodologies when those methodologies are understood as counting tools, embedded in the critical project, rather than as overarching frameworks that constrain critical thought within a hypothesis-testing method. It is possible to use numbers in a postpositivistic fashion” (Condit 1999, 257).

Gross et al. also combine rhetorical analysis with social science methods. Their goal is sweeping: to provide the reader with a rhetorical history of the scientific article from its seventeenth-century beginnings to their present. Accordingly, their generalizations are the result of “an analysis of 1,804 short passages for style and 430 whole articles for presentation and argument” selected randomly from three languages, English, French, and German (2002, viii). As with Condit, these texts are subjected both to statistical and rhetorical analysis. Gross et al. (2002) have two additional features of methodological interest: they expand the scope of text to include graphics, the tables, line graphs, photographs, and drawings that are so central to scientific communication and, in their final chapter, they sketch out an evolutionary theory of the rhetorical development of scientific prose and visuals (→ Rhetoric and Visuality).

SEE ALSO: ► Content Analysis, Quantitative ► Persuasion ► Quantitative Methodology ► Reliability ► Rhetoric and Epistemology ► Rhetoric and Visuality ► Rhetorical Criticism ► Rhetorical Studies ► Sampling, Nonrandom ► Sampling, Random ► Speech Communication, History of ► Style and Rhetoric

References and Suggested Readings

Rhetoric of the Second Sophistic

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“The Second Sophistic” is the name given by Flavius Philostratus (c. 170–245 CE) in his Lives of the sophists (481, 507) to the rhetorical style current in his day. The sophistic culture described by Philostratus involved highly educated members of the Greek elite improvising public declamations, often in the personae of famous figures from Greece’s historical or mythological past. The primary emphasis was upon the re-enactment of key moments of military or political significance: most themes were drawn from the times of either imperial Athens (fifth century BCE) or the conquests of Philip and Alexander (fourth century BCE). This historical emphasis was matched at the level of diction, morphology, and style by the revival of the “Attic” dialect used by classical Athenian writers such as Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes (→ Rhetoric, Greek).

Modern scholars have taken over the phrase to encompass a number of broader phenomena (Whitmarsh 2005, 6–10). The term was revived in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche’s friend Erwin Rohde (1876, 1886), who argued that die zweite Sophistik was a primarily linguistic phenomenon promoting Atticism at the expense of “Asianism,” supposedly a more melodious style emanating from the Ionic Greek cities. Rohde based his arguments on the claims of an ancient author, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (writing in Rome at the turn of the millennium), who praised Roman conquest for its promotion of the “Attic muse” in response to “the other, who arrived yesterday or the day before from one of the pits of Asia” (On the ancient orators, 1). As was seen by the great Prussian scholar Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1900), however, Dionysius’ claims are motivated by the rhetorical (not to say xenophobic) need to promote Rome: there is no real evidence for an Asianist movement.

Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s weighty intervention deterred subsequent generations of scholars, who generally left the field alone, until the 1960s. In a more politically conscious era, Glen Bowersock (1969) turned the focus away from literary content, and onto the historical role of the orators (or “sophists”) themselves, which he identified as one of mediation between the Greek elites who were politically dominant in the cities of the eastern Roman Empire and Rome itself. Against Bowersock’s Rome-centered view, Ewen Bowie (1970) argued that the Second Sophistic – the term now extended to cover the wider phenomenon of the literary archaism practiced in most Greek literary composition in the first three centuries CE – was primarily a vehicle for the preservation of Greek cultural values in the face of Roman domination. This interest in relations between Greece and Rome was spurred on, from the 1990s onward, by → postcolonial theory: thus, for example, Simon Swain (1996) extends Bowie’s ideas into a broad theory of Greek resistance to Roman occupation, and Tim Whitmarsh (2001) argues that Roman conquest forced Greeks to rethink their ways of understanding the nature of identity. The diverse range of interpretations can be sampled in a number of collections of essays (especially Goldhill 2001; Konstan & Said 2006).
While many use “the Second Sophistic” as a convenient label for Roman–Greek imperial literary production in general, the narrower phenomenon described by Philostratus has also received considerable attention. As a form of rarefied competition for elite status, sophistry was an important means of consolidating class hierarchies while allowing for a limited amount of mobility. Thomas Schmitz (1997) has helpfully cross-applied Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of social distinction, built on the analysis of modern European educational structures. Bourdieu’s ideas have also been used, along with those of the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, by Maud Gleason (1995), who emphasizes the importance of sophistry as a forum for constructing and debating masculinity (→ Rhetoric and Gender). The self-conscious role-playing so central to the Second Sophistic (in the narrower sense) does indeed lend itself readily to discussion in terms of social constructionism, built around the idea of identity as performed rather than essentially inherent (→ Constructivism; Identities and Discourse). Such approaches have been further cultivated by postmodern interest in performativity and mimicry (e.g., Connolly 2001; Whitmarsh 2005; Webb 2006; → Postmodernism and Communication; Rhetoric, Postmodern).

SEE ALSO: ▶ Constructivism ▶ Identities and Discourse ▶ Postcolonial Theory ▶ Postmodernism and Communication ▶ Rhetoric and Gender ▶ Rhetoric, Greek ▶ Rhetoric, Postmodern ▶ Rhetoric, Roman

References and Suggested Readings

Semiotics is the study of → signs and signification, including both linguistic and nonlinguistic signs (→ Linguistics; Semiotics; Sign Systems). The American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), who coined the term and did innovative work in the area, regarded it as the study of that which supports inferences; that is to say, of how signs enable interpretive inference to other signs. Peirce held that all we know or experience comes to us through the mediation of signs. He did not hold that all signification is solely the product of social convention or of language proper, maintaining that signs serve as tools for scientific investigation as well as for the exploration of human creations (→ Language and Social Interaction). One consequence of this view is that all inquiry is semiotic inquiry. Another lineage of semiotics, usually designated by the term “semiology,” grows out of a tradition of European → structuralism traced back to the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and carried forward by such writers as → Roland Barthes, Roman Jakobson, and the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. In this tradition, emphasis is placed on the social structuring of meaning and the rendering of cultural forms as texts. In contrast to Peirce, this tradition places emphasis on the arbitrariness of signs and on binary structures of meaning.

Umberto Eco has helped to bridge the gap between the two traditions, perhaps with incomplete success, by bringing the Peircean approach (and the term “semiotics”) into a common theoretical frame with semiology. Like Peirce, he emphasizes the triadic structure of signs; and like Barthes, he accesses discursive domains through → codes. Codes make signs intelligible in linguistic communication, visual information, emotional expressions, color schemes, scientific discourse, social rituals, literary → genres, and so on (→ Visual Communication). There is some debate about whether the Peircean logic of signification can be explained as functioning purely as social conventions. To hold so would appear to put one at odds with a central feature of the Peircean theory, that is, the belief that as-yet unconventionalized signs break in unexpectedly, challenging established semiotic conventions from without, a feature especially important to scientific inquiry. Similarly, there are different understandings of whether Peirce’s idea of “infinite semiosis” should be read against the grain of his professed → realism. Peirce saw movement toward the fixing of belief as a matter of acquiring interpretive habits within communities; but these habits had to accommodate the recalcitrance that creates doubt and requires new interpretations. This process may go on indefinitely, so long as the opinion of the community of inquiry remains unsettled.

In a general sense, much of the rhetorical tradition can be understood as defining a semiotic practice, not just in respect to the study of tropes and figures, but in respect to how inferences are produced, on the scaffolding of signs, in the minds of audiences and observers (→ Rhetorical Studies). This would also encompass rhetorical invention, which aligns rather well with Peirce’s treatment of abduction. Semiotics was attractive to early film theorists, who were seeking vocabularies and tools for discussing the visual,
linguistic, musical, and image editing occurring in films (→ Film Theory). It was also used as a strategy for reading a wide variety of social signifiers, from clothing fashion to the subject positions constituted within semiotic practices. The idea of “codes,” along with Peirce’s terms, “icon,” “index,” and “symbol,” found their way into common usage in books on rhetoric and communication. During the heyday of structural semiotics in the 1980s and 1990s, Peirce’s philosophical realism may have made his approach less attractive to those rhetorical theorists and critics who shared widely held assumptions about the social construction of reality (→ Constructivism). As theories of structural semiology have become less fashionable, perhaps a space has been cleared for the largely untaken Peircean option. Apart from some theoretical work dealing with Peirce’s “speculative rhetoric” and some theoretical preparation of the ground for a Peircean approach to rhetoric, there has been little work in rhetorical criticism that takes the explicitly semiotic approach.

On the expansive view of semiotics, found in such writers as Eco and Julia Kristeva, “implicit” semiotic theories can be found in writings stretching from the pre-Socratics to Freud and picking up much in between, reminiscent of the expansive view of rhetoric that invites appropriation of figures such as → Habermas and Foucault as “implicit” theorists of rhetoric. One way to draw the distinction between rhetoric and semiotics is to say that semiotics is largely concerned with mapping out the codes, patterns, and conventions of signification, whereas rhetoric is concerned with how such codes, patterns, and conventions can be put to use in the processes of → persuasion, → identification, and articulation. This is a rough distinction, but it has the virtue of emphasizing the performative, addressive, and pragmatic aspects of the rhetorical tradition, while acknowledging that rhetoric takes flight only on the wings of signification.

SEE ALSO: Barthes, Roland → Code → Constructivism → Film Theory → Genre → Habermas, Jürgen → Identification → Language and Social Interaction → Linguistics → Persuasion → Pragmatism → Realism → Rhetorical Studies → Semiotics → Sign → Sign Systems → Structuralism → Visual Communication

References and Suggested Readings

Research in rhetoric and social protest strives to discover how organized, uninstitutional forces use symbols and symbolic actions to promote or resist change in societal norms and values. Its focus ranges from interpersonal to mass communication, from the colonial period to the present, from moderate to radical elements, and from formal discourses to the rhetoric of the streets.

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, research in the rhetoric of social protest lay dormant in the field of communication, while rhetorical scholars pursued traditional studies of great men speaking well in times of crisis. However, studies of protest rhetoric developed rapidly in the late 1960s with the rise of the civil rights movement in the US, threats of confrontational “black power” advocates, and widespread protests opposing the war in Vietnam. Rhetorical scholars could no longer ignore threatening protestors, who were in their streets, on their campuses, and in their classrooms. Researchers, at first, viewed conflict and confrontation with its attendant strident rhetoric as problems to be avoided or resolved through reasoning and locating common ground. Problems (controversies rather than conflicts) were perceived as communication breakdowns or failures to communicate.

THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Simons (1972) was the first to challenge the “establishment bias” of rhetorical studies of social protest. He and others argued that while many questioned the rhetorical strategies and tactics of social protest, the protestors themselves faced nearly impossible rhetorical situations in which they were viewed as illegitimate, systematically denied access to normal channels and procedures, had virtually no powers of reward and punishment, and enjoyed neither legislative nor enforcement powers. Simons argued that methods of influence appropriate for “drawing room controversies” were ineffective in resolving conflicts in which neither party was willing or able to compromise. Confrontations were inevitable because they were clashes in which one party’s relative gain was the other’s relative loss. Simons described the essential nature of protest rhetoric as “coercive persuasion” designed to make institutions pay attention, address issues, and consider
change. Both Simons and Burgess (1973) claimed that coercive persuasion was inherently rhetorical because protestors had to persuade target audiences that dire consequences were likely, if not certain, before they would feel forced to comply, and that audiences must become convinced of the coercer’s probable capacity and intent to follow through with the threatened action.

When scholars began to study social protest rhetoric in earnest, doubts arose about the theoretical bases of such studies. After studying US president Johnson’s “war on poverty” as three establishment movements, Zarefsky (1977) questioned whether the life cycle and strategies being attributed to the rhetoric of social movements were unique to social protest or common to most campaigns and movements. He claimed that Johnson’s war on poverty followed the same cycle and employed the same strategies scholars claimed to be unique to non-establishment movements. McGee (1980) argued that the notion of a social movement was more "meaning" than "phenomenon" and concluded that the study of social movements, and therefore social protest, might become a theory of human consciousness but not a rhetorical theory.

Lucas (1980) challenged these criticisms by claiming that the roles of rhetoric in social protest could not be understood by merely looking at the formal properties of protest discourse or by applying self-evident propositions to the role of rhetoric in constructing social reality, but only by carefully analyzing the interaction of discourses with other social and situational factors that influence the process of protest rhetoric within social movements. Simons (1980) took a similar position, noting that strategies and life cycle were not the definitive characteristics of social movements. He traced situational theory to classical Greek rhetorical theory and identified common situational factors with which protestors must contend in their efforts to bring about or resist change. These factors made their rhetorical efforts unique, set them apart from establishment movements, and made them worthy of study. The emphasis on unique situational variables and the interaction of situational forces has significantly influenced the study of social protest rhetoric since the early 1980s.

**RHETORIC AND SOCIAL CONFLICT**

Rhetorical scholars have claimed that confrontational strategies in social protest are not only inevitable but essential to successful outcomes. Cathcart (1978) claimed that protestors must use such strategies to produce a **dialectical tension growing out of moral conflict** that provokes a clash with institutions and institutional leaders. The struggle becomes a moral battle for power and legitimacy to define and control the social order. To attain legitimacy in this moral struggle, protestors must strip institutions and their leaders of legitimacy by provoking confrontations that show how ugly institutions really are. The need to create this dialectical tension explains the use of symbolic actions and language strategies (vilification, obscenity, scapegoating, and polarization) to provoke repressive and sometimes violent reactions by institutional agents and agencies.

Researchers have also argued that conflict and controversy should not be avoided or stifled because both are critical to the development and improvement of society. Griffin (1969) employed the theories of Kenneth Burke when writing that to study social protests is to study strivings for salvation, perfection, and progress, rather than efforts to disrupt,
do harm, or destroy. Stewart et al. (2007) have advocated an interpretive systems approach that sees the potential of conflict to create opportunities for societal growth and progress, adaptation and evolution. These notions have led to studies aimed at understanding the rationales and purposes of extremist rhetoric, violence, riots, terrorism, and disruptive acts such as sit-ins and boycotts.

Since confrontations inherently involve two or more adversaries, researchers have studied the rhetorical strategies and tactics of institutions and counter-movements – a rhetoric of control – created to resist or stifle protest rhetoric in moral struggles for right and wrong, good and evil (Bowers et al. 1993). They have studied institutional efforts to control language, media, channels, information, expertise, and agendas, and strategies such as evasion, counterpersuasion (framing issues, enhancing fear appeals, challenging motives, denigrating the opposition), coercive persuasion (expulsion, restrictive laws, harassment, arrests), and adjustment. Some researchers have focused on the internal conflicts among individuals and groups fighting for essentially the same causes, including competing labor unions and moderate to radical organizations struggling for women’s rights, to preserve the environment, or to protect animals.

**FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES**

Studies from the 1950s to the 1990s often focused on the life cycle of social movements, many based on the research of sociologists and social psychologists. While usually avoiding the notion that social protest follows a linear life cycle, moving inevitably from one stage to another, researchers have attempted to discover recurring and changing rhetorical purposes, strategies, and ever-changing relationships. Recent efforts have focused on similarities and differences between first, second, and third wave feminism and environmentalism and how the perspectives of protestors are shaped and changed over time, for example, in the gay liberation and civil rights movements (Darsey 1991; Stewart 1997).

Rhetorical researchers have also conducted leader-centered studies. Simons’ (1970) classic essay has had profound effects on the study of protest rhetoric. He identified the requirements, problems, and dilemmas leaders must resolve through rhetorical strategies, and concluded that, while protestors are denied the controls enjoyed by institutional leaders and are harassed from outside, they must perform the same functions while trying to adapt to the external system (→Leadership in Organizations). Leaders of social protests must continually balance inherently conflicting demands on their positions and organizations. Stewart et al. (2007) studied the roles of protest leaders (organizers, decision-makers, and symbols), fundamental leadership characteristics based on Max Weber’s work (charisma, prophecy, and pragmatism), and how they sustain their leadership. Other researchers have focused on the rhetoric of individual leaders, including their use of narratives, the jeremiad, a feminine style, dialectic, argument from transcendence, perspective by incongruity, and framing. They have analyzed efforts to adapt to generic and situational constraints and to use what they have, including family, position, personal sufferings, and personal testimony.

Theorists have long advocated a functional approach to understanding social protest rhetoric and to constructing generalizations that apply to past and future protest activities.
This approach sees rhetoric as the agency through which protestors perform necessary functions (indispensable processes) that enable organized efforts to come into existence, to meet oppositions, and perhaps to succeed in bringing about or resisting change (Stewart 1980). Researchers have developed schemes of functions and identified which might be most prevalent during differing phases of social protest. Simons (1970) identified three general functions or requirements: attracting, maintaining and molding believers into effective organizations; securing adoption of their ideology by established institutions; and reacting to resistance from within and without. Stewart et al. (2007) have identified six critical functions: transforming perceptions of social reality, altering self-perceptions, legitimizing the protest effort, prescribing courses of action, mobilizing for action, and sustaining the effort. Gregg’s (1971) early functional study of ego enhancement has had major impact on research in social protest. He claimed that protest rhetoric was primarily self-directed because protestors must recognize and proclaim to self and others that their ego had been ignored or harmed to the point of disenfranchisement.

Many researchers have studied the channels protestors have used to transmit messages to believers, nonbelievers, and the opposition and to sustain their efforts. Such studies include artillery election sermons as a prelude to the American fight for independence, pamphleteering of anti-British colonialists, the radio addresses of the Rev. Charles Coughlin in the 1930s, the eulogies of Cesar Chavez, television coverage of feminism’s Strike for Equality, and video documentaries opposing abortion. Several studies addressed the rhetorical characteristics, purposes, strategies, and impact of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” Other research has focused on songs, slogans, the Internet, autobiographies, and memorials that recruit, celebrate, and recall past struggles to bring about change and equality and to sustain the struggles and gains of past protestors.


References and Suggested Readings

Aristotle defines rhetoric as the art of determining the available means of persuasion in a particular case. This can be interpreted in a number of ways. When considered narrowly, the study of rhetoric can be equated with the psychology of → persuasion or with informal logic. However, when that definition is read along with the rest of the Rhetoric, as well as the Ethics and the Politics, and in the context of the rhetorical instruction given by the Sophists and Isocrates, rhetoric is better understood as the theory and practice of civic → discourse (→ Rhetoric, Greek).

This civic orientation is, at least among American scholars working in communication departments, usually associated with the study of political oratory, or what is called public address (→ Rhetoric and History; Rhetoric and Politics). While studies of public address in the early to mid-twentieth century were often primarily descriptive or appreciative, the last three decades of that century saw the development of a systematic attempt to link rhetorical theory and the study of public address to the literature on political and social theory. This was anticipated in the work of Kenneth Burke, which was heavily influenced by Marx and Freud, in books such as Counter-statement (1931), A grammar of
motives (1945), and A rhetoric of motives (1950). Burke offered a philosophically rich account of the political and social implications of the human use of symbols. Rhetoric and social theory developed in the context of the “linguistic turn,” the resurgence of French and German social philosophy, and the consolidation of cultural studies in the humanities (→ Rhetoric and Philosophy). Rather than focusing on the artfulness or effect of particular speeches, rhetoric and social theory sought to identify the role that public discourse plays in social, cultural, and political processes (→ Rhetorics: New Rhetorics).

As a project, rhetoric and social theory has three trajectories. The first trajectory is analytic and descriptive, and directed toward properly identifying the manner in which public discourse mediates the development of politics and culture (→ Culture: Definitions and Concepts). The second trajectory is critical, and aims to identify the systematic distortions, biases, or interests produced or served by public discourse. These first two trajectories, when linked to a discussion of power, are often subsumed under the category of “critical rhetoric,” a term coined by Raymie McKerrow (1989). Finally, the third trajectory is to contribute to normative political philosophy by developing norms for democratic public communication.

The most influential American rhetorical scholars in the development of rhetoric and social theory in the late twentieth century include Michael Calvin McGee and Thomas B. Farrell, both because of their authorship of heavily cited essays in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, and because of their formative effect on doctoral students at the University of Iowa and Northwestern University, respectively. While they did not collaborate and their work is in many respects incompatible, it in large measure defined the boundaries of work that would follow. McGee, an anti-foundationalist, argued that rhetoric rather than philosophy was the source of political values such as “liberty” and “equality.” His work thus emphasized rhetoric’s ontological power. Farrell, a neo-Aristotelean, looked to Aristotle’s Rhetoric to develop an alternative to normative models of democratic communication developed by German political philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the best-known heir to the “Frankfurt School” of critical theory. Farrell, as such, emphasized rhetoric’s power to create social knowledge.

The rhetoric and social theory project was in large part successful, in that contemporary rhetorical studies is written in the context of and responds to German critical theory, cultural studies, feminism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism (→ Feminist and Gender Studies; Postmodernism and Communication; Rhetoric, Postmodern).


References and Suggested Readings

South Asia usually refers to the geo-cultural area traditionally known as the Indian subcontinent and consists of contemporary Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tibet, and the Maldives. The region has a rich tradition of conceptualization of the arts of argumentation, oration, and literary embellishment, marked by a flair for categorizing even the subtlest features.

In ancient India, the understanding of various forms of rhetoric practice was necessitated by cultural practices, including public deliberations in Vedic assemblies and post-Vedic republics, urban leisure cultures’ adulation of oratory (vacanam) and the aesthetic, the tradition of public debates to establish and defend academic and religious thoughts, and well-organized judicial and political systems (Rhetorical Studies).

Comprehensive theorizations of scholarly argumentation were reached at in logic (Nyāya) and other disciplines (Argumentative Discourse; Rhetoric, Argument, and Persuasion). Caraka (400 BCE), in his treatise on medicine, classifies debate into two types: friendly discussion between two scholars (Sandhāya sambhāṣā) and argumentation of two hostile scholars (Vigraha). Gautama (c. 200 CE), the founder of Nyāya, however, classifies argumentation (Kathā) into three categories: discussion for truth without fear of losing (Vāda), a debate where the debater censures the opponent’s thesis without establishing any counter-position (Vitanḍā), and debate for victory without care for the truth (Jalpa).

Sanatnī (c. 1000 CE) denies Vitanḍā any independent existence; Dharmakirti rejects all forms of debate except the Vāda. Gautama categorizes quibble (Chala) and false parity of reasoning (Jāti), the tricks used for victory in lieu of fair argumentation, and sub-varieties of these features. Gautama also identifies 22 categories of censuring a debate (Nigrahasthāna). Caraka and Maitreya (400 CE) prescribed some context-sensitive nonverbal strategies for public argumentation.

Emperor Ashoka (200 CE) proclaimed mutual tolerance, restraint of speech, and respect for the truth in each system as the basic principles of religious argumentation. Mughal Emperor Akbar (1500–1600 BCE) conceptualized “the path of reason” (Rah-I-Akl) as the guiding principle of interreligious dialogue.

Judicial argumentation was discussed in Dharmaśāstras, the Hindu treatises on law (200 BCE onwards), and Arthaśāstra, a treatise on polity by Kautilya (300 BCE). As testimonies were accorded importance, more than even divine tests, technical discussion on forms, qualities, and defects of legal argumentations (Vāda) are aplenty. Concise, relevant, reasonable,
unambiguous, capable of proof, understandable without an explanation, consistent, and nonfigurative submissions (Vākyā) are considered as ideal.

Arthaśāstra discusses the political rhetoric (→ Rhetoric and Politics). Persuasive verbal strategies used by spies and the composition of royal writs were discussed by Kautilya. He categorizes the qualities of royal writs as arrangement of the content (arthakarma), relevance (samvandha), completeness (paripurnatā), sweetness (mādhurya), dignity (audārya), and lucidity (spastatva).

Caraka, Kautilya, and Sushruta detailed a comprehensive system of technical textual composition (Tantra-yukti) having more than 30 clearly explained and categorized stylistic and logical devices (Tantra), including content (vidhāna), quotation (apadeśā), doubt (samasyā), derivation (nirvacana), and exception (apavarga) (→ Invention and Rhetoric; Style and Rhetoric).

Sanskrit aestheticians’ endeavors in understanding the sources of literary persuasiveness focused on rhetoric figures. Bharata (c. 200 BCE), in Nātyaśāstra, the most ancient available treatise on poetics, identifies four literary figures – Upamā, Rūpaka, Dipaka, and Yamaka (simile, metaphor, zeugma, and homophony). Later theoreticians’ insistence on categorizing finer differences of rhetoric strategies proliferated figures and sub-figures. With the contributions of generations of scholars through the centuries, the number of figures had risen to 136 by the thirteenth century (in Appayadikshita’s Chitramimāṃsā). However, the search for broader categories to understand the general ornamentality of literary writings also led to the concepts of Soundrya (beauty) and Vakratva (deviance) being propounded as defining categories of literary writings (→ Rhetoric and Poetics).

Aestheticians of other languages of the region also show comparable engagement with literary rhetoric. Though ancient Tamil aestheticians did not invest in subtle details, the Tolkaippiyam, the earliest available Tamil treatise on poetics (c. 100 BCE), recognizes simile (Uvamam or Uvamai) as the most important literary technique and dedicates one full chapter to the subject. Siyabaslakara (c. 900 CE), the oldest prose work in Sinhalese, the Sri Lankan language, is a treatise on rhetoric. Other important works like Dandyālakara sama and Siyabās Lakuṇa (c. 1200–1300 CE) continue the engagement. These works in general share close affinity with Sanskrit aestheticians’ understanding of rhetoric, Dandyālakara sama being itself a commentary on Dandi’s work, the Kāvyādarśa.

With the spread of Muslim education during the medieval period, classical Arabic and Persian thinking became, and continued to be, an indispensable part of the south Asian knowledge system (→ Communication Modes, Muslim). Though some insights are offered on the art of oratory, as in the Bayān-wa-al-Tabyīn of Jahiz, classical Arabic and Persian thinking accords much importance to rhetorical aspects of literary works. Led by scholars like Al-Mubarad, Ibn-al-Mutaz, Qudama-bin-Jafar, Rashid al-Din Vatvat, Qays al-Razi, and Sad al-Din Taftazani, the tradition offers multidimensional understanding of the nature and categories of rhetoric figures and composition styles.

During the past two centuries, elements of western rhetoric have been incorporated into the south Asian knowledge system. However, the idea of rhetoric as a discipline covering areas other than literary figures has failed to gain circulation. In the west, Oliver (1971) and Kennedy (1998) have offered brief introductions to rhetorical practices of ancient India within a comparative framework. Though constrained by lack of access to
important primary sources, these works take into account various areas of rhetorical practices other than the literary. In south Asia, however, non-innovative exposition of classical rhetoric figures in contemporary literary contexts has become predominant with a few comparative and interactive exceptions. Chakraborty (1988) offers valuable insights on possible interaction between western and Sanskrit rhetoric figures by identifying examples of western figures like asyndeton, anticlimax, etc. in contemporary Bengali literature and simultaneously noting how the finer peculiarities of various types of comparison-based rhetoric practices of the western literatures, overlooked by the western system, can be effectively categorized under the Sanskrit figures. Karickam (1999) provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of the Indian (Dravidian and Sanskrit) and western rhetoric figures, preparing the base for further interactivity.

SEE ALSO: Argumentative Discourse Communication Modes, Muslim Invention and Rhetoric Rhetoric, Argument, and Persuasion Rhetoric in the Middle East Rhetoric and Poetics Rhetoric and Politics Rhetorical Studies Style and Rhetoric

References and Suggested Readings


Rhetoric in the South Pacific

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Since the “new rhetorical” movement of the 1960s, the definition of rhetoric has expanded to encompass a variety of theories and movements, technologies and innovations, thereby raising the question of how rhetoric is understood and employed in the twenty-first century (→ Rhetorics: New Rhetorics). While its rich connection with composition studies has increased the profile, popularity, and applications of rhetoric in North America, the emphasis on composition or academic writing as a mainstay of tertiary education is not nearly so widespread in the South Pacific. As a result, the term “rhetoric” is regarded dubiously.

Popular uses of the word as a term of denigration, such as “rhetoric of the media,” “just rhetoric,” “empty rhetoric,” and “political rhetoric,” have propagated images of trickery, deception, or simply the antithesis of reality. In academic circles, “rhetoric” is too often perceived as synonymous with remedial, with “fixing up” bad writing, with teaching grammar,
and with decorating language (→ Style and Rhetoric). However, progressive programs in the region reject these narrow definitions of rhetoric and see it instead as a valuable element of new textual cultures, particularly digital cultures. The five canons of classical rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery) have enjoyed a revival in everyday written and oral communication as a direct result of the information age. Particularly in online environments, critical applications of rhetoric are vital for managing, interpreting, and processing data (→ Technology and Communication; Rhetoric and Technology).

When considered in light of Andrea Lunsford’s definition of rhetoric as the study of human communication, the South Pacific region becomes a rich environment for “communication studies.” Claire Woods, Director of International Programs for the School of Communication, Information, and New Media at the University of South Australia, argues that rhetoric is central to a critical understanding of textual culture, to developing “an understanding of the theoretical and applied work involved in the tekhnē of text production as readers, writers, makers and receivers of multi-genre textual forms” (2007; → Text and Intertextuality).

The English Department at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, offers a curriculum that features classical rhetoric and “writing studies” in much the same tradition as North American universities. This department is a leader in rhetorical studies in the region, and is one of very few to include courses in “rhetoric” alongside more mainstream degree requirements.

The emphasis on communication studies, however, is perhaps best demonstrated by the region’s ever-evolving understanding of and increasing appreciation for its indigenous people. Studies of Aboriginal life writing have grown in popularity over recent decades and have awakened the region to its earliest histories of communication, in written, oral, and graphic forms. In Writing never arrives naked (2006), Penny van Toorn explores the involvement of Indigenous Australians in the colonizers’ paper culture, and describes how Aboriginal people used the written word, creatively and resourcefully, for self-empowerment and survival (→ Culture and Communication, Ethnographic Perspectives on).

In Comparative rhetoric, George Kennedy writes that “evidence for traditional aboriginal rhetoric comes from an extensive body of prose myths and religious and secular song, which can be classified as epideictic in that its primary function was the transmission and reaffirmation of the beliefs and values of the community” (1998, 60; → Rhetoric, Epideictic).

As Edward Corbett, widely regarded as an unassuming giant of twentieth-century rhetoric, described it, rhetoric is the “enabling discipline” that crosses cultures and blurs boundaries. Though not always referred to as “rhetoric,” this classical art is ever present in the South Pacific and remains a pillar of ethical and meaningful human communication.

SEE ALSO: ▶ Culture and Communication, Ethnographic Perspectives on ▶ Rhetoric, Epideictic ▶ Rhetoric and Technology ▶ Rhetorical Studies ▶ Rhetorics: New Rhetorics ▶ Style and Rhetoric ▶ Technology and Communication ▶ Text and Intertextuality

References and Suggested Readings
Rhetoric and Technology

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Rhetoric as the study of forms of self-expression has many meanings depending on the context in which it is used. For theorists and practitioners of public speech, it is concerned primarily with the study of persuasion (→ Rhetoric, Argument, and Persuasion). For those interested in cultivation of effective expression, rhetoric concerns the use of style and development of polished writing and speaking (→ Style and Rhetoric). Rhetoric has been the subject of scholarly theory and analysis in education since at least the fourth century BCE, when Aristotle developed his theories of artistic proof and stylistic expression in On rhetoric (Aristotle 1991; → Rhetoric, Greek; Rhetorical Studies).

INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON RHETORIC

Aristotle’s On rhetoric exemplifies the ways in which technology has influenced rhetoric. The advent of writing in Greek culture meant that public oratory would be influenced by technical developments in inscribed expression. The adoption of writing in a previously oral culture precipitated interest in sequential logic and prescribed forms of organization. As Walter J. Ong (1982, 9) noted, “writing from the beginning did not reduce orality but enhanced it, making it possible to organize the ‘principles’ or constituents of oratory into a scientific ‘art,’ a sequentially ordered body of explanation that showed how and why oratory achieved and could be made to achieve its various specific effects.” Pursuing this same line of work, Ong traced the work of Ramus, a sixteenth-century educator who developed pedagogical theories during the shift from oral to print culture and literacy. Ramus produced grand display schematics that “proceeded by cold-blooded definitions and divisions, until every last particle of the subject had been dissected and disposed of” (Ong 1982, 134). Ramus’s visual displays and diagrams were remarkably well suited to dissemination in the new medium of print (→ Media History; Medium Theory; Rhetoric and Orality-Literacy Theorems).

The digitization of print technologies in the late twentieth century has further influenced the nature and form of rhetoric (→ Digitization and Media Convergence; Printing, History of). Early affordances introduced by digitization included use of new fonts and hypertext commentary on primary texts (Lanham 1993). Further development of hypertext markup language (HTML) in the 1990s provided enhanced possibilities for rhetorical expression.
that included embedded supporting hyperlinks, producers’ ability to track users’ movements through sites, automated personalization of messages delivered to users, and interactive user interfaces. These technical capacities of the new medium have been also combined with persuasive appeals in the form of animations and multimedia content to create online platforms that are highly effective for rhetorical expression (Farkas & Farkas 2002; Burnett & Marshall 2003).

The distinction between expressive forms seen in earlier media contexts and those associated with new media has been clarified by Lev Manovich (2001). He observed that an important difference between prior media and new media is that the latter are computerized. Whether it be a text or visual image, the new media object originates on computers and is comprised of digital code and subject to algorithmic manipulation (Digital Imagery). Because it has been converted using mathematical functions, digital text is modular and is comprised of independent, separate elements such as pixels, hyperlinks, gif and jpeg elements, and media clips. These elements can be disaggregated, rearranged, and re-presented through automated processes. Thus, a good deal of digital media content is produced through the cooperation of multiple agents who produce variable texts that can be tailored to individual users, rather than unified, stable texts designed for mass audiences. As Manovich noted, another dimension of the digitally constituted text is its variability. Instead of a master text or copy that is created and stored, a digital text may give way to many versions as the text is altered automatically through periodic updates and processually through actions taken by users. This process has been termed “co-production” and viewed as a collaborative constitution of the text, in which content is jointly produced by authors and users (Text and Intertextuality).

THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

The need to study and analyze co-produced texts has led some scholars in the humanities to turn to the work of prominent theorists such as Roland Barthes (1977) and Mikhail Bakhtin (1981). Barthes’ work shifted the critic’s focus from the author as sole producer of an oral or written message to the reader or consumer of the text. Barthes believed that an author-centered orientation worked from the perspective of the “readerly text” – a finished work that views the author as the center of meaning production. This is in contrast to what Barthes labeled the “writerly text” – one which is incomplete, plural, and indeterminate, thus calling upon the reader to supply or fill in meaning. Barthes’ view of text as a network in which meaning emerges along a horizon of possible significations aligns well with digital expression as experienced in contemporary media environments, where texts are produced through corporate authorship, constantly revised, often borrowed, and frequently parasitic on the other texts to which they are linked. Analysts and critics of rhetorical expression working from Barthes’ framework often consider the range of possible meanings and construals of a persuasive message and how it might be taken up, rather than emphasizing the purported intention of its author in interpreting its meaning. (Rhetoric and Semiotics; Semiotics).

Because Bakhtin viewed artistic expression as seen in novelistic prose as interweaving the speech of the author, the characters, the various forms of expression in the host culture, and what is said in other texts, his theories have also been quite pertinent to study of
rhetorical expression in certain current media forums. For example, the world wide web is host to many forms of heteroglossic speech, such as multiply authored sites, intertextual satire, parody, group discussion and deliberation, and other contexts where many voices blend and clash (→ Internet). In such an environment, it is useful to consider persuasion in multiply authored sites as an expression of orientations that evolve from multiple forms of expression and points of view.

METHODS AND STUDIES

The study of online persuasion has included various methods of analysis and criticism. For example, Laura Gurak’s (1997) study of text-based discussion in listservs, newsgroups, and email used a → case study method to examine persuasion practices among people protesting actions that they considered to be a threat to online privacy. Gurak considered participants’ use of form letters, petitions, and the patterns of their dissemination as well as the content of the messages circulated to explain why the agents against whom they were protesting acceded to their demands. In a later study of web-based protest, Gurak and her co-author John Logie (2003) considered member protest against online service provider Yahoo! in 1999 by using a comparative case study method. They demonstrated that the structure of hypertext discourse on the web enabled actions that would not have been possible in earlier text-based communication. These included defacement of existing websites, redirection of users to alternate sites, and use of notices and site placement to establish a single website as a central node in the protest action. These two studies indicate how the rapid grow of the web and its associated technologies changed the form and effectiveness of online protest over time (→ Rhetoric and Social Protest).

A second line of research on rhetorical discourse in new media environments is from a critical perspective. For example, Susan Herring studied the roles and nature of online communication involving women for over 15 years. In a 2001 retrospective of trends relating to gender, she used → discourse analysis to trace the ways in which gender differences emerged in control of online interaction and nature of online messages (→ Mediated Social Interaction). In the Internet’s early days, when women were a small minority of Internet users, they were often harassed or dismissed by participants in online discussions. The advent of the web brought with it online pornography, which objectified women and exploited their representations for personal gain (→ Sex and Pornography Online). By the 2000s, online content came to be dominated by commercialized representations that positioned women as having a need to please others and improve themselves. Herring’s current work has considered practices of self-representation produced by women in personal home pages, online meeting sites, and on webcams to describe the ways in which online gender representation has continued to be stereotypical (→ Stereotypes).

Rhetorical criticism, a method of analysis that focuses on text-based persuasive strategies and how they function to influence users, has also been used to study online discourse (→ Rhetorical Criticism). This mode of criticism closely examines uses of expressive form, placement, genre, argument, visual image, and other means of symbolic representation that are used to persuade audiences. For example, a rhetorical criticism of web-based discourse would consider site layout, the link structure, ease of use, and the means by which site design is planned to encourage repeat visitors and increase site usability. Such
an approach might also examine site elements such as interactivity and intertextuality as they are used to promote user involvement with site content, as well as the means by which site authors seek to establish their ethos, or credibility, with audiences (Warnick 2007; → Ethos and Rhetoric).

As communication and information technologies develop, the means used to persuade audiences are likely to change as well (→ Technology and Communication). During the classical period, additional logical forms emerged and exposition became increasingly linear. In the late nineteenth century in the United States, training in oratory emphasized dramatic use of the voice and elaborate gestures to convey content to large audiences in the absence of devices for oral projection of the voice. By the early twenty-first century, the Internet made possible new forms of immediate and highly visual persuasive expression. In each case, rhetoric has adapted to the communication contexts in which it has been used, and there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue in the future.


References and Suggested Readings

The rhetorical tradition began with, and has remained linked to, the public discourse of official forums. Aristotle named these deliberative, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric (→ Rhetoric, Greek). Although these first appeared as genres and later included additional forms of address, such as the sermon and the essay, the distinctive focus of rhetorical theory and criticism into the mid-twentieth century remained on speaking and writing. With some notable exceptions, these genres were typically delivered in an official site, such as a legislative chamber, or by a person who was in a position of power, such as the leader of a movement. They are captured by the category of “public address.” From the mid-1960s this category was challenged on a number of fronts, such as its inability to account for protest rhetoric, the rhetoric of new media, or that of marginalized groups, which became subjects of inquiry among rhetoricians (→ Rhetoric and Social Protest). In the mid-1990s, this challenge was extended theoretically and critically to reconsider excluded voices without access to official sites, voices that are not in positions of leadership, or whose modes of expression do not take the form of public address or formal essay, by considering them as they were manifested in vernacular exchanges, or vernacular rhetoric.

Vernacular rhetoric is variously understood as deliberation and opinion formation reflecting the rhetoric of the everyday (Hauser 1999), rhetoric of the people (McGee 1975), mundane rhetorical performances within a culture that shape it as a culture (Ono & Sloop 1995), and a critique of culture and a mode of resistance that makes power relations visible (Calafell & Delgado 2004; Hauser 2006; Holling 2006; Ono & Sloop 1995; Sloop & Ono 1997). Irrespective of these differences, those who study vernacular rhetoric examine “texts” that are outside power, and often as they interact with power. They contain the voices of citizens who do not hold office, do not have access to official forums, and whose expression of opinions and sentiments exerts influence more through its logic of circulation than as a significant official statement.

Usually vernacular rhetoric consists of discourses that circulate within a particular group or community, such as a street gang. It may also include the range of expression outside power directed to pervasive concerns and issues or signal events, such as how lay people discuss euthanasia. And it may include artistic expression and images that reflect commitments and sentiments of some identifiable social unit, such as an identity group, a social movement, or a significant cross-section of a nation as these are expressed in the public sphere (Finnegan & Kang 2004).

Study of vernacular modes of expression has opened rhetoric studies to areas heretofore ignored by the discipline. Vernacular rhetoric does not necessarily frame issues in the same way as authority, often uses different topoi, and is commonly expressed through alternative media, such as the Internet (Holling 2006), visual images (Calafell & Delgado 2004), the body (Hauser 2006), or other means of materiality to make different arguments from those expressed in official public spheres by the elite voices of the empowered. These differences are important for what they reveal about dimensions of
human experience; invention and expression of community, subjectivity, and identity; and resistance and aspiration as they are expressed by people in their everyday lives, often in hush harbors, sometimes under conditions of overt oppression, but always drawn from the community. Sometimes they may reflect and circulate the ideas of authority figures, sometimes they may influence the expression of authority figures (Hauser 1999), but sometimes the ideas and sentiments circulating in everyday discourse may frame life’s realities in ways that are quite different from, and are a critique of, those of authority (Sloop and Ono 1997). Regardless of how they relate to official expressions, they are an essential voice in a social dialogue that shapes a human world of values, ideas, beliefs, emotions, celebrations, and actions.

Within this frame, studies of vernacular rhetoric are an extension of the mid-twentieth century shift in rhetoric study’s focus from producing influential communication to exploring rhetoric as a social practice (Burke 1969; Rhetorics: New Rhetorics). This line of thought argued that society could not be understood without taking into account how humans use symbols – speaking and writing primarily but not exclusively – to shape social realities, which, in turn, constitute a human world. Because the rhetorical perspective toward language use always considers it as addressed, theorizing rhetoric as a social practice means it must be regarded as a performance that is always enacted ensemble.

The shift from production to social performance has had the significant consequence of decentering the privileged position of the speech or the essay as the focus of rhetoric scholars. In this respect, those who study vernacular rhetoric join a number of other schools within the discipline in addressing major questions now to the fore in rhetoric studies: how do we establish social identification through our modes of social discourse; what do our modes of rhetorical exchange reveal about a shared sense of identity and a shared reality; how does ensemble performance, which shifts from “an audience” addressed to “a public” that forms through networks of everyday rhetorical exchanges, challenge the definition and locus of agency, subjectivity, public memory, identity, and epistemology?

In addition to these questions, there are major challenges facing the study of vernacular rhetoric that are, to some degree, sui generis. How is a text constructed when the discourse, unlike a speech or a diary, is not continuous? The evidence of vernacular rhetoric is often like archeological shards that must be pieced together from fragments of significant symbolic performances. Does vernacular rhetoric have a logic or multiple logics of circulation? Must such logic(s) necessarily challenge those of official voices? This question is central to critique of vernacular rhetoric, since some, following Ono and Sloop (1997), always regard it as already “outlaw” rhetoric, while others, following Hauser (1999), regard it as an exchange out of power that, while constitutive of community, is often a mode of citizen deliberation that is not necessarily a mode of resistance.

Finally, what are the methodological implications that accompany studying vernacular rhetoric? The humanities have traditionally deployed methodologies suited to textual analysis of specific artifacts, such as the painting, the drama, or the public address. Although vernacular rhetoric may take these forms, it is more commonly found in everyday exchanges that require participant observation if not ethnographic methods (Rhetoric and Ethnography). Combining non-traditional methods with traditional methods poses intellectual challenges, but also opens an avenue to bringing the humanities to the street.
If visuality is understood broadly as the practices, performances, and configurations of the appearances, then the relationship between rhetoric and visuality is as old as the art of rhetoric itself. The ancients tied rhetoric to the world of mimesis, or the appearances, rather than to the realm of philosophical truth; this relationship has often unfairly relegated both rhetoric and the visual to subordinate status in the Platonic regime of knowledge (Kennedy 2001). Yet in the ancient tradition the visual is constitutive of rhetoric in a number of ways (Rhetoric, Greek). The canon of delivery references visuality in its emphasis on gesture, movement, and performance (Kjeldsen 2003; Delivery and Rhetoric; Gestures in Discourse). The trope of ekphrasis (literally “bringing-before-the-eyes”) and Aristotle’s notion of phantasia reference the ability of rhetoric to create images in the mind and cultivate affective grounds for judgment (O’Gorman 2005; Pathos and Rhetoric; Rhetoric, Epideictic). Sight is framed as a powerful influence on persuasion by Quintilian, who divided images into the categories of pictorial images and
mental images, and argued that the best orators created visions (visiones) in their listeners’ minds (Scholz 2001; Kjeldsen 2003; → Rhetoric, Roman).

A contemporary discussion of the relationship of rhetoric to visuality would position itself in relation to the rise of visual culture studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The concept of visuality emerged in the 1980s as a key term of the poststructuralist turn in art history (→ Art as Communication; Visual Culture). Hal Foster’s germinal collection, Vision and visuality (1988), which featured the work of scholars such as Jonathan Crary and Martin Jay, notably framed visuality as the recognition that vision is socially constructed and historically constrained; how we see is not natural but tied to the historically specific ways that we learn to see. Jay (1996) usefully lists a range of concepts and theorists associated with the study of visuality, most importantly the gaze (Laura Mulvey), surveillance and panopticism (Michel Foucault), → spectacle (Guy Debord), → scopic regime (Christian Metz and Martin Jay), the mirror stage (Jacques Debord), and the pictorial turn (W. J. T. Mitchell; → Spectator Gaze). The concept of the pictorial turn has been of particular interest to rhetorical scholars because it encourages scholars to revisit relationships between image and text, and marks a growing recognition that the visual is not reducible to the operations of language or text (Mitchell 1994).

In the field of communication, scholars’ attention to the rhetorical aspects of visuality in this poststructuralist sense is relatively recent, though attention to the rhetoric of visual artifacts goes back several decades. The 1971 Wingspread Conference “Report of the Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism” famously argued that rhetorical critics should pay increased attention to visual artifacts, performances, and media (→ Rhetorical Criticism). While scholars after Kenneth Burke accepted the notion that rhetoric was best conceived broadly as symbolic action of all kinds, it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that a critical mass of scholars began conducting → case studies of visual artifacts such as murals, → posters, → documentary film, → television, political → prints, and memorials; their interests are reflected in Martin J. Medhurst and Thomas Benson’s (1984) edited collection, Rhetorical dimensions in media (→ Rhetoric and Media Studies). Partly as a result of the growing disciplinary acceptance of rhetorical analysis of visual artifacts, and partly as a result of the rise of attention to visuality in the humanities more generally, by the late 1990s what was coming to be called “visual rhetoric” had begun to coalesce into a recognizable sub-field of rhetorical studies in communication departments. Scholars not only continued their decades-long interest in exploring the rhetorical aspects of historical and contemporary visual artifacts, they also began to attend to issues of visuality more explicitly. Today, communication scholars working at the intersection of rhetoric and visuality concern themselves with a wide variety of theoretical, critical, and historical questions, including the practices of visibility and invisibility, the role of spectacle in the → public sphere, rhetorical histories of viewing, the role of image appropriation and circulation in public culture, and the complex relationships among rhetoric, the body, and cultural performance (Prelli 2006; Olson et al. 2008).

SEE ALSO: → Art as Communication → Case Studies → Delivery and Rhetoric → Documentary Film → Gestures in Discourse → Image → Nonverbal Communication and Culture → Pathos and Rhetoric → Poster → Prints → Public Sphere → Rhetoric, Epeidectic → Rhetoric, Greek → Rhetoric and Media Studies → Rhetoric, Nonverbal
The tradition of rhetorical theory and practice in Britain is longstanding and vibrant. In the Middle Ages, Britain produced important contributions to rhetorical theory. The Venerable Bede (c. 672/73–735), for instance, provided a treatment of the stylistic aspects of discourse in his *De schematicibus et tropis*, and Alcuin (c. 735–804), the British-born tutor of and advisor to Charlemagne, left us his *Disputatio de rhetorica et de virtutibus*, a dialogue in which emperor and teacher explore the theoretical underpinnings of civic discourse in the Ciceronian tradition (→ Rhetoric, Medieval). While the practice of public address was quite limited during the period, British rhetorics explored the persuasive elements of verse, and monastic libraries in the British Isles preserved manuscripts of some of the key rhetorical texts of late antiquity.

While the Renaissance came relatively late to Britain, it brought continental influence to the rhetorics Britain produced (→ Rhetoric, European Renaissance). Humanist texts such as Leonard Cox’s *Arte or crafte of rethoryke* (1530) and Thomas Wilson’s *Arte of rhetorique* (1553) had a decidedly Ciceronian flavor. Cox treated invention (the ancient canon of discovering ideas or developing lines of argument) by drawing upon Roman
theories of the *loci communes* (argumentative commonplaces; → Invention and Rhetoric). Wilson offered a full-blown treatment of all five *officia* of Ciceronian rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery) and adapted them to the needs of a Tudor audience. Both of these works were heavily influenced by the theories of Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), the German humanist theologian, whose *Institutiones rhetoricae* (1521) provided a four-fold division of the art (judgment, invention, disposition, elocution) compatible with both antiquity and Protestant Christianity.

Britain also produced stylistic and Ramistic rhetorics in the sixteenth century. Richard Sherry’s *Treatise of schemes and tropes* (1550) and Henry Peacham’s *Garden of eloquence* (1577) treated expression, the stylistic aspect of rhetoric (→ Style and Rhetoric). John Jewell (*Oratio contra rhetoricam*, 1548), Gabriel Harvey (*Rhetor*, 1575; *Ciceronianus*, 1576), and Douglas Fenner (*The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike*, 1584) all gave voice to different aspects of Ramus’s attack on Ciceronian rhetoric (→ Rhetoric and Dialectic).

In terms of diversity and innovation, rhetoric reached its zenith in Britain during the Enlightenment. Rhetorical theories developed along five broad lines of inquiry. The first of these is the neo-classical or neo-Ciceronian. In John Holmes’ *Art of rhetoric made easy* (1755), John Lawson’s *Lectures concerning oratory* (1758), and especially John Ward’s *System of oratory* (1759), British writers crafted theories of rhetoric that adapted the broadly classical concerns of the orator in public controversy to the somewhat changed environment of Enlightenment Britain. These theories considered the civic goals of rhetorical discourse, the orator’s argumentative resources, and the situations or causes (legal, political, occasional, and religious) he might confront.

A second and related line of inquiry considered rhetoric as an art of criticism and conversation. This line, the belletristic, expanded rhetoric to include literature, historical writing, and even epic poetry. Concerned largely with matters of taste, style, and sublimity, belletristic rhetoric shifted attention from the production of discourse to its reception. In his *Elements of criticism* (1762), Henry Home, Lord Kames, offered a nearly pure form of belletristic rhetoric, while Adam Smith’s *Lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres* (delivered 1762–1763) and Hugh Blair’s *Lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres* (1783) created rhetorics that combined neo-classical and belletristic concerns.

A third line of theory might broadly be called the philosophical, for it resulted from the quest to explain persuasion in light of contemporary advances in psychology and philosophy of mind. George Campbell, in his *Philosophy of rhetoric* (1776), drew upon both Thomas Reid’s commonsense philosophy and David Hume’s radically different conceptions of human thought and crafted a rhetoric rooted in faculty psychology, inductive processes, and the passions and judgments of the audience (→ Rhetoric and Philosophy). Hume himself, in his essays on eloquence, taste, and essay writing, assessed contemporary eloquence in light of the ancients and also suggested that women be included in the sphere of intelligent discourse.

Students were exposed most directly to a fourth kind of rhetoric, the lectures provided in the schools and universities. Robert Watson, George Jardine, William Greenfield, William Leechman, Archibald Arthur, and many others toiled in near obscurity but provided students with a version of rhetoric that was situated in the moral philosophy course. They taught students that rhetoric was best considered in its relationship to other moral studies, including what today would be called theology, psychology, philosophy of mind,
ethics, jurisprudence, and logic. These teachers tended to make rhetoric subordinate to logic and limited to matters of style, taste, and criticism.

One final type of rhetoric, the elocutionary, focused almost exclusively on delivery of the speech (→ Delivery and Rhetoric). Thomas Sheridan, in his *Course of lectures on elocution* (1762), argued that a correct and powerful speaking voice would improve not only the speech but also the moral character of the individual and the institutions about which he spoke. Elocutionary theories tended to de-emphasize the invention or substantive aspects of the art.

The eighteenth century also saw a dramatic increase in the quality and quantity of oratorical discourse. Preachers in the pulpits of the Scottish Kirk and the Anglican Church, advocates and barristers in the courts, and MPs in parliament made public discourse a central part of civic life, and illegal reports of political orations fed the public’s growing appetite for speech texts. Political discourse of the period is best exemplified by the epic battles between Pitt the Elder and Horatio Walpole and the speeches of Burke and Pitt the Younger on the French and American revolutions.

SEE ALSO: ► Delivery and Rhetoric ► Invention and Rhetoric ► Rhetoric and Dialectic ► Rhetoric, European Renaissance ► Rhetoric, Medieval ► Rhetoric and Philosophy ► Style and Rhetoric

**References and Suggested Readings**


