Misappearing Pleasure: *Philebus* 41a7-42c3

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Following his argument for false anticipatory pleasure at *Philebus* 36c3-40e5, Socrates argues for a second way that pleasure can be false (41a7-42c3).¹ Socrates’ argument for false anticipatory pleasure has received a great deal of scholarly attention.² His argument for the second kind of false pleasure has received little.³

¹ τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἦμιν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον. τούτω γάρ ἵσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις’. (41a7-b2)

Frede, in Cooper (1997), 430, translates 'τρόπον' as 'sense'; but this is misleading since the meaning of 'false' here is the same as in the preceding case of anticipatory pleasure.

² Gosling (1959); Kenny (1960); Gosling, (1961); McLaughlin (1969); Dybikowski (1970); Penner (1970); Gosling (1975); Brandt (1977); Gosling and Taylor (1982), 429-53; Frede (1985); Frede (1992); Frede (1997); Bravo (1995); Mooradian (1996); de La Taille (1999); Teisserenc (1999); Pradeau (2002), 50-7; Delcomminette (2003); Harte (2004); Russell (2005), 176-93; Delcomminette (2006), esp. 349-424; Evans (2008).

Several scholars have described the second kind of false pleasure as pleasure of 'overestimation'.\(^4\) However, the pleasure in question may involve underestimation as well as overestimation. In addition, estimation is doxastic or judgmental. But Socrates explicitly distinguishes the pleasure in question from *doxa*. This is in fact crucial to the way he views the second kind of false pleasure as complementing, by opposition, false anticipatory pleasure. In concluding his account of the second kind of false pleasure, Socrates remarks:

This is the opposite (*enantion*) of what occurred before [that is, in the case of false anticipatory pleasure] … In the former case, true and false beliefs (*doxai*) filled up the pains and pleasures with their condition [that is, their truth-value].\(^5\)

Socrates does not further clarify the opposition between the two cases. However, in light of his foregoing accounts, I take the opposition he has in mind to be the following. In the case of the second kind of false pleasure, true and false pains and pleasures fill up beliefs with their truth-value. In short, in the case of false anticipatory pleasure false belief engenders false pleasure; but in the present case false pleasure engenders false belief. My exposition of Socrates' argument for the second kind of false pleasure will corroborate this interpretation.

More broadly, my aim in this paper is to clarify Socrates' argument for the second kind of false pleasure. Since, as I will argue, Socrates holds that it is precisely the false


\(^5\) *Phlb.* 42a5-9: "Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σομικρόν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν ... Τότε μὲν ἀι δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμα τοῦ παρ’ αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπιμπλασαν*. 
appearance (phainomenon) of the pleasure that engenders false belief, I will hereafter refer to this second kind of false pleasure as 'misappearing' pleasure. The dearth of secondary literature on Socrates' account of misappearing pleasure provides some justification for my discussion. But I hope to show that Socrates' argument is of broader philosophical interest, both with respect to the Philebus as a whole and with respect to Plato's corpus still more broadly.

Before turning to the details of Socrates' argument, I want to say a word about the relation of my paper to the topic of the conference, Plato and the power of images. Consider the Müller-Lyer illusion. This illusion suggests that the mind, at least to some extent, is modular. The information that a certain kind of perceptual appearance encodes is resistant to other information available to consciousness. Believing and even knowing that the lines are the same length has no effect on how they perceptually appear. This is one sort of power that a certain kind perceptual appearance or image has. Here, possibly, is another. Insofar as the Müller-Lyer illusion is an illusion, it is a misrepresentation. Can there be misrepresentation without truth-value? I'm not sure. The answer depends on an adequate theory of representation as well as truth-value. At any rate, if misrepresentation requires truth-value and if the Müller-Lyer illusion is indeed a case of misrepresentation, then there can be truth-value without belief.

In his argument for misappearing pleasure, Socrates engages with the relations between appearance, aisthēsis, doxa, and truth-value. He is especially concerned with the idea that perceptual appearance may have a kind of cognitive independence from belief and possibly that perceptual appearance may have truth-value independently of belief. These concerns are salient in Socrates' argument because the argument is, precisely,
concerned with perceptual appearances, especially with perceptual appearances of pleasure and pain. Now, we may not think of pleasures and pains as forms of perception; but Plato does. He thinks of them as forms of proprioception. For example, when one stubs one's toe and feels pain, the painful feeling or algesic experience is, on Plato's view, an appearance of bodily damage or disorder. Given that Plato thinks there are algesic and hedonic appearances, he also thinks that some such appearances can be illusory. In other words, he thinks that pleasures and pains can mis-appear.

So much for preliminaries. I turn now to scrutinize Socrates' argument for misappearing pleasure; and I'll begin by further clarifying its context. As I have suggested, the argument occurs within a central stretch of the dialog during which Socrates defends the view that there are various kinds of false pleasure. False anticipatory pleasure is the first kind of false pleasure for which Socrates argues. The gist of Socrates' argument for false anticipatory pleasure is as follows. Assume a man believes that he is going to come into a lot of money. There is, Socrates suggests, a sort of scribe in the psyche who inscribes this content into the man's psyche, and the inscription is believed. Assume that the doxastic content is false. That is, what the man believes is false. Then, Socrates suggests, the complex state of belief, that is, the attitude of believing and the doxastic content believed, inherit the truth-value of the doxastic content. In other words, the complex is false. A second psychological operation may accompany belief. There is a

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sort of painter in the psyche, and the painter depicts an image of the man indulging himself with the wealth he believes he is going to acquire. This picture or *eikôn* in the psyche is based on the man's belief, and it inherits the truth-value of the belief. In other words, it too is false. Finally, the man takes pleasure in this image of himself; and the hedonic complex consisting of his attitude of taking pleasure and the iconic object in which he takes pleasure inherits the same truth-value. Hence, Socrates concludes, a false pleasure occurs.

Note that in this account of false anticipatory pleasure, imagery and the pleasure taken in it derive their truth-value from the truth-value of belief and doxastic content. That is, in this case doxastic content is the primary bearer of truth-value. The complex consisting of the doxastic attitude and its content derives its truth-value from that of the doxastic content itself; imagery derives its truth-value from the former; and the complex of the hedonic attitude and its object finally derives its truth-value from that. In other words, there is a distinctive chain of truth-value derivations, at the core of which is a derivation from a primary truth-value bearer, which is doxastic content, to secondary, tertiary, and quaternary truth-value bearers, including imagery. I note that the chain of truth-value derivations is questionable at each step. It would be rewarding to scrutinize these questionable steps. But I will not do that here.\(^8\) For our purposes, it suffices to have the preceding sketch of Socrates' account of false anticipatory pleasure in mind.

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\(^8\) For example, in view of the first step, where truth-value derives from doxastic content to the complex of a doxastic attitude with that content, it may be questioned whether a complex can inherit truth-value from the truth-value of one of its constituents. Certainly, the following is not a sound general principle that would support this derivation: For any
Socrates now begins his argument for misappearing pleasure with the following premise:

(1) Whenever we have appetitive desires, the body and psyche are affected in distinct ways.\(^9\)

Socrates is here referring a discussion of desire that occurred earlier in the dialog (at 34e9-35d7). The point of premise (1) is to reiterate that appetitive desire (epithumia) is a condition of the psyche, not the body. More precisely, Socrates has in mind a situation where the body is in a state of lack or depletion and the psyche desires replenishment.

Granted this, Socrates proceeds:

(2) In such cases, the psyche desires conditions that are opposite (enantiōn) to those of the body.\(^{10}\)

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proper part \(p\) of a complex \(c\), if \(p\) has property \(F\), then \(c\) has property \(F\). For example, functional properties do not conform to this principle. The function of a carburetor is to regulate the flow of air and gasoline into the engine cylinders of a car. But that is not the function of a car itself. Likewise, quantitative properties do not conform to this principle. A part of a body is smaller than the whole body, but the whole body is not smaller than itself. The point, then, is simply that the truth-value derivations on which Socrates' account depends are open to question.

\(^9\) *Phlb.* 41c1-3: 'ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὡσι, δίχα ἀρα τότε σώμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληται'.

\(^{10}\) *Phlb.* 41c5-6: 'Οὐκοὖν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἢν ἢ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἔξεων ...' The continuation of Socrates' claim here introduces a complication. Socrates speaks of the body undergoing pain 'or pleasure' of an affection: 'τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἢ
The condition that the psyche desires is replenishment and hence pleasure. The condition of the body is lack and hence pain. In short, in premises (1) and (2) Socrates underscores the following relations obtaining in a case of appetitive desire:

DISTINCTION OF SOMATIC AND PSYCHIC CONDITIONS:

Somatic lack, psychic desire;

OPPOSITION OF SOMATIC STATE AND PSYCHIC CONTENT:

Somatic pain, pleasure as object of psychic desire.

The next premise in Socrates' argument is rather puzzling:

(3) Pain and pleasure, then, exist side-by-side.\textsuperscript{11}

Premise (3) is puzzling because we have not yet been told that pleasure actually occurs in this situation, only desire for pleasure. Accordingly, we should rather expect a premise such as:

(3a) Pain and the hedonic content of desire, then, exist side-by-side.

Having a desire for pleasure is not itself a pleasure. Indeed, it may well be painful. On the other hand, arguably, what Socrates intends to convey is that there is a hopeful

\[\text{τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονήν τὸ σῶμα ἢν τὸ παρεχόμενον;}\ (41c6-7)\]

Consequently, Socrates commits to a case where bodily pleasure is accompanied by psychic attitude whose content is pain. Frede (1993), 46, n.2, has a gloss: 'I may enjoy my present dinner and simultaneously fear its aftereffects'. But fear is not desire. So if Frede's suggestion is to be accepted, then it must also be accepted that Socrates is compressing his ideas in a misleading way.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Phlb.} 41d1-2: 'Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ἢ ταῦτα, ἀμα παρακεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς'.

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expectation of gaining the desired pleasure and this hopeful expectation is itself pleasant.

In that case, we would understand premise (3) as supported by:

**(3b)** Pain and the pleasant expectation of satisfying desire, then, exist side-by-side.

The text is unclear. But premise (3) is crucial to Socrates' argument. So let's temporarily suspend judgment regarding whether (3a) or (3b) is the more attractive interpretation.

We return to the course of the argument. Socrates now introduces the following premise:

**(4)** Perceptions (*aisthêseis*) of pain and pleasure, then, occur simultaneously,

although they are opposed to one another.\(^\text{12}\)

Premise (4) raises at least two questions: What are 'perceptions' of pleasure and pain? And—since we are undecided between premises (3a) and (3b), that is, between whether the pleasure in question is the content of desire, as premise (3a) would have it, or whether it is a pleasant expectation of satisfying desire, as premise (3b) would have it—what is the pleasure perceived?

I'll take the questions in turn. Regarding the first, let's focus on the perception of the bodily pain, that is, the lack whose alleviation is desired. Plato holds that bodily pain is a complex process. One part of the process consists of a physiological depletion or disorder. Another part consists of a psychological registering of the physiological condition. Plato conceives of this psychological registering as a perceptual state, that is, as an *aisthêsis*. As such, bodily pain is a form of proprioception. The *aisthêsis* has a phenomenal character; it is painful. In still other words, bodily pain involves

\(^{12}\) *Phlb.* 41d2-3: ‘καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἀμα παρ’ ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαί'.
proprioception; the perceptual modality is algesic. In short, when in premise (4) Socrates speaks of the 'perceptions' of pleasure and pain, the genitive is surely objective; but, at least in the case of the bodily pain, the perception is partly constitutive of the object of perception, that is, the psychological aspect of perceiving is partly constitutive of pain itself. Precisely, the perception is the appearance or perceptual apprehension, in the algesic modality, of the depletion or disorder.¹³

But what now of the perceived pleasure? If we accept premise (3a)—that is, pain and the hedonic content of desire, then, exist side-by-side—then what is perceived is a pleasant image; for example, it may be the man's image of himself enjoying a meal and thus sating his desire. In that case, premise (4) should be interpreted as:

(4a) Perceptions of pain and a pleasant image occur simultaneously, although they are opposed to one another.

Alternatively, if we accept premise (3b)—that is, pain and the pleasant expectation of satisfying desire exist side-by-side—then the perception consists of the pleasant quality of the hopeful expectation of satisfying one's desire. In other words, one experiences the pleasantness of anticipatory pleasure. In that case, premise (4) should be interpreted as:

(4b) Perceptions of pain and (anticipatory) pleasure occur simultaneously, although they are opposed to one another.

I am going assume—in other words, without argument—that premise (4b) is the correct interpretation. Hence, premise (3b) is too. Both premise sets (3a)-(4a) and (3b)-(4b) are continuous with the sort of case Socrates employed in his account of false

anticipatory pleasure. But premises (4b) and (3b) enable us to maintain a literal interpretation of premise (3): there is a pain and a pleasure simultaneously side-by-side.

Granted this, I will also note—in passing—that perception of anticipatory pleasure must be understood slightly differently from perception of bodily pain, in the following respect. I said that Plato conceives of bodily pain as a process consisting of a physiological depletion and a psychological and specifically proprioceptual registering of the former. It is questionable to what extent anticipatory pleasure can be conceived analogously. In particular, what is the correlate in this case to the physiological depletion? Is there, for instance, a psychological restoration, perhaps an emotional restoration, that registers as pleasant? I note the point, but will not pursue it further. For our main purpose, it suffices that anticipatory pleasure, just like bodily pain, has phenomenal character; it is, in short, experienced or perceived as pleasant.

In sum, we have a psycho-physical condition in which there is bodily pain and a psychological pleasure of anticipation. Insofar as both pleasure and pain each have as a constituent a phenomenal property, these two affectively opposed phenomenal properties are compresent. That is, the painfulness of the bodily pain and the pleasantness of the anticipatory pleasure are simultaneous contents of awareness. Granted this, Socrates proceeds to argue that compresent affective conditions can engender affective illusions, similar to the way that compresent visual images can engender visual illusions. To this end, he first asserts that pleasure and pain are gradable:

(5) Pleasure and pain admit degrees with respect to their magnitudes.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\) _Phlb._ 41d8-9: "ὢς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην".
That is, pleasures and pains may be more or less pleasant and painful.

Now consider the following crucial passage of Socrates' argument:

In vision, seeing the magnitudes (ta megethē) from far away or nearby obscures the truth and causes us to form false beliefs (doxazein). Doesn't the same also occur in the cases of pains and pleasures? … Pleasures and pains themselves are changed through being observed at a distance and proximately (dia to porrôthen te kai enguthen), and being set next to one another (tithemenai par' allēlas) at the same time. Pleasures appear (phainontai) greater (meizous) and more intense (sphrodroterai) in relation to pain, and pains appear the opposite [that is, smaller and less intense] in relation to the pleasures.15

Here Socrates gives two possible explanations of misappearance of affective states. The first is:

DISTANCE:

the subject's envisioned temporal proximity to or distance from the conditions.

For example, one envisions oneself in the future enjoying oneself. But the envisioned pleasure is distant from the present. Hence, one might envision it as less pleasant than it will in fact be. The second is:

JUXTAPOSITION:

the juxtaposition of multiple affective appearances.

15 Phlb. 41e9-42a3, 42b2-6: 'ἐν μὲν ὠψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὀρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφαινεῖ εἰ καὶ ψευδὴ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δὲ ἀρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἐστὶ ταύτων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; ... Νῦν δὲ γε αὐταί διὰ τὸ πόρρωθεν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἁμα τιθέμεναι παρ’ ἀλλήλας, αἰ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λύπαι δ’ αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ’ ἡδονάς τούναντιν ἐκείναισ'.

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Support for the view that Plato regards DISTANCE and JUXTAPOSITION as, indeed, two different causes of misappearance derives from the fact that he introduces these causes of misappearance separately in earlier dialogs. In the examination of akrasia at Protagoras 352b-358d and specifically in discussing the hedonic calculus, Plato also has Socrates employ an analogy with vision:

Do things of the same size (ta auta megethê) appear to you larger (meizous) when seen close up and smaller when seen at a distance …?\(^\text{16}\)

In the discussion of true and untrue pleasures at Republic 583b-587a Plato has Socrates argue that the juxtaposition of affective conditions, like the juxtaposition of hues of color on a two-dimensional surface in shadow-painting (skiagraphia), produces illusions:

When the [neutral state of calm] is next to the painful state, it appears (phainetai) pleasant; and when it is next to the pleasant state, it appears painful. However, there is nothing sound in these phantasms (phantasmatôn) as far as the truth of pleasure is concerned, only some kind of magic (goêteia).\(^\text{17}\)

Then isn't it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere images (eidôlois) and shadow-paintings of true pleasures? And doesn't the juxtaposition of these pleasures and pains make them appear (phainesthai) intense (sphodrous) …?\(^\text{18}\)

In short, in composing the Protagoras passage Plato conceives of the analogy between visual and affective illusions in terms of the subject's spatial and (envisioned) temporal

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\(^\text{17}\) R. 584a7-10.

relation to the objects, whereas in composing *Republic* 9 Plato conceives the additional point that the juxtaposition of multiple colors and of multiple affective conditions affects the appearance of individual colors and affective conditions.\(^{19}\)

Clearly Socrates is appealing to **Juxtaposition** in the *Philebus* argument. But, arguably, he is also appealing to **Distance**. Sorting this matter out requires sorting out preference for premise set (3a)-(4a) versus (3b)-(4b). I note this point, but will not pursue it further.

In short— and uncontroversially— Socrates maintains:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(6)] The appearances of the magnitudes of pleasure and pain may be distorted through their juxtaposition with opposed affective conditions.
\end{itemize}

That is to say, there are affective illusions; pleasure and pain can misappear.

Granted this, it is also central to Socrates' account that the appearances themselves, that is, the *aisthêseis* of pleasure and pain, influence belief. Recall Socrates' claim, which I cited at the beginning of the paper, but which occurs precisely at this point in his argument:

\[\text{This is the opposite of what occurred before … In the former case, true and false beliefs filled up the pains and pleasures with their condition.}\]  

When I first introduced this passage, I had offered an interpretation of the nature of the opposition Socrates has in mind. I can now use my exposition of Socrates' argument for

\[^{19}\] It is perhaps also noteworthy that Plato seems consistently to maintain that the subject's (envisioned) temporal relation to the objects causes misappearances of magnitude of duration, whereas the juxtaposition of objects causes misappearances of intensity.

\[^{20}\] *Phlb.* 42a5-9.
misappearing pleasure to defend that interpretation. My view, recall, is that misappearing pleasure is opposed to anticipatory pleasure in that in the former case the true and false pains and pleasures fill up the beliefs with their truth-value.

Granted this, the crucial point in Socrates' argument is this: the compresence of affective conditions can engender an affective distortion, thus an illusion, and this illusion can influence belief. Let me try to make this point precise so as to avoid any misunderstanding. To be sure, belief plays a role in the existence of at least one of the occurrent affective conditions, namely, the anticipatory pleasure. For example, the man believes that he is going to be enjoying a meal. This belief engenders a hopeful expectation and thus an anticipatory pleasure. Indeed, we may assume that the man envisions himself eating his meal and takes pleasure in this image. To this extent, however, the account simply replicates the account of false anticipatory pleasure. The difference that Socrates introduces in the case of misappearing pleasure is that the compresence of the anticipatory pleasure with an occurrent bodily pain, that is, the compresence of multiple affective conditions itself engenders an affective illusion. It is this affective illusion that in turn influences belief. For example, if the man were not pleasantly anticipating his meal, he would experience his bodily pain in a different way, perhaps only in a slightly different way, but nonetheless differently. Likewise, if he were not experiencing bodily pain, he would experience his anticipatory pleasure in a different way, perhaps only in a slightly different way, but nonetheless differently.

I am dwelling on this point because it is, I take it, central to Socrates' account, and because I think it is epistemologically significant. The crucial point is not that being in an affective state can affect our beliefs. Obviously, that is true. Under normal circumstances,
if one stubs one's toe and is in pain, one will believe that one is in pain. Likewise, if through some biochemical change one's mood suddenly lightens, one will believe that one is feeling better. Our affective states influence our beliefs all the time. The crucial point is, rather, that the compresence of multiple affective conditions itself can engender an affective illusion. As such, the affective illusion that occurs is, in a crucial respect, independent of belief. As such, it is like the Müller-Lyer illusion.

Socrates' account now continues with the following passage:

Then if you take that part of [the pleasure or pain] by which it appears (phainontai) greater or smaller than it really is, and cut it off from each of them [that is, from the true part of the pleasure or pain] as that which appears (phainomenon), but does not exist (ouk on), you will neither say that it appears correctly (orthôs phainomenon), nor will you dare to say that the part of the pleasure or pain related to this (epi toutôi) [that is, what the mis-apparent part represents] is correct and true.\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\) Phlb. 42b8-c3: 'Οὐκοῦν ὁσῶ ἐμείξουσ τῶν σοῦσ ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἑλάττουσ φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτελόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ` οὐκ οὖν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἑρεῖς, οὐδε` αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθὸν τε καὶ ἀληθῆς τολμήσεις λέγειν'. The phrase 'ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ' at 42c2 is difficult to interpret. 'τοῦτῳ' in manuscripts BT is unacceptable. The common reading 'τοῦτῳ' is also unacceptable, for it yields a clause whose meaning replicates the preceding one. So if we accept 'ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ', what does it mean? What is the part of the pleasure and pain 'related to this' false appearance? Presumably, the idea is this: what the appearance represents does not exist. Hence, what the appearance relates to is nothing correct or true.
The passage is tricky and would reward careful consideration. But, minimally, Socrates is referring to an errant appearance (*phainomenon*), that is, an affective appearance that is incorrect and untrue. In our example of the hungry man anticipating his meal, the appearance, that is, the phenomenal character of the anticipatory pleasure is heightened, and the appearance, that is, phenomenal character of the bodily pain is diminished. Hence, the quantitative excess in the phenomenal character of the anticipatory pleasure and the quantitative deficit in the phenomenal character of the bodily pain are incorrect and untrue parts (*merê*).

In short— and simplifying— Socrates is claiming that:

(7) To the extent that they misappear, affective appearances are false. Moreover, insofar as this account is an account of a second way in which pleasure (or pain) can be false, Socrates is further committed to:

(8) The false part (*meros*) of the affective appearance falsifies the affective appearance as a whole, and indeed falsifies the pleasure (or pain) as a whole. Compare this idea to a portrait that is accurate, save for, say, the fact that the subject is depicted as having a larger nose than he does. Accordingly, a part of the portrait, which is false, falsifies the portrait as a whole. Likewise, compare the report of an event, one of whose parts misrepresents a part of the event and thereby falsifies the report as a whole.

Finally, as we have already seen, Socrates maintains that:

(9) Beliefs about affective conditions may derive their truth-value from the truth-value of the affective conditions. That is, insofar as the false pleasure or pain causes one to form a correlative belief about the pleasure or pain, the belief is thereby falsified.
In conclusion, I want to underscore just one point. Evidently, Socrates holds that images or appearances as well as doxastic contents are truth-apt. This, however, we already learned from his first account of false anticipatory pleasure. The eikôn derived its truth-value from the truth-value of the belief. The significance of Socrates' argument for misappearing pleasure is that certain images or perceptual appearances may be truth-apt, in a crucial respect, independently of belief. Precisely, in the case of the affective illusion, the misappearing part is untrue, hence false. In short, in the argument Socrates attributes truth-value to appearances themselves.

If I had more time, I would try to show you that this attribution may be inconsistent with the content of Theaetetus and Sophist, and thus the power of such appearances might be strong enough to compel us to rethink the constituency and order of Plato's late dialogs. But let me briefly suggest why. In Republic 10, Plato discusses the illusion of the bent stick in water. Remarkably, that discussion does not set perceptual appearance in opposition to belief. Rather, it places one part of the psyche, appetite, against another, reason. Appetite lacks the capacity for rational reflection and takes the appearance as it is; reason has a reflective capacity and resists. Hence, Plato treats the result as a case of explicit, contradictory beliefs occurring in the same person at the same time. Again, the contrast here is not between perceptual appearance and belief; it is between irrational perceptual belief and rational perceptual belief.  

In Theaetetus and Sophist, it is doubtful that Plato continues to view conditions in the same way. In Theaetetus, he expends considerable effort to draw a firm distinction between aisthēsis and doxa. And he explicitly attributes truth-value to doxa and not to

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aisthēsis.\textsuperscript{23} Compare Sophist where the Eleatic Stranger explicitly identifies phantasia as a psychological state in which aisthēsis and doxa are wedded. In light of these results, it is more likely that Plato would re-characterize the bent-stick-in-water illusion as a contrast between non-doxastic aisthēsis and belief itself. The curious thing is that in his account of misappearing pleasure in Philebus Plato attributes truth-value to a perceptual appearance independently of belief. This looks to be a position between Republic and Theatetus/Sophist. But that is a large topic for a different occasion.

\textbf{Bibliography}


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\textsuperscript{23} (So:) Then knowledge does not lie in [perceptual] affections (παθήµασιν), but in reasoning about them. For it is possible, it seems, to apprehend being and truth (ἀληθείας) in the latter, but impossible in the former ... Then will you call the two the same thing, when the differences between them are so great? ... What name will you give to the one that includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot? (Tht:) I call it perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι) ... (So:) Then in sum you call it perception (αἰσθησις) ... By which we agree that it is not possible to grasp truth, for it cannot grasp being'. (Th. 186d-e) More to my point, the effect of this conclusion in Theaetetus is that perception is not truth-apt, whereas belief is.


— (1961), 'Father Kenny on False Pleasures', *Phronesis* 6, 41-5.


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