CHAPTER 36

Socrates, Vlastos, and Analytic Philosophy

David Conan Wolfsdorf

1 Introduction

Prior to World War II, the Anglo-Germanophone movement that came to be called “analytic philosophy” was largely ahistorical. Its governing philosophical concerns lay in epistemology and methodology, in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding the importance and influence of intuitionism in the first decades of the twentieth century, by the thirties noncognitivism had eclipsed cognitivism in ethics. Adherents of philosophical analysis by and large held that ethical utterances and thoughts are not truth-apt and thus that ethics is not a domain of knowledge. Illustrative statements by Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Russell follow:

My whole tendency and the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge.

Wittgenstein 1965, 12

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1 On the use of the phrase, cf. G.H. von Wright: “It has struck me that the name ‘analytic philosophy,’ as far as I know became current relatively late in the history of the movement. It only gradually supplanted the label ‘logical positivism’ which lingered on longer after it had become obsolete. To the change in terminology contributed, I should think, significantly the works of Arthur Pap [1949]. The early Cambridge analysts and members of the Vienna Circle insisted on their method being (logical and conceptual) analysis. But they did not use the term ‘analytical philosophy’ for their new type of thinking” (von Wright 1993, n. 35). Cf. H.-J. Glock: “Pertinent uses of ‘analytic(al) philosophy’ came relatively late. One of the first occurs in Ernst Nagel [1936] ... But the name caught on only after the war” (Glock 2008a, 44).

2 Most prominently, Moore 1903; Ross 1930, 1939; Prichard 1949 (published posthumously).

3 On the history of this development, in particular the work of Stevenson, and its Germanophone and Anglophone roots, see Satris 1987.

4 The lecture was originally delivered in late 1929 or early 1930.
In the domain of metaphysics, including the philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless.  

_Carnap_ 1932, 60–1

Questions as to “values” lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge. That is to say when we say that this or that has “value,” we are giving expression to our own emotions, not to a fact which would still be true if our feelings were different.  

_Russell_ 1935, 230–1

If analytic philosophy is so understood, then assuming Socrates was principally an ethical philosopher, indeed a cognitivist and a realist, it is hard to see how there could be any positive relation between analytic philosophy and Socrates.

If instead analytic philosophy is understood as a style of philosophy that came to dominate the Anglophone philosophical world in the second half of the twentieth century, above all in terms of its focus on philosophical arguments and its aspirations to clarity and rigor in thought and expression, then the availability of a positive relation between this and Socrates becomes more plausible. In certain contexts, such a broad use of “analytic philosophy” might threaten to be vacuous. But in the context of a history of the reception of Socrates since antiquity, it demarcates a movement tolerably well. Consequently, we will refer to those philosophical students of Socrates whose work conforms in spirit and style to mainstream analytic philosophy as “analytically oriented” philosophers of their subject.

The plausibility of a positive relation between Socrates and analytic philosophy so understood now crucially depends on how “Socrates” is handled. Assume “Socrates” is taken to refer to the historical Socrates. The historical Socrates wrote no philosophy. If there are no texts that contain Socrates’ philosophical arguments or at least Socrates’ philosophical theses or commitments, then again there can be no positive relation between analytic philosophy and Socrates.

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5 It is noteworthy that Carnap’s position here is not representative of the Vienna Circle; on which cf. Satris 1987, 23.

6 Cf. J. Annas who uses “analytic philosophy” in this way in an expository context similar to mine: “It is arguable that by the late twentieth century analytical philosophy has become essentially characterized as a concern for precision and rigor in argument, less tied to particular assumptions about meaning and the role of science than earlier analytical philosophers” (2004, 41).
To this last problem there are two main responses. One is that there are texts that contain the historical Socrates’ philosophy. Socrates of course did not compose these texts, but some of his successors did. Those analytically oriented philosophers who advocate this position more precisely endorse the view that Plato’s early dialogues or at least a sizeable subset of them contain Socrates’ philosophy. The sense in which these texts “contain” Socrates’ philosophy is that the character Socrates portrayed within them is faithful to the historical Socrates; he raises the philosophical questions that the historical Socrates raised and pursues answers to these questions as the historical Socrates did.

The alternative response to the problem discards the assumption that “Socrates” in our title refers to the historical Socrates. Instead it assumes that “Socrates” refers only to the character Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues. These dialogues are distinguished as objects of analytically oriented study in virtue of the fact that in them the character Socrates raises and pursues a distinctive set of philosophical questions and responses. The crucial difference between the advocates of the two distinct responses then is that the former engage the Socratic problem and answer it with the thesis that some of Plato’s early dialogues contain the philosophy of the historical Socrates. The crucial common ground they share is that the character Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues advances a distinctive philosophy worthy of studious attention.

2 The Burgeoning of Analytically Oriented Work on Plato’s Early Dialogues

In the first sixty-five years of the twentieth-century there was very little work on Plato’s early dialogues that one could well characterize as analytically oriented. Such work has emerged only in the last half century and burgeoned in the last thirty years. The explanation for this development has much to do with the career of Gregory Vlastos. Consider Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith’s remarks in the preface to their 1994 book Plato’s Socrates:

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7 Robinson 1941 is the only book length treatment that I can think of that might satisfy this description. (Robinson taught in the Philosophy Department at Cornell University from 1928 to 1946 and so left Cornell just at the time Max Black and Malcolm Norman arrived there and the department became a leading center for analytic philosophy in the United States.)
8 Cf. Vlastos’s remark: “Thirty years ago work on Socrates was a rarity in the scholarly literature in English. Today it is appearing in abundance. I feel privileged to have had a share in this greening of Socratic studies whose beginning can be dated to the sixties ...” (Vlastos 1991, 18–19).
Perhaps the most important quality of Vlastos's work is that it has provided grounds for treating the philosophy of the character Socrates in Plato's early dialogues as a serious special subject for investigation.

Brickhouse and Smith 1994, viii

Vlastos was arguably the most influential student of Greek philosophy working in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. His 1954 article “The ‘Third Man' Argument in the Parmenides” is often described as the first paper to show that concerns related to traditional problems of analytic philosophy could be found in ancient philosophical texts and that the methods or style of analytic philosophy could be applied to the interpretation of aspects of these texts. Alexander Mourelatos's following remark nicely conveys the point:

What emerged in the revolutionary period of the mid-1950s was [a new paradigm for the study of ancient Greek philosophy]: the techniques of rigorous analysis and formal modeling that philosophers had applied ahistorically to the study of philosophical concepts and arguments came to be applied to the analysis of Greek philosophical texts. The techniques of ordinary-language analysis were correspondingly utilized to map the logic of ancient Greek usage. Given the common concern for linguistic analysis and for attention to textual detail, classicists and philosophers came to see their respective approaches as convergent and complementary. In North America the revolution had a single precipitating event and a single instigator: the publication [of Vlastos's Parmenides paper].

Mourelatos 2015, 379

Compare Vlastos's own comments in the introduction to the 1970 collection of essays on Plato that he edited:

Much of this new zeal for Platonic studies has been generated by the importation of techniques of logical and semantic analysis that have proved productive in contemporary philosophy. By means of these techniques we may now better understand some of the problems Plato attempted to solve.

Vlastos 1970

9 Kahn 1992, 234; Schofield 2002, 263.
During the second of two tenures as chairman of the Philosophy Department at Princeton (1971–76), Vlastos founded the first joint Classics-Philosophy program in the United States. This in turn became a model for similar programs at Harvard, Pittsburgh, Cornell, Berkeley, and the University of Texas at Austin, in some of these cases through Vlastos’s direct involvement. All of these programs have since become leaders in the study of ancient philosophy in the United States.¹²

At Princeton Vlastos worked with a number of students of ancient philosophy who have since become prominent in the profession such as Terry Irwin, Richard Kraut, Alexander Nehamas, and Paul Woodruff. In the eighties Vlastos led numerous celebrated National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminars on the philosophy of Socrates. A number of participants in these seminars, such as Brickhouse and Smith, Benson, Mark McPherran, and Roslyn Weiss, acknowledging their influence, have since made important contributions to the subject.¹³

Some of the broader historical and philosophical conditions that facilitated the development of analytically oriented ancient philosophical ethics and the philosophy of Socrates specifically may also be noted here. Among academics and more generally on college and university campuses, the broad social and political movements of the sixties and seventies in American culture (and elsewhere in the world) imbued philosophical ethics with a historical urgency.¹⁴ But the resurgence of ethics into mainstream analytic philosophy began earlier, in the late fifties, and had philosophical roots.¹⁵ Explaining this development itself would go well beyond the bounds of the present chapter. But among its precipitating factors were challenges to noncognitivism in ethics, pragmatist criticisms of the value neutrality of science and of rationality generally, as well as novel approaches to ethical objectivity.¹⁶

Of particular importance for work in ancient ethics were contributions such as Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 paper “Modern Moral Philosophy,” which encouraged a reorientation away from the dominant modern traditions of deontology and utilitarianism toward virtue ethics or ethics of character. Works of the seventies such as Peter Geach’s The Virtues (1977) and Philippa

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¹² Mourelatos 2015, 380.
¹³ E.g., Benson 2000, Preface.
¹⁴ Cf. Glock 2008b, 98.
¹⁵ It is important to note that ethical theory and applied ethics had been marginalized only in mainstream analytic philosophy in the thirties and forties. Elsewhere in Anglophone philosophy both areas of ethics were widely studied and taught. Cf. Frankena 1964; Sloan 1979.
Foot’s *Virtues and Vices* (1978) further contributed to what has since become a renaissance of virtue ethics.\(^ {17}\)

One of Vlastos’s central grounds for distinguishing the philosophy advanced in Plato’s early dialogues from the philosophy advanced in the middle dialogues is his thesis that the ethics of the early dialogues do not depend on a commitment to the centerpiece of Plato’s mature philosophy, transcendent Forms.\(^ {18}\) Although metaphysics also returned to mainstream analytic philosophy in the seventies,\(^ {19}\) the absence of metaphysical commitments to such entities as Platonic Forms made the ethics of the early Platonic dialogues much more palatable than the ethics of Plato’s middle dialogues.

More recently and especially with the increased attention to the relation between empirical psychology and ethics, work in ethical or moral psychology has contributed to interest in ancient ethics generally and the ethics of Plato’s Socrates specifically. Brickhouse and Smith’s *Socratic Moral Psychology* is a signal contribution.\(^ {20}\) But topics in ethical psychology such as *akrasia* and desire for the good have been salient in the study of Plato’s Socrates of the early dialogues since the seventies.\(^ {21}\)

Two further points are worth adding here pertaining to the relevance of and perennial interests in Socrates. One is the pride of place held by the historical Socrates as the alleged founder of Western philosophical ethics and of Plato’s early dialogues as among the earliest works in the field. The other is the extraordinary personality and life of the historical Socrates or at least the character Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues as a champion of philosophy and the philosophical life. This latter point finds expression in numerous analytically oriented contributions to the subject. For example, consider Gerasimos Santas’s remarks on the “immense strength of Socrates’ life” and on “a man with an endless passion for reason ... who had achieved a complete harmony between reason and passion, and between word and deed—a fantastic integration of life and thought”:

> Few subsequent philosophers have achieved this integration between philosophic thought and philosophic life ... Perhaps even fewer philosophers have considered such integration necessary ... It is certainly

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\(^ {17}\) Cf. Gill 2004, 213.


\(^ {19}\) On this, cf. Schwartz 2012, 204–38; Simons 2013.

\(^ {20}\) Brickhouse and Smith 2010; cf. Brickhouse and Smith 2013, 185–209.

\(^ {21}\) E.g., cf. Santas 1966; Gulley 1968; Vlastos 1969.
a stroke of good fortune that the first great philosopher could inspire and teach as well as he could philosophize.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsc{santas} 1979, 8–9

In sum, it was Vlastos's great enthusiasm for and advocacy of the subject, his compelling personality, as well as his philosophical and philological skills\textsuperscript{23} and acumen that from about the seventies played a crucial role in the burgeoning of analytically oriented philosophy of Socrates or of Plato's early dialogues, particularly in the United States. This development was facilitated by broader trends in post-War analytic philosophy, in particular the resurgence of ethics into mainstream analytic philosophy as well as the growth of ancient philosophical studies generally. In the latter case special notice should also be taken of the founding in this period of the first Anglophone journals devoted to ancient philosophy: \textit{Phronesis} (in 1955), \textit{Apeiron} (1966), \textit{Ancient Philosophy} (1980), and \textit{Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy} (1983).\textsuperscript{24} The emergence of these organs particularly enabled and encouraged focused studies on relatively narrow ancient philosophical problems and textual passages.

3 \quad \textbf{Vlastos's Socratic Dialogues}

Vlastos's two principal publications on Plato's Socrates of the early dialogues are his 1991 \textit{Socrates Ironist and Moral Philosopher} and his shorter posthumously published collection \textit{Socratic Studies}.\textsuperscript{25} Much of the content of both books is developed from earlier published and unpublished papers.\textsuperscript{26} As Vlastos

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Observe that Santas's book was published in The Arguments of the Philosophers series, which describes itself in this way: “The group of books of which this is one will include an essential analytic and critical account of each of the considerable number of the great and influential philosophers.” Cf. also Santas's remark: “I have selected here for study what I consider to be Socrates' greatest contributions to philosophy. And even here I have concentrated on the topics in which I thought that I could make some progress, using contemporary techniques of analysis and scholarship, in understanding and assessing Socrates' contributions” (xii).
  \item \textsuperscript{23} For a discussion of all three of these qualities, cf. Nehamas 1996.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} To be precise, \textit{Phronesis} was founded as a multilingual journal, but in fact almost all of the articles it has published have been in English.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Vlastos 1994.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Vlastos describes the history of his work on Socrates and Plato's early dialogues in the Introduction to the 1991 book. That history goes back to 1953 when Vlastos devoted a sabbatical to the subject. Between then and the mid seventies, he published an edition of Plato's \textit{Protagoras} (1956), the edited collection \textit{The Philosophy of Socrates} (1971), and five papers on aspects of Plato's early dialogues (Vlastos 1957–58, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1974).
\end{itemize}
describes in the Introduction to the 1991 book, it was the influence of Terry Irwin’s 1977 (generally very well received) book *Plato’s Moral Theory*, the first half of which is devoted to the ethics of the early dialogues, that “proved one of the outstanding learning experiences of my life” and “did more to invigorate and deepen my understanding of its topic than anything I had yet read.” From about this time until his death in 1991, Vlastos’s research and writing principally focused on the philosophy of Socrates as presented in Plato’s early dialogues.

The distinction of a set of Platonic dialogues as early and the view that the historical Socrates heavily influenced the philosophy of these texts is certainly not proprietary to Vlastos or to the analytically oriented philosophers of the subject. Developmentalism, the thesis that the philosophical content of Plato’s dialogues exhibits development over the course of Plato’s career, was first advanced at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The most influential early formulation was in Karl Friederich Hermann’s 1839 *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie*. Developmentalism was further encouraged by stylometric studies, which were first applied to the investigation of the chronology of Plato’s texts toward the end of the nineteenth century. Among developmentalists, since the mid-nineteenth century the earliest period in Plato’s philosophical development has widely been referred to as “Socratic.” The term was originally Hermann’s. Compare C. Köstlin, who in his 1859 *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* writes that “in der ersten Periode ist Platon noch gänzlich Sokratiker”; and Hermann’s most prominent student F. Susemihl who in his 1855–60 *Die genetische Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie* maintains that in his first period Plato rejected all other philosophical systems for Socrates.

Concurrently, in the course of the nineteenth century Plato’s early dialogues came to replace Xenophon’s Socratic writings as the source of the historical Socrates’ philosophy, thereby reversing scholarly consensus that had prevailed prior to the nineteenth century. Consequently, the view for which Vlastos argues in chapter three of his 1991 book (“The Evidence of Aristotle and Xenophon”), namely that Aristotle’s testimony corroborates the thesis that Plato’s early dialogues exhibit the philosophy of the historical Socrates and

29 Köstlin 1859, 125.
30 These remarks are based on Wolfsdorf 1997, 8–9.
that Xenophon's Socratic writings do not, culminates a more than 150 year tradition of modern scholarship.\textsuperscript{32}

On the other hand, among interpreters who endorse this view, exactly which dialogues constitute the early Socratic period, that is, which early Platonic dialogues contain the philosophy of Socrates, varies.\textsuperscript{33} For example, two of the most prominent Anglophone interpreters of Plato of the first half of the twentieth century, John Burnet and A.E. Taylor, advocate the view that Plato's Socrates is the historical Socrates.\textsuperscript{34} But in advancing this claim, they treat the middle as well as early dialogues as Socratic. Today, analytically oriented philosophers of Plato's early dialogues typically regard the following texts, in alphabetic order, as Socratic: \textit{Apology}, \textit{Charmides}, \textit{Crito}, \textit{Euthydemus}, \textit{Euthyphro}, \textit{Gorgias}, \textit{Hippias Major}, \textit{Hippias Minor}, \textit{Ion}, \textit{Laches}, \textit{Lysis}, \textit{Meno} (excluding the epistemological portion of this text from 80a), \textit{Protagoras}, and \textit{Republic} Book 1.

Vlastos's view of Plato's Socratic dialogues is more restricted. In particular, it excludes aspects of \textit{Gorgias}, \textit{Lysis}, \textit{Euthydemus}, and \textit{Hippias Major}. The basic reason for this is that Vlastos maintains that in these four texts, as in the later portion of \textit{Meno}, Plato develops ideas that transcend the philosophy of the other early dialogues. Accordingly, Vlastos distinguishes two subsets of early Platonic dialogues: an earlier and a later group.\textsuperscript{35}

The key reason for the distinction owes to the most influential of Vlastos's contributions, his account of Socrates' philosophical method. In the first volume of \textit{Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy} (1983), Vlastos published his seminal paper, “The Socratic Elenchus.” There he defines Socratic \textit{elenchus} as “a search for moral truth by adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted only if the negation of his thesis is deduced from his beliefs.”\textsuperscript{36} According to this description, Socrates' philosophical method operates as follows. Socrates elicits a thesis \textit{t} from his interlocutor. Socrates then secures the interlocutor's agreement to a premise set \textit{P} that includes one or more premises \textit{q}, \textit{r}, etc. relevant to \textit{t}. Socrates argues and the interlocutor agrees that \textit{P} entails not-\textit{t}. And Socrates concludes that not-\textit{t} has been proven true; in other words \textit{t} is false.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{32} Vlastos himself does not acknowledge this fact.
\textsuperscript{34} Burnet 1911, 1916; Taylor 1933. Cf. Miller 1953.
\textsuperscript{35} Cf. Irwin 1977, 6–9.
\textsuperscript{36} Vlastos 1983, 30.
\textsuperscript{37} More precisely, this is an abbreviated description of what Vlastos calls "standard elenchus" (Vlastos 1994, 11). He acknowledges that Socrates also, albeit infrequently, employs a method that he calls "indirect elenchus" (11 n. 35).
For our purposes, three aspects of this account of Socrates’ philosophical method are important. One is that Socrates is strictly a moral philosopher. This is a central thesis that Vlastos advances in his 1991 book *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher* as distinguishing the philosophy of Socrates and the early Socratic dialogues from the philosophy of Plato’s middle dialogues. In contrast, the character Socrates in Plato’s middle dialogues is also a metaphysician committed to a theory of transcendent Forms, an epistemologist heavily influenced by mathematics as well as his metaphysical commitments, a psychologist committed to the tripartition and immortality of the soul, and a political philosopher with an elaborate theory of the ideal state.

A second aspect of Vlastos’s account of Socratic *elenchus* relates to Socrates’ disavowal of ethical knowledge. More precisely, according to Vlastos, Socrates disavows ethical knowledge $C$, where the addition of the subscript “C” here serves to denote knowledge that is certain and infallible. This is contrasted with so-called knowledge $E$, which is to say fallible and uncertain knowledge that has up to this point survived elenctic (“E”) testing. Socrates has ethical knowledge $E$, Vlastos maintains. But since ethical knowledge $E$ is uncertain and fallible, Socrates must continue to subject it to the *elenchus*; and he does this precisely by engaging any and all willing interlocutors, among other reasons, to discover whether their commitments might unsettle his own.

The third aspect of Vlastos’s account of Socratic *elenchus* is in fact the one that has garnered the most attention. $P$ and $t$ are inconsistent. So $t$ or at least one member of $P$ must be false. But this does not entail that $t$ is false. So there is a puzzle as to how Socrates can employ the *elenchus* to conclude not-$t$. Vlastos calls this “the problem of the *elenchus*.”

For our immediate purposes, the key point relates to how Vlastos views Socrates’ *elenchus* in terms of Plato’s philosophical development. In the earlier early Platonic dialogues, namely those that contain the philosophy of the historical Socrates, the grounds for inferring not-$t$ are simply that Socrates and his interlocutor are more strongly committed to the premises of $P$ than to $t$. However, Vlastos maintains that by the time he composes *Gorgias* Plato has come to his own, alternative understanding of how the problem of the *elenchus* may be solved. This involves the attribution to the character Socrates in the *Gorgias* of the following ideas. If the interlocutor chose to reject some

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38 Vlastos uses “moral” as equivalent to “ethical” (see Vlastos 1994, 6–7). This is not a usage I endorse, but will employ it here in describing his position.


40 The existence of cognitive states that are fallible but epistemic seems dubious to me.

premise of P rather than \( t \), Socrates would have the resources to show his interlocutor that \( t \) conflicts with some other of his interlocutor’s beliefs. This is because Socrates in the *Gorgias* is committed to the following two principles:

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\begin{align*}
\text{(A)} & \quad \text{Anyone who ever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that belief.} \\
\text{(B)} & \quad \text{Socrates himself has a consistent set of moral beliefs.}
\end{align*}
\]

The conjunction of (A) and (B) entails that:

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\text{(C)} \quad \text{Socrates’ set of moral beliefs consists exclusively of true beliefs.}^{42}
\]

Consequently, Socrates can employ his commitment to (C) to ensure that P rather than \( t \) is true.

Finally, in the post-*Gorgias* early dialogues—again *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, and *Hippias Major*—there is, Vlastos maintains, a “demise of the elenchus.” In other words, Socrates’ method of philosophical investigation is not limited to testing his interlocutors’ theses. Instead, Vlastos claims, “the theses that are seriously debated in these dialogues are uncontested by the interlocutor.”^{43}

In sum, Vlastos’s view that a subset of Plato’s early dialogues contains the philosophy of the historical Socrates is crucially based on Vlastos’s view of the character Socrates’ philosophical method, the *elenchus*, which is in turn related to a set of theses about the character Socrates’ interests and commitments, saliently including his exclusive focus on moral philosophy and his disavowal of moral knowledge.^{44}

4 \hspace{1cm} Socratic Studies after Vlastos

Interest in the problem of the elenchus and more broadly in Socrates’ method of pursuing ethical knowledge conforms to one of the defining features of analytic philosophy, concern with argumentation. The epistemology pertinent to Socrates’ avowals and disavowals of knowledge is closely related to this defining feature. Beyond these topics the central contribution of Vlastos, his contemporaries, and heirs has been the identification or precisification and intense scrutiny of a number of topics and problems definitive of the philosophy of Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues.

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43 Vlastos 1994, 30.
Loosely speaking, a number of these topics fall within domains familiar to mainstream analytic philosophy: ethics, ethical epistemology, ethical psychology, and metaphysics. Others are more idiosyncratic and proprietary to the life of Socrates or at least Plato’s Socrates. Salient among the former are the relation between virtue (aretê) and knowledge, the relation between virtue or knowledge and eudaimonia, the relation between the putative parts of virtue, the relation between definitional and non-definitional ethical knowledge, the nature of desire for the good, and the nature and motivational role of irrational desire. Salient among the latter are Socratic irony; Socrates’ political views, in particular his opinions of Athenian democracy and civil disobedience; and topics relating to Socrates’ religious commitments, in particular his opinions regarding popular Athenian religion, his understanding of his divine sign (daimonion), and his view of his trial for impiety. It would be illuminating to canvass treatments of each of these topics within the analytically oriented literature and beyond that to trace the relations between the analytic contributions and the pre-analytic Anglophone and European literature of the twentieth and nineteenth centuries. The scope and demands of that undertaking go well beyond the limits of this chapter. Here I make some very general remarks on the analytic treatments.

First, while Vlastos’s work has been crucial in defining and spurring on a research program, the details of his own results are, as often as not, contested. For example, most analytically oriented philosophers of Plato’s early dialogues do not accept Vlastos’s solution to the problem of the elenchus, his division of these texts into elenctic and post-elenctic, or his division of knowledge C and knowledge E.

Second, most of the analytically oriented work, including Vlastos’s, has been historically reconstructive. That is to say, its aim has been to present, as accurately as possible based on the evidence of the dialogues, the philosophical commitments of the character Socrates in these texts (whether or not these commitments are also identified as those of the historical Socrates). Contrast this with alternatives such as rational reconstruction or historical reconstruction complemented by evaluation of the ahistorical philosophical merit of the position reconstructed. As such, much of the work of the analytically oriented philosophers may be characterized as for the most part history of philosophy in a relatively historical as opposed to philosophical mode.

44 I prefer the translation “excellence” for aretē, but use “virtue” here on the grounds of its familiarity in this context.

45 Overviews of the analytically oriented literature pertaining to most of these topics can be found in Bussanich and Smith 2013.
Third, only some of the topics that are definitive of the philosophy of (Plato’s) Socrates are the explicit subject of arguments that Socrates develops in the early dialogues. For example, the relation between knowledge and eudaimonia is the subject of an argument in Euthydemus (278e–281e); the relation between the virtues is the subject of a series of arguments in Protagoras (329 ad finem); and the claim that everyone desires the good is the subject of an argument in Meno (77b–78b). Other topics are not the subject of arguments that Socrates pursues. Rather, interpretations of Socrates’ commitments regarding the given topic are determined on the basis of disparate claims he makes throughout the early dialogues or at least a subset of them. For example, this is the case with Socrates’ view of the relation between definitional and non-definitional ethical knowledge and with his ethical epistemological commitments, given his disavowals and occasional avowals of ethical knowledge.

I underscore that in this latter sort of case, insofar as the interpreter is not attempting to interpret an argument, what distinguishes such treatment as analytically oriented must be something like the following combination of characteristics: the content of the topic under investigation, the degree of explicit assembly and scrutiny of textual evidence in support of the thesis advanced regarding the topic, and the aspiration to clarity and rigor in advancing the thesis on the basis of the textual evidence assembled and scrutinized. Arguably, the second and third characteristics here are simply virtues of academic or intellectual inquiry and presentation in any domain. If that is so, then in many cases it should be difficult to distinguish analytically oriented interpretation from what we might simply call responsible ancient philosophical scholarship on Plato’s early dialogues. Some corroboration of this point may be derived from Christopher Gill’s remarks concerning contemporary Anglophone work in ancient philosophy generally:

Much of the most innovative work [in ancient philosophy] in English-language scholarship has tried to combine the more philosophically informed techniques of the analytic approach with greater attention to the history of philosophy or to questions of literary form and genre. The range of areas of ancient philosophy studied in this way in recent years has increased greatly ... With certain exceptions, I am not sure that it is any longer accurate to speak of a distinctively “analytic” movement in English-language scholarship on ancient philosophy.

GILL 2004, 211

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I underscore that such interpretation depends on the assumption that views Socrates expresses in various dialogues are coherent.
On the other hand, Gill acknowledges “certain exceptions” to this point, and it is noteworthy that with regard to these exceptions he singles out the following:

Study of the philosophy of “Socrates” (taken to mean a subsection of Plato’s early dialogues) in the USA still tends to be couched in a rather rigidly analytic mode strongly influenced by Vlastos’s later work.

GILL 2004, 211 n. 9

Hence, despite the close relation between rigorous contemporary scholarship on Plato’s early dialogues and analytically oriented philosophy of Plato’s early dialogues, it remains reasonable to distinguish within mainstream Anglophone philosophy of the last half-century or so a body of analytically oriented work. In further considering what distinguishes this work, it will be helpful to discuss some topics and problems associated with Plato’s early dialogues that analytically oriented contributors by and large tend not to engage.

5 Limits in the Analytically Oriented Philosophy of Plato’s Early Dialogues

A number of dialogues in the Platonic corpus have contents that might qualify them as early, but these texts are often treated as spurious. Alcibiades and Theages are notable examples. Analytically oriented philosophers of Plato’s early dialogues have largely steered clear of questions of authorship in these

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47 The phrase “philosophy of Socrates” has been and continues to be used ambiguously. In its earliest occurrences (Miller 1953, Gulley 1968) it was used to refer to the philosophy of the historical Socrates, whether or not that philosophy was based solely on Plato’s early dialogues; in fact for both Miller and Gulley it was not. But the phrase is often used to refer to the philosophy of the character Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues, without the additional commitment to that philosophy being the philosophy of the historical Socrates. For example in his 1971 edited collection The Philosophy of Socrates, Vlastos writes: “Socrates of this book is the Platonic Socrates, or, to be more precise, the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues” (1). Compare the 1992 collection edited by Hugh Benson entitled Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates. All of the contributions in Benson’s volume focus on Plato’s early dialogues. But not all of the contributors maintain that these works contain the philosophy of the historical Socrates. In his own 2000 book on the epistemology of Plato’s early dialogues, Socratic Wisdom, Benson explicitly restricts his interpretation to the philosophical content of the texts and resists a judgment on the Socratic problem.

48 Recent defenses of the authenticity of these texts can be found in Denyer 2001, 14–25, and Joyal 2000, 121–34. It is perhaps noteworthy that both of these scholars work in Classics departments.
and other cases. Instead, they have assumed as their evidential base the dialogues widely acknowledged to be authentic and early.

In the last twenty or so years, especially since the publication of Gabriele Giannontoni’s Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, increasing work has been done on Socratics contemporaneous with Plato, particularly Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Xenophon. Here too analytically oriented philosophy of Plato’s early dialogues has largely remained focused on Plato’s texts.

As we have seen, analytically oriented philosophy of Plato’s early dialogues has more precisely focused on certain aspects of these texts: the philosophical arguments and commitments of the character Socrates. This focus tends to exclude or at least marginalize other aspects of the texts. Among these are historical aspects. In speaking of the historical aspects of the texts, I have in mind both the fact that the texts represent historical people and places and refer or allude to historical events and the fact that the philosophical contents of the texts themselves may be studied in various historical terms. For example, in this latter case, one might examine the philosophical content in relation to the contributions of other Socratics or in relation non-Socratic ethical philosophical works of the late fifth or early fourth century such as the Dissoi Logoi or Anonymus Iamblichi. Alternatively, one might examine it in relation to popular Athenian or Greek values or ideas.

Another aspect of Plato’s early dialogues marginalized in the analytically oriented philosophy is their drama. One feature fundamental to the drama of the texts is that they are dialogues. So marginalization of the drama of the texts tends to marginalize their dialogicity. To some degree a conception of the elenchus such as Vlastos’s engages the dialogical character of the texts. As we have seen, on Vlastos’s view it is Socrates’ interlocutors who provide the theses that Socrates targets for refutation and Socrates’ interlocutors who provide or at least agree to the premise sets that Socrates employs in refuting the targeted theses. Whether this is in fact always or even commonly the way arguments Socrates initiates are conducted is contestable. But assuming Vlastos’s account for the sake of illustration, since Socrates is supposed to be responsive to his interlocutors, understanding the interlocutors’ contributions must shed light on Socrates’ own contributions. More broadly, understanding the relations between Socrates’ and his interlocutors’ commitments and contributions is

49 Paul Woodruff’s 1982 argument for the authenticity of Hippias Major is a noteworthy exception.
50 Giannantoni 1990.
51 E.g., cf. Hobden and Tuplin 2012; Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013; Zilioli 2015; Lampe 2015; Prince 2015; Flower 2016.
52 E.g., cf. Wolfsdorf 2003.
necessary for understanding how the dialogues as a whole are structured and operate. Marginalization of the dialogicity of the texts therefore obscures the broader structures and aims of the texts.53

Furthermore the characters that participate in the arguments in Plato’s early dialogues have relatively well-rounded personalities and again historical identities. Consequently, while argumentation is indeed central to the texts, there is more to understanding the arguments than grasping their bare propositional contents and the logical or conceptual relations obtaining between them. The psychological complexity of the characters also introduces a special set of problems for the interpretation of the arguments. Broadly speaking, these problems fall under the rubric of pragmatics. The fundamental pragmatic problem is that in any given argumentative passage it is questionable what Socrates’ and his interlocutor’s motivations are. But to make sense of the argument at issue, the interpreter must take a stand on these questions.

The problem of Socratic irony here looms large. As we noted above, this is a topic that analytically oriented philosophers have examined. In fact, Vlastos devotes the opening chapter of Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher to it.54 But it is noteworthy that interpretation of Socratic irony requires attention to features of the texts other than their philosophical arguments narrowly construed. Consequently, there may in principle be a tension between analytically oriented focus on Socrates’ philosophy and on these other aspects of the texts.

Finally, it is questionable whether an understanding of the psychological attitudes of the characters in the dialogues can be insulated from an interpreter’s views regarding Plato’s interests in portraying the characters as such and in composing a given dialogue or the dialogues in general. For example, in principle Plato might put even a thoroughly sincere Socrates and his interlocutor to any number of uses within a passage or text.55 One striking

53 In addition, Socrates is not the only character who initiates arguments in Plato’s early dialogues. A signal example is Protagoras’ Great Speech in Protagoras. Another is the series of arguments that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus develop in Euthydemus. So here again understanding Socrates’ contributions and the texts as wholes requires consideration of the philosophical contributions of other characters.

54 A central component of Vlastos’s view is that when Socrates participates in arguments, he is sincere and adheres to the “say what you believe” constraint that he places on his interlocutors (Vlastos 1983, 35). For a recent survey of alternative interpretations of Socratic irony, cf. Vasiliou 2013.

55 Observe that Vlastos explicitly commits himself to “grand hypothesis” that the character Socrates is Plato’s mouthpiece: “In my previous book [Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher] I blocked out the hypothesis on which my whole interpretation of Plato’s
illustration of this point relates to the fact that most but not all of the discussions in Plato’s early dialogues conclude in *aporia*. How is this fact to be explained? It cannot be explained on the grounds that Socrates lacks knowledge of the answer to the questions that he pursues, since again some of the early dialogues do not end in *aporia*. Possibly, Socrates is more deeply perplexed about some questions than others. But this is not the only reasonable explanation. By and large analytically oriented philosophers have been silent on the topic of the aporetic and non-aporetic conclusions of the early dialogues.

6 Conclusion

It has now been a quarter century since Vlastos’s death. The principal value of the analytically oriented study of Plato’s early dialogues that he above all inspired has been to draw attention to a set of philosophical problems and commitments in these texts and to examine this content with a degree of rigor and clarity that it has not received since antiquity, arguably ever. In the title of the preceding subsection, I spoke of the limits in analytically oriented philosophy of Plato’s early dialogues. I did not intend to use “limits” in a blanketly critical way. Every form or style of interpretation or textual engagement must be limited in various ways. As I said, specifying those features of the texts and those considerations relating to them that the analytically oriented philosophers tend to avoid or marginalize further helps to define their contribution. In discussing these features, I have, however, also drawn attention to the way certain limits might jeopardize or problematize the interpretation of those very aspects of the texts with which the analytically oriented philosophers are concerned: the character Socrates’ arguments and philosophical commitments.

dialogues depend: Plato makes Socrates say in any given dialogue ‘whatever *he*—Plato—thinks at the time of writing would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own philosophy’” (Vlastos 1994, 125; originally at 1991, 50). But even if this extraordinary hypothesis were true, it would not settle the question of Plato’s interests in crafting and disseminating the dramatic dialogues as he did.

Appendix 1: Doctoral Dissertations Supervised at Princeton University

Shehadi, F.A., *Concept of Mystical Union in Al-Ghazali*, 1959
Sykes, R.H., *The Doctrine of Substance in the Logical Works of Aristotle*, 1959
Donnell, F.H., Jr., *Thinking and Imagination*, 1960
Sartorius, R., *The Judicial Decision: Philosophical Perspectives*, 1965
Wilkins, B.T., *John Locke and Edmund Burke on Human Rights*, 1965
Waterfall, Donald E., *Plato and Aristotle on Akrasia*, Oct 1969
Irwin, Terence, *Theories of Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Early and Middle Dialogues*, Jan 1973

Appendix 2: NEH Summer Seminars Directed

The Moral and Social Philosophy of Socrates and Plato (FF-10310-74), 1974

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57 I present the following information precisely as it was given in the database I received from the Philosophy Department at Princeton University. For example, the titles of the first two dissertations listed seem to need definite articles. In all instances, Vlastos is listed as the first adviser on the dissertation. He is listed as second adviser on only the following dissertation: Albritton, Rogers, *A Study of Plato's Philebus*, 1955. Thanks to Josephine Kelly, Graduate Program Administrator, for assistance with the data. Despite repeated requests, I was unfortunately unable to get a list of doctoral dissertations that Vlastos supervised while at the University of California, Berkeley.

58 The contents in parentheses are the NEH application/award numbers. Further information about these applications/awards can be found at: https://securegrants.neh.gov/PublicQuery/Main.aspx.

59 The NEH database supplies so-called council dates for the applications/awards. These are the dates on which the NEH committee determines the award for the application, not the dates on which the seminars are conducted. For instance, the council date for the last
The Moral and Social Philosophy of Socrates and Plato (FS-10280-76), 1976
The Philosophy of Socrates (FS-10698-77), 1978
The Philosophy of Socrates (FS-*0066-81), 1981
The Philosophy of Socrates (FS-20934083), 1983
The Philosophy of Socrates (FS-21751-88), 1988
The Philosophy of Socrates (FS-22154-90), 1990

References

Boys-Stones, G. and Rowe, C. The circle of Socrates. Indianapolis 2013.

application/award is August 1989. I have dated the seminars to the summer following the award date. Thanks to Richard Pettit, Program Analyst at the NEH, for assistance with the data.

60 Vlastos received one additional award from the NEH (FA-10774–74) in February 1974. This award appears to be for independent research on Plato's social philosophy. Mr. Pettit was unable to confirm that the award was for this purpose. However, two considerations support the claim. One is the amount of the award, which is significantly less than the amounts awarded for seminars. The other is the claim on the website of Princeton University’s Philosophy Department that Vlastos conducted seven NEH summer seminars: https://philosophy.princeton.edu/about/past-faculty/gregory-vlastos.


Ross, W.D. *The right and the good*. Oxford 1930.
