Plato on the Varieties of Truth and Falsity

"(T:) Stranger, what can we say an image (εἰδωλὸν) is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one (τάληθινὸν). (S:) Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say 'such'? (T:) Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true one. (S:) And by the true one you mean that which really is (ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄν). (T:) Exactly. (S:) And the not true is the opposite of the true? (T:) Of course. (S:) That which is like, then, you say does not really exist (οὐκ ὃντως ὄν), if you say it is not true (μὴ ἀληθῶς). (T:) But it does exist — in a way. (S:) But not truly (ἀληθῶς), you mean. (T:) No, except that it is really (ὡς ἀληθῶς) a likeness. (S:) Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist? (T:) Non-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very strange."  

(Plato, Sophist, 240a7-c2)

"One way that 'false' is used is as of a false entity (πρᾶγμα), because it cannot be substantiated … that the diagonal of a square is commensurable (with the side) or that you are sitting … These are not things that exist. (Another way 'false' is used is as of) such things as do exist, but whose nature it is to seem either such as they are not or like things that are unreal, e.g., shadow-painting (σκιαγραφία) and dreams. For these are really something, but not that of which they create the impression. (A third way that 'false' is used is as of) a false statement (which is) a statement of what is not."

(Aristotle, Metaphysics Δ.29, 1024b17-30)

A New Way in

Today philosophical interest in truth and falsity is more or less tantamount to interest in propositional truth and falsity. Relatively little interest is taken in another kind of truth and falsity, sometimes called "ontological" or "metaphysical." Consider the phrases "true friend" and "false friend." Here "true" and "false" are not even implicitly attributed to a propositional entity. Whatever theory of propositional truth-value we endorse will not explain the way that friends, among other things, are true and false.

Apparently, the words "true" and "false" have two different pairs of meanings. For convenience, I will distinguish these as "propositional" and "ontic" respectively. Granting the distinction, it may be questioned whether the pairs are homonymous. One condition for homonymy is etymological distinctness. For example, "bass" (the fish) derives from the Old English "baers," while "bass" (the
sound quality) derives from the Italian "basso." The fact that these meanings are expressed by a single lexeme in English is accidental. Propositional "true" and "false" and ontic "true" and "false," however, have the same etymology.

A single lexeme with multiple meanings, but also with a single etymology, can still be homonymous if the meanings are remote. "Cardinal," the ecclesiastical office and the bird, is an example.1 The name of the North American finch derives from the red cassock of the Church official.

A single lexeme with multiple meanings, whose meanings are closely related, is polysemous. For example, consider the uses of "run" in "run a marathon," "run for office," and what one's nose does in winter.2 "True" derives from the Old English "tréowe," which is cognate with the noun "tréow" meaning "faith," "covenant," "fidelity." The OED gives the primary and secondary senses of "true" as pertaining to persons: "steadfast in adherence to a commander or friend, to a principle or cause, to one's promise ..." and, more generally, "honest, upright ... trustworthy" respectively. The tertiary sense pertains to a statement or belief: "consistent with fact; agreeing with reality; representing the thing as it is." "False" derives from the past participle "falsum" of the Latin "fallere" meaning "to deceive." Its primary sense is of opinions, doctrines, and representations: "contrary to what is true, erroneous." Its secondary and tertiary senses are "mendacious, treacherous, deceitful" and "spurious, not genuine" respectively. The sets of meanings associated with "true" and "false" are clearly more closely related than those of "cardinal." But whether they are close enough to admit "true" and "false" as polysemes is debatable and perhaps undecidable.

Although such concerns are themselves remote from contemporary philosophical theorizing, matters were not always so. Within the history of philosophy, it has not always been clear whether "true" and "false" — or their equivalents in other languages — are multi-vocal; or, granting distinctions among kinds of truth and falsity, that the relations among these kinds is more attenuated than kinship. Plato's theoretical efforts are a signal and instructive case. In Cratylus and more fully in Sophist, Plato was the first philosopher to theorize propositional truth-value or at least a recognizable ancestor of it.3 In doing so, he specifically engages the idea that propositional truth-values differ from ontic truth and falsity. Plato's attention to propositional truth-value was drawn in this way because throughout his corpus the concepts of ontic truth and falsity dominate his interests. Saliently, the Forms are true, true beings, while

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1 I derive the example from Ingrid Lovius Falkum, The Semantics and Pragmatics of Polysemy: A Relevance-Theoretic Account, University College London dissertation, 2011, 17.
2 Again, I owe the example to Falkum (2011) 9.
3 On this point, see Paolo Crivelli, Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 3-4 and 221-60.
their participants are relatively false. Propositional truth-value was, thus, wrested from the domain of ontic truth and falsity.4

In considering Plato’s treatments of the varieties of truth and falsity here I have chosen to focus on a text that prior students of the subject have neglected. The text is a passage from Philebus.5 Within it, the dramatic character Socrates argues for a division of pleasures into various kinds. In the process of the discussion, Socrates argues that pleasure can be false as well as true. In short, the passage is Socrates’ division of false pleasures in Philebus.

Such a context for theorizing about truth and falsity will strike most as very strange. Philosophers generally regard pleasure as some sort of non-cognitive state or process. Thus, the very idea of true or false pleasures will seem confused.6 Stranger still, Socrates argues that there are four different ways that pleasure can be false (and correlatively true).7 Each one of these four kinds of truth and falsity appears elsewhere in Plato’s corpus. But only in the Philebus passage does Plato examine all four in close proximity and in relation to one another. This makes the text a remarkable and valuable locus for exploring Plato’s various conceptions of truth and falsity.

I will call the four false pleasures “α, β, γ, and δ”; likewise, with respect to correlative true pleasures and to the genera to which the false and true species belong. I will discuss the pleasures in Greek alphabetic order and conclude by considering their interrelation.

False Pleasure A

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4 Whether Plato ultimately thought propositional truth-value could be explained in wholly non-ontological terms is open to debate.


6 Socrates’ interlocutor Protarchus is initially resistant to the idea that pleasure can be false. But Protarchus’ initial position differs from that of most contemporary philosophers in that he maintains that pleasures can bear truth, but only truth. In other words, Protarchus denies only that pleasure can be false. For some relatively contemporary discussion of pleasure’s capacity to bear truth and falsity, cp. Irvine Thalberg, “False Pleasures,” Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962) 65-74; Terence Penelhum, “Pleasure and Falsity,” American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964) 81-91; David Perry, The Concept of Pleasure, Mouton, 1967, at 112-33. Cp. also Sabina Lovibond, “True and False Pleasures,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1989-90) 213-30.

7 Cp. the use of “τρόπος” at Phil. 41a7. Note: most of Socrates’ discussion focuses on ways that pleasure can be false. However, I believe and will assume here that all of these are ways that pleasure can bear truth. Second, Socrates only distinguishes two ways that pleasure can bear truth and falsity using the term “τρόπος.” However, following his distinction of these two ways, he says at 42c6 that he will consider pleasures that are “more false” (ψευδεστα μάλλον) than the preceding ones. I assume, then, that the following false pleasures are false in a different way (τρόπος) than the preceding ones. Indeed, it is clear from the exegeses of these pleasures that they bear truth and falsity in a different way.
Socrates argues for false pleasure $\alpha$ in conjunction and by analogy with belief. He distinguishes two components of belief: the psychological attitude of believing and the object of this attitude, that which is believed.\(^8\) The doxastic object is truth-apt. For example, a man may believe that he is going to win the lottery, but in fact he isn't.\(^9\) Hence what he believes is false.\(^{10}\) Additionally — I want to draw special attention to this point — Socrates maintains that the belief itself, that is, the complex consisting of the conjunction of doxastic attitude and doxastic object, possesses truth or falsity.\(^{11}\) Precisely, the belief derives its truth or falsity from the truth-value of its component doxastic object.

Socrates suggests that a certain kind of pleasure, namely, pleasure $\alpha$, has a form analogous to belief. That is, pleasure $\alpha$ has two components: the psychological attitude of taking-pleasure and the object of this attitude, that in which pleasure is taken.\(^{12}\) In short, pleasure $\alpha$ is a complex of a hedonic attitude and a hedonic object.

Now, it seems that we do indeed take pleasure in things. For example, a man may take pleasure in winning the lottery or in the thought of winning the lottery. But at this stage in the argument, Socrates' interlocutor Protarchus objects. Protarchus grants that pleasure may occur in conjunction with false belief. Yet he insists that the pleasure itself is not thereby falsified.\(^{13}\) Protarchus' position seems to be that the belief merely causes pleasure.

In response, Socrates grants that the belief does cause pleasure. However, he insists that the caused pleasure still has two components: the attitude of taking pleasure and the object in which pleasure is taken. Socrates' view seems to be this. Taking pleasure is an intentional state, in the philosophical sense of "intentional." That is to say, when one takes pleasure in something, one's pleasure is directed toward that thing; it is about that thing.\(^{14}\) Moreover — although it would be psychologically possible to take pleasure in believing something — the object of taking pleasure is rarely the attitude of believing. One is rarely pleased at exercising a psychological capacity to believe certain things. So, someone who is pleased because he believes he will win the lottery does not take pleasure in believing he will win the lottery.

Granted this, is the hedonic attitude directed toward the doxastic object instead of the doxastic attitude? In other words, does the man in the example take pleasure in what he believes? Indeed, one can take pleasure in what one

\(^{8}\) Phlb. 37a2-8.  
\(^{9}\) Cp. Phlb. 39a3-7.  
\(^{10}\) Strictly speaking, there may be cases where this claim itself is false, cases of vagueness and undecidability, Liar-like paradoxes, arguably also future contingents. It is unclear whether Plato was alive to any such cases. For simplicity's sake I ignore them.  
\(^{11}\) For example, Phlb. 37b10-1c1.  
\(^{12}\) Phlb. 37a5-10.  
\(^{14}\) An early discussion of this is Bernard Williams, "Pleasure and Belief," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume, 33 (1959) 57-72.
believes. But Socrates develops his position in a slightly different way. He suggests that the object in which pleasure is taken is not identical to the object of belief. Instead, a man who falsely believes he is going to win the lottery may then envision himself winning the lottery; and he may take pleasure in this vision. In the case of pleasure \( \alpha \), then, Socrates holds that, the object of taking pleasure is a vision.\(^{15}\)

At this point, it may be wondered why Socrates develops his position in this way, that is, why he takes the vision, rather than the doxastic object, to be the hedonic object. I confess I do not feel certain of the answer. However, I suspect at least the following. Socrates hereby draws a strong distinction between belief and pleasure. Pleasure can be taken in a vision whose content one does not believe. Thus, by showing that pleasure can have its own object, distinct from that of belief, Socrates encourages the rejection of Protarchus' view that belief merely causes an object-less pleasure.

Now, Socrates maintains that the content of the hedonic object, that is, the content of the vision, derives from the content of the doxastic object, from what is believed.\(^{16}\) Some appreciation of this point may be gained by considering Tim Crane's remarks on what he calls different vehicles of mental representation:

"Consider a road sign with a schematic picture in a red triangle of two children holding hands. The message this sign conveys is: 'Beware! Children crossing!' Compare this with a linguistic sign that says in English: 'Beware! Children crossing!' These two signs express the same message, but in very different ways. I'll call this sort of difference in the way a message can be stored a difference in the vehicle of representation. … The most obvious distinction between vehicles of representation is that which can be made between sentences and pictures."\(^{17}\)

Indeed, in his argument in *Philebus* Socrates characterizes doxastic objects as akin to psychological inscriptions. A scribe, as it were, etches \( \lambda \overline{\text{o}}\gamma \overline{\text{o}} \) (words or sentences) in the soul, and these are believed.\(^{18}\) Likewise, a painter, as it were,

\(^{15}\) *Phlb.* 39b3-b8.

\(^{16}\) *Phlb.* 39b9-c2.

\(^{17}\) Tim Crane, *The Mechanical Mind*, 2nd ed. Routlege, 2003, 136. Vehicular distinctions should be distinguished from another set of distinctions, which Crane calls media of representation: "I shall call different ways of storing different tokens of the same type of sentence the different media in which they are realized. Written English words are one medium, spoken English words are another … The same sentence can be realized in many different media." (ibid) This distinction between media features is implicit in another passage in the present context of *Philebus*. Immediately following his statement that the deliberator may silently answer himself, Socrates notes that if he happens to be in the company of another person: "<the deliberator> might speak aloud to his companion thereby stretching into sound (\( \varepsilon \nu \tau \varepsilon \iota \nu \alpha \zeta \varepsilon \varphi \omega \nu \iota \nu \) what he had told himself, and so what we earlier called ‘belief’ would become an assertion." (*Phlb.* 38e1-4) In this case, the doxastic and spoken representations are distinguished by the substances in which they are realized, psychological and somatic substance (precisely, air) respectively, including distinct causal properties of these substances.

\(^{18}\) *Phlb.* 38e12-39a7.
depicts images in the soul, and pleasure is taken in these. Hence, Socrates, like Crane, maintains that both linguistic and pictorial or imagistic representations can possess the same content, but by means of different kinds of vehicle. More precisely, Socrates maintains that imagistic representations can be fashioned so that they convey the same content as linguistic representations. Thus, truth or falsity should transmit from the linguistic to the imagistic representation.

In short, then, the hedonic object possesses truth or falsity. The truth or falsity of the hedonic object derives from the truth or falsity of the doxastic object. Finally, pleasure, that is, the complex of the hedonic attitude and the hedonic object, derives truth or falsity from the truth or falsity of its component hedonic object. Thus, Socrates concludes that pleasure α exhibits one way that pleasure may be false.

Appendix to False Pleasure A

Before turning to false pleasure β, I want to pause over an intriguing lacuna in Socrates' argument for false pleasure α. Pleasure α is a complex of an attitude and its object. Given that the object may be false, on what basis can we infer that the complex is false? To appreciate the force of this question, consider that there is no sound principle according to which complexes must inherit the properties of their components. In other words, there is no sound principle according to which properties are transitive from component to complex. The following argument proves this:

- If a and b are not identical, then a has a property that b lacks and b has a property that a lacks (a version of Leibniz's Law).
- But a component is not identical to the complex.
- So the component has a property that the complex lacks.
- For example, the component is a component of the complex, but the complex is not a component of the complex.
- So the complex cannot inherit all of the properties of the component. Consequently, if a complex does inherit truth or falsity from its component, some additional argument is needed. I suspect that some such argument is available.

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19 Phlb. 39b3-c2.
20 In contrast, Fred Dretske, who distinguishes between linguistic entities carrying information in digital form and pictures carrying information in analog form, emphasizes that "most pictures have a wealth of detail, and a degree of specificity, that makes it all but impossible to provide even an approximate linguistic rendition of the information the picture carries in digital form." (Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT, 1981, 137)
21 Phlb. 39c4-6.
22 This is obviously a highly compressed and selective account of Socrates' argument. But it serves the present purposes.
23 Generally speaking, Plato's use of Leibniz's Law, or at least a pre-theoretical ancestor of it, is recognized by a number of interpreters, particularly in the contexts of Socrates' pursuit of definitions. For example, cp. Joel I. Friedman, "Plato's Euthyphro and Leibniz's Law," Philosophia 12 (1982) 1-20.
For example, it is natural to attribute paleness to Socrates, although strictly it is the surface of Socrates' skin, a component of Socrates, that is pale. Still, identifying the argument in virtue of which truth or falsity is transitive from component to complex is no simple matter. I cannot entirely resolve the problem here, but I offer a preliminary proposal. Consider a 2-inch line segment AB and a 1-inch sub-segment of AB, which I'll call AC. While AC is a component of AB, AB does not inherit AC's property of being 1-inch. The reason for this is that the part AC and the remainder of the whole AB both possess quantitative properties of length. Moreover, the length of AC contributes to and thus affects the length of AB. In other words— and speaking somewhat loosely now— the length property of AC is not insulated from any such properties of AB. Thus, in order for a complex to inherit the property of a component, the property of the component must, in some sense, be an insulated property. The truth or falsity of the hedonic object looks to be an insulated property relative to pleasure as a whole. This is because pleasure, taken independently of its object, simply does not possess truth or falsity. Hence, the component's possession of truth or falsity does not affect or influence any other such property of the complex.

In fact, Plato has Socrates consider the problem of property-transmission from part to whole in the context of another discussion of pleasure. In *Hippias Major* Socrates and Hippias agree that not all pleasure is καλόν (beautiful, fine). Rather, only pleasure-through-sight and pleasure-through-hearing are. Socrates now asks what καλόν-making property pleasure-through-sight and pleasure-through-hearing possess. In poses this question, Socrates cautions Hippias to consider what καλόν-making property the two pleasures conjointly possess in virtue of their individual possession of the καλόν-making property. Hippias finds Socrates' cautious remark idiotic, since he can't imagine a property that the two pleasures would conjointly, but not individually possess: "And how could that be, Socrates? That when neither has a property individually, this property could belong to both conjointly?"24 Indeed, Socrates grants Hippias that many properties transmit from individuals to conjunctions of individuals, for example, if individuals are made of gold, silver, are healthy or wise, then the conjunction of individuals is made of gold, silver, is healthy or wise. But Socrates subsequently explains that quantitative properties do not conform to the principle: "... each of us is one, but we are not conjointly one ... because we're conjointly two."25

In short, Plato clearly took an interest in the metaphysical problem of property transmission from part to whole. Assuming there is some cogent argument for truth and falsity as insulated properties, at least with respect to the problem of the lacuna, Socrates has a compelling argument for the falsity of pleasure α.

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**False pleasure B**

24 *HpMa.* 300b6-8.
25 *HpMa.* 301d6-9.
Socrates holds some general views about pleasure that I have not yet introduced because they are not pertinent to the truth and falsity bearing capacity of pleasure α. They are pertinent to pleasures β, γ, and δ. So here they are. There is a distinction between what pleasure is (τὸ ὄν) and the way that pleasure appears (τὸ φανόμενον). To those who hold the Berkeleyan idea that pleasure’s esse is percipi, for example, that pleasure is merely a feeling, quale, subjective state, or φανόμενον (appearance), this is a startling view. More precisely, Socrates holds that pleasure is a kind of restoration or coming-to-be (γένεσις). For example, in the case of bodily pleasure, say, pleasure derived from drinking when thirsty, rehydration, a physiological restoration, occurs. This restoration, if robust enough, registers psychologically. This psychological registering is the way the restoration appears. I will refer to this as the phenomenal component of pleasure. I will refer to the restoration itself as the ontic component. Socrates holds that pleasure is constituted by both phenomenal and ontic components. For instance, if a restoration is too gradual or slight to register psychologically, then no pleasure occurs.

In light of the preceding claims, I will begin by outlining a case of true pleasure β. Here, restoration occurs, and the phenomenal component indicates the occurrence of restoration. It does so by having a phenomenally pleasant, as opposed to, say, painful character. More precisely, the phenomenal component indicates various properties of restoration. For example, restoration may occur more or less rapidly; it may occur over a wider or narrower scope of the body or soul.

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27 How the phenomenal and ontic components of pleasure figure in pleasure α is a question for a different context — although I address the matter briefly toward the end of this paper.
28 Evidence for this claim derives from the following passage where, in the context of discussing mixed affective conditions, that is, conditions where pleasure and pain concur, Socrates asks: 
"<What device is there for correctly judging (κρίσεως) pleasures and pains> if we have a desire to judge them in some such circumstances (τοιούτοις τισ;) and want to know then which is greater (µείζων) or lesser (ἐλάττων) in relation to the other or which is more (μᾶλλον) or more intense (οφθαλμῷ) …?" (Phlb. 42e2-5) In this question, Socrates appears to indicate three respects in which pleasure and pain admit degrees. These three respects correspond to Socrates’ expressions "greater and lesser," "more," and "more intense." In a subsequent passage, Socrates also appears to distinguish three respects in which pleasures admit degrees: "Now, mind you, my question was not whether the very sick have more (πλέον) pleasures than healthy people, but rather with the size (µέγεθος) and intensity (τὸ σφόδρα) of the condition when it occurs." (Phlb. 45c3-6) The first and third members of each set appear to correlate. The first members refer to numbers of pleasures; the third members refer to intensities of pleasure. The second members are more difficult to interpret, and it is unclear whether they correlate with one another. Again, in the first set, Socrates speaks vaguely of “more” (µᾶλλον); in the second set he speaks somewhat less vaguely of “magnitude” (µέγεθος) of pleasure. One possibility is that Socrates has in mind pleasures of varying durations, in other words, long- and short-lasting pleasures. In the analogy with vision that he draws in his account of misapparent pleasure, Socrates speaks of the magnitudes (τὰ µεγέθη) of objects whose visual appearance changes when they are beheld at
In veridical cases, then, the character of the phenomenal component of pleasure correlates with the ontic component and certain of its properties. More generally, in the case of pleasure β, the phenomenal component of pleasure possesses content, and the truth or falsity of this content is a function of its relation to the ontic component.

Broadly speaking, in non-veridical cases, the character of the phenomenal component deviates in some way from the veridical case. Simplifying considerably, the deviation is akin to an illusion. In this case, restoration, which is in fact a property, functions analogously to an object of perception. So restoration occurs and registers psychologically, but it mis-appears. There are many ways we might imagine such misappearance occurring, but Socrates suggests that the misappearance results from the compresence of the pleasure with some other affective condition. For example, a pleasure occurs in conjunction with another pleasure or with a pain. The compresence of the two affective conditions distorts one or both of their individual appearances. Compare the way juxtaposition of colors or shapes may distort the appearances of individual colors or shapes. Indeed, Socrates explains false pleasure β by analogy with visual illusion.

If the preceding account of pleasure β sounds strange as a conception of pleasure, it is worth comparing with contemporary representational conceptions of sensation. Michael Tye is a prominent expositor. In the following passage, he analogizes the representation involved in bodily pain with that involved in basic visual sensation:

"Pains are sensory representations of bodily damage or disorder. More fully, they are … responses to the relevant bodily changes in the same way that the basic visual sensations are … responses to proximate visual

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different distances. Accordingly, Socrates is analogizing the magnitudes of spatial extension of visual appearances with the magnitudes of temporal extension of affective appearances.

29 Socrates' treatment occurs at *Phlb.* 41a7-42c3.

30 Here again, I am simplifying considerably. In particular, Socrates conceives of the case as a conflict with anticipatory or imagined affective conditions or the conjunction of one anticipatory or imagined affective condition and a bodily pain or pleasure.

31 An example may help. This is my example. A woman who likes, but is allergic to shellfish derives pleasure from eating a meal of prawns, while simultaneously fearing the consequences. The phenomenal component of the anticipatory displeasure affects and distorts the phenomenal component of the pleasure derived from eating.

32 Granted this, the question may arise why we should not take a hedonic appearance engendered, say, by a bodily restoration in conjunction with a painful anticipation to represent that complex of affective conditions just as it occurs. The reason, I propose, is that a hedonic appearance *qua hedonic* differs in its phenomenal character from an algesic appearance. Moreover, a hedonic appearance *qua hedonic* is an appearance of a hedonic condition, a restoration. Thus, a hedonic appearance, if engendered in the context of a complex affective state such as a pleasure in conjunction with a pain is, insofar as it is a hedonic appearance, not an appearance of that complex affective state. Rather, it is an appearance of one aspect or component of that complex affective state. Moreover, according to Socrates' account, the compresence of the pain causes the restoration to appear in a way that it would not were the restoration unaccompanied by pain.

stimuli. In the case of pain, the receptors (known as nociceptors) are distributed throughout the body. These receptors function analogously to the receptors in the retina. They are transducers. They are sensitive only to certain changes in the tissue to which they are directly connected (typically, damage), and they convert this input immediately into symbols. Representations are then built up ... of internal bodily changes, just as representations are built up of external surfaces in the case of vision. These representations, to repeat, are sensory. They involve no concepts. One does not need to be able to conceptualize a given bodily disturbance in order to feel pain.34

Tye's position rests on the theory of indicator or informational semantics.35 The basic idea is that one state, in this case a mental state, represents, indicates, or carries information about another insofar as they causally covary under optimal conditions. Here is how Tye puts it:

"For each state S ... S represents ... P =df if optimal conditions obtain, S is tokened ... iff P and because P. <Hence,> when optimal conditions do not obtain, there is misrepresentation."36

In pleasure ß, optimal conditions require a psychological context free from other affective conditions. Once again, it is the compresence of multiple affective conditions that distorts the way the restoration registers psychologically, thus yielding misrepresentation.37,38

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38 It is also worth noting here why the truth or falsity conferring relation of causal covariation under optimal conditions does not apply to pleasure α. Consider Tye's comments on why indicator semantics cannot explain mental representation generally: "The account is not straightforwardly applicable to beliefs across the board. Take, for example, the belief that the Devil is an angel who fell from grace. What are the relevant optimal conditions here? And what about mathematical beliefs, the belief that 2 + 2 = 4, say? Again, the proposal does not seem applicable. There are no states in human heads that are tokened because 2 + 2 = 4. That abstract mathematical fact has no causal power." (1995, 101-2). Tye's mathematical example is particularly germane to Socrates' discussion of pleasure α. Socrates focuses on false anticipatory pleasure: the man believes he will win the lottery. The doxastic and hedonic objects represent a future state of affairs. Thus, what they represent is causally inert.
Consider now some significant points of contrast between pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$. The primary truth- or falsity-bearer of pleasure $\alpha$ is its object, that in which pleasure is taken. The primary truth- or falsity-bearer of pleasure $\beta$ is the phenomenal component of pleasure. Availing ourselves of a broad notion of representation, we may say that the truth- and falsity-bearing conceptions for the primary truth- and falsity-bearers of both pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are representational.\(^{39}\) The representations are, however, distinct in several significant ways. In pleasure $\alpha$, the pictorial representation derives from a doxastic and so linguistic representation. In pleasure $\beta$, in principle the phenomenal representation does not depend on belief.\(^{40}\) Additionally, the vehicles of the representations differ. Pictorial representation is visual or imagistic. Phenomenal representation occurs, for lack of a better expression, in the hedonic modality. Finally, the content of the hedonic representation is limited to the property of restoration and certain of its properties.\(^{41}\)

Let this suffice for an account of false pleasure $\beta$ and of the relation between the conceptions of truth and falsity operative in pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$.\(^{42}\)

\(^{39}\) Tyler Burge refers to use of "representation" of which I am here availing myself as "deflationist." (2010, 293) I am sympathetic to Burge's criticisms of this broad use as well as to the narrow use of perceptual representation he defends. However, my use of "representation" is well motivated by the fact that it seems to capture Plato's broad conception of content-bearing entities and their truth-conditions.

\(^{40}\) Phlb. 42a5-9.

\(^{41}\) It is noteworthy that the phenomenal component can not represent objects. To clarify this point, consider the correlative case of pain, for example, pain in the knee. According to Socrates, the phenomenal component of pain represents damage or disintegration. Moreover, the representation may have a locative property. That is, one senses, as part of the experience of pain, a bodily location of the pain. However, this algesic representation cannot represent the knee itself, that is, the object where it represents the damage as located. In contrast, pictorial or imagistic representation can represent objects.

\(^{42}\) Observe also Tye's claim that sensory representation is non-conceptual: "They involve no concepts." This invites the question whether in pleasure $\beta$ Socrates commits to the view that the phenomenal component represents restoration non-conceptually. I merely want to flag this possibility and suggest one reason to think the answer may be positive. In Republic 9, Socrates articulates a similar conception of hedonic misrepresentation, likewise using visual illusion as an analogue. In Republic, however, Socrates does not draw any clear distinction between sensation and belief. For example, in the well-known passage in book 10 where he describes the visual illusion of a stick in water, Socrates says that the irrational part of the soul believes the stick to be bent, while the rational part believes it to be straight. (R. 602d6-603a2) (I note in passing that Alex Byrne advances a similar account in "Experience and Content," The Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2009) 429-51, esp. at 450-51.) In Theaetetus, by contrast, Socrates famously works to distinguish sensation and belief. I take Philebus to have been composed after Theaetetus and to incorporate this distinction between sensation and belief. Recall that a central point in the account of pleasure $\beta$, in contrast to pleasure $\alpha$, is that false pleasure $\beta$ in principle occurs independently of belief. If it could be shown that the distinction between sensation and belief in Theaetetus entails that sensation is non-conceptual, then there would be good reason to think that the phenomenal component of pleasure $\beta$ represents non-conceptually. (While noting this intriguing possibility, it must also be emphasized that the nature of non-conceptual content is vexed. There is considerable need to clarify just what one is talking about here, let alone whether Plato is committed to it.)
False Pleasures Γ and ∆

Immediately following his account of pleasure β, Socrates says: "Next after these (namely, false pleasures α and β), we will see whether we can come upon pleasures (namely, γ and δ) ... even more false (ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον) ... both as they appear (φαινομένας) and as they are (οὗσας)." For convenience, I will refer to being false in appearance as being "representationally false," and I will refer to being false in being as being "ontically false." Socrates' statement suggests, but does not strictly entail that false pleasures γ and δ are both representationally and ontically false. I say his statement "suggests, but does not entail" this, because he could mean, for instance, that false pleasure γ is representationally false and that false pleasure δ is ontically false. However, I think broader textual evidence supports the view that Socrates takes false pleasures γ and δ to be both representationally and ontically false.

Let's begin with the representational falsity of false pleasures γ and δ. Relative to false pleasure β, false pleasure γ can be understood as akin to hallucination. The phenomenal component of pleasure occurs, but there is no ontic component; that is, no restoration occurs. I will not discuss the mechanisms by which Socrates thinks such hedonic hallucination may occur.

I turn to the representational falsity of pleasure δ. As we saw in his account of false pleasure β, Socrates explains that the compresence of two affective conditions, whether both pleasures or a mixture of pleasure and pain, distorts the phenomenal character of each. False pleasure δ likewise entails the compresence of two affective conditions. In this case, Socrates requires that the affective conditions be opposites: pleasure and pain. The ontic components of the pain and pleasure may be bodily or psychological. For example, a somatic part may undergo disintegration, while a psychological part undergoes restoration.

43 Phlb. 42c5-7.
44 Discussed at Phlb. 42c5-44d6. It is also central to and discussed in detail in Socrates' argument at Republic 9, 583b1-585a7.
45 For example — my example — assume a child is suffering from some short-term fever. He struggles through the night and finally falls into a deep asleep. When he awakens, the fever is gone. The state into which he awakens is one of health. For Socrates, this is an affectively neutral rather than hedonic condition. Moreover, the child does not experience as pleasant the restorative process that occurred during the night since it occurred while he was unconscious. Crucially, it is the contrast between the child's present conscious state and the antecedent pain that makes this present state appear pleasant. That is, the antecedent pain causes the present neutral condition to misappear as pleasant. (One might reasonably wonder here why this isn't conceived as a misapparent neutral state instead. Presumably, the reason is this. The character of the phenomenal component is the primary epistemological means, i.e., the primary evidence, by which a subject cognizes his or her affective condition. Hence in case the ontic component does not correlate with the phenomenal component, the deviant affective condition is named after the character of the phenomenal component.)
46 Discussed at Phlb. 44d7-50e4.
When they both register psychologically, Socrates emphasizes, the phenomenal components of pleasure and pain fuse into a single experience:

"When there is pain over and against pleasure or pleasure against pain, both are finally joined in a single blend (μιαν κροσιν). We have talked about them earlier ... <and> when we discussed this, we did not make any special mention, as we do now, of the fact that in all cases where <the ontic components> are not in agreement the final result is a single mixture (μειξις μια) of both pleasure and pain."47,48

Like false pleasure β, false pleasure δ is false in that the phenomenal component is akin to illusion. Restoration occurs, but it misappears. Likewise, the illusion or distortion is a function of the compresence of two affective conditions.49 Indeed, false pleasures β, γ, and δ are all representationally false.

With respect to the introduction and development of ideas within the dialog, what is especially distinctive and noteworthy about false pleasures γ and δ is their ontic falsity. The source of ontic falsity is the condition of the entity's ontic component. False pleasure γ is ontically false because it wholly lacks an ontic component. No restoration occurs. False pleasure δ is ontically false because it is conjoined with an algesic component, damage or disintegration.

Ontic truth of falsity and ontic falsity specifically are not matters of representation or misrepresentation.50 They concern what something is. Consider the phrases "true friend" and "false friend." Here, "true" is akin to "real" or "genuine," while "false" is akin to "fake" or "pseudo." Compare the following

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47 Phlb. 47c4-d3. Although Socrates makes his comment about psycho-somatic mixed pleasure, I assume his point that mixed pleasure involves fusion of phenomenal components holds for all somato-somatic mixed pleasure and psycho-psychological mixed pleasure as well. The reason Socrates makes the remark precisely in the context of his discussion of psycho-somatic pleasure is just that he has already discussed such pleasure, in the context of his discussion pleasures α and β. The difference here, as he says, is that previously he did not "make any special mention" of the fact that "the final result is a single mixture of pleasure and pain."

48 I note, but will not further discuss, the worry that the present account undermines the account of false pleasure β, since the latter requires that at least one of the phenomenal components be distorted.

49 Note that in the case of misapparent pleasure, the false form of pleasure β, Socrates does not limit compresence of multiple affective conditions to pleasure and pain; mis-appearance may derive from two comprosent pleasures.

50 Presently, I have focused on false pleasures γ and δ, not on the true forms of pleasures γ and δ. True pleasure γ is a restoration that registers psychically, in case this restoration is not preceded by pain. Because the restoration is not preceded by pain, the hedonic appearance is not distorted. In other words, a true or veridical appearance occurs. Since disintegration must precede restoration, this condition is only possible if the disintegration is gradual or slight and thus does not register psychically. In discussions of pleasure in Republic 9 and Timaeus as well as Philebus, Timaeus and Socrates admit this possibility. (R. 584b1-8; Ti. 65a1-b3) A signal example is olfactory pleasure, which — strangely but consistently with his theory — Plato conceives as a restoration of the olfactory faculty. The restoration is sudden, forceful, and hence pleasant, but the correlative depletion or disintegration is subtle, gradual, and hence unperceived. (I note in passing that true pleasure γ is identical to true pleasure β — although the sense of "true pleasure γ" differs from that of "true pleasure β."
pairs: "a genuine or true Degas" versus "a fake Degas"; "real money" versus "fake or counterfeit money"; "true or real happiness" versus "false happiness"; "true modesty" versus "false modesty."

Linguists refer to "false," "fake" and their kin in these contexts as "privative" adjectives. Their semantic character is explicable by contrast with so-called "intersective" adjectives. For example, "red" and other color terms are often characterized as intersective adjectives. The extension of the phrase "red house" is the intersection of the extensions of "red" and "house," that is, the intersection of the sets of red entities and houses. In contrast, the extension of "fake Degas" excludes works by Degas. So the extension of phrases composed of privative adjectives and noun-phrases excludes entities in the extension of the noun-phrase.

In contrast, the extension of "true Degas" is identical to that of "Degas," just as that of "true gold" is identical to that of "gold." Accordingly, Barbara Partee refers to this class of adjectives as "tautologous." If the semantic function of these adjectives does not affect the extension of the noun-phrases they modify and, more generally, is truth-functionally idle, then their meaning is not descriptive. Arguably, their semantic function is validating and contrastive: precisely, to validate the ontological status of the referent in contrast to some invalid set. For example, in the sentence "That is a true Degas," "true" serves to validate the authenticity of a painting in contrast to a set of fakes.

False pleasure is ontically false in the privative sense. It is like a false friend, no friend (or pleasure) at all. The mere hedonic appearance does not

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51 In fact, this is a controversial claim. For example, cf. François Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, 2010, esp. 55-59. But for the purposes of the present discussion, it is innocuous.

52 At least, this is a familiar way in which the semantics of privative adjectives has been explained. Recently, however, Barbara Partee has argued that so-called privative adjectives are actually subsective. That is, the extension of "false friend" is a subset of the extension of "friend" — at least in the context in which the former phrase occurs. This is because the so-called privative adjective coerces the expansion of the noun-phrase it modifies. For example, in the question "Is this gun fake or real?" the extension of "gun" includes fake as well as genuine instances.

53 There seem to be counter-examples. Are false teeth and false eye-lashes not teeth or eye-lashes? Partee (2007) 157. Partee herself maintains that so-called tautologous adjectives are also subsective. "True friend" coerces the extension of "friend" to include untrue instances.


constitute a pleasure since, once again, for Socrates, pleasure's *esse* is not simply *percipi*.

The ontic falsity of false pleasure δ is a more difficult case. I suggest that "false" is not exactly used here in the privative sense—although its use is related. Consider the following sentence: The paint we used in the bedroom is not true white; it has some admixture of rose. Here, the color's not being true white does not exclude it from the extension of "white." Rather, "not true white" as well as "true white" designate members of the set of white entities.57 Likewise, according to the present usage, some whites may be truer than others. Indeed, the example of off-white paint is aptly chosen since Socrates' account of false pleasure δ entails that this pleasure is mixed with pain, and mixtures may be of various proportions. Accordingly, a pleasure conjoined with a slight pain will be ontically truer in this sense than a pleasure conjoined with a greater pain.

The privative and tautologous uses of "false" and "true" as in pleasure γ are, we might say, *absolute* rather than *gradable* ones. Once again, the set of absolutely true Fs is identical to the set of Fs; whereas absolutely false Fs are excluded from this set. In contrast, the uses of "false" or "not true" and "true" as in pleasure δ are gradable. More and less true or false Fs belong to the set of Fs. For convenience, hereafter I'll simply refer to these kinds of ontic truth and falsity as "absolute and gradable" truth and falsity.58

The gradable truth and falsity to which Socrates commits in his account of pleasure δ entails a distinction between pure and impure property possession, where pure and impure property possession in turn requires possession of properties to various degrees.59 This, finally, entails limiting minimal and maximal degrees of property possession. Maximal property possession is pure property possession. For example, an object that is maximally green will, with respect to its color, not possess any other color. Note, however, that minimal property possession will not be the degree next to zero. For consider the condition of mixed pleasure, that is, pleasure mixed with pain: If a mixture involved a preponderance of pain over pleasure, that mixture would not be a mixed pleasure; it would be a mixed pain. Hence minimal property possession here must be significantly greater than zero.

In short, gradable truth and falsity can be understood as follows. The more purely F some x is, the more gradably truly F x is, the limit being where x is purely F. The more impurely F some x is, the more gradably falsely F x is—up to

57 I note in passing that we do not use the phrase "false white" in this context, at least not in English.

58 My discussion in this section has been informed by Jan Szaif's discussion of Plato's use of "ἀληθὲς" and equivalent expressions such as "ἀληθινόν," "ὡς ἀληθῶς," and "τῇ ἀληθείᾳ," in Szaif (1996) 49-56; Szaif distinguishes two logically attributive uses of "ἀληθὲς" and its cognates, which he calls "statuierende" (52) and "signierende" (54). The former conforms to my absolute, the latter to my gradable ontic truth and falsity conceptions.

59 These must be properties whose genera have multiple species. In other words, the properties themselves must have coordinate kinds.
the point where $x$ is not $F$ (which is significantly greater than possessing $F$-ness to zero degree).\footnote{But again, the point at which $x$ is absolutely not $F$ is not the point at which $x$ is $F$ to zero degree. In fact, the extent will have to be considerable, presumably more than half. For example, it would be absurd to say of a glass of water into which a microscopic amount of alcohol was introduced that the solution was of impure alcohol.}

**Appendix to False Pleasures $\Gamma$ and $\Delta$**

The preceding suggests several intriguing consequences for the metaphysics of absolute and gradable truth and falsity. Before moving to the discussion of the interrelation of Socrates' various conceptions of truth and falsity, I will briefly remark on some of these.

First, are there in fact properties of absolute truth and falsity? Insofar as the phrase "true $F$" is "tautologous" and non-descriptive, the answer seems clear to me: there is no property of being absolutely true. Just being $F$ is necessary and sufficient for being an absolutely true $F$.

Turning to absolute falsity — tables and houseplants, for instance, are not pleasures. Does this mean they possess the property of not being a pleasure? It is questionable whether there are such negative properties.\footnote{For Plato's view of negative properties, for example, not being beautiful, cp. *Sophist* 257b ff. For a recent discussion of the metaphysics of negative properties, cp. Nick Zangwill, "Negative Properties," *Nous* 45 (2011) 528-56. Interestingly, Zangwill resurrects the Platonic notion of degrees of reality and argues that negative properties are in fact real, but less real than positive properties.} But whether or not there are negative properties, not being an $F$ is not sufficient for being an absolutely false $F$. Tables and houseplants, for instance, are not false pleasures. In addition to not being an $F$, a false $F$ must appear to be an $F$. Tentatively, I conclude that the property of absolute falsity is the property of merely appearing to be something. Is this a genuine property? I'm not sure. It looks like it would have to be a conjunctive property of appearing to be an $F$, but not being an $F$.

With respect to the metaphysics of gradable truth and falsity, I said that the more purely $F$ an $x$ is, the more gradably true it is; and the less purely $F$ an $x$ is, short of not being an $F$, the more gradably false it is. Being $F$ to a certain degree looks like a property, assuming "certain" is given a definite quantity (or range of quantities). Plato, however, would balk at this suggestion; for this seems to entail that there are properties $P_1$, $P_2$, … $P_n$ for each degree of possession of a property $P$. But even assuming that there are properties of being $F$ to different degrees, being more and less ontically true or false are relational. For example, relative to a purely $F$ entity and a barely $F$ entity, one and the same entity may be less truly (hence more falsely) $F$ and more truly (hence less falsely) $F$. In other words, assuming there are properties of being $F$ to a particular degree, having gradable truth or falsity characterizes those properties in relation to one another.

A further difficulty is this: it looks like there is a difference between *being* $F$ to a certain degree and *possessing the property* $F$-ness to a certain degree. The
latter evidently does not entail the former. For example, a liquid possessing a microscopic amount of alcohol is not alcohol to some degree.

I believe these remarks scratch the surface of the metaphysics of ontic truth and falsity.

On the Interrelation of Socrates' Conceptions of Truth and Falsity

There are many things to say about the interrelations of Socrates' conceptions of truth and falsity in pleasures α, β, γ, and δ. In this final section I confine myself to considering one central point. Recall Socrates' claim cited above:

"Next after these (namely, false pleasures α and β), we will see whether we can come upon pleasures (namely, γ and δ) ... even more false (ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον) ... both as they appear and as they are."

Socrates here expresses the following comparison:

Bridge In representational and ontic falsity, false pleasures γ and δ are more false than false pleasures α and β.

My question is how Bridge should be interpreted.

Strictly, Bridge imposes four limiting conditions on its interpretation:

- False pleasure γ must be more false than at least one member of the pair of false pleasures α and β.
- False pleasure δ must be more false than at least the other member of the pair of false pleasures α and β.
- One of false pleasures γ and δ must be more representationally false than one of false pleasures α and β.
- One of false pleasures γ and δ must be more ontically false than one of false pleasures α and β.

Within these limits, numerous interpretations of Bridge are possible. Deciding among them requires resolving two basic interpretive problems. One concerns the identity of the particular false pleasures being compared to one another. For instance, Socrates might mean only that false pleasure γ is more false than false pleasure α and that false pleasure δ is more false than false pleasure β. Generally, Bridge admits various interpretations depending on whether one or the other or both of false pleasures γ and δ is more false than one or the other or both of false pleasure α and β. The second interpretive problem concerns the kinds of falsity of the pleasures being compared. For instance, Socrates could be claiming that false pleasure γ is more false, in its representational falsity, than false pleasure β is false in its representational falsity and that false pleasure δ is more false, in its ontic falsity, than false pleasure α is false in its ontic falsity. In sum, Bridge admits various interpretations depending on whether one or the other or both of false pleasures γ and δ is more false in one

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62 For example — with respect to how the true and false forms of pleasures α, β, γ, and δ are correlated — the true forms of pleasures β, γ, and δ are in fact identical. Once again, this is consistent with the senses of "being a true pleasure β, γ, and δ" differing.
or the other or both of representational and ontic falsity than one or the other or both of false pleasure $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are false in one or the other or both of representational and ontic falsity.

How should we proceed in the face of these possibilities? Several considerations from the wider context of the discussion encourage the elimination of certain interpretations and the endorsement of others. First, consider the relation between false pleasures $\beta$ and $\gamma$, precisely, the following claim:

**IB1**  
False pleasure $\gamma$ is more representationally false than false pleasure $\beta$.

I have suggested that false pleasures $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are the hedonic analogs of visual illusion and hallucination. Illusion gets its object right, but some property of the object wrong. Hallucination does not get the object right. A fortiori, it errs in misrepresenting properties of the object. In false pleasure $\beta$, the phenomenal component veridically indicates the occurrence of restoration. However, it misrepresents the way the restoration occurs. In false pleasure $\gamma$, the phenomenal component misrepresents the occurrence of restoration. A fortiori, it misrepresents the way restoration is occurring. In this way, we may conclude that hallucination misrepresents to a greater extent than illusion. Consequently, I suggest that in stating Bridge, one thing Socrates intends to convey is IB1. In other words, in Bridge one thing Socrates is claiming is that, with respect to representational falsity, false pleasure $\gamma$ in particular is more false than false pleasure $\beta$ in particular.

We may, of course, wonder how things stand regarding the relative representational falsity of false pleasure $\gamma$ and false pleasure $\alpha$. But I don't see any reason to think that Socrates has this comparison in mind. Likewise, we may wonder how things stand regarding the relative representational falsity of false pleasure $\delta$ and false pleasures $\alpha$ or $\beta$ or both. Once again, I don't see any reason to think that Socrates has these comparisons in mind.

Consider now a second possible implication of Bridge:

**IB2**  
False pleasures $\gamma$ and $\delta$ are both more false in their ontic falsity than false pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$.

In contrast to IB1, IB2 compares both pairs of false pleasures. This is plausible since in his accounts of false pleasures $\gamma$ and $\delta$ Socrates showed how both are ontically false. In the case of false pleasure $\gamma$ there was no ontic component at all. In the case of false pleasure $\delta$ the ontic component coincided with a disintegration. Hence, false pleasure $\gamma$ is wholly ontically false, and false pleasure $\delta$ is partly ontically false.

Granted this, several interpretations of IB2 are possible. First consider:

**IB2Easy**  
False pleasures $\gamma$ and $\delta$ are more ontically false than false pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$ because false pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are not ontically false at all.

The problems with false pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$ that Socrates addresses are representational, not ontic. Perhaps, then, false pleasures $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are not ontically false at all.
I believe that IB2Easy is not the right interpretation of IB2. Up to the point in the dialog when Socrates introduces Bridge, he has said nothing about the ontic falsity of false pleasures \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). His concern has been limited to their representational falsity. Hence it is more likely that when he claims that either or both of false pleasures \( \gamma \) and \( \delta \) are more false, in their ontic falsity, than either or both of false pleasures \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), he means that either or both of false pleasures \( \gamma \) and \( \delta \) are more false, in their ontic falsity, than either or both of false pleasures \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are false in their representational falsity. In other words, IB2 involves comparison of heterogeneous kinds of falsity. For convenience, let's precisify the interpretation and give it a name:

**IB2Hard**

False pleasures \( \gamma \) and \( \delta \) are more false, in their ontic falsity, than false pleasures \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are false in their representational falsity.

Further support for IB2Hard derives from the following consideration. In the context of the discussion of false pleasure \( \delta \), it comes to light that some forms of false pleasure \( \delta \) are identical to some forms of false pleasure \( \beta \):

"But now take the cases where the soul's contribution is opposed to the body's. When there is pain over and against pleasure or pleasure against pain, both are finally joined in a single blend. We have talked about them earlier [namely, in the context of discussing false pleasure \( \beta \)] and agreed that in these cases it is the deprivation that gives rise to the desire for replenishment, and while the expectation is pleasant, the deprivation itself is painful."\(^{63}\)

Hence, it comes to light that false pleasure \( \beta \) is just as ontically false as false pleasure \( \delta \).

In view of this result, one might be tempted to think that pleasure \( \alpha \) ultimately also comes to light as ontically false. Indeed, the description in the quotation is of a mixed anticipatory pleasure, and pleasure \( \alpha \) is an anticipatory pleasure. Arguably, however, pleasure \( \alpha \) need not be mixed pleasure. That is, one may pleasantly anticipate something without simultaneously experiencing a pain of lack. Granting this, pleasure \( \alpha \) might still qualify as ontically false if no restoration accompanies it. In that case, false pleasure \( \alpha \) would be just as ontically false as false pleasure \( \gamma \), and even more ontically false than false pleasure \( \delta \).

Such considerations concerning false pleasures \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) would, then, further tell against IB2Easy and for IB2Hard. Indeed, I endorse IB2Hard. But I must add here — and thus complicate my endorsement — that I don't believe pleasure \( \alpha \) lacks the ontic component of restoration. The problem is a familiar one in *Philebus* scholarship. Plato seems committed to the view that pleasure requires restoration. Most saliently, at the end of his division of pleasures, Socrates endorses the view that pleasure, ergo ontically true pleasure, entails coming-to-be (\( \gamma\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\sigma \)).\(^{64}\) Nowhere in *Philebus* does Socrates speak of restoration or coming-to-be in the case of anticipatory pleasure. Nonetheless, given the

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\(^{63}\) *Phlb.* 47c3-7.

\(^{64}\) *Phlb.* 53c4-7, 54c6-7.
centrality of the condition of restoration or becoming on pleasure in the dialog—and elsewhere in the corpus, in particular in the two other principal passages where Plato theorizes the nature of pleasure, Republic 583-7 and Timaeus 64-65—I see no reason to accept that Plato holds the view that anticipatory pleasure involves no restoration. Generally speaking, Plato maintains that purely psychological pleasures involve restoration. For instance, at Philebus 52a Socrates maintains that the intellectual pleasures of learning are restorative, and at Republic 586c7-e1 he treats emotional as well as physiological and intellectual pleasures as pleasures of replenishment. I presume, then, Plato holds that anticipatory pleasure involves some sort of psychological, precisely emotional or spirited, restoration.65

Since I maintain this view of pleasure α, I cannot appeal to the ontic falsity of false pleasure α to support IB2Hard over IB2Easy. Thus, as I say, my endorsement of IB2Hard is complicated. Strictly speaking, the following interpretation of IB2 is a live alternative to IB2Hard:

IB2Odd The ontic falsity of false pleasures γ and δ are more false than the ontic falsity of false pleasure α, because false pleasure α is not ontically false at all.

But this interpretation strikes me as odd and implausible, principally for the same reason I gave previously against IB2Easy: At the point in the dialog when Socrates introduces Bridge, he has focused on the representational falsity of false pleasures α and β; he has made no claims about their ontic falsity. Hence, I maintain that IB2Hard is the most reasonable interpretation of IB2.

The point of IB2Hard within Bridge, then, is as follows. Socrates intends, in the ensuing discussion, to show a way that pleasure can be more false than by being representationally false. In sum, I am suggesting the following interpretation of Bridge:

HardBridge False pleasures γ and δ are more false than false pleasures α and β in the following particular respects: False pleasure γ is more representationally false than false pleasure β; and false pleasures γ and δ are, in their ontic falsity, more false than false pleasures α and β are false in their representational falsity.

What makes IB2Hard and thus HardBridge hard is, once again, that it involves comparison of heterogeneous kinds of falsity. Given this, the question now arises on what basis Socrates can take ontic falsity to be more false than representational falsity.66 To start, consider the following idea: the ontic component of pleasure has ontological priority relative to the phenomenal component. By "ontological priority" I mean:

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65 For a very different attempt to handle this problem—albeit one that I do not find persuasive—see Amber Carpenter, "Pleasure as Genesis," Ancient Philosophy 31 (2011) 73-94.
66 Künne—who devotes just a few pages to the discussion of what I am calling ontic truth and falsity—concludes that this and the notion of representational truth-value "are vastly different." (2003, 105)
An entity \( e \) has ontological priority relative to an entity \( f \) if the existence of \( e \) does not depend upon the existence of \( f \), whereas the existence of \( f \) depends upon the existence of \( e \).\(^67\)

An appearance of some object \( o \) ontologically depends on \( o \), whereas \( o \) is not ontologically dependent on the appearance of \( o \). Consequently, the ontic component of pleasure has ontological priority relative to the phenomenal component.\(^68\)

Accordingly, Socrates may be implicitly committed to the view that ontic truth or falsity has ontological priority relative to representational truth-value. The justification for this view would be that ontic truth or falsity can exist independently of representational truth-value, whereas representational truth-value cannot exist independently of ontic truth or falsity.\(^69,70\)

Ontic falsity is, then, a more ontologically fundamental way of being false than representational falsity. If this is correct, then we now need an explanation of the inference from:

\[
\text{\( x \)'s falsity is more ontologically fundamental than \( y \)'s falsity}
\]

to:

\[
\text{\( x \)'s falsity is more false than \( y \)'s falsity.}
\]

Finally, if this inference can be justified, then it remains to clarify what conception of comparative falsity is operative in the final claim.

This is as far across HardBridge and, more generally, into this inquiry into Plato on the varieties of truth and falsity as I can go here. I leave you to ponder whether to forge ahead, turn back, or jump.

\(^{67}\) Conversely, an entity \( f \) has ontological posteriority in relation to an entity \( e \) if the existence of \( f \) depends upon the existence of \( e \), while the existence of \( e \) does not depend on the existence of \( f \).


\(^{68}\) Note that this is so even in the case of hedonic hallucination, that is, in the case of false pleasure \( \gamma \). This is because the phenomenal aspect represents restoration, even though no restoration occurs, because there is a natural correlation between restoration and hedonic appearance.

\(^{69}\) Note that this claim must not be construed too narrowly. It is possible to represent a given object that does not and has not existed. Hence, the representation of such an object does not depend on its existence. However, it is possible for objects to exist, without the existence of representations, whereas — perhaps barring idealism — it is impossible for representations to exist without the existence of objects.

\(^{70}\) This is in fact questionable, at least in the following way. While ontically true \( F \)s can in principle exist if no other entities exist, ontic falsity requires entities that appear to be \( F \). This makes me wonder whether ontic falsity is actually an epistemological category.