Pleasure and Truth in Republic 9

I. Introduction

At Republic 9, 583b1-587a2, Socrates argues that the pleasure of the philosophical life is the truest pleasure. I will call this the "true pleasure argument." The true pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1-585a7 and 585a8-587a2. Each part contains a sub-argument, which I will call "the misperception argument" and "the true filling argument" respectively. In the misperception argument Socrates argues that it is characteristic of irrational men to misperceive as pleasant what in fact is a condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained. In the true filling argument Socrates argues that insofar as pleasure entails somatic or psychic filling and there are more and less true fillings, there are more and less true pleasures. Philosophical filling is the truest filling and thus the truest pleasure. The misperception argument critically contributes to the true pleasure argument by clarifying what pleasure is not: merely an appearance (phainomenon) or merely the absence of pain. The misperception argument thereby clears the ground for the constructive contribution of the true filling argument.

This paper endeavors to clarify the true pleasure argument. Central to achieving this objective is clarifying Socrates' conceptions of pleasure and of truth.

1 In the context of Republic 9, the true pleasure argument is the third in a series whose collective function is to demonstrate that the just life is the happiest life since the just life is the most pleasant life. But the true pleasure argument also has important ramifications beyond Republic 9 and beyond Republic. The true pleasure argument contains many of the seeds of what was to become the centerpiece of Plato's Philebus, the division (diairesis) of pleasure at 31b-55b. Indeed, the true pleasure argument reads as a kind of rough draft of the division of pleasure in Philebus. Above all, in the true pleasure argument Plato first introduces the concepts of true and untrue pleasures.
The ensuing discussion is organized as follows:

I. Introduction

II. Introduction to the Misperception Argument

III. The Irrational Man's Misperception of Calm as Pleasant

IV. Socrates' Explanation of the Irrational Man's Misperception

V. The True Filling Argument

VI. Semantic Remarks on "Ἀλήθεια" and its Cognates

VII. Conditions of True Pleasure

VIII. The Representational Untruth of the Irrational Man's Quasi-Pleasure

IX. Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes the central results of the discussion and situates them in relation to prior contributions.  

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2 The condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained is often referred to in the secondary literature as the "neutral condition"; however, Socrates never uses an equivalent Greek phrase.

II. Introduction to the Misperception Argument

The misperception argument begins with Socrates' claim that "in contrast to the pleasure of the rational man (τοῦ φρονίμου), the pleasure of others (τῶν ἄλλων) is neither true at all (παναληθής) nor pure (καθαρά), but in a way shadow-painted (ἐσκαγραφημένη τις)." Socrates does not here identify these others more specifically than by contrasting them with the rational man. In the true filling argument, however, he refers to them as "irrational men" (τοῖς ἁφροσιν). Accordingly, I will refer to them either as "irrational men" or in the generic singular as "the irrational man."

In the true filling argument Socrates contrasts philosophers with men whose appetitive and spirited souls govern their lives. Thus, it is natural to assume that the philosophers of the true filling argument are identical to the rational man of the misperception argument and that the appetitive and spirited men of the true filling argument are identical to the irrational men of the misperception argument. Strictly speaking, this must be true. However, when Socrates speaks of the irrational man in the misperception argument, he principally has somatic pleasure-seekers in mind, that is, men whose appetites govern their lives.

Observe that Socrates speaks of irrational men's pleasure as not at all true, impure, and in a way shadow-painted: "the pleasure of others (ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονή) is … not at all true." Contrast this with Socrates' claim, later in the argument, that irrational


An alternative translation of "οὐδὲ παναληθής" would be "neither wholly (or entirely) true." I discuss my translation on p. 43-44.

R. 583b3-5.
men do not have healthy opinions about pleasure: "Should you wonder, then, if those inexperienced in truth do not have healthy opinions regarding many other things as well (θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν εἴ καὶ οἱ ἀπειροὶ ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἀλλων μὴ ὑγείας δόξας ἔχουσιν)." The belief of the irrational man may be representationally and specifically semantically false—so we would characterize it—but it is questionable whether the untruth of the irrational man's pleasure itself is to be explained in this way. Relevant to this question is the question of how being impure, untrue, and in a way shadow-painted relate to one another. We will answer these questions in the following sections.

III. The Irrational Man's Misperception of Calm as Pleasant

At 583c3-6 Socrates introduces a distinction between pain (λύπη), pleasure (ἡδονή), and a condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained (τὸ μὴ ἔχειν χαίρειν μὴ ἔχειν λυπεῖσθαι):

1. Pain (λύπη) is the opposite of pleasure (ἡδονή).
2. There is a condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained (τὸ μὴ ἔχειν χαίρειν μὴ ἔχειν λυπεῖσθαι).

Socrates then clarifies the nature of the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained and its relation to pleasure and pain:

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6 R. 586c3.
7 R. 584e7-8.
8 Note that I use the word "untrue" rather than "false" throughout the paper. This corresponds to Socrates' language. Socrates never uses the word "ψευδές" in the true pleasure argument, only "οὐκ ἀληθές" or the like.
9 R. 583c3-4.
10 I take it that Socrates treats "χαίρειν" and "ἡδεσθαι" as equivalent.
<the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained,>\(^{12}\) which is in the middle between both of these, <namely, pleasure and pain,> is a certain calm of the soul (<ήσυχία πιστεύει τῆς ψυχῆς> in relation to them (<περὶ ταῦτα>) <again, pleasure and pain>.\(^{13}\)

It is unclear what Socrates means by claiming that the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained is "in the middle between both of these," (μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφότερον ἐν μέσῳ), namely, pain and pleasure. He might mean that during a process in which there is a transition from pain to pleasure or vice versa, the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained intervenes. Alternatively, he might mean that on some dimension, the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained relates to the poles of pleasure and pain as a midpoint. In that case, we would like to know what dimension Socrates has in mind. In the absence of further evidence, I propose temporarily to leave the meaning of this aspect of (3) undetermined.

In (3) Socrates also refers to the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained as a certain "calm" (<ήσυχία>) "in relation to" (<περὶ>) pain and pleasure. I take this to entail that pleasure and pain are both conditions of absence of calm. Hereafter I will refer to the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained as "calm." Precisely how we should understand absence of calm is questionable. For example, perhaps Socrates understands pleasure and pain to be conditions of agitation. I return to the problem below.

Socrates also indicates that calm is psychic: it is a condition "of the soul." This is significant for interpreting Socrates' conception of pain and pleasure. It would be odd for

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\(^{11}\) R. 583c5-6.

\(^{12}\) Here and throughout I add text in angle brackets simply to enhance intelligibility.

\(^{13}\) R. 583c7-9.
Socrates to conceive of calm as psychic, but not to conceive of pain and pleasure as involving the soul. Accordingly, we should assume that Socrates conceives of all three conditions as involving the soul. This in turns raises the question of how we should understand the condition of calm as involving the soul. Is Socrates referring to what the experience of calm is like? Or is Socrates referring to an objective condition of the psyche: the psyche's being at rest? At this point in the argument no evidence indicates which interpretation to prefer or whether Socrates would distinguish between the two. I will return to this question below.

The first step of the misperception argument thus begins with these basic distinctions between pain, pleasure, and calm. At once, however, Socrates draws attention to events that appear to undermine these distinctions:

(4) Sick men say (λέγουσιν) that being healthy is most pleasant (ὁδιστοι).\(^{14}\)

(5) In general, men who are in the grip of great pain (περιωδυνία) say (λέγοντων) that nothing is more pleasant (οὐδὲν ἡδίον) than the cessation of being in pain (ὁδυνώμενον).\(^{15}\)

In both (4) and (5) men who are in pain claim that the states of health and cessation of pain are pleasant. It is clear from the ensuing argument that Socrates himself views the states of health and cessation of pain as states of calm rather than pleasure. Thus, Socrates understands pained men as claiming that calm is most pleasant. He continues:

(6) And in many other circumstances, men who are in pain (λυπώνται) praise

\(^{14}\) R. 583c10-d1.
\(^{15}\) R. 583d3-5. Note also that in (5) Socrates does not simply generalize his claim in (4) by broadening the scope of those in pain from sick people to all others in pain. Socrates also clarifies the condition on which he is focusing by referring to the great pain (περιωδυνία). Relief from great pain, in particular, is said to be pleasant.
not being in pain (τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι) and the calm (ἡσυχία) following pain as most pleasant (ἡδοστοι), rather than <praising> having pleasure (χαίρειν) <as most pleasant>.\(^\text{16}\)

The claim of pained men that cessation of pain is even more pleasant than having pleasure is ostensibly self-contradictory. But I take their claim to mean that cessation of pain is more pleasant than familiar sorts of pleasure, for example, pleasures associated with eating, drinking, and sex. Pained men's praise of cessation of pain challenges Socrates' basic distinctions, and the ostensible conflict between these positions invites resolution. Glaucon offers the following:

(7) "Perhaps on this occasion (τότε), <namely, when calm follows pain,> calm becomes (γίγνεται) pleasant (ἡδού) and beloved."\(^\text{17}\)

Glaucon's response assumes that the claims of pained men are true, that is, that calm following pain is indeed pleasant. This implies that Socrates' basic distinctions are false. At 583e1-8, Socrates responds with an argument whose purpose is to show that Glaucon's explanation in (7) is untenable. I will refer to Socrates' argument as "the puzzling argument." The puzzling argument is a *reductio*. It begins by assuming the following premise drawn from the content of the preceding premise-set:

(8) Whenever a man ceases being pained, the calm following the pain will be pleasant.

Given this, by parity of reasoning Socrates suggests that:

(9) Whenever a man ceases having pleasure (χαίρειν), the calm following the pleasure (ἡ τὴς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία) will be painful (λυπηρῶν).\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{16}\text{R. 583d6-9.}\)
From (8) and (9), Socrates infers:

**(10)** That which is between both pleasure and pain will at some point (ποτέ) be both pleasure and pain.¹⁹

Yet, he insists:

**(11)** It is impossible for that which is neither <pleasure nor pain> to become both <pleasure and pain>.²⁰

Thus, Glaucon's explanation at (7) is untenable. More precisely, Socrates maintains that (8) and (9) are false.

Socrates' puzzling argument is puzzling in at least two respects.²¹ First, it is puzzling how Socrates can derive (10) from the conjunction of (8) and (9).²² (8) and (9)

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¹⁷ R. 583d10-11.
¹⁸ R. 583e1-3.
¹⁹ R. 583e4-6.
²⁰ R. 583e4-8.
²¹ As far as I know only two scholars have even acknowledged that there are problems with the puzzling argument: Adam (1899) 350 and Butler (1999) 291-93. The following commentators treat the passage as though there were no problems: Cross and Woozley (1964) 266-67, White (1979) 229, Annas (1981) 310-11, Gosling and Taylor (1982) 113, Reeve (1988) 146-147, Stokes (1990) 33-34. Reeve (1988, 147) provides a good example of someone proceeding through the argument in ignorance of its difficulties. He says the following and nothing more: "Between pleasure (ἡδονή) and its opposite, pain (λυπή) (583c3), there is such a thing as being neither pleased nor pained (583c5), this being a kind of psychic calm (ἡσυχία) (583c7-8). But when this state follows one of pain it is pleasant: 'And there are many other circumstances in which you find that people, while in pain, praise freedom from pain, and relief from that, as the most pleasant, and not enjoyment [το χαίρειν] itself (583d6-9).' Conversely, 'whenever a person's enjoyment of something ceases, then this cessation of pleasure is painful' (583e1-2). It follows that the same state 'will at times be pain and at times pleasure' (583e4-5). But this is impossible. For it is not 'possible for that which is neither [pleasure nor pain] to become both.' (583e7)"
²² Butler (1999) appears to be concerned with this problem: "Socrates' derivation of <(10)> from <(8) and (9)> is rather obscure." (291) But in fact he is concerned with a different problem. He continues: "How are we to understand that, according to the views under consideration, the <calm> will be sometimes both pleasure and pain?" (291) But Butler's treatment of this problem is actually more closely related to my second problem.
claim that under certain conditions calm is "pleasant" or "painful," but in (10) Socrates infers that under certain conditions calm is "pleasure" or "pain." Thus, Socrates appears to conflate predication and identity.\(^{23,24}\) Second, it is puzzling what justifies Socrates' assertion of (11), namely, that it is impossible for what is neither pleasure nor pain to become both pleasure and pain. Is Socrates committed to either one of the following principles?

**\(\text{P1} \)** It is impossible for not-\(F\) to become \(F\).

**\(\text{P2} \)** It is impossible for what is neither \(F\) nor the opposite of \(F\) to become both \(F\) and the opposite of \(F\).

Let's consider (P1) and (P2) in turn. (P1) is reasonable insofar as "\(F\)" is taken to refer to a universal or type, conceived realistically as opposed to nominalistically: universals or types so conceived do not change. Thus, (11) does follow from (P1). However, it then becomes difficult to see what function (9) and (10) serve in the argument. Given (P1), (8) suffices to undermine Glaucon's explanation. In other words, Socrates could merely argue that it is impossible for what is not pleasure, namely, calm, to become pleasure. Consequently, it seems that if Socrates' assertion of (11) depends upon either (P1) or (P2), it depends upon (P2). On the other hand, it is hard to see what substantive work (P2) does beyond (P1). (P1) is all that is needed for (11). This is simply because (P2) is a conjunction of two interpretations of (P1), one on which "\(F\)" stands for one of a pair of

\(^{23}\) It would be strange for Socrates to make such a mistake. In *Gorgias*, when Polus answers Socrates' question "What is rhetoric?" by saying that it is the finest of the arts, Socrates criticizes him for saying what it is like (\(\piούδ\)) rather than what (\(\pi\zeta\)) it is. (*Grg*. 448e6-7)

\(^{24}\) No scholar has noted this problem. However, Gosling and Taylor (1982) are poised to recognize it: "At first (583c-e) we are introduced to people in a depleted state, looking
opposites, for example, pleasure, and the other on which "F" stands for the other member of the pair, for example, pain.

Given this, our second puzzle turns out to consist of two puzzles that are closely related. One is what justifies Socrates' assertion of (11). The other is why Socrates argues against Glaucon's explanation in (7) using the conjunction of (8) and (9) as opposed to using merely (8).

Let's return to the problem of the conflation of predication and identity. What if we introduce indefinite articles into (10), thus rendering (10) as:

(10r) That which is between both pleasure and pain will at some point be both a pleasure and a pain.

The inference of (10r) from (8) and (9) is now more reasonable: in certain contexts a given condition instantiates pleasure and thus is pleasant; in certain other contexts that condition instantiates pain and thus is painful. Given this, we should also emend (11) by adding indefinite articles:

(11r) It is impossible for that which is neither pleasure nor pain to become both a pleasure and a pain.

This solves the first puzzle.25

Let's turn now to the second and third puzzles. I grant that (11r) may depend upon some more general principle, but before attempting to determine what that principle is, let's attend to the subject of (10r). Socrates describes the subject precisely as follows:

(113) Observe their phrase "a pleasure."

25 I emphasize that this charitable interpretation, which is consistent with the Greek, is most likely not an accurate interpretation of the argument. I think that Socrates employs
"What we just now said was between both <pleasure and pain>, calm" (ὅ μεταξὺ νυνί ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἑσυχίαν). That is, Socrates uses the word "calm," but he also reminds Glaucon that calm is between pleasure and pain. Recall Socrates' emphatic statement of this in (3): "the condition of neither having pleasure nor being pained,> which is in the middle between both of these, <again, pleasure and pain>." I suggest that Socrates' reminder of this point in (10r) is important. Clearly, there are many things that are neither F nor the opposite of F that can instantiate F and the opposite of F in different circumstances. For example, the act-type of giving a person an apple, which is not justice or injustice, can be just in certain circumstances and unjust in other circumstances. However, giving a person an apple is not— I presume— "in the middle between" justice and injustice in the sense in which Socrates intends this phrase here. Yet in (3) Socrates emphatically states that calm is in the middle between pleasure and pain.

As we noted above, it is unclear precisely what Socrates means when he says that calm is in the middle between pleasure and pain. Assume, following the second of the two possible interpretations suggested above, that calm is in the middle between pleasure and pain in the sense that all three essentially stand in certain relations in a single dimension, and specifically that calm is situated between the poles of pleasure and pain in this dimension. In that case, what is in the middle cannot be at either pole because the

(10) and (11) in the argument, not (10r) and (11r). Thus, Socrates' argument is problematic in this respect.

26 R. 583e4-5.
27 I will clarify why I suppose this momentarily. Also cp. Butler (1999, 291): "There is nothing absurd about something which is neither X nor Y, sometimes being X and at other times being Y. For example, a man of average height is neither tall nor short. Yet,
relations in which the entities stand in this dimension are fixed. In other words, calm is necessarily between pleasure and pain in this dimension.²⁸

My talk of pleasure, pain, and calm situated and essentially related in a dimension is informed by Socrates' own talk in the ensuing broader misperception argument. At 584d1-585a7 Socrates uses the analogy of spatial positions to characterize the distinction and relations among pleasure, pain, and calm. On a vertical line segment, the top point is analogous to pleasure; the midpoint is analogous to calm; and the bottom point is analogous to pain. Socrates does not clarify the nature of the dimension in which pleasure, pain, and calm are situated. For convenience, we may offer Socrates the following description: pleasure, pain, and calm are situated in the dimension of affectivity.

²⁸ Among commentators, Stokes (1990, 33-34) comes closest to cognizance of this feature of Socrates' argument. In contrast, it is Butler's (1999) failure to recognize this feature of the argument that misleads him to suggest that the impossibility expressed in (11) results from the fact that one can make contrary and thus unrealizable predictions: "How then can we make sense of Socrates' claim that the quietude <Butler's word for calm> will sometimes (ποτε) be both pleasure and pain? … Since predictions about the future state of <calm> … generate the idea that the <calm> will be both pleasure and pain, it might be that people sometimes make rival predictions about the same future quietude. Take the following situation: on Monday, Pete is sick and believes the sickness will end on Wednesday. So, according to his beliefs about the <calm> from pain, Wednesday will be pleasant. Then on Tuesday, Pete enjoys the special attention given to him by his attendant because he is sick (the chicken soup, pillow fluffing, etc.) Pete knows the attendant will leave Wednesday when the sickness abates. Thus, according to his beliefs about the <calm> from pleasure, Wednesday will be painful. So according to Pete's predictions, the state of <calm on> Wednesday will be both pleasant and painful." (291-92) Cp. also Butler's (1999, 291) discussion of and criticism of Adam's response (1899, 350) to (10).
Granting this, let us return to the suggestion that the puzzling argument has no logical need for (9) and (10) or (10r). On that view, the puzzling argument needs only the following weaker version of (11r):

(11w) It is impossible for what is not pleasure to become a pleasure.

However, this is not entirely true. Just as it is possible for the act-type of giving a person an apple to instantiate justice or injustice, it is possible for some entity \( E \) that is not pleasure to become a pleasure, so long as \( E \) is not essentially situated within the dimension of affectivity. Given this, Socrates could indeed dispense with (9) and (10) or (10r), but only so long as he emended (11) or (11r) to something stronger than (11w) such as:

(11s) It is impossible for what is not pleasure, but is essentially situated at a fixed point in the dimension of affectivity, to become pleasure.

But given this, it should now be easier to appreciate why Socrates does in fact construct the puzzling argument using (9) and (10) or (10r) as well as (11) or (11r): the clause "but is essentially situated at a fixed point in the dimension of affectivity" is doing a lot of work. My suggestion is that (9)-(11) or (9)-(11r) are doing similar, if less explicitly sophisticated, work. Precisely, the use of (9)-(11) or (9)-(11r) serves to emphasize Socrates' point that calm is essentially situated in the same dimension as pain and pleasure and that the relations between these entities within this dimension are fixed.

This, then, resolves the closely interrelated second and third puzzles of the puzzling argument. Given this, let us note the following consequence of the preceding resolution. Two paths are potentially available to advance the inquiry. One path, open to Glaucon, would be to defend the pained man by contesting Socrates' basic distinctions. In
particular, Glaucon could demand justification of Socrates' initial assertions that pleasure, pain, and calm are essentially situated in a set of fixed relations in a single dimension.

The other path, to which Socrates has some obligation to pursue, is to explain why pained men tend to make the false claims they do. As the broader argument in fact ensues, Glaucon concedes the conclusion of the puzzling argument and thus the soundness of Socrates' basic distinctions, and Socrates proceeds to explain the confusion of the pained, irrational man.

IV. Socrates' Explanation of the Irrational Man's Misperception

Socrates' explanation of the misperception of the irrational man begins with the following three claims:

(12) That which becomes pleasant in the soul (τὸ ἡδόν ἐν ψυχῇ γενόμενοι) and that which becomes painful <in the soul> (τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐν ψυχῇ γενόμενοι) are both a sort of motion (κίνησις τις).²⁹

(13) Yet (Καὶ μὴν ... γε) that which is neither pleasant nor painful (τὸ μὴ λυπηρὸν μὴ ἡδόν) is calm (ἡσυχία) and in the middle of both of these (ἐν μέσω τούτων).³⁰

(14) Therefore, it is incorrect to think (ἡγεῖσθαι) <, as the irrational man does,> that not being in pain (τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν) is pleasant (ἡδόν) and that not having pleasure (τὸ μὴ χαίρειν) is painful (ἀναρότ).³¹

²⁹ R. 583e9-11.
³⁰ R. 584a1-3.
³¹ R. 584a4-6.
(12)-(14) have both backward- and forward-looking functions. (12)-(14) look backward to the preceding stretch of argumentation, (1)-(11), and now in conjointly intrinsic and objective terms specify how calm differs from pleasure and pain: pleasure and pain are kinetic conditions, whereas calm, as the name indicates, is an absence of motion.\textsuperscript{32, 33} (14), thus, corroborates the conclusion of the puzzling argument that the irrational man misperceives and that calm does not become pleasant or painful.

It remains to explain the source of the irrational man's misperception. In contributing to this explanation, (12)-(14) look forward. Central to Socrates' explanation is a distinction between the appearance of the affective condition, which is a subjective component, and the objective component, which, as (12)-(13) state, is a kinetic or a-kinetic condition. Socrates continues:

(15) \textit{<It is not that calm> is (\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu) <pleasant or painful>, but that calm (\iota\sigma\upsilon\chi\iota\alpha) appears (\phi\alpha\iota\nu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\iota) pleasant (\iota\delta\iota) beside (\pi\alpha\rho\alpha) that which is painful (\tau\omicron \\alpha\lambda\gamma\iota\varepsilon\iota\nu\omicron\omicron) and that calm appears painful (\alpha\lambda\gamma\iota\varepsilon\iota\nu\omicron\omicron) beside that which is pleasant (\tau\omicron \\iota\delta\iota).}\textsuperscript{34}

In other words, Socrates explains the irrational man's misperception as based on a misleading appearance (\phi\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\omicron\omicron). Socrates explicitly characterizes the misleading appearance as illusory:

\textsuperscript{32} Recall our consideration above that in contrast to calm, pleasure and pain might be conditions of agitation. Note that I use the word "intrinsic" to differentiate between the relational terms in which Socrates characterizes calm as distinct from pain and pleasure in (3) and the way he characterizes calm as distinct from pain and pleasure here.
\textsuperscript{33} Note also that (13) confirms the inference we drew above, that pleasure and pain, like calm, are psychic, that is, conditions of the soul. But— I hasten to emphasize— this should not be taken to preclude the possibility of pleasure, pain, and calm having somatic as well psychic components.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{R. 584a7-8.}
With respect to the truth of pleasure (ἡδονής ἀληθείαν), there is nothing healthy (ψυγεία) in these phantasms (φαντασμάτων), but a certain magic (γοητεία).35 Let us say, then, that the irrational man is subject to a hedonic illusion and thus experiences a quasi-pleasure.

In the true filling argument Socrates refers back to the irrational man's quasi-pleasures as "shadow-painted (ἐσκιαγραφημέναις) and tainted by juxtaposition (ὑπὸ τῆς παρ’ ἀλληλας θεσέως ἀποχραιμέναις)."36 The invention of the technique of shadow-painting (σκιαγραφία) is attributed to Apollodorus of Athens in the fifth century. Apollodorus seems to have transmitted it to Zeuxis, among other students, who apparently composed a treatise on painting technique.37 Shadow-painting involves the juxtaposition of darker and lighter shades on a two-dimensional surface to create the illusion of depth.38 For example, Livy relates the story that Zeuxis painted a bunch of grapes so realistic a bird pecked at it.39 Analogously, in Republic 9 Socrates suggests that the juxtaposition of pain and absence of pain engenders a hedonic illusion.

How should we understand the juxtaposition of pain and absence of pain that engenders the hedonic illusion? When at (4)-(6) Socrates reports the views of the irrational, he speaks of what sick people say when they are sick (τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους οὗς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν), of what men in the grip of great pain say (τῶν

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35 R. 584a9-11.
36 R. 586b8-c1.
37 Socrates refers to Zeuxis at Grg. 453c6. Zeuxis is referred to as "Zeuxippus" at Prt. 318b7.
periφονία τινί ἐχωμένων), and of the praise that men in pain (λυπώνται) heap on not being in pain. In each case, the irrational speak while in pain. Thus, the irrational are describing as pleasant not a state they are currently in, but a future state. Thus, the future state presently appears to them as pleasant. So the irrational are imagining or envisioning the future state, and this image is of something pleasant.

Contrast this with Glaucon's explanation at (7), which assumes that calm becomes pleasant. In this case, Glaucon speaks not in terms of someone envisioning the future, but of what the future state will actually be like. Similarly, at (9) in the puzzling argument, Socrates says that when one who is having pleasure ceases, the calm following the pleasure will be painful. Again, he speaks not in terms of someone envisioning the future, but of what the future state will actually be like. Similarly in (10), Socrates says that the calm will be both pleasant and painful. Now of course Socrates rejects Glaucon's explanation at (7) and thinks that (8)-(10) are false. But Socrates' rejection of (7)-(10), which entails rejection of the view that calm actually becomes pleasant or painful, is compatible with the view that calm, when it occurs, appears pleasant or painful. This possibility is corroborated by Socrates' analogy between affective conditions and spatial positions at 584d1-585a7. Socrates says:

"Do you think that someone who was brought from the bottom to the middle would have any other belief than that he was moving upward? And if he stood in the middle (ἐν μέσῳ στάντα) and saw where he had come from, would he believe that he was anywhere other than at the top …?"40

39 35.36.
40 R. 584d6-9.
In this case, the mover is not predicting where he will stand as he moves from the bottom. Rather, he believes he is at the top when he is standing at the midpoint.

Analogously, as we have seen, Socrates claims:

(16) "Whenever <people inexperienced in pleasure> are conveyed from pain to the middle state (ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ <φέρονται>), they strongly believe they are in a state of filling (πληρώσει) and pleasure."\(^{41}\)

Observe that the hedonically inexperienced are characterized here as being conveyed (φέρονται) to the middle state, not merely predicting what the middle state will be like.

Further consideration of Socrates' view of how the juxtaposition of pain and absence of pain produces a hedonic appearance can be derived from Socrates' contrast between pure pleasures and quasi-pleasures. At 584b1-c3 Socrates introduces what he calls "pure" pleasures:

"Look at … pleasures that do not derive from pains so that you do not think that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation of pain (παύλαν λύπης) … There are numerous examples, but the best to consider are pleasures of smell. For these suddenly become strong without preceding pain, and when they cease they leave behind no pain … Do not then be persuaded that pure pleasure (καθαρὰν ἡδονήν) is the release from pain (τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν)."\(^{42}\)

Socrates then contrasts pure pleasure with two kinds of quasi-pleasure. First, at 584c4-7, he says:

(17) Yet by far the most numerous and greatest (μέγισται) of the so-called pleasures (λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί) that extend through the body to the soul (διὰ τοῦ σώματος

\(^{41}\) R. 585a2-3.
έπι τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι) are of this kind, releases from pains (λυπῶν τινες ἀπαλλαγαί).

The phrase "διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν" indicates that Socrates is here referring to quasi-pleasures that are bodily. Pure olfactory pleasures are bodily. So Socrates first contrasts pure bodily pleasures with bodily quasi-pleasures. Socrates' use of "greatest" (μέγισται) in (17) suggests a quality of hedonic experience. Compare Socrates' use of "μέγεθος" at 584b7: Socrates explains that olfactory pleasures, which are not preceded by pain, "suddenly become especially great (ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος)." In (17) the quality of the hedonic experience appears to be coterminous with the release from pain, not a prediction or envisioning of how the release will be.

Socrates then compares bodily with psychic quasi-pleasures:

(18) Anticipatory pleasures (προηθήσεις) and pains (προλυπήσεις) that arise in expectation (ἐκ προσδοκίας) of and prior to (πρὸ) those <states> to come are also the same (ταῦτα) <as the quasi-pleasures of (17)>.

How are anticipatory pleasures or rather anticipatory quasi-pleasures the same (ταῦτα) as bodily quasi-pleasures? I suggest that Socrates conceives of these quasi-pleasures as arising from an occurrent state of pain. Of course, one needn't be in pain to have an anticipatory pleasure, but, again, I take it that this is the kind of case Socrates has in mind here.

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42 R. 584b1-c2.
44 R. 584c9-11.
45 Of course, one needn't be in pain to have an anticipatory pleasure, but, again, I take it that this is the kind of case Socrates has in mind here.
which there is a cessation of the pain; the future state appears pleasant; and one takes pleasure in this image or vision.\textsuperscript{46}

In sum, Socrates variously conceives of the juxtaposition of pain and absence of pain as productive of a hedonic appearance. In (4)-(6) those in pain envision the cessation of pain as pleasant. In (18) the envisioned cessation of pain as pleasant is enjoyed in anticipation. In (8)-(10), (16), and in (17) calm preceded by pain produces a hedonic appearance. Thus, when in (15) Socrates claims that "calm appears pleasant beside that which is painful," he can be charitably interpreted to mean both that calm actually following pain appears pleasant and that cessation of pain envisioned as following pain when one is in pain appears pleasant. The former exemplifies an experiential illusion; the latter exemplifies a misleading vision or, so to speak, mis-imagination.

There is more to be said about Socrates' explanation of the misperception of the irrational man, in particular, about Socrates' conception of the hedonic appearance. But before we discuss this, let's turn to the contents of the true filling argument.

V. The True Filling Argument

\textsuperscript{46} Butler (1999) 288, n.10, suggests that Socrates' "\textit{προσηγήσεις}" and "\textit{προλυπήσεις}" are in fact not anticipatory pleasures and pains. He offers two reasons. First, "It is possible that in <the true pleasure> argument Plato was unaware of (or perhaps ignored) representative pleasure and concentrated on non-representative pleasure … \textit{προσηγήσεις} … often translated as 'anticipatory pleasure,' are representational." Second, "pre-enjoyings" are "said to be the same (\textit{ταύτα}) as other releases from pain … But anticipatory pleasure is not a release from pain at all; if anything an anticipatory pleasure for drink \textit{intensifies} my thirst." Later in the paper I argue that in the misperception argument one way in which pleasure is untrue is that it is representationally untrue. Thus, I find Butler's first reason unacceptable. Regarding Butler's second point, as I have just suggested, Socrates is not claiming that pre-enjoyings are releases from pain. Rather, they are pleasures taken in anticipated releases of pain.
In the misperception argument Socrates hints at his view that pleasure requires filling (\(\pi\lambda\rho\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma\)). Specifically in (16), in the analogy of spatial positions, he says that the inexperienced strongly believe they are in a state of "filling (\(\pi\lambda\rho\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota\)) and pleasure." In the true filling argument, Socrates makes this point more explicitly. More precisely, he suggests that pleasure requires a filling with what is naturally appropriate (\(\phi\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \pi\rho\omicron\omicron \sigma\epsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\omega\nu\)).\(^{47}\) Moreover, Socrates maintains that there are three species of naturally appropriate filling related to the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of the soul respectively. Socrates argues that the fillings related to the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul are less true than rational filling. Since a truer filling is constitutive of a truer pleasure, Socrates concludes that rational pleasure, which is equivalent to philosophical pleasure, is the truest pleasure.

Socrates begins the true filling argument by clarifying two species of inanition and correlative filling:

(19) Hunger, thirst, and the like are inanitions (\(\kappa\epsilon\nu\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\)) of the body's state (\(\tau\varsigma\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\omicron \sigma\omicron\mu\alpha \ \varepsilon\xi\epsilon\omega\varsigma\)).\(^{48}\)

(20) Ignorance and lack of intelligence are inanitions of the state of the soul (\(\tau\varsigma\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu \ \varepsilon\xi\epsilon\omega\varsigma\)).\(^{49}\)

(21) He who partakes of nourishment, such as food, drink, and relish, is filled (\(\pi\lambda\rho\omega\iota\tau\)).\(^{50}\)

(22) He who possesses true judgment, knowledge, and understanding is filled.\(^{51}\)

\(^{47}\) "\(\tau\omicron \ \pi\lambda\rho\omega\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\theta\omicron\ \tau\omicron \ \phi\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota \ \pi\rho\omicron\omicron \sigma\epsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\omega\nu \ \eta\delta\omicron \ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\" (R. 585d11) Note that this is a crucial assumption of the true-filling argument; Socrates does not argue for this claim.

\(^{48}\) R. 585a8-b2.

\(^{49}\) R. 585b3-5.

\(^{50}\) R. 585b6-8, with 585b13.
Socrates ultimately, at premise (30), clarifies that being filled with what is naturally appropriate is pleasant. Accordingly, in view of (19) and (21), we will assume that nourishment is the naturally appropriate content for the body. Regarding the naturally appropriate content of the soul, although Socrates initially speaks of true belief, knowledge, and understanding,\(^{52}\) otherwise he focuses on knowledge. So for the sake of simplicity, I will assume that knowledge is the naturally appropriate content of the soul.\(^{53}\)

Socrates now suggests that some fillings are truer than others:

\begin{equation}
\text{(23)} \quad \text{Truer ( álληθεστέρα) filling fills with what is more (τοῦ μᾶλλον).}^{54}
\end{equation}

The concept of what is more in (23) is clarified by the contents of subsequent premises, in particular (24). Socrates suggests that what is more is more immutable. Thus, (23) suggests that a true filling is a filling whose contents are relatively immutable. In fact, Socrates subsequently claims, in premise (29) below, that truth of filling is a function of containers as well as contents. In that case, we may take (23) as an abbreviated and preliminary formulation. (23), like (29), is a crucial and faulty premise of the true filling argument. It requires further discussion, which I offer below.

Socrates now claims:

\begin{equation}
\text{(24)} \quad \text{That which is connected to (ἐχόμενον) that which is always the same and immortal and to truth and is itself of such a kind and comes to be in (ἐν … γίγνομενον) such a kind has more being (μᾶλλον εἶναι) than that which is}
\end{equation}

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\(^{51}\) R. 585b6-8, with 585b14-c1

\(^{52}\) R. 585b14-c1.

\(^{53}\) It is odd that Socrates includes true belief since, for instance, in *Meno* he specifically criticizes true belief for its instability. It is also noteworthy that in *Philebus* true pleasures, which involve restorations that do not involve pains, are not characterized in terms of stability. It is unclear why Plato drops this condition in the later dialogue.

\(^{54}\) R. 585b9-11.
connected to that which is never the same and mortal and is itself of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind.\textsuperscript{55}

(24) is obviously complex. One fundamental question for the interpretation of (24) is whether reference is being made to four or rather six entities. Consider the following two interpretations, in which I have added symbols to clarify the various referents:

(\textit{24}_a) That (x\textsubscript{1}) which is connected to that (x\textsubscript{2}) which is always the same and immortal and to truth and is itself (x\textsubscript{1}) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (x\textsubscript{2}) has more being than that (y\textsubscript{1}) which is connected to that (y\textsubscript{2}) which is never the same and mortal and is itself (y\textsubscript{1}) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (y\textsubscript{2}).

(\textit{24}_b) That (x\textsubscript{1}) which is connected to that (x\textsubscript{2}) which is always the same and immortal and to truth and is itself (x\textsubscript{1}) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (x\textsubscript{3}) has more being than that (y\textsubscript{1}) which is connected to that (y\textsubscript{2}) which is never the same and mortal and is itself (y\textsubscript{1}) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (y\textsubscript{3}).

I suggest that (24) refers to six entities; thus, (\textit{24}_b) is the correct interpretation. One reason for preferring (\textit{24}_b) to (\textit{24}_a) is that the distinct phrases "being connected to" (\textit{\varepsilon\chi\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\omicron}) and "becoming in" (\textit{\epsilon\gamma\nu\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu\nu\omicron}) suggest that what x\textsubscript{1} or y\textsubscript{1} is connected to and becomes in are two different things. Further considerations below will confirm that (\textit{24}_b) is the correct interpretation.

Assuming that (\textit{24}_b) is the correct interpretation of (24), the core claim that (24) makes is:

\textsuperscript{55} R. 585c1-6.
(24a)  $xI$ has more being than $yI$.

But (24) also makes the following claims:

(24b)  $xI$ is connected to $x2$.

(24c)  $x2$ is always the same and immortal, and is truth.

(24d)  $xI$ is always the same and immortal, and is truth.

(24e)  $x3$ is always the same and immortal and truth.\(^{56}\)

(24f)  $xI$ comes to be in $x3$.

And similarly:

(24g)  $yI$ is connected to $y2$.

(24h)  $y2$ is never the same and is mortal.

(24i)  $yI$ is never the same and is mortal.

(24j)  $y3$ is never the same and is mortal.

(24k)  $yI$ comes to be in $y3$.

I suggest that the core claim, (24a), depends upon the following ontological principles:

(O1)  That which is is true.

(O2)  That which is is immutable.

(O1)'s identification of truth and being is one among several conceptions of ontological truth that occur in the true pleasure argument. I will say more about this and the other conceptions of ontological truth below.

Note also that (24h)-(24j) are not precisely opposites of (24c)-(24e). Socrates does not say that $yI$, $y2$, and $y3$ are untruth. Since untruth entails non-being, that would mean

\(^{56}\) (24e), unlike (24d), seems false since, for example, the acquisition of knowledge constitutes an alteration of the soul.
that $yI$, $y2$, and $y3$ were non-existent. Instead, $yI$, $y2$, and $y3$ have an intermediate ontological status.

Now, (24) itself is a general claim. In the following premises, (25)-(28), Socrates specifically contrasts the containers and contents involved in nutritional filling with those involved in epistemic filling. In doing so he is in effect applying (24) to these specific entities. To facilitate understanding of premises (25)-(28) and their function in the argument, it may be helpful to bear in mind the following application of (24):

Knowledge, which is connected to beings, which are always the same and immortal and are truth, and which is itself of such a kind and comes to be in the soul, which is of this kind, has more being than nutriment, which is connected to becomings, which are never the same and mortal, and which is itself of such a kind and comes to be in the body, which is of this kind.

Consider now premises (25)-(28):

(25) The being ($oúσία$) of what is always the same participates in being ($oúσία$) as much as the being of knowledge.$^{57}$

Socrates does not explicitly mention Forms here, but I assume he has these entities in mind.$^{58}$ Given this, Socrates' point is the following: that which is immutable participates

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$^{57}$ R. 585c7-9.

$^{58}$ Reeve (1998) 111-5, 148-9 interprets the true-filling argument in terms of Forms. As he claims, a soul being filled with knowledge more "completely or perfectly" instantiates the Form of Filling than a body being filled with food. I will avoid further mention of Forms in my treatment of the argument because Socrates himself does not mention them. But I do not view my interpretation of the argument as a whole as at odds with Reeve's.
in being to a given extent; knowledge is of what is immutable; therefore, knowledge participates in being to that extent.\textsuperscript{59}

(26) The being of what is always the same participates in truth (\(\alpha\lambda\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma\)) as much as the being of knowledge.\textsuperscript{60}

(26) follows from the ontological principle (O1). Admittedly, the fact that Socrates claims (26) as well as (25) might be taken to suggest that he does not identify being and truth, but rather that he takes truth to be a property of being. However, I can see no further reason to prefer this thesis. I will assume that the function of (26) is to clarify that since knowledge participates in being as much as its objects do, knowledge participates in truth as much as its objects do.\textsuperscript{61}

(27) The kinds of thing related to somatic treatment (\(\tau\iota\mu \tau\omicron\upsilon \sigma\omicron\varphi\mathtt{mato} \varsigma \theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu\)) participate less in truth and being than the kinds of thing related to psychic treatment (\(\tau\iota\mu \tau\omicron\eta\varsigma \psi\omicrux\eta \varsigma \theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu\)).\textsuperscript{62}

I assume that "the kinds of thing related to somatic treatment" in (27) refers to becomings and nutriment, the correlates of being and knowledge in (25) and (26).

(28) The body participates less in truth and being than the soul.\textsuperscript{63}

(28), thus, completes the specification of the three components—\(xI\) and \(yI\), \(x2\) and \(x2\), and \(yI\), \(y2\), and \(y3\)—involved in (24) interpreted as (24\textsubscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{59} We can reasonably assume that what is immutable participates in being to the full extent and thus that knowledge does. But the argument doesn't require this further specification.
\textsuperscript{60} R. 585c10-11.
\textsuperscript{61} I offer more support for my identification of being and truth below.
\textsuperscript{62} R. 585d1-4.
\textsuperscript{63} R. 585d5-6.
On the basis of the application of (24) to nutritional and epistemic filling entailed by premises (25)-(28), Socrates now expands his point regarding more and less true fillings at (23):

(29) That which is filled with things that are more (μᾶλλον ὅντων) and which itself is more (μᾶλλον ὅν) is more filled than that which is filled with things that are less (ηττον ὅντων) and which itself is less (ηττον ὅν).

Whereas in (23) Socrates correlates truth of filling with truth of contents, here in (29) Socrates correlates truth of filling with both contents and containers. The phrase "that … which itself is more" refers to the container. From (29) it can now be inferred that epistemic filling is truer filling than nutritional filling.

Observe that Socrates’ argument does not require (29). A premise akin to (23) would suffice to show that epistemic filling is truer than nutritional filling, for instance:

(29a) That which is filled with things that are more is more filled than that which is filled with things that are less.

I presume that Socrates expresses (29) simply because (29a) does not adequately capture his view. Evidently, his view is that the truth of a filling is not solely a function of the contents, but conjointly of the container and the contents.

Having clarified the conception of true filling, Socrates now relates pleasure to filling by specifying that pleasure involves a filling with what is naturally appropriate:

(30) Being filled with what is naturally appropriate (φύσει προσηκόντων) is pleasant.

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64 R. 585d7-10. As in the case of (23) I will discuss this crucial and faulty premise further below.
65 R. 585d11.
From (30) Socrates infers:

(31) Therefore, being filled with things that really are (τὶ ὁντὶ ... τῶν ὁντῶν) makes one more really (μᾶλλον ὁντὸς) and truly (ἀληθεστέρως) enjoy true pleasure (χαίρειν ἡδονῇ ἀληθεὶ).\(^{66}\)

From (31) it follows that rational filling is the truest pleasure. Thus, philosophical pleasure, which is rational pleasure, is the truest pleasure.

VI. Semantic Remarks on "Ἀλήθεια" and its Cognates

The preceding certainly cannot stand as a satisfactory interpretation of the true filling argument. A number of premises cry out for explication. Above all, the central concept of truth requires elucidation. Indeed, clarification is needed here both to understand the true filling argument and to make sense of Socrates' conception of pleasure.

The word "Ἀλήθεια" and its cognates "παναληθεῦς," "ἀληθές," "ἀληθεστέρως," "ἀληθεστάτως," "ἀληθινός," "ἀληθινωῆς," and "ἀληθοστέρως" — all of which I will refer to as "alethic terms" — occur 23 times in the true pleasure argument, in the following order:

(a) At the beginning of the misperception argument, Socrates characterizes the pleasure of the irrational man as "not at all true" (οὐδὲ παναληθῆς).\(^{67}\)

(b) Socrates says that in the phantasms of the irrational man's quasi-pleasures, there is nothing healthy relative to "the truth" (ἀλήθεια) of pleasure.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{66}\) R. 585d12-e1.

\(^{67}\) R. 583b3.

\(^{68}\) R. 584a10.
(c) In response to Socrates' example of olfactory pleasures as pure insofar as they are not preceded by pains, Glaucon replies that Socrates has spoken "most true things" or "most truly" (ἀληθεστατα).69

(d) In his analogy of spatial positions, Socrates claims that one who moves from the bottom to the midpoint believes he is at the top because he has not seen what is "truly top" (ἀληθῶς ἄνω).70

(e) In the same analogy, Socrates suggests that if the mover were brought back down to the bottom, he would believe that he was at the bottom and would, in this case, believe "true things" (ἀληθῆ).71

(f) In the same analogy, Socrates says that the mover has true and false beliefs because he is inexperienced in "that which is truly top (τὸ ἀληθῆ ἄνω ὅντο)."72

(g) In the same analogy, Socrates says that when irrational men experience pain, analogously to the mover being brought to the bottom, they believe "true things" (ἀληθῆ).73

(h) In the true filling argument, Socrates says that a "truer" (ἀληθεστέρα) filling is a filling with that which more.74

(i) Socrates says that the kind of filling that the soul undergoes is a filling with "true belief" (δόξης ἀληθοῦσα), knowledge, and understanding.75

69 R. 584b9.
70 R. 584d9.
71 R. 584e2.
72 R. 584e5.
73 R. 585a1.
74 R. 585b9.
75 R. 585b14.
Socrates claims that that which is connected to what is always the same and immortal and "truth" (ἀληθείας) is more.\(^{76}\)

Socrates claims that the being of that which is always the same partakes equally of being and knowledge and "truth" (ἀληθείας).\(^{77}\)

Socrates claims that the therapy pertaining to the body partakes less "of truth" (ἀληθείας) and being than the therapy pertaining to the soul.\(^{78}\)

Socrates claims that being more really filled makes one more really and (1) "truly" (ἀληθεστέρως) enjoy (2) "true pleasure" (ηδονή ἀληθεῖ).\(^{79}\)

Socrates claims that when one is less (1) "truly" (ἀληθῶς) and stably filled, one has a share of less trustworthy and less (2) "true" (ἀληθοῦς) pleasure.\(^{80}\)

In the true filling argument, Socrates refers back to the analogy of spatial positions and claims that those preoccupied with non-philosophical fillings, never ascend to what is "truly the top" (τὸ ἀληθῶς ἀνω).\(^{81}\)

Socrates claims that pleasures mixed with pains are imitations of "true pleasure" (τῆς ἀληθοῦς ηδονῆς) and shadow-painted.\(^{82}\)

In reference to Stesichorus' ode, Socrates speaks of the Greeks and Trojans fighting over the copy of Helen, through their ignorance of "that which is true" or "truth" (τοῦ ἀληθοῦς).\(^{83}\)

\(^{76}\) R. 585c2.  
\(^{77}\) R. 585c10.  
\(^{78}\) R. 585d3.  
\(^{79}\) R. 585e1.  
\(^{80}\) R. 585e4.  
\(^{81}\) R. 586a4.  
\(^{82}\) R. 586b8.  
\(^{83}\) R. 586c5.
At the end of the true filling argument, Socrates says that if they are led by reason, the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul can grasp the (1) "truest" pleasures \( (\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha \xi) \), insofar, that is, as it is possible for their pleasures to grasp (2) "true" \( (\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota \xi) \) pleasures, and that they will do so since they follow (3) "truth" \( (\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota \alpha) \).\(^{84}\)

Likewise, Socrates says that if the baser parts of the soul follow the wisdom-loving part, they will enjoy the best and "truest" \( (\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha \xi) \) pleasures possible for them.\(^{85}\)

Prima facie, these instances fall into two groups. The first group— (c), (e), (g), (i), and (q)— includes those instances in which truth is attributed to semantic entities such as beliefs and statements.\(^{86}\) The second group includes the remainder. The first group appears to employ the cognates of "\( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\alpha \)" representationally. At least— and this is an important qualification— this is how we who are committed to the correspondence theory of truth understand phrases and clauses such as "true belief," "what you claim is true," and "you have spoken truly." In other words, the content of the belief or utterance represents a state of affairs; and the content corresponds to the world. One might refer to this as a "semantic" truth-conception. Indeed, all of the entities to which truth is attributed in (c), (e), (g), (i), and (q) are semantic. But I prefer to refer to this truth-conception more broadly as "representational." The idea— controversial, to be sure— is that there are non-semantic modes of representation that are truth-apt.

\(^{84}\) R. 586d8-e1.  
\(^{85}\) R. 587a1.  
\(^{86}\) (q) is perhaps a controversial case. I interpret Socrates to mean that the Trojans and Greeks are ignorant of the fact that the entity they take to be Helen is actually a copy.
I will refer to the remaining cases—namely, those in (a), (b), (d), (f), (h), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), (p), (r), and (s)—as employing an "ontological" conception of truth.\footnote{And I take this to imply that they Trojans have false beliefs about the entity that they take to be Helen.} Among the cases of ontological "\(\alpha\lambda\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)" and its cognates, a substantive distinction can be drawn between what I will call "independent" and "dependent" uses. In the independent use—which occurs in (j), (k), (l), and at (r3)—the noun "\(\alpha\lambda\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\)" is employed, and in its employment the noun does not complement any other noun. For example, in (k), the being of what is always the same is said to partake of "truth"
(ἀληθείας). In its dependent uses, "ἀληθεία" and more commonly its adjectival and adverbial cognates are employed, and these terms modify or complement a nominal, adjectival, or verbal expression. For example, in (g) Socrates speaks of "truer filling" (πληρωσία ἀληθεστέρα) and in (m2) of "true pleasure" (ἡδονή ἀληθεί)。

I will first comment on the independent uses. In (j), (k), and (l) Socrates explicitly relates ἀληθεία to what is always the same (τοῦ ἄεὶ ὁμοίου) and immortal (ἀθανάτου) and to being (οὐσίας). In my discussion of the true filling argument, specifically in (O1), I suggested that Socrates identifies truth (ἀληθεία) with being (οὐσία). Some support for this suggestion derives from a line in the true filling argument. After Socrates has gained Glaucon's assent to the claim that the being of what is always the same and immortal partakes of truth, he implies that that which partakes of truth partakes of being. Strictly speaking, this only implies that truth entails being. But consider the following passages from elsewhere in Republic:

"When <the soul> focuses on what truth and being (ἀληθεία τε καὶ τὸ ὄν) illuminate, it understands and knows … but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and perishes, it has opinion …" 

"<The guardians must be educated in the study of numbers, for this turns> the soul around, away from becoming towards truth and being (ἀληθείαν τε καὶ οὐσίαν)."

88 Other independent uses in Republic occur at 475e4, 485c4, 10, 485d3, 486d7, 487a5, 490a1, b6, 501d2, 508d5, e1, 4, 5, 509a1, 7, 9, 511e3, 519b8, 517c4, 525b1, c6, 526b3, 527b9, e3, 581b6, 582a10, 597a11, 602c2, 603a11.
89 "(τοῦ) ἄεὶ ὁμοίου" at 585c1-2, ἀθανάτου" at 585c2; "οὐσίας" at 585c12.
90 R. 585c12. The implication is actually based on a negative claim: if something partakes less of truth, then it partakes less of being.
91 R. 508d4-9.
"Will they deny that philosophers are lovers of being and truth (τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀλήθειας)?"93

I suggest that in these passages the conjunction "τε καὶ" is epexegetical. In support of this suggestion, consider also the discussion of artificial imitations in book 10. In one passage these imitations are said to be at a "third remove" from "being" (τοῦ ὄντος).94 In another passage, one such artifact is said to be an obscure thing in relation to "truth" (ἀλήθεια).95

In short, I maintain that Socrates uses "ἀλήθεια" in the independent ontological sense and "οὐσία" or "τὸ ὄν" interchangeably. Granted this, what is the independent ontological sense of "ἀλήθεια"? One possibility is that Socrates means "the totality of Forms." That is, he uses "ἀλήθεια" as a mass noun, whereby each Form is a portion of ἀλήθεια. Alternatively, Socrates may be using "ἀλήθεια" to designate a property of Forms, precisely, that in virtue of which they are the kind of entity they are. In his article, "The Split Personality of Ontological Alêtheia," Blake Hestir distinguishes two aspects of ontological ἀλήθεια that correspond to these two independent uses of ontological "ἀλήθεια":

1) "the being or substance that Plato identifies as Forms"

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92 R. 525b12-c6.
93 R. 501d1-2.
94 R. 599a1; cf. 599d2, 602c2,
95 R. 597a10-11, Socrates is here referring to the carpenter's bed. Cf. 605a10. Other passages in the middle dialogues where Plato identifies ἀλήθεια and οὐσία include: Cra. 438d2-440c1 (cf. Hestir's discussion at 2004, 113-16); Prm. 134a3-b2 (again, cf. Hestir's discussion at 118-19). I also agree with Hestir (116-17) that in the Republic 5 argument for the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα, where Socrates says that philosophers are lovers of ἀλήθεια and that ἐπιστήμη is set over what is (τὸ ὄν), he is using "truth" in an ontological, not a representational sense. (Cf. Jan Szaif, "Doxa and Epistêmê as Modes of Acquaintance in Republic V," Études platoniciennes 4 (2007) 253-72.)
(2) "the ontological stability which is the precondition for the Forms being what they are insofar as they are Forms and for each form having the particular $F$-property it has by virtue of itself and which guarantees that each form will satisfy the Parmenidean requirements for knowledge and entails that Forms possess attributes such as immutability and eternality." 

I suggest that in (j), (k), (l), and (r3), that is, in all of its instances in the true filling argument, Socrates deploys the independent use of ontological "$\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$" in accordance with Hestir's second aspect. That is, Socrates deploys the independent use of ontological "$\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$" to designate the being in virtue of which the Forms are the kind of entity they are. Consider (k) in particular: "the being of that which is always the same" ($\eta$ $\dot{a}$e $\delta$moi$\omicron$ ou$\omicron$sia) partakes of "being" (ou$\omicron$sia) and so of "truth" ($\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$). The Forms are that which is always the same, and Socrates specifically refers here to their "being" (ou$\omicron$sia). He says that their being partakes of being and so of truth. At least the second instance of "ou$\omicron$sia" must therefore refer to Hestir's second aspect of ontological $\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$.

Moreover, I incline to agree with Hestir that stability — both existentially (that is, eternality) and with respect to alteration (that it, immutability) — is the fundamental concept that informs Socrates' claim. That is, Plato here treats ou$\omicron$sia and thus ontological $\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ as stability. Recall (O2): that which is is immutable.

I turn now to the dependent use of ontological "$\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$" and more commonly its adjectival and adverbial cognates. In this case, the alethic term functions as a logical attribute of some noun. So far as I know, Gregory Vlastos, in section one of his "Degrees

96 (2004) 120. Although I agree with much of Hestir's discussion, it is not clear to me that the examples of "$\Delta\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$" he cites at 113-19 are all cases of use 1.
of Reality in Plato,"\(^{97}\) was the first to discuss this use in Plato. I find Vlastos's account mistaken in crucial ways. However, because it is a seminal contribution, I will discuss it before turning to the more recent and, I think, more tenable position of Jan Szaif.

Vlastos never uses the phrase "ontological truth"; nonetheless, the concept pervades his discussion. His paper begins with the claim that Greek, unlike English, can form a noun, "οὐσία," and an adverb, "ὁντως," from the verb "εἰναι," whereas English requires the use of a different verbal root, "real" as in "reality" and "really."\(^{98}\) Vlastos asserts that "true' is a fairly common meaning of 'real'" in English as <ἀλήθες> is in Greek; that "one can speak of 'a true friend,' 'true gold,' 'true courage,' and so forth"; and that "in all cases 'real' can be substituted for 'true' with little change of sense."\(^{99}\)

Vlastos claims that when we speak of a "true friend," we mean that the person so described has "those very properties in virtue of which they can be truly so described: e.g. of Jones as sympathetic, responsive, considerate, loyal, and whatever else we expect of a man whom we would call 'a friend' …"\(^{100}\) Observe that Vlastos's formulation explains the sense of "true" as "real" using the concept of a true sentence or description. Again, Vlastos writes: "Jones is a 'real' friend because … he has those attributes in virtue of


\(^{98}\) ibid. 1. Strictly speaking, Vlastos is wrong since "being" can function as a noun as well as a participle.

\(^{99}\) ibid. 3. Strictly speaking, the phrase "true friend" is ambiguous; see the following footnote.

\(^{100}\) ibid. 3. The *OED* (s.v. 5. a) well captures this meaning of "true": "genuine; rightly answering to the description; properly so called; not counterfeit, spurious, or imaginary." Note that there are two meanings of the phrase "true friend." One, meaning "faithful" or "loyal," adheres more closely to the etymology: Old English "tréowe," meaning "faithful" derives from the noun "tréow" meaning "faith" or "covenant." (See *OED* s.v. 1. a.)
which sentences applying these predicates to him are true …"\textsuperscript{101} One wonders whether 
the ontological sense of "true" as "real" must be formulated using the semantic 
representational sense of "true." Why not instead claim that a true friend is something 
that has all the properties of a friend? It may be objected that "true friend" is not 
synonymous with "friend," but that the reformulation makes "true" redundant. Although 
Vlastos does not consider the reformulation I am offering, he is aware of the redundancy 
problem: "There would be no point in saying that Jones is a 'real' friend, as distinct from 
just saying that he is a friend, unless we were tacitly contrasting him with people who 
talk and act like friends, and for a time pass for friends, but then turn out to be fakes 
…"\textsuperscript{102} Granted this, we can still formulate the meaning of "true friend" independently of 
the semantic representational truth-conception: "a true $F$" means "something that has all 
the properties of an $F$, in contrast to something that does not." In other words, part of the 
meaning of the dependent ontological use of "true" is contrastive. Granted this, Vlastos 
should have avoided formulating his account in terms of semantic representational truth. 

Vlastos also claims that when we speak of a true friend, the following 
counterfactual is implied: "<such claims> would be found to be true if put to the test."\textsuperscript{103} 
Again, we should reformulate this point independently of the reference to semantic 
representational truth: someone's being a true friend entails that if that person's friendship 
were tested, the person would pass the test. Thus, a true friend is reliably a friend. Vlastos 
thinks that it is this "implicit reference to reliable truth … that saves 'real' from 

\textsuperscript{101}ibid. 3. 
\textsuperscript{102}ibid. 3. 
\textsuperscript{103}ibid. 3.
redundancy when used in this sense." As we have seen, this is mistaken, for in this context "true" has a contrastive meaning. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between what the word "true" here means and the logical entailments of the concept that transcend its meaning. For example, "heptangular" means "having seven angles"; and although having seven angles entails having seven sides, "heptangular" does not mean "having seven sides." Again, it is necessary to distinguish what the word "true" here means from the causal relations in which true F's stand, such as that given by the counterfactual Vlastos mentions. Again, a true friend may be one who would prove true if put to the test and thus prove reliable, but "true F" does not mean "reliably F."

I dwell on this point because a central claim of Vlastos's paper is that the dependent ontological use of "true" has the "sense" of "reliable." More precisely, Vlastos claims that "true" here has the "sense" of "cognitively reliable." In sum, then, Vlastos's claim rests on two errors. The first depends on Vlastos's conception of dependent ontological "truth" in terms of semantic representational truth. The second is that Vlastos conflates the meaning of "true" in the sense of "real" with the fact that a true F would reliably prove to be an F, and he consequently claims that "true" means "cognitively reliable." The mistakes are evidently interrelated precisely insofar as true and false beliefs and statements about F's or pseudo-F's derive from relations to true and untrue F's. In short, then, we ought to distinguish between the meaning of "true" in its

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104 "There would no be point in saying that Jones is a 'real' friend, as distinct from just saying that he is a friend, unless we were tacitly contrasting him with people who talk and act like friends, and for a time pass for friends, but then turn out to be fakes, i.e., unless we were expressing the conviction that Jones has 'proved' a friend, or would 'prove' one under trial." (ibid. 3)
105 ibid. 7.
dependent ontological use and the epistemological significance of the fact that there are true and untrue $F$'s.

We will return to Vlastos's paper briefly below. Presently, let's turn to Jan Szaif's discussion of the logically attributive use of "$\dot{\alpha}λ\eta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$" or of equivalent expressions such as "$\dot{\alpha}λ\eta\theta\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu$," "(\$\$) \dot{\alpha}λ\eta\theta\omega\varsigma," and "$\tau\bar{\eta} \dot{\alpha}λ\eta\theta\epsilon\bar{\imath}\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma$."\(^{107}\) Szaif claims that this use is equivalent to the logically attributive use of the German "wirklich," "echt," and "wahr," and likewise to the English "true," "real," and "genuine." More precisely, Szaif distinguishes two such logically attributive uses, which he calls "statuierende"\(^{108}\) and "signierende."\(^{109}\) I will render the German adjectives as "confirmative" and "paradigmatic" respectively.

The confirmative use can be seen in following contrasting cases: "true gold versus fool's gold," "the true Elvis versus an impersonator."\(^{110}\) In such cases, Szaif observes, the attribute "true" does not affect the extension of the nominal expression "$F$" that it complements. Thus, a lump of gold is identical a lump of true gold, whereas a lump of fool's gold is not part of the extension of "gold."\(^{111}\) Contrast this with the paradigmatic use of "true" as in the following contrasting cases: "a true Irish setter versus an non-pure-

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\(^{106}\) In this case, one forms beliefs and make statements on the basis of true or untrue $F$'s, and those beliefs and statements are true or false accordingly.

\(^{107}\) (1996) 49-56.

\(^{108}\) ibid. 52

\(^{109}\) ibid. 54.

\(^{110}\) Szaif gives other examples on p.51-2.

\(^{111}\) ibid. 52. Szaif writes: "Der Zusatz von 'wirklich/echt/wahr' beeinflusst in diesen Fallen also nicht die Wahrheitsbedingung des Satzes und ist darum logisch-semantisch gesehen redundant. Seine Funktion ist eine rhetorische und liegt in der Kontrastierung mit demjenigen, was nur $<F>$ zu sein scheint … aber nicht $<F>$ ist." (52) Note that I disincline to think that the so-called "rhetorical function" is distinct from the meaning of the term. For example, in a world without untrue $F$'s, would it be intelligible to claim that something was a true $F$?
bred Irish setter" and "a true red versus a red that has an admixture of other colors." A distinctive feature of this paradigmatic logically attributive use is that it permits entities being $F$ in varying degrees. Accordingly, an untrue $F$ may belong to the set of $F$'s. For example, a color that is predominantly red but also mixed with some other color may still be a case of red. Consequently, the use of "true" here is not truth-conditionally otiose. Rather, it narrows the extension of the type $F$. In other words, while true and untrue $F$'s may both be $F$'s, true $F$'s are a subset of $F$'s.

Szaif claims that the confirmative use applies to the distinction between originals and copies or fakes, while the paradigmatic use applies to the distinction between pure and impure cases. Moreover—apropos of Vlastos's view of the cognitive significance of the dependent ontological use of "true"—Szaif notes the following epistemological or cognitive implication of the confirmative use: there is a tendency for the confirmative use to be employed in the context of indicating that untrue $F$'s are deceptive. In other words, when one characterizes an $F$ as "true," in the confirmative sense, in contrast to an untrue $F$, one tends to convey that the untrue $F$ merely appears to be, without actually being, an $F$. Note that Szaif does not here make Vlastos's mistake of claiming that the epistemological implication of the confirmative use is constitutive of the meaning of "true."

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112 Szaif gives other examples on p.52.
113 "der vermischte Rot-Ton ist, wenn auch in eingeschränkter Weise, ein Fall von Rot." (53)
114 "Was die Entgegensetzung von Original und Abbild oder Nachahmung betrifft, so besteht bei Platon sehr deutlich die Tendenz, die den Abbildern eigene Erscheinungsweise, etwas darzustellen, was sie nicht sind, grundsätzlich für ein Phänomen von Täuschung zu halten." (55)
At this point, let me briefly return to Vlastos's discussion. In section two of his paper, Vlastos maintains that Plato conceives of some entities, namely, Forms, as truer or more real than others, namely, participants, insofar as the latter are always, while the former are never, both $F$ and not-$F$.\footnote{ibid. 10.} Note that by "not-$F$" here Vlastos intends the contrary, not logical opposite, of $F$. As Vlastos puts it, the "$F$ nature <of participants> is adulterated by contrary characters."\footnote{ibid. 6.} For example, a beautiful participant is both beautiful and ugly. As such, Plato conceives of participants as "less 'pure' $F$'s" than true $F$'s.\footnote{Ibid. On the purity and unmixed nature of Forms, Vlastos cites: Phd. 67b (cf. 66a), 78d; Smp. 211b, e; R. 523c-e. A consequence of this adulteration is that on the basis of untrue $F$'s, "we could only get a confused and uncertain idea of what it is to be $F$." (ibid. 6) This may be right, but, as I have said, Vlastos's inference from this that one sense of "real" is "that which is cognitively dependable, undeceiving" is mistaken. Accordingly, Vlastos should have limited himself to the following claim: a true $F$ is an entity that is $F$ and in no way not-$F$.}

Evidently, Vlastos's conception of Plato's dependent ontological use of alethic terms is akin to Szaif's paradigmatic use. Thus, Vlastos's explanation of Plato's "degrees of reality" is akin to Szaif's view that the paradigmatic use permits entities being $F$ in varying degrees. But Vlastos's conception is not equivalent to Szaif's. Again, on Vlastos's view untrue $F$'s are both $F$ and the contrary of $F$; but on Szaif's view untrue $F$'s needn't be untrue because they are both $F$ and the contrary of $F$. Recall the examples of true red versus red mixed with another color and a true Irish setter versus a non-pure-bred Irish setter. Even granting that the color red has a contrary, say, the complementary color green, untrue or impure red needn't be red mixed with green, as opposed to, say, yellow or blue. In the canine case, being an Irish setter simply has no contrary, such that a non-
pure-bred Irish setter is a hybrid of an Irish setter and some particular other breed. Accordingly, while Plato does often characterize paradigmatically untrue $F$'s as both $F$ and the contrary of $F$, the claim that a certain $F$ is paradigmatically "untrue" does not entail that it is both $F$ and the contrary of $F$.

What makes an $F$ paradigmatically true? The key term Szaif uses to characterize paradigmatically untrue $F$'s is "eingeschränkt." For example: "die als wirkliches $X$ gekennzeichnete Sache wird vielmehr von solchen Fällen abgehoben, in denen etwas nur in eingeschränkte Weise $X$ ist."\textsuperscript{118} Accordingly, a paradigmatically true $F$ is an "uneingeschränktes" $F$.\textsuperscript{119} The question, then, is what makes a paradigmatically true $F$ completely or unqualifiedly or unrestrictedly an $F$. Unfortunately, Szaif does not say. We might suggest that a paradigmatically true $F$ fully realizes the properties necessary for being an $F$. For example, a fully realized red is red that is only constituted by red. Thus, an impure red is not paradigmatically true because it is constituted by colors other than red. However, this does little more than substitute one thing that needs explaining for another. What does it mean for something to fully realize a property? In this paper, I must leave the problem unresolved. The examples given in conjunction with our theoretically uninformed intuitions must suffice.

Given the preceding semantic remarks, let's return to the dependent uses of "
\textit{άληθεία}" and its cognates in the true pleasure argument. There are 13 such uses: in (a), (b), (d), (f), (h), (m1), (m2), (n1), (n2), (o), (p), (r1), (r2), and (s). This number is reducible to three for the following reasons. First, in some cases there are several tokens

\textsuperscript{118} (1996) 53.
of the same or at least an equivalent phrase type. For example, "ἀλήθως ἀνω" in (d), "τοῦ ἀληθικῶς ἄνω ὄντος" in (f), and "τὸ ἀληθῶς ἀνω" in (o) are clearly equivalent. Less obviously, "ἡδονῆς ἀληθείαν" in (b) and, for instance, "ἡδονῆς ἀληθοῦς" in (n) are equivalent. Further reduction is possible insofar as an alethic adjective or adverb in different degrees modifies the same type of nominal expression. For example, in (s) Socrates speaks of "truest pleasures" (ἡδονᾶς ἀληθεστάτας). So we are left with three phrase types where an alethic term modifies: a pleasure term, as in (a), (b), (m1), (m2), (n2), (p), (r1), (r2), and (s); a term for the top position, as in (d), (f), and (o); and a filling term, as in (h) and (n1).

In the filling cases, the alethic term is in the comparative degree: (h) speaks of "truer" (ἀληθεστέρα) filling, (n) of being "less truly" (ἡττον ἀληθῶς) filled. This indicates the paradigmatic use. Likewise, in the pleasure cases, insofar as Socrates uses alethic terms in comparative and superlative degrees and argues that true pleasures correlate with true fillings, the alethic terms must be used paradigmatically. This is so in (m1), (m2), (n2), (r1), (r2), and (s).

That leaves the instances in (a), (b), and (p). These are difficult cases. In (a) Socrates characterizes the irrational man's quasi-pleasure as "ουδὲ παναληθῆς." The adjective "παναληθῆς" only occurs here in Plato, and prior to Plato only twice. If we

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119 "Sie kann im übrigen, da es in diesen Fällen eben Grade der Annäherung an ein exemplarisches oder uneingeschränktes F-sein gibt, mit Formen der komparativischen Gradation verbunden werden." (ibid. 53)

120 On the use of "ἀληθεία" with a complementary noun in the genitive and its relation to the logically attributive use of "ἀληθές," cp. Szaif (1996) 57-67; and specifically with respect to the phrase "ἡδονῆς ἀληθεία" in (b), see p.58.

121 A. Sept. 722; Supp. 86. In fact, outside of its use in Callimachus Ep. 18.5, there is no secure attestation before the Roman Imperial period. None of these three instances casts light on Plato's use.
render "οὐδέν παναληθής" as "not wholly true," this entails that the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is partly true. But this is hard to square with (b), where Socrates claims that there is "nothing" (οὐδὲν) healthy in the phantasms of the irrational man's quasi-pleasure relative to the truth of pleasure, that is, relative to true pleasure. Moreover, the contrast between the irrational man's quasi-pleasure as a phantasm and true pleasure suggests that the former is confirmatively untrue. As such, the irrational man's quasi-pleasure appears to be pleasure, but isn't. Again, in (p) the irrational man's quasi-pleasures are characterized as imitations or copies of true pleasure. Again, there is a contrast between appearance and reality. Accordingly, I believe that the alethic terms in (a), (b), and (p) are used confirmatively.

Finally, the top position cases do not yield a straightforward result. The instances in (d) and (f) occur within the misperception argument and are analogous to the contrast between apparent and real pleasure. Thus, they seem to be used confirmatively. But in (o), the spatial positions analogy is applied to the three types of filling. Those preoccupied with non-philosophical fillings never ascend to what is "truly the top." In this case, we appear to have a paradigmatic use since the midpoint would be more truly the top than the bottom point, just as spirited fillings are truer than appetitive fillings, and even though neither is completely true.122

Somewhat tentatively, I conclude that the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is confirmatively untrue. In other words, the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is not a form of pleasure. It is a condition that shares an appearance with (confirmatively true) pleasure, but no more. In contrast, appetitive, spirited, and philosophical pleasures are all
confirmatively true; that is, they are pleasures. However, among these, only philosophical pleasure is paradigmatically true.

The following section elaborates on these conclusions by clarifying what confirmatively and paradigmatically true pleasure are. Note also that since confirmatively true pleasure simply is pleasure—even though "(confirmatively) true pleasure" does not simply mean "pleasure"—it will often be convenient to speak just of pleasure. To avoid confusion, when I wish to refer to paradigmatically true pleasure instead of confirmatively true pleasure, I will speak of "paradigmatic pleasure."

VII. Conditions of True Pleasure

Having clarified Socrates' uses of alethic terms in the true pleasure argument, I will here clarify his conception of confirmatively and paradigmatically true pleasure. I begin with bodily pleasure and pain. In (19) and (21) Socrates refers to somatic depletion and replenishment. He does not provide physiological details, but compare Timaeus' account of digestion in Timaeus:

"… the fire <in our bodies> cuts up the food <we have ingested>; it oscillates, following the <rhythm> of the breath within us; and in its oscillation it fills the veins that lead from the cavity of the belly, pouring into them the <food that has been> cut there … <The cut food is then transformed into blood,> nourishment for the flesh and the whole body, which irrigates each part <of the body> and fills (πληροὶ) the place of what is emptied (τοῦ ἐκνουμῆνου). And the manner in

122 Indeed, the top position cases seem to suggest that although we can distinguish confirmative and paradigmatic uses, Plato may not recognize the difference.
which replenishment and depletion (τῆς πληρώσεως ἀποχωρήσεως τε) occur is consistent with the motion of everything in the universe …”

Passage (30) of Republic 9 suggests that nutritional replenishment is somatically pleasant. Socrates does not specify, but it is reasonable to infer that nutritional depletion is somatically painful. Socrates’ explanation of bodily pleasure and pain in Timaeus and Philebus corroborates this view:

"(Ti:) It is necessary to conceive of pleasure and pain in the following way. When an affection occurs within us that is contrary to nature, forceful, and bulky, it is painful; but a return again to nature when bulky is pleasure.”

"(So:) … when in us living beings harmony is dissolved, a disruption of nature and a generation of pains then occur … But if harmony is again composed and brought back to its nature, then pleasure occurs.”

In fact, Plato commits to the correlation between physiological depletion and replenishment and bodily pain and pleasure as early as Gorgias. In the final movement of the dialogue, where Socrates and Callicles are engaged in a debate over whether pleasure is identical to goodness, Socrates attempts to convince Callicles that hedonism is false by comparing human life to the possession a set of urns that one endeavors to keep full of wine, honey, and milk. Socrates characterizes an intemperate man as one whose urns are leaky and whose life is constantly preoccupied with the work of filling; he asserts that such a life is full of distress, whereas the life of a man whose urns are sound is a life of well-being (εὐδαιμονία). Against this, Callicles argues:

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123 Ti. 80d3-81a3.
124 Ti. 64c7-d2.
125 Phlb. 31d4-9.
"That man who has filled his urns can have no pleasure. Rather, his is the life of a stone … for once he fills <his urns>, he feels no joy or pain. Living pleasantly consists of the greatest inflow."¹²⁷

Socrates interprets and Callicles confirms his interpretation of the advocacy of the life of attending leaky urns:

"(So:) Are you speaking of feeling hunger and eating when one is hungry … and feeling thirst and drinking when one is thirsty? (Ca:) Yes, and having all the other desires and being able to fill (πληρεῖν) them, <that is> living well and pleasantly."¹²⁸

Although neither Socrates nor Callicles explicitly says so, it is clear from the simile of the urns and the following exchange that pleasure is conceived in terms of filling a deficit, whereas pain is conceived in terms of depletion. Moreover, the examples of hunger and thirst suggest that the depletions and replenishments are somatic. Indeed, within this section of the dialogue, Socrates and Callicles have bodily pleasures and pains principally in mind. Consequently, Socrates' account of psychic replenishment and correlative pleasure in Republic 9 should be viewed as an extension of the replenishment model of bodily pleasure.

Finally, note also that there is some reason to think that Plato derived the replenishment model of pleasure from Greek medical literature. Consider the following passage from the Hippocratic treatise Diseases IV, which was probably composed by Hippocrates' son-in-law Polybus in the late fifth century BC:

¹²⁶ Grg. 493d-494a.
¹²⁷ Grg. 494a.
¹²⁸ Grg. 494b-c.
"Now if we are in need of food or drink, then in this case the body too will draw from the sources that store the various physiological humors until the humors are reduced below what is fitting. At that point a man has a desire to eat or drink something of a nature to fill up that deficient portion and make it equal to the others. This is why even after we have eaten or drunk a large amount we sometimes still desire a food or drink and will eat nothing else with pleasure, except the particular thing that we desire. But when we have eaten and the humor in the sources that is, those parts of the body in which the humor is stored and in the body is equalized as far as possible, then the desire ceases.\textsuperscript{129}

I have dwelt on and contextualized Plato's conception of somatic depletions and replenishments and their relation to pleasure and pain in order to demonstrate and emphasize that in Republic 9 Socrates conceives of somatic replenishment as a constituent of bodily pleasure. The point is significant because somatic replenishment is itself a kind of motion (κίνησις). Recall now that within the misperception argument, at (3) and then (12), Socrates distinguishes pleasure and pain from calm by claiming that pleasure and pain are both forms of motion. Yet as we also saw, in the misperception argument Socrates identifies these motions as being of the soul. Evidently, then, bodily pleasure and pain involve two motions: one somatic, the other psychic. How should we understand these motions?

Clearly the somatic motion of bodily pleasure is a motion of replenishment. But it is unclear whether the psychic motion of bodily pleasure is a motion of replenishment as well. In considering this question, note that bodily pleasure requires that the somatic

\textsuperscript{129} 39.5.
motion affect the soul. This point is explicit in the treatments of pleasure in *Timaeus* and *Philebus*. That is, some somatic motions of replenishment are too weak or subtle to affect the soul. Consequently, such motions are not constitutive of pleasures. The point is implicit in *Republic* 9 in Socrates' treatment of olfactory pleasures. Olfactory pleasures are preceded by nasal depletions; but the depletions are too subtle and gradual to be experienced algesically; thus, they are not constitutive of pains.

This suggests that in the case of bodily pleasure, psychic motion is the objective correlate of the subjective experience of pleasure, that is, of the hedonic appearance. But what of the case of psychic pleasure? In the case of psychic and specifically rational pleasure, a motion of psychic replenishment occurs. But what is the objective correlate of the experience of rational pleasure? Are there two psychic motions, one of replenishment and one that constitutes the objective correlate of experience? Or does one psychic motion play both roles insofar as the soul necessarily experiences its objective state? The text offers no answer to the question.

Conservatively, I will hereafter assume that in the case of bodily pleasure, somatic motion is motion of replenishment that affects the soul and that psychic motion constitutes the objective correlate of subjective hedonic experience. In the case of psychic pleasure, psychic motion is motion of replenishment. But it is unclear whether the soul apprehends this motion just because it is psychic, or whether there is a second psychic motion, not of replenishment, that correlates with psychic apprehension.

Note that hereafter I will use "psychic motion" to refer to psychic motion that constitutes the objective correlate of subjective experience, whether this only occurs in

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130 Compare Socrates' reference at (17) to bodily quasi-pleasures that "extend through the
the case of bodily pleasure or also in the case of psychic and specifically rational pleasure. I will distinguish the objective psychic motion that constitutes the objective correlate of the subjective experience of pleasure as "hedonic psychic motion." I will continue to use the phrase "hedonic appearance" to refer to the subjective state of hedonic experience. And I will use "replenishment" and "depletion" to refer to motions of replenishment and depletion, be they somatic or psychic.

In the wake of these conclusions, we can comfortably specify the following conditions on pleasure:

(C1) Pleasure requires a replenishment.

(C2) The replenishment may be psychic or somatic; but if it is somatic, then it must affect the soul.

(C3) Thus, pleasure requires a hedonic psychic motion.

(C4) Pleasure requires a hedonic appearance, coterminous with the hedonic psychic motion.

Since the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is a calm preceded by pain that produces a hedonic appearance, the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is confirmatively untrue; it is no pleasure at all. It merely shares with pleasure a hedonic appearance; and it is in virtue of this appearance that it is called a quasi-"pleasure," as opposed to some other sort of experience.

As we have seen, at 584b1-c8 Socrates appeals to olfactory pleasures to support his claim that pleasure (ήδονή) is not a cessation of pain (παθήσα λύπης).\textsuperscript{131} This suggests

\textsuperscript{131} Socrates' claim that pleasure is not a relief from pain, nor pain a relief from pleasure occurs at R. 584b3.
that pleasure does not arise from pain. In that case, it is necessary to add the following conditions of pleasure:

(C5) Pleasure requires that calm immediately precedes the replenishment.

Accordingly, we can also add the following condition:

(C6) Pleasure requires that the complex of a replenishing motion, a psychic motion, which may be identical to or produced by the replenishing motion, and an immediately antecedent psychic calm are conjointly productive of the hedonic appearance.

While the textual evidence so far considered compels the addition of (C5)-(C6) to the set of conditions of pleasure, these additional conditions do not sit so well in view of two other considerations. Once again, consider Socrates' contrast of bodily quasi-pleasure with "pure" pleasure:

"we should … not accept that pure pleasure (καθαρὰ ἡδονή) is the relief from pain."\(^{132}\)

I suggest that by "pure," Socrates here means that the hedonic condition is not mixed with pain, the contrary of pleasure. This suggestion is supported by a passage in the true filling argument. At 586b7-8, Socrates refers back to irrational men's quasi-pleasures as "mixed with pains" (μεμιμέναις λύπαις). The irrational man's quasi-pleasure is mixed with pain and thus not pure pleasure. But, reflecting on the paradigmatic use of alethic terms, purity should be a property of paradigmatic pleasure, not merely confirmatively true pleasure. Thus, it is awkward that pure pleasure is contrasted with quasi-pleasure in the sense of confirmatively untrue pleasure.

\(^{132}\) R. 584c1-2.
The second consideration in relation to which (C5)-(C6) do not sit so well pertains to the appetitive pleasures introduced in the true filling argument. These are treated as confirmatively true pleasures, albeit not paradigmatically true. But consider the very common condition of the pleasure of drinking following thirst, which is a pain. In order to remain consistent, Socrates must maintain that appetitive hedonic conditions that are not preceded by pain are confirmatively true pleasures, while appetitive hedonic conditions that are preceded by pain are quasi-pleasures, that is, confirmatively untrue. I suggest that both considerations and their accompanying problems are symptomatic of a failure on Plato's part to clearly distinguish between confirmatively and paradigmatically true and untrue hedonic conditions.

Finally, let me turn to the conditions of paradigmatic pleasure. In principle, since confirmatively true pleasure requires the satisfaction of several conditions, more and less paradigmatically true pleasures could be those that more and less fully realize those conditions. But it is no so clear whether any of conditions (C1)-(C6) is conceivable as gradable. For example, what would it mean to have more or less of a hedonic appearance? Perhaps some of these conditions could be construed as gradable insofar as some appearances are more robust or intense than others or insofar as some motions are more or less powerful or swift than others. At any rate, insofar as he distinguishes more and less paradigmatically true pleasures, Socrates focuses only on the following condition:

(C7) Paradigmatic pleasure requires paradigmatically true replenishment, which is replenishment whose content and container are stable.
Appetitive and spirited pleasure may satisfy conditions (C1)-(C6), but only rational or philosophical pleasure satisfies (C7) as well.

(C7) claims that paradigmatically true replenishment requires the stability of the container and content. The idea partially expressed in (23) and (29) of the true filling argument. Once again:

(23) Truer filling fills with what is more (where "what is more" is subsequently clarified as "more immutable").

(29) That which is filled with things that are more and which itself is more is more filled than that which is filled with things that are less and which itself is less.

But (C7) makes a crucial error. First, why should one think that a paradigmatically true filling requires the stability of the container and content? A container is more or less filled depending on whether the filling content completely fills the deficit. In other words, a true filling is a matter of the relation between the quantity of the deficit of the container and the quantity of the filling content, not the durability of either the container or content.

Granted this, one might charitably suggest that although Socrates speaks of filling or replenishment, he has the concept of restoration in mind. True restoration seems to require durability and thus stability. For example, if one glued two broken bowls with two different adhesives and one bowl came unglued, while the other held, it would be correct to say that the one bowl had been more truly restored than the other. But this charitable move does not save Socrates' argument. In restoration, extent of durability or stability is relative to the kind of entity restored. Compare restoring a torn paper bowl and restoring a broken ceramic bowl. A truly restored paper bowl should be as durable and stable as a normal paper bowl, while a truly restored ceramic bowl should be as durable
and stable as a normal ceramic bowl. Thus, the fact that the properly restored ceramic bowl is far more durable or stable than the properly restored paper bowl in no way undermines the fact that the paper bowl is truly restored.

Plato misses this point. Instead, in view of the fact that the soul and its proper content, knowledge, are immortal and immutable respectively, whereas the body and its proper content are mortal and mutable, Plato is misled to think that what makes psychic filling or restoration truer than somatic filling or restoration is its stability or durability. Thus, he falsely claims that that which is filled with what is more is more truly filled. The mistake is fatal to the true filling argument, for Socrates argues that truer pleasure entails truer filling and that philosophical filling is truer than somatic filling.

VIII. The Representational Untruth of the Irrational Man's Quasi-Pleasure

There is one further sense of "truth" operative in the true pleasure argument. More precisely, it is operative Socrates' account of the untruth of the irrational man's quasi-pleasure in the misperception argument. In the course of discussing Socrates' explanation of the irrational man's quasi-pleasure, I spoke of the irrational man as subject to a hedonic illusion. The illusory nature of the irrational man's experience suggests that his quasi-pleasure is representationally untrue, for the content of the hedonic appearance represents the irrational man as having pleasure, whereas in fact he is in a state of calm. In this section, I discuss the representational untruth of the irrational man's quasi-pleasure and attempt to clarify the nature of the hedonic appearance constitutive of his experience.

Within the true filling argument, at 586b7-c5, Socrates refers back to the quasi-pleasures of irrational men as εἰδώλα:
"And isn't it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \) of true pleasure (\( \tau \dot{n} \; \alpha \lambda \theta \theta \omicron \upsilon \zeta \; \eta \delta \omega \nu \eta \zeta \)) and shadow-painted, tainted by juxtaposition with one another, so that each appears to be intense (\( \sigma \phi \omicron \delta \rho \omicron \upsilon \zeta \; \ldots \; \phi \alpha \iota \nu \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \iota \)) and, among the irrational (\( \tau \omicron \upsilon \zeta \; \alpha \phi \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \iota \nu \)), contending passions for them arise; just as Stesichorus says that through their ignorance of the truth, the men at Troy fought over the \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \) of Helen.

There are 17 additional instances of "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \)" in Republic.\(^{133}\) In all cases, an \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \) shares an appearance with something—call it "the original"—but lacks other properties that the original possesses.\(^{134}\) Thus, the \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \) can be conceived as a defective imitation of the original as well as a misleading or illusory entity. For example, Socrates contrasts \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\a} \) as the products of imitators, for example, the paintings and poems of painters and poets, with the originals that they imitate.\(^{135}\) Socrates also speaks of images in water as \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\a} \) of the things of which they are reflections.\(^{136}\)

Socrates' reference to Stesichorus' treatment of Helen informs our interpretation of the use of "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \)" here. In Stesichorus' version of the myth the gods created an "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \)" of Helen, and this \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \) went to Troy, rather than Helen herself, who stayed in Egypt.\(^{137}\) The Trojans were duped by the \( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \) of Helen, and Paris even slept with

\(^{133}\) "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\a} \)" at \( R. \) 516a7, 520c4, 532b7, 605c3; "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \)" at 382b10, 386d5, 443c4, 587d6, 598b8, 599a7; "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \)" at 534c5, 599d3, 601b9; "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\a} \)" at 587c9; "\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \)" at 532c2, 599a7, 600e5.

\(^{134}\) Evidence that Socrates regards appearances as properties of objects derives from the following passage: "Then imitation is far removed from the truth, for it touches a small part of each thing and a part that is itself on an image (\( \text{\'e\i\d\w\o\l\o\n} \))." (\( R. \) 598b6-8)

\(^{135}\) \( R. \) 599a7, d3, 600e5, 601b9, 605c3.

\(^{136}\) \( R. \) 516a7, 532c2.

\(^{137}\) D. L. Page, Poetae melici Graeci, Clarendon Press, 1962, fr. 16; cf. also Eurip. Hel. 605ff.; Elect. 1282-83; Isoc. Hel. 64. Plato also has Socrates cite several verses from Stesichorus' poem at Phaedrus 243a-b.
it. In this context, "imitation" or "copy" is a fitting translation of "εἰδωλον." The copy evidently shares Helen's appearance. But qua copy the pseudo-Helen lacks some of Helen's properties. Compare the irrational man's quasi-pleasure. The irrational man's quasi-pleasure shares an appearance with pleasure. Yet it lacks numerous other properties of pleasure. As such, the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is confirmatively untrue.

But Socrates' talk of the εἰδωλον of Helen and of the εἰδωλα of true pleasure suggests another way in which the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is untrue: the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is also representationally untrue. As we have seen and repeatedly stated, the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is illusory. More precisely, the hedonic appearance of the irrational man's quasi-pleasure is illusory. In contrast, true hedonic appearances are not illusory; they correspond to the replenishing motion that is partially productive of them.

As we have seen, Socrates appeals to the visual illusion produced by shadow-painting to explain the hedonic illusion to which the irrational man is subject. The explanation amounts to no more than an analogy between the juxtaposition of darker and lighter shades in the case of visual illusion and psychic calm and immediately antecedent pain in the case of hedonic illusion. That is, Socrates offers no further physiological explanation of why such hedonic illusion occurs. Indeed, I see no way of advancing our understanding of the explanation in this respect. On the other hand, I do see a way of clarifying what may be called "the mode of hedonic representation," that is, the mode of the hedonic appearance. In other words, I would like to clarify how Socrates understands hedonic appearances, be they illusory or veridical. More precisely, I would like to clarify whether Socrates conceives of hedonic appearances in phenomenal or doxastic terms.
My use of the phrase "hedonic appearance" follows Socrates' own language. Recall that at 584a7-8 Socrates says of the irrational man's quasi-pleasure that it "is not" 
(οὐκ ἐστὶν) pleasant, but only "appears" (φαίνεται) so. At 584a9 he refers to such conditions as "phantasms" (φαντασμάτων). Again, at 586c1-2 he says that the juxtaposition of the antecedent pain and occurrent calm produces quasi-pleasures that "appear" (φαίνεσθαι) intense. In short, the appearance of a hedonic appearance, be it illusory or veridical, is a φανόμενον. Moreover, a φανόμενον is a subjective state; it is a φανόμενον to someone (τινὶ). But it is questionable how Socrates understands such subjective hedonic states.

On the one hand, there are passages where Socrates seems to understand the φανόμενα in terms of qualia. For instance, as we have just recalled, at 586c1-2 Socrates speaks of the conditions appearing "intense" (σφοδροὺς). At 584b7 and c6, Socrates refers to their "greatness" (τὸ μέγεθος, μέγιστοι) in what I take to be a subjective sense, that is, to their robustness or, again, intensity. Recall also Socrates' use of the word "περιοίδευσθα" (great pain) in (5) in reference to the condition of sick people. Generally speaking, Socrates' discussion encourages us to interpret his account of veridical and quasi-pleasure and pain at least partially in phenomenal terms.

At the same time, it is questionable whether affective qualia exhaust Socrates' conception of hedonic and algesic appearances. At least, it is worth considering the relation between beliefs (δόξαι) and appearances since doxastic language pervades Socrates' account of affective conditions. In the analogy of spatial positions he deploys at 584d1-585a7 to explain the irrational man's quasi-pleasure, Socrates says that one who moved from the bottom to the midpoint might mistake the midpoint for the top. Socrates
repeatedly characterizes the mover's psychological condition in doxastic terms. The mover is said to "believe" (οἰσθαί, ἤγεϊσθαι) that he is being carried to the top.\textsuperscript{138} Socrates speaks of such individuals as inexperienced in what is truly top, middle, and bottom; and he concludes:

"Would you be surprised, then, if those who are inexperienced and do not have healthy beliefs (δόξας) regarding the truth about many other things were so disposed with regard to pleasure, pain, and the middle condition …?"\textsuperscript{139} Likewise, earlier in the misperception argument, Socrates refers to what irrational men "say" (λέγουσιν, λέγοντων) when they are ill.\textsuperscript{140} I take it that the statements of the sick reflect their beliefs about their conditions.

Socrates' discussion of illusions in Republic 10 throws further light on the relation between affective appearances and beliefs in Republic 9. In the later book Socrates once again refers to shadow-painting (σκιαγραφία), and he characterizes it as magic (γοητεία).\textsuperscript{141} Recall that when Socrates says that there is "nothing healthy in the phantasms <of irrational men> relative to the truth of pleasure," he says that these phantasms are a kind of "magic" (γοητεία).\textsuperscript{142} In Republic 10, Socrates describes the magical effects of shadow-painting as creating on two-dimensional surfaces appearances of concavity and convexity.\textsuperscript{143} In the same passage he refers to non-artificial cases of illusion: an object at different distances from the observer appearing to be different sizes

\textsuperscript{138} R. 584d7, 8; cf. also 584e1, 8.
\textsuperscript{139} R. 584e7-9.
\textsuperscript{140} R. 583c11, d3-4. Cp. "ἐγομιᾶξουσιν" at 583d8.
\textsuperscript{141} R. 602d2.
\textsuperscript{142} R. 584a10.
\textsuperscript{143} R. 602c11-12.
and a straight object in water appearing to be crooked.\footnote{R. 602d6-9.} In these cases Socrates says that calculating, measuring, and weighing can provide assistance so that the illusory appearance (\(\tau\delta\ \phi\alpha\nu\omicron\delta\epsilon\mu\nu\omicron\nu\)) does not rule (\(\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\nu\)) within us.\footnote{R. 602d6-e3.} He says that calculation, measuring, and weighing are functions of the calculating part of the soul (\(\tau\omicron\omicron\ \\
\lambda\omicron\gamma\sigma\omicron\sigma\tau\\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\ \\
\tau\omicron\ \\
\epsilon\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\iota\))\footnote{R. 602e1-2.}, and he continues:

(32) "But often when this <calculating part of the soul> has measured and indicated (\(\sigma\mu\iota\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\nu\iota\)) that some things are larger or smaller or the same size as others, the opposite appears (\(\phi\alpha\iota\nu\varphi\tau\iota\)) at the same time (\(\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\)) with regard to the same things … But didn't we agree that it is impossible for the same <part of the soul> to hold contrary beliefs (\(\delta\omicron\xi\acute{\alpha}\acute{\zeta}\epsilon\iota\nu\)) about the same things at the same time? … Then the part of the soul that holds a belief (\(\delta\omicron\xi\acute{\alpha}\acute{\zeta}\omicron\nu\)) contrary to the measurements could not be the same part as that which holds a belief in accordance with the measurements."\footnote{R. 602e4-603a2.}

Socrates does not specify which part of the soul is responsible for the illusory appearance, but he does say that it is one of the base (\(\phi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\omicron\iota\nu\)) parts.\footnote{R. 603a7-8.} Thus, it is either the appetitive or spirited part.\footnote{This position is controversial. Cf. Moss (2006) n. 27. I agree with Moss's position here, although I am not sympathetic to her main thesis in this paper.} On the basis of \textit{Timaeus} I would argue that it is the appetitive part.\footnote{See [information withheld for purposes of blind review].} But in either case, beliefs are attributed to both the part responsible for the appearance and the calculating part.
I suggest that the contents of (32) indicate that Socrates does not here draw a distinction between appearance and belief. To appreciate this, observe that Socrates' account is an argument for the view that two different parts of the soul hold contradictory beliefs; and consider the following slightly more formal description of Socrates' account:

(i) As a result of its measuring, the calculating part of the soul indicates that \( p \).

(ii) Simultaneously not-\( p \) appears.

(iii) The same part of the soul cannot simultaneously believe that \( p \) and not-\( p \).

(iv) Thus, the part of the soul that believes that not-\( p \) is not the same as the part of the soul that believes that \( p \).

Implicit in the transition from (ii) to (iii) is a transition from "not-\( p \) appears <to a part of the soul>" to "<the same> part of the soul believes that not-\( p \)." The latter transition assumes that "\( p \) appears to \( S \)" is equivalent to "\( S \) believes that \( p \)." In other words, there is no indication here that beliefs are formed on the basis of appearances.\(^{151}\)

If this interpretation is correct, then we should not reduce affective appearances to affective qualia. Rather, we should hold that affective appearances are qualitative-cum-doxastic states. Indeed, prior to Plato's explicit distinction between bare or relatively bare \( \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) and \( \delta\omicron\xi\alpha \) at Theaetetus 184-86, there is no good reason to think that he recognizes a distinction between bare perception and perceptual belief. Thus, Socrates' conception of appearance in Republic 9 is akin to the conception of \( \phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha \) that the Eleatic Stranger states at Sophist 264b2: a mixture of \( \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) and \( \delta\omicron\xi\alpha \)— with the crucial difference being that since Sophist is a post-Theaetetus dialogue, in composing

the phrase "a mixture of αἰσθησίς and δόξα" in the late dialogue Plato recognizes a distinction between bare or relatively bare perception and perceptual belief, whereas in Republic he does not.

IX. Conclusion

The true pleasure argument in Republic 9 advances the view that pleasure has the following properties:

- a hedonic appearance, which is a qualititative-cum-doxastic state,
- a psychic motion that is coterminous with the hedonic appearance,
- a replenishment or filling, which in the case of bodily pleasure is somatic and productive of the psychic motion and which in the case of psychic pleasure is psychic,
- a psychic calm that is immediately antecedent to the psychic motion that is coterminous with the hedonic appearance.

Additionally:

- the complex of the replenishment, the psychic motion and the immediately antecedent psychic calm produces the hedonic appearance.

According to this account, pleasure has subjective and objective components. The subjective component is the hedonic appearance. The objective component is the complex of psychic calm, replenishing motion, and psychic motion.

With respect to Socrates' truth-conception, the true pleasure argument entails that hedonic conditions may be true or untrue in two senses: representationally and ontologically. Representationally, an untrue hedonic condition is untrue because the
hedonic appearance does not correlate with objective hedonic conditions. For example, no replenishing motion occurs. Such an untrue hedonic condition is illusory.

Ontologically, a hedonic condition may be true or untrue in one of two ways. First, an ontologically untrue hedonic condition may fail to satisfy all of the properties of pleasure enumerated above. Since one of these properties is that the hedonic appearance correlates with objective hedonic conditions, representationally untrue pleasure is also ontologically untrue in this sense. Second, an ontologically untrue pleasure may be more or less true insofar as its replenishment is more or less stable.

I say that Socrates' treatment of pleasure entails that hedonic conditions may be true and untrue both representationally and ontologically. However, in Republic Plato does not exhibit a clear theoretical grasp of the distinction between representational and ontological truth-conceptions. Indeed, there are several senses of ontological truth that Plato runs together. A central task of this paper has been to illuminate these conflations.152

My views of Socrates' conceptions of pleasure and truth relate to prior contributions in the following ways. Most scholars do not recognize that the true pleasure argument advances a conception of pleasure that includes subjective and objective components. Presumably this is because they believe that Socrates conceives of pleasure simply as a feeling or experience.153 Butler rightly rejects this view. But Butler's paper is

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152 Euthd. 283e7-284d7; Cra. 429d-430a; Tht. 188d1-189b2. The problem is solved or partially solved at Sph. 236d9-241b4.
153 George Grote, Plato and Other Companions of Socrates, London, 1875, 602; Murphy (1951) 221; White (1979) at times seems to imply this. (I derive the citation to Grote from Butler (1999) 286, who suggests (n.5) that Cross and Woozley (1964); Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, Clarendon Press, 1977; Dorothea Frede, Plato: Philebus,
critical; he does not present a constructive alternative.\textsuperscript{154} Reeve argues that the true pleasure argument "shows that for Plato, unlike Bentham, pleasure is not a single kind of experience or mental state logically distinct from the activities that give rise to it."\textsuperscript{155}

Thus, Reeve's position seems loosely compatible with my interpretation of Socrates' conception of pleasure as a complex of subjective and objective components. But Reeve asserts that Socrates and thus Plato view pleasure as an activity that gives rise to a certain mental state. This position differs from mine in several ways. The position Reeve attributes to Plato appears to be the Rylean, quasi-Aristotelian one, according to which pleasure is the enjoyment of an activity.\textsuperscript{156} On my view, the kinetic component of pleasure is better conceived as a somatic or psychic process than as an activity. Additionally, the subjective aspect is not a taking of pleasure in something; rather, the objective component causes one to have a certain experience. Gosling and Taylor observe that "pleasure is always spoken of as either some condition or the apprehension of some condition of a sentient being."\textsuperscript{157} This is correct. However, they do not explain why Socrates refers to pleasure in both ways.

\textsuperscript{154} Butler (1999).
\textsuperscript{155} Reeve (1988) 151.
\textsuperscript{157} Gosling and Taylor (1982) 102.
Gosling and Taylor observe that Socrates operates with representational as well as ontological truth-conceptions.¹⁵⁸ Most scholars attend only to the ontological conception. Moreover, different scholars conceive of ontological truth in different ways. Most hold that purity—in the case of pleasure, the property of being unmixed with pain—is a property of ontological truth.¹⁵⁹ A number hold that stability or immutability is a property of ontological truth.¹⁶⁰ But scholars who have treated the true pleasure argument have not recognized—as certain scholars who have examined Plato's conception of truth in *Republic* and the middle dialogues more generally have—that the true pleasure argument involves various senses of ontological truth.

¹⁵⁸ “Clearly a part of what he means is that they [the philosopher's pleasures] are genuinely or really pleasures … Yet there is clearly more to it than this. For the argument in 583-4 is at least as concerned with the false judgment of the subject as with the failure of something to be a pleasure. One feels that Plato wants to suggest that untrue pleasures introduce an element of illusion and false judgment into life and that this is part of the allegation that they are untrue. In that case 'true'/'untrue' are implying more than just 'real'/'unreal'." (1984, 128)
¹⁶⁰ White (1979) 231; Annas (1981) 312. Reeve (1988, 151) speaks of "substantiality" in a way that suggests stability: "It is a true pleasure just in case it always and unalterably satisfies." Cross and Woozley (1964, 267) claim that pleasure is real (= ontologically true) "if it characterizes an activity concerned with real objects." Cp. Tenkku (1956) 159: "only pure pleasures are truly satisfying." Generally speaking, although all commentators on *Republic* as a whole have something to say about the truth-of-pleasure argument in particular, only Gosling and Taylor (1984) have discussed the argument in detail. Reeve's (1988) comments are relatively in depth. Stokes' (1990) discussion is idiosyncratic and focuses on excising the word "καθαρά" at 584c1. I do not find his suggestion convincing.
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