Pleasure and Truth in *Republic* 9

I. Introduction

At *Republic* 9, 583b1-587a2, Socrates presents his third argument for the view that the just life is the most pleasant life. Socrates reaches this conclusion by arguing that the pleasure of the philosophical life, which is the just life, is the truest pleasure. Accordingly, I will speak of Socrates' argument that philosophical pleasure is the truest pleasure as the *truth-of-pleasure argument*.

The truth-of-pleasure argument is divisible into two parts: 583b1-585a7 and 585a8-587a2. The first part argues that it is characteristic of unintelligent men to misperceive as pleasure what is in fact a neutral condition,¹ which Socrates calls "stillness" or "calm" (ἡσυχία). In the second part, Socrates assumes that pleasure involves filling. He distinguishes more and less true fillings, and he argues that since philosophical filling is the truest filling, it is the truest pleasure. I will refer to this crucial sub-argument as the *true-filling argument*. The truth-of-pleasure argument as a whole is organized more precisely as follows:

Part one: the unintelligent man's misperception of pleasure

583b1-c2: The untruth, impurity, and shadow-painted-ness of the unintelligent man's pleasure

583c3-e8: The common misperception of the neutral condition as pleasure

583e9-584a11: Pleasure, pain, and shadow-painting

584b1-c8: Pure pleasure as independent of pain

584c9-12: Anticipatory pleasures and pains²
584d1-585a7: Analogy between hedonic misperception and spatial positions

Part two: three grades of true pleasure

585a8-e1: True-filling argument

586a1-c6: Criticism of appetitive pleasure

586c7-e3: Criticism of spirited pleasure

586e4-587a2: Conclusion

This paper attempts to clarify Socrates' conception of pleasure and of true and untrue pleasures in the truth-of-pleasure argument. The paper argues for the following two theses:

(T1) Socrates conceives of pleasure and pain as ontologically complex. One aspect of pleasure and pain is a physiological condition, more precisely, a certain kind of motion. More precisely still, in the case of pleasure, the physiological condition is the replenishment of a physiological deficit; in the case of pain, the physiological condition is the depletion of a physiological plenitude. These physiological conditions include both somatic and psychic replenishments and depletions. For example, drinking produces a somatic replenishment; being honored and learning produce psychic replenishments. The other aspect of pleasure and pain is an experience. This experience has two aspects. First, it includes a feeling, that is, a phenomenal quale, the feeling of pleasure or pain. Second, it includes a belief, the belief that one is experiencing pleasure or pain. The relation between the physiological and experiential aspects of pleasure and pain can be viewed from the perspective of either the physiological aspect or the
experiential aspect. From the physiological perspective, the physiological condition causes or evokes the experience; from the experiential perspective, the experience is a form of perception: it is the perception of the physiological condition.

(T2) Pleasures are treated as true and untrue in two ways: semantically and ontologically. Semantically, an untrue pleasure is untrue because its content is untrue. Ontologically, an untrue pleasure is untrue for at least one of three reasons: because it is impure, incomplete, or unstable. Impure pleasures are impure because they are mixed with pains. Incomplete pleasures consist of one component of true pleasure, hedonic experience or feeling, but lack another component of true pleasure, a certain kind of motion. Unstable pleasures involve short-lived fillings.

(T1) is novel. As far I know, no prior treatment of Republic broaches the idea that the truth-of-pleasure argument involves a perceptualist conception of pleasure. Regarding (T2), Gosling and Taylor observe that Plato operates with a semantic as well as an ontological conception of truth. But most scholars attend only to the ontological conception. Moreover, different scholars associate different properties with ontological truth. Most agree that purity is characteristic of ontological truth. A number agree that stability or immutability is characteristic of ontological truth. However, no scholar speaks of ontological truth in terms of completeness or wholeness.

One reason scholars do not speak of ontological truth in terms of completeness or wholeness may be that they do not recognize that the truth-of-pleasure argument involves a complex conception of pleasure that includes physiological and experiential aspects.
Some scholars assume that Socrates views pleasure simply as a feeling or subjective experience. Butler rightly rejects this view. Likewise, Reeve argues that "the first <part of the truth-of-pleasure> argument shows that for Plato, unlike Bentham, pleasure is not a single kind of experience or mental state logically distinct from the activities that give rise to it." Butler's paper is critical; he does not present a constructive alternative. But Reeve asserts that Socrates and thus Plato view pleasure as an activity that gives rise to a certain mental state. This position superficially resembles mine. But it differs from mine in several ways. The position Reeve attributes to Plato is the Rylean, quasi-Aristotelian one, according to which pleasure is the enjoyment of an activity. On my view, the physiological aspect of pleasure is better conceived as a process than as an activity; activities, for example, drinking or learning, may give rise to the processes. In addition, the experiential aspect is not a matter of taking pleasure in the process; rather, the process causes one to have a certain experience, namely, a hedonic affective experience and an attendant belief that one is having that experience. Moreover, as I have said, the experiential aspect is a perception of the physiological aspect, and Reeve does not claim that the mental state to which the activity gives rise is a perceptual state. Gosling and Taylor observe that "pleasure is always spoken of as either some condition or the apprehension of some condition of a sentient being." This is correct. However, Gosling and Taylor do not explain why Socrates refers to pleasure in both ways.

II. The Untruth of the Unintelligent Man's Pleasure

The first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument (583b1-585a7) begins with Socrates' claim that "in contrast to the pleasure of the intelligent man (τοῦ φρονίμου), the
pleasure of others (τῶν ἄλλων) is neither wholly true (παναληθής) nor pure (καθαρά), but, in a way, shadow-painted (ἔσκιαγραφημένη τις)." Socrates does not identify these others more specifically than by contrasting them with the intelligent man. I will refer to them as unintelligent men.

In the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument Socrates contrasts philosophers with those whose lives are governed by the appetitive and spirited parts of their souls. Thus, it might seem natural to assume that the philosophers of the second part are identical to the intelligent men of the first part and that the appetitive and spirited men of the second part are identical to the unintelligent men of the first part. Strictly speaking, this must be true. However, when Socrates speaks of the unintelligent men in the first part, he principally has somatic pleasure-seekers in mind, that is, men whose lives are governed by their appetites.

Observe that Socrates speaks of the unintelligent man's pleasure as untrue, impure, and quasi-shadow-painted: "ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονή πλήν τοῦ φρονίμου." Contrast this with Socrates' claim, later in the argument, that unintelligent men do not have healthy beliefs about pleasure: "θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν εἰ καὶ οἱ ἀπειροὶ ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ υγείες δόξας ἐχουσίν..." The unintelligent man's belief may be semantically false—so we would characterize it—but it is questionable whether the untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure itself is to be explained in this way. Relevant to this question is the question of how being impure, untrue, and quasi-shadow-painted relate to one another. In pursuing these questions, let us turn to the first part of the argument.
III.  Step One (583c3-e8): The Unintelligent Man's Misperception of the Neutral Condition as Pleasant

The stretch of dialogue at 583c3-584c8 develops an argument to show that unintelligent men misperceive the neutral condition as pleasure. This argument can be viewed as developing in three steps: 583c3-e8, 583e9-584a11, and 584b1-c8. In this section and the subsequent two, I will move through each step in order.

The first step of the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, 583c3-e8, begins with the following claims:

(1) ἤδονη is the opposite of λύπη.19

(2) τὸ μὴτε χαίρειν μὴτε λυπεῖσθαι is something.20

Since (2) follows (1) in adding a third condition, namely, what Socrates will subsequently describe as stillness (ἡσυχία), "χαίρειν" in (2) must be used to mean the same thing as "ἡδονή" in (1).21 But, granted this, it is unclear whether "ἡδονή" and "χαίρειν" refer to hedonic experience or to the physiological conditions that cause hedonic experience or to both. Since, as I will argue in this paper, Socrates and thus Plato conceive of pleasure as a complex of experiential and physiological aspects, Socrates should be using "ἡδονή" and "χαίρειν" to refer to both aspects. However, the following claim indicates otherwise:

(3) Between and in the middle of these <namely, experiencing pleasure and experiencing pain> there is a certain stillness (ἡσυχία τις) of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς) related to these.22

The third condition, stillness, is here characterized as a condition of the soul. Consequently, in (3) Socrates must be using "ἡσυχία" to refer to the neutral experience,
rather than to the neutral physiological condition that the experience is of. Accordingly, I suggest that in (1) and (2) Socrates is focusing on the experiential aspect of pleasure.

The reason for Socrates' initial focus on experience rather than physiology emerges in the following claims:

**4.** Sick men claim that being healthy is most pleasant (ἡδιστον). Given our experiential interpretation of "ἡδονή" and "χαίρειν," (4) must mean that sick men claim that their experience of being healthy feels pleasant. In other words, for sick men being healthy is experienced hedonically.

**5.** In general, men who are in a condition of extreme pain (περιωδυνία) say that the cessation of being in pain (ὀδυνώμενον) is most pleasant (οὐδὲν ἡδιον). Likewise, in (5), "περιωδυνία" and "ὀδυνώμενον" must refer to algesic experience. Thus, (5) claims that men who experience extreme pain also experience the cessation of this algesic experience as a most hedonic experience. Socrates proceeds to argue that this is paradoxical and in fact absurd. The cessation of algesic experience should be neutrally, not hedonically, experienced.

**6.** And in many other circumstances, men who experience pain (λυπώνται) praise not experiencing pain (τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι) and the stillness (ἡσυχία) after experiencing pain as most pleasant (ἡδιστον), rather than experiencing pleasure (χαίρειν). The paradox expressed in (6) is that men hold that when their algesic experience ceases, that cessation is a hedonic experience. Indeed, their view is that the cessation is a more hedonic experience than hedonic experience itself. This last point must mean that the cessation of pain is experienced more hedonically than the sorts of things that are
typically identified as hedonic experiences, for example, certain experiences of eating, drinking, and sex.

Glaucon suggests the following explanation of the paradox:

(7) "Perhaps in this case stillness (ησυχία) becomes (γίγνεται) pleasant (ηδί) and desirable."²⁷

From Socrates' point of view, Glaucon's proposal is incoherent. A person or a soul may at one time have a neutral experience and subsequently a hedonic experience, but a neutral experience cannot itself become a hedonic experience. Socrates exposes the absurdity of Glaucon's proposal as follows:

(8) "Then also when a man ceases experiencing pleasure (χαίρων), the stillness following the pleasure (η τῆς ηδονής ησυχία) will be (ἔσται) painful (λυπηρῶν)."²⁸

In (8) Socrates is drawing an inference on the basis of Glaucon's attempt in (7) to explain the paradox. The inference is that if the neutral experience transforms into hedonic experience when it follows algesic experience, then the neutral condition will also transform into algesic experience when it follows hedonic experience. The inference is ad hominem, again, based on Glaucon's suggestion in (7). Socrates clearly does not endorse (8). Indeed, he concludes that (7) and (8) are impossible:

(9) In that case, that which is between both ηδονή and λύπη will be (ἔσται) both ηδονή and λύπη.²⁹

(10) Yet it is impossible for that which is neither ηδονή nor λύπη to become (γίγνεσθαι) both.³⁰
Thus, Glaucon's suggestion in (7) and Socrates' inference of (8) from (7) are reduced to absurdity. Consequently, the claims of sick men and those who otherwise experience pain are incorrect, and their experiences are illusory. Given this, it is convenient to distinguish between genuine hedonic, algesic, or neutral experiences and illusory ones. The nature of illusory experiences and thus the solution to the paradox are explained in step two of the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, to which we now turn.

IV. Step Two (583e9-584a11): Misperception of the Neutral Condition and the Illusions of Shadow-Painting

In an effort to resolve the paradox and explain the illusory experience, Socrates continues, at 583e9-584a11, as follows:

(11) That which becomes pleasant in the soul (τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γινομένων) and that which <becomes> painful (τὸ λυπηρῶν) are both a sort of motion (κίνησις τις).31

(12) That which is neither pleasant nor painful (τὸ μὴ τε λυπηρὸν μὴ τε ἡδὺ) and which is in the middle of these <namely, that which is pleasant and that which is painful> is stillness (ἡσυχία).32

Observe that in (11), instead of speaking of "ἡδόνη" or "χαίρειν," Socrates uses the expression "that which becomes pleasant in the soul." Likewise, in (12), instead of speaking of "τὸ μὴ τε χαίρειν μὴ τε λυπεῖσθαι," Socrates speaks of "that which is neither pleasant nor painful." In addition, in (12) Socrates speaks merely of "ἡσυχία," whereas in (3) above he had spoken of stillness specifically "of the soul." I suggest that whereas in (1)-(10) Socrates has focused on hedonic, algesic, and neutral experiences, in
(11)-(12) and in the remainder of the second step in the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, Socrates includes the physiological conditions that give rise to the experiences. Socrates' identification of the subjects in (11) as certain motions confirms that he is speaking of physiological conditions. On this interpretation the phrase "that which becomes pleasant in the soul" refers to a physiological condition, which Socrates identifies as a sort of motion, that affects the soul by causing a hedonic experience in the soul. Accordingly, "ηδόν" and "λυπηρόν" in (11) must refer to hedonic and algesic experience respectively. Thus, in (12) Socrates is claiming that in addition to the physiological motions that cause hedonic and algesic experiences, there is an akinetic physiological condition, appropriately named "stillness."

(13) Therefore, it is incorrect to believe that not experiencing pain (τὸ μὴ ἄλγειν) is pleasant (ηδόν) and that not experiencing pleasure (τὸ μὴ χαίρειν) is painful (ἄνιαρόν). At least two interpretations of (13) are possible:

(13a) Therefore, it is incorrect to believe that not experiencing pain (τὸ μὴ ἄλγειν) is pleasant (ηδόν) <that is, is caused by a hedonic physiological condition> and that not experiencing pleasure (τὸ μὴ χαίρειν) is painful (ἄνιαρόν) <that is, is caused by an algesic physiological condition>.

(13b) Therefore, it is incorrect to believe that not experiencing pain (τὸ μὴ ἄλγειν) is pleasant (ηδόν) <that is, has a hedonic feeling> and that not experiencing pleasure (τὸ μὴ χαίρειν) is painful (ἄνιαρόν) <that is, has an algesic feeling>.
(13a) makes sense on its own, but the price of this interpretation is that Socrates will then be using the adjectives "ἥδυ" and "ἄνηπρόν" differently than he uses "Ἦδυ" and "λυπηρόν" in (11). According to (13b), the adjectives are used consistently throughout. On the other hand, the meaning of the claim as a whole is difficult to make out. Consider just the first point: it is wrong to believe that not experiencing pain produces a hedonic experience. It is difficult to make sense of this point because in the first step of the argument it was admitted that sufferers experience the cessation of their suffering hedonically; thus, the neutral condition produces a hedonic experience. But perhaps it is precisely this notion, that the neutral condition produces a hedonic appearance, that Socrates is criticizing in (13), interpreted as (13b). Socrates' point is that in itself, the neutral condition produces a neutral experience. However, in relation to the antecedent pain, the perceptual or experiential faculty is deceived. Thus, it is not the neutral condition itself that produces a hedonic experience, but the broader conditions of the neutral condition preceded by the algesic condition. Support for the interpretation of (13) as (13b) derives from the following claim:

(14) Rather, stillness (ἡσυχία) appears (φαίνεται) pleasant (Ἦδυ) next that which is painful (τὸ ἀλγείνον), and stillness appears painful (ἀλγείνον) next to that which is pleasant (τὸ Ἦδυ).\(^{35}\)

In (14) "stillness" clearly refers to the neutral physiological condition, which is what can appear (genuinely) as a neutral experience or (illusorily) as an algesic or hedonic experience when it and a hedonic or algesic condition are juxtaposed. Likewise, I suggest that "that which is painful" and "that which is pleasant" in (14) refer to the algesic and hedonic physiological conditions respectively. And, again, in these cases the adjectives
"painful" and "pleasant" must refer to "algesic experience" and "hedonic experience" respectively. Thus, that which is painful is the algesic physiological condition that produces algesic experience, and that which is pleasant is the hedonic physiological condition that produces hedonic experience. In short, in (14) Socrates is claiming that under certain conditions, namely, when the neutral physiological condition follows the algesic physiological condition, a certain illusory appearance of pleasure is produced. Likewise, Socrates is claiming that when the neutral physiological condition follows the hedonic physiological condition, a certain illusory appearance of pain is produced.

(15) With respect to the truth of pleasure (ἡδωνής ἀλήθειαν), there is nothing healthy (ϒευέζ) in these phantasms (φαινησμάτων), but a certain witchcraft (γοητεία).\\footnote{36}

Thus, Socrates concludes by characterizing the illusory experiences as "phantasms" and occurring through a sort of witchcraft. Socrates' description of these circumstances as "unhealthy" suggests that something goes awry in the natural or normal process of the transmission of the physiological condition to the psychological faculty of perception.

In the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument Socrates refers back to the unintelligent man’s hedonic mis-experiences as "shadow-painted (ἐσκιαγραφημέναις) and tainted by juxtaposition (ὑπὸ τῆς παρὰ ἀλήθειας θεσέως ἀποχραινομέναις) ..."\\footnote{37}

The invention of the technique of shadow-painting (σκιαγραφία) is attributed to Apollodorus of Athens in the fifth century. Apollodorus seems to have transmitted it to Zeuxis, among other students, who apparently composed a treatise on painting technique.\\footnote{38} Shadow-painting involves the juxtaposition of darker and lighter shades on a two-dimensional surface to create the illusion of depth.\\footnote{39} Analogously, in Republic 9,
Socrates is suggesting that the juxtaposition of an antecedent pain and a subsequent cessation of pain, stillness, engenders the illusory appearance of pleasure.

In *Republic* 10, Socrates speaks of shadow-painting itself as witchcraft (γοητεία), and he describes its effects as creating on two-dimensional surfaces appearances of concavity and convexity. In the same passage he also refers to non-artificial cases of illusion: an object at different distances from the observer appearing to be different sizes and a straight object in water appearing to be crooked.

How does Plato understand such illusions? Socrates says that calculating, measuring, and weighing can provide assistance in these cases so that the illusory appearance (τὸ φανόμενον) does not rule (ἀρχεῖν) within us. He says that calculation, measuring, and weighing are functions of the rational part of the soul, and he continues:

"But often when this <rational part of the soul> has measured and indicated (σημαίνοντι) that some things are larger or smaller or the same size as others, the opposite appears (φαίνεται) at the same time with regard to the same things … But didn't we agree that it is impossible for the same (part of the soul) to form contrary beliefs (δοξάζειν) about the same things at the same time? … Then the part of the soul that forms a belief (δοξάζων) contrary to the measurements could not be the same part as that which has a belief in accordance with the measurements."

Socrates does not specify which part of the soul is responsible for the illusory appearance, but he does say that it is one of the base (φαιλών) parts. Thus, it is either the appetitive or spirited part. In either case, belief is attributed to both the part responsible for the appearance and the rational part. Moreover, the appearance for which
one part of the soul is responsible is said to conflict with what the rational soul indicates. Thus, the appearance for which the base part of the soul is responsible clearly has conceptual content. There is no indication here or elsewhere in Republic of a distinction between bare sensation and the conceptualization of sensation, nor is there a distinction between the non-conceptual content of perception and the conceptual content of belief. Consequently, illusion is to be explained as follows: the base part of the soul responsible for visual perception is like a naïve observer whose perceptual beliefs about objects and their properties conform to the way those objects appear. This part of the soul is irrational (ἀλογος), then, not because it lacks the capacity to conceptualize experience, but because it cannot reason about experience. In short, for the base part of the soul, there is no distinction between the phenomenal aspect of experience and the doxastic aspect of experience.

V. Step Three (584b1-c8): Purity and Truth

At 584b1-c8, Socrates appeals to olfactory pleasures (αὶ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδοναί) to support his claim that pleasure (ἡδονή) is not a cessation of pain (παθλα λύπης). Socrates claims that olfactory pleasures, among a number of other sorts of pleasure, do not arise from antecedent pains. By this Socrates must mean at least this: our familiar hedonic olfactory experiences, for instance, the pleasant smell of certain flowers, dishes, or perfumes, can occur without algesic olfactory experiences preceding them. Indeed, under normal circumstances, one does not have an algesic olfactory experience prior to having a hedonic olfactory experience. Accordingly, the fact of hedonic olfactory experience supports the view that cessation of pain is not the cause of genuine hedonic
experience. This, in turn, indicates that Socrates takes hedonic olfactory experiences to be genuine hedonic experiences, which means that hedonic physiological conditions cause these experiences.51

Given this, Socrates concludes:

(16) "we should … not accept that pure pleasure (καθαρά ἡδονή) is the relief from pain (ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀπαλλαγὴ)."52

It seems that by "pleasure" in (16) Socrates includes both experiential and physiological aspects. Thus, "pure pleasure" is a condition where a hedonic physiological condition causes a hedonic experience. I suggest that by "pure" Socrates specifically means that the condition is not one in which pleasure is mixed with pain. If this is correct, then it can be inferred that Socrates conceives of the unintelligent man's hedonic experience as an impure pleasure. Indeed, at 586b7-8, Socrates refers back to unintelligent men's hedonic experiences as pleasures mixed with pains (μεμιγμέναις λύπαις). In this case, the mixture is, precisely, a sequential conjunction of pain and one aspect of pleasure, the hedonic experience.

In Philebus Socrates contrasts mixed pleasures with unmixed pleasures. In this contrast, he includes olfactory pleasures, along with visual and auditory pleasures, as species of unmixed pleasures. Moreover, Socrates identifies unmixed pleasures as true and mixed pleasures as untrue. If this conception of truth in Philebus is applicable to Republic 9, then the pleasures of the unintelligent man will be untrue because they are impure qua mixed.

The conception of truth as purity is ontological rather than representational or semantic. Indeed, it has often been claimed that Plato uses the adjective "ἀληθές," as we
use the adjective "true" in contexts such as "true friend" and "true patriot," to mean "real." More precisely, it is said that the attributive use of "true" in phrases of the form "a true x" means that the referent of "x" conforms to the ideal of being an x. For example, a true or real friend is an ideal friend.

Plato's conception of ontological truth is, however, narrower than this conception of truth as ideal, in at least two ways. Plato's conception of ontological truth implies immutability, and it has an ethical dimension. The ideal aspect of ontological truth can conflict with the immutability aspect, as in concepts such as true chaos and true volatility. Here the conditions may be ontologically untrue precisely because they are unstable. The ideal aspect of ontological truth can also conflict with the ethical aspect, as in concepts such as true evil and true criminal. Here the objects or conditions may be ontologically untrue precisely because they are forms of disvalue. Observe, then, that in the context of an ethical theory that is either anti-hedonistic or at least wary of the value of pleasure, the concept of ontologically true pleasure is inherently problematic. Likewise, in an ontological theory that regards pleasure as essentially transient, a process or becoming rather than a being or static condition, the concept of ontologically true pleasures is also inherently problematic.53

Presently, let us affirm this first sense in which the unintelligent man's pleasure is untrue: it is ontologically untrue because it is impure, and it is impure because it is sequentially mixed with pain.54

VI. The Pleasure of the Unintelligent Man Qua Ἔιδολον
Another way in which the pleasure of the unintelligent man is untrue pertains to Socrates' claim that the pleasure is an \( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\nu \). At 586b7-c5, that is, in the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, Socrates refers back to the pleasures of the unintelligent man as \( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\alpha \):

"And isn't it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, \( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\alpha \) of true pleasure (\( \tau\nu\zeta\ \delta\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron\zeta\ \eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta\zeta\zeta \)) and shadow-painted, colored by juxtaposition with one another, so that each appears to be intense and, among the unintelligent, contending passions for them arise; just as Stesichorus says that through their ignorance of the truth, the men at Troy fought over the \( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \) of Helen."

The word "\( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \)" has several meanings: reflected image (as in water or a mirror), mental image, phantom of the mind, fancy, phantom. \(^{55}\) Socrates' reference to Stesichorus' treatment of Helen may inform our interpretation of the meaning of "\( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \)" here. In Stesichorus' version of the story the gods created an "\( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \)" of Helen, and this \( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \) went to Troy, rather than Helen herself, who stayed in Egypt. \(^{56}\) In this context "\( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \)" might be translated as "phantom." But, in considering the ontological implications of the translation, one must be cautious. The Trojans were not only duped by the false appearance of Helen, Paris actually slept with the pseudo-Helen. Thus, the \( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \) of Helen at Troy was not some sort of ghostly apparition. "Imitation" or "copy" might be a better rendition of "\( \varepsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\nu\nu \)" in this context. The following passage in Cratylus might also throw light on how Plato conceived of the pseudo-Helen:

"[Soc:] … an image cannot remain an image if it presents everything just like what it resembles … Would there be two things, Cratylus and an image of
Cratylus, in the following circumstances? Suppose some god didn't just copy your color and shape, the way painters do, but made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, and put motion, soul, and wisdom like yours into them— in a word, suppose he made a duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you. Would there then be two Cratylyuses or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus? [Cra:] It seems to me, Socrates, that there would be two Cratylyuses."

In this passage, Socrates uses the word "εἰκών," not "εἰδωλον." However, his point seems applicable to the case of the εἰδωλον of Helen. The pseudo-Helen is a copy or imitation of Helen. The copy evidently shares Helen's appearance. But qua copy the pseudo-Helen must lack some properties that Helen herself possesses. It is unclear what these missing properties are. Nonetheless, compare the unintelligent man's pleasure. The unintelligent man's pleasure shares an appearance with true pleasure. Yet it lacks the physiological condition, the motion, that produces the genuine experience. Consequently, I suggest that the pleasure of the unintelligent man is also ontologically untrue insofar it is incomplete: it lacks a component of genuine pleasure.

VII. Pleasure and Αἴσθησις

In addition to these two ways in which the unintelligent man's pleasure is ontologically untrue, I suggest that the unintelligent man's pleasure is also representationally untrue. As we have seen, the unintelligent man's hedonic experience is an illusory experience. In contrast, pure and genuine hedonic experiences are non-illusory. The language of hedonic experience as illusory or non-illusory indicates that Plato conceives of hedonic and algesic experiences as forms of perception. As far as I
know, this is the first time that this conception of pleasure has been attributed to Plato on the basis of *Republic* 9.

A number of commentators have suggested, on the basis of other dialogues, that Plato conceives of pleasure and pain as forms of perception. For example, Simo Knuuttila writes of *Philebus*: "In realizing that bodily pleasures and pains are forms of perception, Plato came to think that they are certain modes of self-disclosure, pleasant or unpleasant ways of being aware of oneself." Some ancient interpreters also understood Plato in this way. For instance, in his commentary on *Timaeus* Galen writes: "If, following the destruction of natural mixture and composition, a certain restoration leads to the natural state, we speak of the process as a pleasant affection, and we say that the perception (τὴν αἴσθησιν) of the process is pleasure." It must be emphasized, however, that my position differs from these expressed by Knuuttila and Galen in the following way. Both Knuuttila and Galen identify pleasure with the experiential aspect alone. In contrast, on my view, the experiential aspect is one aspect of pleasure. Pleasure is the perception of a certain physiological condition. (Compare the Cyrenaic definitions of pleasure and pain, which are perhaps attributable to their Socratic founder Aristippus: pleasure is smooth motion delivered to perception; pain is rough motion delivered to perception.) Thus, a mere hedonic feeling (whether or not this includes the belief that one is experiencing pleasure) does not constitute genuine pleasure, but incomplete or untrue pleasure.

In *Republic* 9, Socrates does not explicitly state that pleasure is a form of perception (αἴσθησις), the perception of a certain physiological condition. Indeed, he does not explicitly state that pleasure is a complex that consists of an experiential and a
physiological aspect. To a large extent, my argument for this view rests on the sense it
gives to the truth-of-pleasure argument, especially to Socrates' treatment of the
unintelligent man's experience in the first part of this argument. But the view that Plato
operates with a perceptualist conception of pleasure in Republic 9 is also supported by
claims in a number of other dialogues that pleasure and pain are forms of perception.

First, note that throughout his corpus, Plato uses the word "\(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\)" in two
ways: broadly, to refer to any form of apprehension or awareness and narrowly, to refer
to awareness or apprehension by means of certain bodily organs such as the ears and
mouth. For example, the broad use occurs in Euthyphro where Socrates asks Euthyphro
whether he perceives (\(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\deltav\)), that is, realizes that the discussion has returned to a
point made earlier.\(^{63}\) The narrow use occurs in Charmides where Socrates refers to sight,
hearing, and all of the "\(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\varsigma\)."\(^{64}\)

We may be inclined to translate instances of the narrow use as "sense" and "sense-
perception," but we should be careful not to beg the question whether and how Plato
understands pleasure and pain qua forms of \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\). I suggest that the concept of
awareness or perception is common to both the broad and narrow uses of "\(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\)" and
that the narrow use specifically implies awareness or perception by means of the body.
Thus, the narrow use of "\(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\)" might be translated as "bodily awareness" or "bodily
perception."\(^{65}\)

In four passages in the corpus, pleasure and pain are characterized as forms of
\(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\). In Phaedo Socrates says that the soul reasons best when "neither hearing nor
sight, nor pain nor pleasure" troubles it. He subsequently refers to these as forms of
bodily perception: \(\tau\omega\nu\ \pi\epsilon\ri\ \tau\omicron\ \sigma\omegama\ \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma\epsilon\omega\nu\).\(^{66}\) In this case, the use of the
qualifying phrase "περὶ τὸ σώμα" indicates that Socrates is here using the word "αἰσθησίς" in the broad sense. Granted this, since the qualification occurs, Socrates clearly understands pleasure and pain here, like sight and hearing, to be forms of bodily perception.

In *Laws* 2, the Athenian claims that a child's first *αἰσθησίς* is pleasure and pain.\(^6^7\) Given that a child is cognitively undeveloped, it is reasonable to infer that the Athenian conceives of the child's *αἰσθησίς* as bodily perception. This suggestion is confirmed by the Athenian's subsequent statement that the child experiences pleasure and pain before it can understand why it does.

Timaeus begins his account of pleasure and pain in the eponymous dialogue by referring to pleasure and pain as affections that occur through the whole body.\(^6^8\) He subsequently contrasts unperceived (*ἀναίσθητον*) bodily motions, which are not pleasures or pains, with perceived (*αἰσθητόν*) bodily motions, which are pleasures and pains.\(^6^9\)

Finally, at *Theaetetus* 156b, Socrates enumerates pleasure and pain as well as seeing, hearing, smelling, and feeling hot and cold as forms of *αἰσθησίς*. The passage is puzzling, however, for Socrates then includes desire and fear on the list. Socrates may be using the word "*αἰσθησίς*" anomalously here. Alternatively, his inclusion of desire and fear may be the anomaly.\(^7^0\)

At any rate, these passages suggest that Plato identifies pleasure and pain specifically as forms of bodily perception. On the other hand, in *Republic* 9 and *Philebus*, Socrates also admits forms of pleasure and pain that are purely psychic or rational. For example, in the true-filling argument in *Republic* 9 Socrates speaks of pleasures that
involve intellectual filling. Consequently, in the cases of Republic 9 and Philebus, we should revert to the view that Plato conceives of pleasure and pain as forms of perception generally, not bodily perception specifically. Granted this, Plato's tendency to identify pleasure and pain with forms of bodily perception in Phaedo, Timaeus, and Theaetetus needn't be inconsistent with his treatment of pleasure and pain in Republic 9 and Philebus. It may simply be that the kinds of pleasure and pain that concern Plato in Phaedo, Timaeus, and Theaetetus are bodily.

Granted, then, in Republic 9 Plato conceives of pleasure and pain as forms of perception. In that case, the objects of hedonic and algesic perception are forms of motion within the subject; some unspecified psychic faculty of proprio- or interoception perceives these kinetic conditions; and the perceptual mode of hedonic and algesic perception is or at least includes hedonic or algesic feeling. Specifying the perceptual mode of hedonic and algesic experience is tricky, however, for at least two reasons. First, there is in fact no Greek word in Republic 9 or anywhere else in Plato's corpus that corresponds to "feeling." Instead, as we have seen, Socrates characterizes the perceptual mode of pleasure and pain merely in terms of appearance (φαίνεται, φαινόμενον). On the other hand, there are passages in the discussion where Socrates clearly has the affective aspects of hedonic and algesic experience in mind. For example, at 586c1-2 he says that the juxtaposition of the antecedent pain and subsequent stillness makes pleasures appear intense (σφοδρῶς φαίνεσθαι).71 In light of this, let us admit that Socrates recognizes the affective aspect of hedonic and algesic experience.

At the same time, Socrates' conception of hedonic and algesic experience cannot be reduced to affective qualia. One reason for this is that, as we saw in section IV,
Socrates conjoins or rather conflates the phenomenal and doxastic aspects of hedonic and algesic experience. This conflation is, in turn, consequential for explaining Socrates' claim that the pleasure of the unintelligent man is untrue. Perceptual belief would be the obvious candidate for the bearer of representational and more specifically semantic content. Alternatively, though less likely, hedonic or algesic feeling itself might be conceived as a perceptual mode with representational content. In the following sections I explore this question further. Presently, let us confirm that insofar as Plato is, in *Republic* 9, committed to the view that pleasure and pain are forms of perception, a third sense in which the unintelligent man's pleasure is untrue is that it is representationally untrue. The operative truth-conception here is some form of correspondence, at least some pre-theoretical ancestor of correspondence. In this case, there is a failure of correspondence between the entity that stands in the position of the truth-bearer, namely, the hedonic experience, and the entity that stands in the position of the truth-maker, namely, the physiological condition, which in this case is the neutral condition following pain. This construal of the untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure requires two qualifications, however, both concerning the identity of the truth-bearer. Since the explanations of these two qualifications are relatively detailed, to facilitate legibility, I will present them in two successive sections.

VIII. The Representational Untruth of the Unintelligent Man's Pleasure: First Qualification

We have raised the question whether the doxastic or rather the affective aspect of the unintelligent man's hedonic experience is to be identified as the bearer of
representational content. Since Socrates conflates the two, there is no simple solution to the question. Granted this, we could argue that despite the conflation, Plato's intuitions about the truth-aptness of doxastic states would be responsible for Socrates' claim that the unintelligent man's hedonic experience is untrue. This is reasonable. But there are also reasons to proceed cautiously here. Strictly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth assumes that the contents of truth-bearers are propositionally structured. We know, however, that Plato only invents the concept of propositional structure and with it propositional falsity in *Sophist*, a dialogue, which, it is reasonable to presume, was composed many years after *Republic* 9. Now, this objection might be answered by the claim that although propositionality is not explicitly formulated until after the composition date of *Republic* 9, Plato is implicitly committed to the view that the contents of truth-bearers are propositionally structured. There is, however, good reason to doubt this view. At *Cratylus* 385b5-c16 Socrates maintains that ὄνοματα, that is, names and general terms, as well as statements, are true and false; indeed, Socrates appears to argue that true and false statements derive their truth and falsity from the truth and falsity of their constituent ὄνοματα and verbs.\(^4\)

Furthermore, it may be questioned whether correspondence must be understood here in semantic terms, let alone in propositional terms. In *Theaetetus*, when Socrates attempts to explain false perceptual judgment, the account he gives is of a mismatch between a memorial imprint and a perception. For example, one has a memorial imprint of Theaetetus' face; one sees Socrates at a distance; and one infers that the appearance of Socrates matches the imprint of Theaetetus' face. One makes the false judgment that Theaetetus is present, and indeed it is the judgment that is false; but the basis of the
falsity of the judgment is a failure of correspondence, a mismatch, between the imprinted image of an object and the visual appearance of an object. Consider also Socrates' remark at *Cratylus* 430e that a name is an imitation, just like a portrait or painting.\textsuperscript{75} Passages such as these suggest that in *Republic* 9 Plato might take the affective aspect of the hedonic experience of the unintelligent man to be untrue because it does not correspond to, correctly represent or imitate the physiological condition of stillness.

In considering this possibility, however, one further passage from *Cratylus* lends support to the view that it is, after all, Plato's intuitions about the truth-aptness of semantic representations and thus the doxastic aspect of hedonic experience that is responsible for Socrates' claim in *Republic* 9 that the unintelligent man's pleasure is untrue. While Socrates maintains that both a name and a portrait are imitations, he insists that they are different kinds of imitation. Moreover, with regard to portraits' and names' accurate and inaccurate imitations he says:

"I call the first kind of assignment (namely, one involving an accurate imitation) correct (ῥηθήν), whether it is the assignment of a painting or a name; but if it is the assignment of a name, I call it both correct and true (ἀληθῆ). And I call the other kind of assignment, the one that assigns and applies unlike imitations, incorrect (οὐκ ῥηθήν), and in the case of names false (ψευδή) as well."\textsuperscript{76}

This passage suggests that Plato is committed to applying the predicates "true" and "false" to semantic entities specifically, rather than to representational entities generally. And this lends support to the view that in having Socrates claim that the unintelligent man's pleasure is untrue, Plato is motivated by intuitions about beliefs and judgments. In
short, the doxastic aspect of the hedonic experience is responsible for the untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure.  

Final confirmation of the view that it is the doxastic aspect of the hedonic experience that is responsible for the untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure can be derived from Republic 9 itself, specifically from the analogy of spatial positions Socrates deploys at 584d1-585a7 to characterize the unintelligent man's misperception of pleasure. Socrates distinguishes three positions, low, middle, and high, which are supposed to correspond to pain, stillness, and pleasure respectively. Socrates speaks of moving from a low position to a middle position, and he says that one who moved from a low position to a middle position might mistake the middle position for the high position insofar as one related it merely to the low position. Socrates repeatedly uses doxastic language to characterize the mover's psychological condition. The mover is said to believe (οἴσθοι, ἤγείσθαι) that he is being carried to the truly high region. Socrates speaks of such individuals as inexperienced in what is truly (ἀληθὴν ὁδόν) high, middle, and low. He then concludes: "Would you be surprised, then, if those who are inexperienced and do not have healthy beliefs (δόξα) regarding the truth (ἀληθείας) about many other things were so disposed with regard to pleasure, pain, and the middle condition ...?"  

In sum, the untruth of the unintelligent man's hedonic experience is semantic: the doxastic aspect of the hedonic experience does not correspond to the neutral condition.

IX. The Representational Untruth of the Unintelligent Man's Pleasure: Second Qualification
So much, then, for the first qualification of our original construal of the untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure— I turn now to the second qualification. I wish to call into question whether, strictly speaking, the truth-bearer is the hedonic experience of the unintelligent man. In the previous section, I focused on the experiential aspects of pleasure and pain, that is, on affective-cum-doxastic states, which are the modes by which the objects of hedonic and algesic experiences are perceived. Yet I maintain that Plato does not identify pleasure and pain merely with these experiential aspects. Included in the identities of pleasure and pain are the physiological conditions, that is, motions, that are objects of the hedonic and algesic perceptions.80

Given this view of the complexity of pleasure, we can formulate the second qualification of the original construal of the untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure as follows. The failure of correspondence of the unintelligent man's pleasure must be, so to speak, internal to the pleasure. In other words, the unintelligent man's pleasure is not untrue because it fails to correspond to some truth-maker external to it. Rather, the pleasure as a whole derives its untruth from the fact that one of its components does not correctly represent or correspond to another of its components. I emphasize that this derivative form of semantic untruth is logically problematic, for a semantic truth-bearer requires a truth-maker, and the pleasure as a composite whole has none. In short, then, the pleasure of the unintelligent man is representationally and more specifically semantically untrue in the peculiar sense that the pleasure as a complex whole is untrue because one of its aspects, a perception, does not correspond with another of its aspects, the physiological condition that is the object of the perception.
So much, then, for the various ways in which the unintelligent man's pleasure is treated as untrue in the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument— I turn now to the second part of the argument where pleasures are characterized as untrue in a further way.

X. **Immutability and Truth**

As we have seen, in the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument Socrates maintains that certain motions (κινήσεις) are constitutive of pleasure and pain. In the true-filling argument, central to the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, Socrates specifies the kind of motion that is constitutive of pleasure. The kinetic component of pleasure is a filling (πλήρωσις), more precisely a filling with what is naturally appropriate (φύσει προσηκόντων). Moreover, Socrates maintains that there are three species of naturally appropriate filling related to the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of the soul respectively. Socrates argues that appetitive and spirited filling are less true than rational filling. Since a more true filling is a more true pleasure, Socrates concludes that rational pleasure, which is philosophical pleasure, is the truest pleasure.

Socrates' conception of more and less true fillings is rather metaphysically extravagant, but this should not obscure the fact that a mundane conception of more and less true fillings may inform his account. Consideration of this mundane conception will, at any rate, facilitate comprehension of his position. Assume that a patient visits a dentist to have a cavity filled. Typically dentists completely fill cavities. But a cavity that is not completely filled may be conceived as not truly filled. Assume, further, that dentists may fill cavities with various substances and that some substances are more durable than
others. In that case, a cavity might be characterized as more or less truly filled depending on whether the filling-substance was more or less durable. Admittedly, in this case it is more natural to say that the cavity has been more or less completely repaired or that the tooth has been more or less perfectly restored. But Socrates' conception of naturally appropriate filling relies on concepts such as repair, remedy, or restoration. In other words, Socrates' conception of naturally appropriate filling does not merely imply the occupation of space, but the completion or fulfillment of something lacking.

Finally, assume that a patient might suffer from such bad tooth decay that despite the intrinsic durability of a given filling-substance, the filling will nevertheless be unstable. In that case, we might say that it is impossible to truly repair the cavity or restore the tooth. The second and third of these mundane conceptions of true filling, repair, or restoration operate within Socrates' true-filling argument.

In the true-filling argument, Socrates focuses on the contrast between somatic, more specifically nutritional fillings and psychic, more specifically rational fillings. He maintains that the quality of the filling is a function of both the contents, which fill a container, and the container, which is filled. In the case of nutritional filling, the body is the container and nutriment is the content. Socrates maintains that the body and its nutriment are relatively untrue. They are untrue in the sense that they are unstable; they are unstable because they are short-lived. In the case of psychic and specifically rational filling, the soul is the container and knowledge is the content. Socrates maintains that the soul and knowledge are relatively true. They are true in the sense that they are stable. Consequently, the relative truths of these species of filling are conceived as functions of the containers and contents.⁸³
Let us turn now to Socrates' own words in the true-filling argument at 585a8-e1. Socrates begins by clarifying two species of inanition and correlative filling:

(17) Hunger, thirst, and the like are somatic inanitions (κενώσεις).

(18) Ignorance and lack of intelligence are psychic inanitions.

(19) Taking nourishment is filling the body.

(20) Strengthening the mind is filling the soul.

Socrates ultimately, at premise (28) below, clarifies that being filled with what is naturally appropriate is pleasant. Accordingly, in view of (17) and (19), we will assume that nourishment is the naturally appropriate content for the body. Regarding the naturally appropriate content of the soul, at one point in the argument Socrates speaks of "true belief, knowledge, understanding, and in a word all excellence." But otherwise Socrates focuses on knowledge. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that knowledge is the naturally appropriate content of the soul.

Socrates now suggests that some fillings are more true than others:

(21) Truer filling fills with what is more (ἀληθεστερὰ).

The concept of what is more in (21) is clarified by the contents of subsequent premises, in particular (22). Socrates suggests that what is more is more immutable. Thus, (21) suggests that a true filling is a filling whose contents are relatively immutable. In fact, Socrates subsequently claims, in premise (27) below, that truth of filling is a function of containers as well as contents. In that case, we may take (21) as an abbreviated and preliminary formulation.

Socrates now claims:
(22) That which is connected to (ἐχόμενον) that which is always the same, immortal and true and is itself of such a kind and comes to be in (ἐν … γιγνόμενον) such a kind has more being (μᾶλλον ἐίναι) than that which is connected to that which is never the same and mortal and is itself of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind.91

Obviously, (22) is a mouthful. One fundamental question for the interpretation of (22) is whether reference is being made to four or rather six entities. Consider the following two interpretations, in which I have added symbols to clarify the various referents:

(22a) That (x1) which is connected to that (x2) which is always the same, immortal and true and is itself (x1) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (x2) has more being than that (y1) which is connected to that (y2) which is never the same and mortal and is itself (y1) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (y2).

(22b) That (x1) which is connected to that (x2) which is always the same, immortal and true and is itself (x1) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (x3) has more being than that (y1) which is connected to that (y2) which is never the same and mortal and is itself (y1) of such a kind and comes to be in such a kind (y3).

I suggest that (22) refers to six entities; thus, (22b) is the correct interpretation. One reason for preferring (22b) to (22a) is that the distinct phrases "being connected to" (ἐχόμενον) and "becoming in" (ἐν … γιγνόμενον) suggest that what x1 or y1 is connected to and becomes in are two different things. Further considerations below will confirm that (22b) is the correct interpretation.

Granted that (22a) is the correct interpretation of (22), the core claim that (22) makes is:
(22a) $xI$ has more being than $yI$.

But (22) also makes the following claims:

(22b) $xI$ is connected to $x2$.

(22c) $x2$ is always the same, immortal, and true.

(22d) $xI$ is always the same, immortal, and true.

(22e) $x3$ is always the same, immortal, and true.$^{92}$

(22f) $xI$ comes to be in $x3$.

And similarly:

(22g) $yI$ is connected to $y2$.

(22h) $y2$ is never the same and is mortal.

(22i) $yI$ is never the same and is mortal.

(22j) $y3$ is never the same and is mortal.

(22k) $yI$ comes to be in $y3$.

I suggest that the core claim (22a) depends upon the following ontological principles:

(O1) That which is is true.

(O2) That which is is immutable.

(O1) is simply a conception of ontological truth; in other words, (O1) simply identifies being and truth. I take (O2) to be the more illuminating claim of the two, for it clarifies the more obscure entities, being and truth.

Note also that (22h-j) are not precisely opposites of (22c-e). Socrates does not say that $yI$, $y2$, and $y3$ are untrue. Since untruth implies non-being, that would mean that $yI$, 

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\( y_2 \) and \( y_3 \) were non-existent. Instead, \( y_1 \), \( y_2 \), and \( y_3 \) have an intermediate ontological status.

Now, (22) itself is a general claim. In premises (23-26), which follow, Socrates specifically contrasts the containers and contents involved in nutritional filling with those involved in epistemic filling. In doing so he is in effect applying (22) to these specific entities. To facilitate understanding of premises (23-26) and their function in the argument, it may be helpful to bear in mind the following application of (22):

Knowledge, which is connected to beings, which are always the same, immortal and true, and which is itself of such a kind and comes to be in the soul, which is of this kind, has more being than nutriment, which is connected to becomings, which are never the same and mortal, and which is itself of such a kind and comes to be in the body, which is of this kind.

Consider now premises (23-26):

\begin{align*}
(23) & \text{ The being } (\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{V}}) \text{ of what is always the same participates in being } (\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{V}}) \text{ as much as the being of knowledge.}\end{align*}

Socrates does not explicitly mention Forms here, but presumably he has these beings in mind. In any event, his point is this: that which is immutable participates in being to a certain extent \( E \); knowledge is of what is immutable; therefore, knowledge participates in being to extent \( E \).

\begin{align*}
(24) & \text{ The being of what is always the same participates in truth } (\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{L}}) \text{ as much as the being of knowledge.}\end{align*}

(24) follows from the ontological principle (O1). Admittedly, the fact that Socrates claims (24) as well as (23) might be taken to suggest that he does not identify being and
truth, but rather that he takes truth to be a property of being. However, I can see no further reason to prefer this thesis; so I will assume that the function of (24) is to clarify that since knowledge participates in being as much as its objects do, knowledge participates in truth as much as its objects do.

(25) The kinds of thing related to somatic treatment (θεραπεία) participate less in truth and being than the kinds of thing related to psychic treatment.97

I assume that "the kinds of thing related to somatic treatment" in (25) refers to becomings and nutriment, the correlates of being and knowledge in (23) and (24).

(26) The body participates less in truth and being than the soul.98

(26), thus, completes the specification of the three components — x1 and y1, x2 and x2, and y1, y2, and y3 — involved in (22) interpreted as (22).)

On the basis of the application of (22) to nutritional and epistemic filling implied by premises (23-26), Socrates now expands his point regarding more and less true fillings at (21):

(27) That which is filled with things that are more (μᾶλλον οντων) and which itself is more (μᾶλλον ον) is more filled than that which is filled with things that are less (μεττον οντων) and which itself is less (μεττον ον).99

Whereas in (21) Socrates correlates truth of filling with truth of contents, here in (27) Socrates correlates truth of filling with both contents and containers. The phrase "that … which itself is more" refers to the container. From (27) it can now be inferred that epistemic filling is truer filling than nutritional filling.100

Observe that Socrates' argument does not require (27). A premise akin to (21) would suffice to show that epistemic filling is truer than nutritional filling, for instance:
(27a) That which is filled with things that are more is more filled than that which
is filled with things that are less.

I presume that Socrates expresses (27) simply because (27a) does not adequately
capture his view. Evidently, his view is that the truth of a filling is not solely a function of
the contents, but conjointly of the container and the contents. This is why in the dental
analogy I presented in my introduction to the argument, I spoke of the quality of the tooth
itself, the container, as well as the quality of various filling-substances, the contents.

Having clarified the concept of true filling, Socrates now relates pleasure to filling
by specifying that the motion involved in pleasure is a filling with what is naturally
appropriate:

(28) Being filled with what naturally appropriate (φύσει προσηκόντων) is
pleasant.101

From (28) Socrates infers:

(29) Therefore, being filled with things that really are (τῷ ὀντὶ ... τῶν ὀντῶν)
makes one more really (μᾶλλον ὀντῶν) and truly (ἀληθεστέρως) enjoy true
pleasure (χαίρειν ἠδονὴ ἀληθεῖ).102

From (29) it follows that rational filling is the truest pleasure. Thus, philosophical
pleasure, which is rational pleasure, is the truest pleasure.

In short, the true-filling argument suggests that pleasure may be ontologically true
insofar as it is stable or immutable.

XI. Conclusion
In the truth-of-pleasure argument in *Republic* 9, Socrates operates with both representational, more specifically semantic, and ontological conceptions of truth. The pleasure of the unintelligent man is semantically untrue insofar as the doxastic aspect of the hedonic experience does not correspond to the man's physiological condition. The pleasure of the unintelligent man is ontologically untrue insofar as it is impure; the hedonic experience is sequentially mixed with pain. The pleasure of the unintelligent man is ontologically untrue insofar as it is incomplete; the man's condition involves a hedonic experience, but it lacks a hedonic motion. Finally, certain pleasures are more ontologically true than others insofar as their naturally appropriate fillings or replenishments are relatively stable.

While we can draw these distinctions between truth conceptions and aspects of truth conceptions, it is unclear to what extent Plato himself appreciated the distinctions. The primary distinction, between semantic and ontological truth-conceptions, is especially salient to us, but it appears not to have been so for Plato when he composed *Republic* 9. The conflation of semantic and ontological truth-conceptions in the truth-of-pleasure argument in *Republic* 9 testifies to a period in Plato's intellectual career before he recognized that semantic falsity and ontological untruth require distinct explanations. *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, composed after *Republic* 9, bear witness to Plato's struggles with and, ultimately, putative success in clarifying semantic falsity.

When, following *Sophist*, Plato composed *Philebus* and revisited the topics of true, false, and untrue pleasures, he had achieved greater appreciation of the distinction between semantic and ontological truth-conceptions. In *Philebus*, semantically false pleasures—false anticipatory pleasure (36c-40e), misjudgment of apparent hedonic
conditions (41b-42c), and mistaking the neutral condition for pleasure (42c-44a)—are distinguished from ontologically untrue pleasures—mixed somatic pleasure (46d-47c), mixed psychosomatic pleasure (47c-d), and mixed psychic pleasure (47d-50d). Observe also that I have described the distinction between semantic and ontological truth-conceptions in English using "true" and "false" for the former and "true" and "untrue" for the latter. The distinction is also philologically marked in the Greek of Plato's Philebus. Socrates refers to untrue pleasures as "οὐκ ἀληθεῖς," and he refers to false pleasures as "ψεύδεις." In contrast, in Republic 9 Socrates never uses the word "ψευδές." The semantic as well as ontological untruth of pleasure is referred to as "οὐκ ἀληθές." This further corroborates the view that in composing Republic 9 Plato did not appreciate the distinction between semantic and ontological truth-conceptions. It also supports the view that the dominant truth-conception in the truth-of-pleasure argument is ontological.

The question why Plato conceives of ontological truth as he does, specifically why he associates immutability, purity, and completeness with being and truth is difficult. Plato's views ultimately derive from Parmenides' Way of Being. Thus, the answer to this question would require an explanation of Plato's reception of this aspect of Parmenides' poem. I will attempt no such thing here. But consider the following

Eleatic-style argument:

What-is and what-is-not are opposites.

Thus, what-is cannot in any way be what-is-not.

Thus, what-is must be.

Thus, what-is must be what it is.

If what-is were to change, then it would not be what it is.
Thus, what-is is immutable.

I am not suggesting that this argument is free from fallacy, nor, more importantly, that either Parmenides or Plato would wholly assent to it. I present the argument simply to give some indication of what considerations an answer to the question of the relation between being and one of the three properties, immutability, might require. I begin with immutability, rather than purity, because I suspect that immutability is the more fundamental property of the two, at least in view of the truth-of-pleasure argument. In this case, change implies impurity because change involves a conjunction of opposites. Thus, immutability implies purity. On the other hand, for Plato, immutability is not equivalent to purity, for Plato elsewhere maintains that entities are subject to compresence of opposites simply because they stand in relation to other entities. For example, one finger is both large in relation to another and small in relation to a third. As such, purity is implied by what, for lack of a better phrase, may be called ontological if not logical independence.

With regard to the property of completeness, it is unclear whether completeness is to be derived from stability or purity, or whether it is to be derived more directly from being. In fragment 8 of the Way of Being Parmenides has the goddess say: "[What-is] is not lacking, for it were lacking, it would lack everything." I am unsure how to interpret this claim. Perhaps it is that the concept of lack in some respect implies non-being. Thus, given that being and non-being are opposites and that what-is cannot in any way not-be, what-is cannot be lacking; thus, what-is must be complete.

As the foregoing remarks indicate, Plato's ontological conception of truth in Republic 9, specifically his conception of the relation between the properties of stability,
purity, and completeness are obscure and, evidently, require separate treatment. I will conclude this discussion by drawing attention to one point where clarification of these questions would be particularly helpful for the interpretation of the truth-of-pleasure argument.

In the midst of the true-filling argument Socrates asks whether nutritional or rather epistemic filling partakes of pure being (καθαρά οὐσία). His view is that epistemic filling partakes of pure being, whereas nutritional filling does not. Again, following the true-filling argument, and in the context of criticizing appetitive people, he asserts that such people never enjoy stable and pure (μεταξύ τινα καθαρά) pleasure. Gosling and Taylor have rightly and astutely questioned whether these claims about the impurity of appetitive pleasures in the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument are inconsistent with the claim in the first part that olfactory pleasures are pure because they are not preceded by pains. The worry is motivated by the assumption that olfactory pleasure is a form of bodily pleasure. Thus, qua bodily pleasure it should be relatively unstable and so impure, whereas qua pleasure unpreceded by pain it should be pure.

Gosling and Taylor suggest two possible solutions to this problem. The first is that olfactory pleasures are more true than somatic pleasures that involve pains, but less true than, say, rational pleasures. The second is that olfactory pleasures are true because they are pure, and it is unclear whether they are also relatively untrue because qua bodily fillings they are relatively unstable. It is unclear because they are never said to involve filling, and, as Gosling and Taylor write, to infer that they do involve filling is "pure speculation." This last assertion, however, strikes me as unreasonable. On the
assumption made in the true-filling argument that naturally appropriate filling is pleasant and that other bodily pleasures involve filling, it is safe to assume that olfactory pleasure involves filling as well. Timaeus' and Socrates' identification of olfactory pleasures as forms of replenishment in *Timaeus* and *Philebus* corroborates this view. Thus, Gosling and Taylor's first solution is correct: olfactory pleasures are more true than somatic pleasures that involve pains, but less true than, say, philosophical pleasures. More precisely, olfactory pleasure are true qua pure, but relatively untrue qua relatively unstable. The following problem now arises: insofar as the relation between immutability and purity is unclear, the relative truth or untruth of olfactory pleasure is unclear. Mutability implies impurity in the broad sense that change involves conjunction of opposites. Thus, more stable pleasures are more pure than less stable pleasures. But, in the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, impurity of pleasure was construed more narrowly as involving the mixture of pleasure with its specific opposite, pain. The problem, then, is that olfactory pleasures cannot simply be said to be purer than other bodily pleasures, but less pure than, say, rational pleasures. One needs clarification regarding the relation between the relative impurity implied by mutability per se and impurity involving mixture of pleasure with its specific opposite.

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1 The phrase "neutral condition" is common in the secondary literature. Socrates does not use a precisely equivalent Greek phrase. But he does speak of this condition as "that which is neither pleasant nor painful," for example, at *R.* 584a1.

2 James Butler, "On Whether Pleasure's Esse is Percipi: Rethinking *Republic* 583b-585a," *Ancient Philosophy* 19 (1999) 285-98, at n.10, suggests that these "προσηκουσηθησελς" (literally 'pre-enjoyings') are in fact not anticipatory pleasures. He offers two reasons.
First, "It is possible that in [the truth-of-pleasure] argument Plato was unaware of (or perhaps ignored) representative pleasure and concentrated on non-representative pleasure … \( \pi\rho\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma\theta\iota\varsigma \) … often translated as 'anticipatory pleasure,' are representational."

Second, 'pre-enjoyings' are "said to be the same \( \tau\alpha\nu\tau\alpha \) as other releases from pain … But anticipatory pleasure is not a \textit{release} from pain at all; if anything an anticipatory pleasure for drink \textit{intensifies} my thirst." In this paper I argue that in the first part of the truth-of-pleasure argument Socrates is committed to the view that one way in which pleasure is untrue is that it is representationally untrue. Thus, Butler's first reason is undermined. Butler's second reason is more compelling, but it should be tempered by the following facts. First, Plato includes anticipatory pleasures in \textit{Philebus}, and the truth-of-pleasure argument appears to be a rough version of \textit{Philebus} 36c-50d. Second and more importantly Socrates characterizes "pre-enjoyings" and "pre-sufferings" as follows: "Pre-enjoyings and pre-sufferings that derive from the expectation \( \dot{\epsilon} \kappa \ \pi\rho\sigma\sigma\delta\sigma\omicron\kappa\iota\alpha\varsigma \) of things in the future and which occur before these future things \( \pi\rho\omicron \ \mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\nu \ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \) \ldots" This description seems to suggest cases such as the following. I am hungry and order food at a restaurant. I experience pleasure in anticipation of the arrival of the food and my consumption of it. This looks to me to be one form of anticipatory pleasure. Butler would be right to insist that my hunger has not ceased. But, then, perhaps Socrates is making a mistake. Unfortunately, Socrates has nothing more to say about pre-enjoyings and pre-sufferings in the truth-of-pleasure argument. I will not discuss this form of pleasure further in the paper.

\(^3\) Note that I use the word "untrue," rather than "false," through much of the paper. This corresponds to Socrates' language. Socrates never uses the word "\( \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\iota\varsigma \)" in the trurth-of-
pleasure argument, only "οἶκος ἀληθῆς." I think this is significant, and I discuss the point in the conclusion.


5 The idea that Plato advances a perceptualist conception of pleasure and pain has, however, been suggested in view of *Philebus*. Such a view was also attributed to Plato in antiquity. I discuss this in section VI.
"Clearly a part of what he means is that they [the philosopher's pleasures] are genuinely or really pleasures … Yet there is clearly more to it than this. For the argument in 583-4 is at least as concerned with the false judgment of the subject as with the failure of something to be a pleasure. One feels that Plato wants to suggest that untrue pleasures introduce an element of illusion and false judgment into life and that this is part of the allegation that they are untrue. In that case 'true'/untrue' are implying more than just 'real'/unreal.'" (1984, 128)


White (1979) 231; Annas (1981) 312. Reeve (1988, 151) speaks of "substantiality" in a way that suggests stability: "It is a true pleasure just in case it always and unalterably satisfies." Cross and Woozley (1964, 267) claim that pleasure is real (= ontologically
true) "if it characterizes an activity concerned with real objects." Cp. Tenkku (1956) 159: "only pure pleasures are truly satisfying."

10 Generally speaking, although all commentators on Republic as a whole have something to say about the truth-of-pleasure argument in particular, only Gosling and Taylor (1984) have discussed the argument in detail. Reeve's (1988) comments are relatively in depth. Stokes' (1990) discussion is idiosyncratic and focuses on excising the word "καθαράν" at 584c1. I do not find his suggestion convincing.


13 Butler (1999).

14 Reeve, like others, assumes that the character Socrates' views are attributable to the author Plato. In this case, I agree.


17 *R*. 583b3-5.

18 *R*. 584e7-8.

19 *R*. 583c3-4. I have left the Greek untranslated for reasons that will become clear immediately.

20 *R*. 583c5-6.

21 The same applies to "λύπη" and "τὸ λυπεῖσθαι" of course, but for the sake of simplicity I will focus on the hedonic terms and conditions.

22 *R*. 583c7-9.

23 *R*. 583c10-d1.

24 *R*. 583d3-5.

25 Note also that in (5) Socrates does not simply generalize his claim in (4) by broadening the scope of those who experience pain from sick people to all others who experience pain. Socrates also clarifies the condition on which he is focusing by referring to the extreme algesic experience (*περιώδνια*). Relief from the experience of extreme pain, in particular, seems to be a hedonic experience.

26 *R*. 583d6-9.

27 *R*. 583d10-11.

28 *R*. 583e1-3.

29 *R*. 583e4-6.

30 *R*. 583e7-8.
31 R. 583e9-11.

32 R. 584a1-3.

33 Cf. the following phrase at R. 584c4-5: "αἱ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
tείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἤδοναι." Here Socrates is actually talking of so-called
pleasures (λεγόμεναι ἤδοναι), but the point to which I am drawing attention is his
specification that the pleasures extend through the body to the soul.

34 R. 584a4-6.

35 R. 584a7-8.

36 R. 584a9-11.

37 R. 586b8-c1.

38 Socrates refers to Zeuxis at Grg. 453c6.

1-16. Eva C. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting, E. J. Brill, 1978, has argued that
σκιαγραφία actually refers to a technique of juxtaposing color patches to effect optical
fusion. But cf. Elizabeth G. Pemberton, "A Note on Skiagraphia," American Journal of
Archaeology 80 (1976) 82-84.

40 R. 602d2.

41 R. 602c11-12.

42 R. 602d6-9.

43 R. 602d6-e3.

44 R. 602e1-2.

45 R. 602e4-603a2.

46 R. 603a7-8.
This position is controversial. Cf. Moss (2006) n. 27. I agree with Moss's position here, although I am not sympathetic to her main thesis in this paper.

An odd consequence of this position— but a general one for Plato's tripartition of the soul— is that one part of the soul's believing that \( p \) does not imply that the bearer of the soul believes that \( p \). Rather, the bearer of the soul identifies with the belief of whatever part of the soul is dominant.

The phrase occurs at \( R. \) 584b6.

Socrates' claim that pleasure is not a relief from pain, nor pain a relief from pleasure occurs at \( R. \) 584b3.

Based on the true-filling argument, as well as Timaeus' discussion of the physiology of pleasure and specifically olfactory pleasure in the eponymous dialogue and Socrates' account of olfactory pleasure as true and pure pleasure in \( Philebus \), it is reasonable to assume that these hedonic physiological conditions in \( Republic \) 9 are olfactory replenishments.

\( R. \) 584c1-2.

This point emerges in consideration of stability as a characteristic of ontological truth in section X.

Note that mixed pleasures in \( Philebus \) are not restricted to sequential concatenations of opposites, but include simultaneous mixtures, that is, compresent opposites. The reasons for this distinction between \( Republic \) 9 and \( Philebus \) are not obvious. The concept of illusion and shadow-painting as a salient means of explaining illusion play a prominent role in \( Republic \) generally. But this fact cannot explain the difference since shadow-painting would actually serve as a better case by which to explain pleasures that are
mixed with simultaneously conjoined opposites as the distinct color patches in a shadow-painting are.

55 LSJ s.v.

56 D. L. Page, Poetae melici Graeci, Clarendon Press, 1962, fr. 16; cf. also Eurip. Hel. 605ff.; Elect. 1282-83; Isoc. Hel. 64. Plato also has Socrates cite several verses from Stesichorus' poem at Phaedrus 243a-b.


58 Cf. Sph. 239d-240c.

59 One can imagine a correlative ontologically untrue pleasure in a case where the right kinetic condition occurred, but, for whatever reason, the hedonic feeling did not. Perhaps surgery under anesthesia would count as such an example of untrue pain.


62 DL 2.85-6.


64 *Chrm.* 167d9. The narrower use predominates in dialogues such as *Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*, and *Republic* where Plato is concerned with the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual forms of cognition.


66 *Phd.* 65c5-7. The phrase "αὕται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων" occurs at 65b4-5. Cf. the use of "αἰσθησις" at 65e4.

67 *Lg.* 653a5-6.

68 *Ti.* 64a2.

69 *Ti.* 64c-d.

70 Cf. note 84.

71 Cf. 584b5-8, where Socrates describes olfactory pleasures as sudden and intense (ἐξαίφνησι ἀμηχανοῖ τὸ μέγεθος) and the phrase "αἱ πλεῖσταί τε καὶ μέγισται" at 584c5-6. Cf. *Phlb.* 45a-d.

72 Some contemporary philosophers who hold a perceptualist or representational theory of pain draw a distinction between the affective and non-doxastic perceptual aspects of algesic experience. If the affective aspect of pleasure and pain were not identical to the non-doxastic perceptual aspect in Plato, this would be another reason to resist reducing hedonic and algesic experience to affective qualia. Obviously, there is no reason to think that Plato recognized such a distinction. Still, Plato's conception of pleasure and pain in *Republic* 9 may be profitably compared with a number of modern Anglophone perceptualist and representationalist theories of pain. (Cf. D. M. Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962; G. Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception*, Princeton University Press, 1971; Fred Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind*, MIT Press, 1995. Cf. also the references to Michael Tye's work in the following note.) One difference between Plato's view and the modern theories is that the modern theories do not propose
to explain pleasure as well as pain in perceptual or representational terms. For some explanation of the asymmetry, cf. Muryat Aydede, "An Analysis of Pleasure vis-à-vis Pain," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000) 537-570. Another difference is that some philosophers distinguish between and offer distinct explanations of the affective and sensory-discriminatory aspects of algesic experience. For instance, Muryat Aydede suggests that although "the sensory-discriminative aspect of pain can perhaps be handled representationally … the affective aspect (may reduce) to the way in which the sensory-discriminative information is processed, not for analysis to extract information about proximate or distal properties of the stimuli, but rather for its significance for the effector or motor systems, to set motivational parameters for action on the basis of stimuli's informational content." ("Pain," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at 31-2) The distinction between affective and sensory-discriminative aspects of algesic experience was stimulated by research into neurological conditions that suggest that patients may experience nociception without experiencing the negative affect of pain. In Plato's case, not only is the affective aspect not distinguished from the sensory-discriminative aspect, but, again, the doxastic aspect is not distinguished from the sensory aspect. In that case, Plato's conception of the experience of pleasure and pain must be understood as conjoining three aspects: affective, perceptual, and doxastic.


75 Cf. *Cra.* 423b.

76 *Cra.* 430d3-7.

77 Having said this, it cannot be denied that in the argument for false anticipatory pleasures in *Philebus* 36-40, Socrates argues that certain imaginary images may be true or false. However, even here such images are argued to derive their truth or falsity from related beliefs.

78 *R.* 584d7, 8; cf. also 584e1, 8.

79 *R.* 584e7-9. In the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument Socrates also recycles the analogy of spatial positions (586a2-6). This time, however, the poles of the axis are to be understood in terms of instability and stability. Socrates characterizes the recurring cycle of restoration and depletion pertaining to appetitive and spirited conditions as analogous to moving upward from the low to the middle position and back down again. In other words, one's relations to somatic pleasure and honor are unstable and cyclical. In contrast, movement to the high position is analogous to the pursuit of philosophical satisfaction, movement between the middle and high position is (relatively) stable and linear.
In the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument in *Republic* 9, it is suggested that pleasure involves the filling of a physiological deficit. But Plato clearly does not identify pleasure merely with the physiological condition. Consider the following. In the case of certain pleasures, for instance, olfactory pleasures, it is claimed, in the first part of the argument, that there is no pain antecedent to the pleasure. Thus, in the terms of the second part of the argument, this means that the process of depletion that precedes the filling is not painful. The reason for this, which is made explicit in *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, is that the depletions are gradual and subtle. Thus, the motion of depletion does not penetrate to the soul and is not perceived. Compare the converse idea proposed in *Timaeus* that while certain cuts and burns are painful because the motions involved are sudden and violent, the natural processes by which wounds heal may not be pleasant if the restorative motions are too gradual and subtle. In short, certain restorative and destructive motions are not pleasant or painful precisely because they do not penetrate to the soul. Thus, pleasant or painful motions must be perceived. Cf. also Socrates' remark in *Republic* 9: "I am talking about the so-called pleasures that reach the soul through the body …" (*R.* 584c4-5; Socrates uses the phrase "so-called" because he is speaking of the unintelligent man's pleasures and thus of untrue pleasures.)

81 "τὸ πληροῖσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἦδον ἐστὶ" (*R.* 585d11) Note that this is a crucial assumption of the true-filling argument; Socrates does not argue for this claim.

82 Note that this conception of ontological truth is not applied to the account of the unintelligent man's pleasure in the first part of the argument, even though it applies to non-philosophical pleasures and non-philosophers are unintelligent men.
54

83 R. 585d. Note that in this part of the examination Socrates focuses on the contrast between the activities of nutritional fulfillment, on the one hand, and activities of rational fulfillment, that is, knowledge acquisition, on the other. However, he briefly treats spirited filling (586c-d) as well. We can reasonably infer that spirited filling is more true and real than appetitive filling, in part because it involves more of the soul than the body. At the same time, honor depends upon the esteem of other people, and this is less real and true than knowledge. Cf. note 100.

84 R. 585a8-b2. Note that Socrates conceives of hunger and thirst here, not as desires or even felt conditions of depletion or lack, but as the bodily conditions of depletion. This is noteworthy in regard to Socrates' inclusion of desire among forms of αἰσθήσεις in Theaetetus 156b, for desire may then be understood as the perception of a depletion. For example, the feeling of hunger is the perception of hunger qua nutritional depletion. This conception of desire is not free from difficulties since the perception of a lack, say, the feeling of hunger may be distinguished from the wish to satisfy the hunger. It is also unclear how fear can be regarded analogously as a form of αἰσθήσεις. Fear may have a certain phenomenological profile, but this doesn't seem to be the perception of an anticipated harm. Rather, the anticipated harm seems to cause disturbance which in turn may be perceived in a certain manner.

85 R. 585b3-5.

86 R. 585b6-8. At Ti. 80d3-81a3 Timaeus clarifies the physiological process of somatic filling more precisely: "… the fire <in our bodies> cuts up the food <we have ingested>; it oscillates, following the <rhythm> of the breath within us; and in its oscillation it fills the veins that lead from the cavity of the belly, pouring into them the <food that has
been cut there … <The cut food is then transformed into blood,> nourishment for the flesh and the whole body, which irrigates each part <of the body> and fills the place of that which is depleted. And the manner in which replenishment and depletion occur is consistent with the motion of everything in the universe …"

87 R. 585b6-8.

88 R. 585b14-c1.

89 It is odd that Socrates includes true belief since, for instance, in *Meno* he specifically criticizes true belief for its instability. It is also noteworthy that in *Philebus* true pleasures, which involve restorations that do not involve pains, are not characterized in terms of stability. It is unclear why Plato drops this condition in the later dialogue.

90 R. 585b9-11.

91 R. 585c1-6.

92 (22e), unlike (22d), seems false since, for example, the acquisition of knowledge constitutes an alteration of the soul.

93 R. 585c7-9.

94 Reeve (1998) 111-5, 148-9 interprets the true-filling argument in terms of Forms. As he claims, a soul being filled with knowledge more "completely or perfectly" instantiates the Form of Filling than a body being filled with food. I will avoid further mention of Forms in my treatment of the argument because Socrates himself does not mention them. But I do not view my interpretation of the argument as a whole as at odds with Reeve's.

95 We can reasonably assume that what is immutable participates in being to the full extent and thus that knowledge does. But the argument doesn't require this further specification.
Within the second part of the truth-of-pleasure argument, Socrates segregates and postpones his discussion of spirited filling. Evidently, his principal interest lies in the contrast between appetitive and rational fillings. The nature of the instability of spirited satisfaction remains obscure, but may to some extent be clarified by considering the basic point that spirited satisfaction is the attainment of honor, esteem, or status (τιμή), more specifically the attainment of public recognition for one's contributions to the polis. I suppose that such an achievement may be unstable in several ways. For example, one may subsequently gain notoriety for other deeds, or one's reputation may fade with time because, for instance, societal values change or the achievements of one's contemporaries come to overshadow one's own achievements. Celebrity in athletics, arts, and politics suggests a salient set of examples. In this way, spirited filling is less stable than rational filling, as Socrates believes. On the other hand, a citizen's relation to τιμή may be more stable than his relation to nutriment, for one experiences bodily depletions and restorations such as hunger and thirst repeatedly everyday.

Consider, in particular, the close relation between the semantic untruth of the unintelligent man's pleasure and the ontological untruth of incompleteness of the unintelligent man's pleasure. In the former case, the hedonic experience fails to
correspond to the stillness; the truth-maker, the hedonic motion, is lacking. In the latter case, the hedonic experience is problematically conjoined with the stillness; an ontological component, the hedonic motion, is lacking.

As far as I can see, there is only one exception to this usage in the dialogue. After discussing the first two types of semantically false pleasure and with an eye to enlisting the help of the δυσχερεῖς, Socrates says: "Next, then, we will see whether we may not in another direction come upon pleasures and pains still more false (ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον) than these <namely, the first two types of semantically false pleasure,> both in appearance and really in animals (φαινομένας τε καὶ οὐσίας)." (42c5-7) I believe that the phrase "still more false pleasures" refers to two kinds of false pleasure, mistaking the neutral condition for pleasure and mixed pleasures. Note that Socrates uses the plural "ψευδεῖς," so it should refer to multiple kinds simply on grammatical grounds. More precisely, I take mistaking the neutral condition for pleasure to be a false pleasure in appearance (φαινομένας) and the mixed pleasures to be false in reality (οὐσίας).

Mistaking the neutral condition for pleasure is an apparently false pleasure because one has the αἰσθησία of pleasure, but not the restorative motion. As we have seen, Socrates discusses this illusion in Republic 9 by analogy with σκίαγραφία. Note also that in Republic 9 the word "γοητεία" is used and at Philebus 44c8, the word "γοιητευμα" is used. Mixed pleasures, in turn, are really, not merely apparently, false because they involve restorative motion (constitutive of pleasure), but they also involve disintegrative motion (constitutive of pain). Now it may be doubted whether Socrates uses the δυσχερεῖς to clarify mixed pleasures as well as mistaking the neutral condition for pleasure. But it is clear that he does from the following passage. Socrates has concluded
his discussion of mixed pleasures and is proceeding to the discussion of true, that is, unmixed pleasures, and he says: "For I do not in the least agree with those <namely the δυσχερείς> who say that all pleasures are merely cessation of pain. Rather, as I said, I use them as witnesses to prove that some pleasures are apparent, but not in any way real (εἶναι δοκούσας, οὖσας δ’ οὐδαμῶς) <namely mistaking the neutral condition for pleasure,> while others seem to be great and numerous, but they are really (εἶναι) mixed with pains … <namely mixed pleasures> …" (51a3-7) Thus, Socrates frames his discussion of both mistaking the neutral condition and mixed pleasures with the same concepts: merely apparent pleasure and pleasures that are really mixed with pains and thus not really pleasures. And thus, when Socrates at 42c5-6 says that he will next discuss even more false (ψευδέις) pleasures, he must be referring to mistaking the neutral condition and mixed pleasures.


106 *R.* 585b12.

107 *R.* 586a6.


111 *Ti.* 65a; *Phlb.* 51e.
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