False Pleasures of the Imagination: *Philebus* 36c6-40e5

There was another disagreement among philosophers. Some took the sphere of what true and false to be the "signification," other the "utterance," and others the "process that constitutes the thought."¹

I. Introduction

In Plato's *Philebus* Socrates convinces Protarchus that there are several kinds of false pleasure. The first kind, so-called false anticipatory pleasure, which is described at 36c6-40e5, has attracted the most scholarly attention over the last fifty years. Justin Gosling's 1959 discussion is often treated as the point of departure for this vein of inquiry, in and from which there is much to admire and learn.² In order to clarify the sore spots of interpretation and the salient contours of the debate, it will be helpful to begin with an outline of the argument.

The passage 36c6-40e5 is divisible into three parts. First, at 36c6-e13, Socrates broaches the idea, to which Protarchus is resistant, that there are false pleasures. Second, at 37a1-38b2, Socrates presents his first argument that some pleasures are false. The argument is from analogy with judgment (ὄδηγησις). It is agreed that pleasure and judgment share certain characteristics. On the basis of these commonalities, Socrates infers that pleasures, like judgments, can be false as well as true. Protarchus blocks the inference; he admits that pleasures may involve true and false judgments and even that a pleasure involving a true judgment differs from a pleasure involving a false judgment, but he maintains that pleasures themselves are not false. Third, at 38b3-40e5, Socrates develops a second argument, continuous with the first. This argument convinces Protarchus that certain pleasures, most conspicuously certain anticipatory pleasures, are false. At the heart of this second argument is a distinction between two functions of the soul, that is,
psychological functions, described in terms of inscription and painting. A scribe, as it were, inscribes judgments in our souls. Under certain conditions a painter may illustrate those judgments. Socrates focuses on illustrations of expected pleasures, for example, an image of oneself at some point in the future enjoying pleasures consequent upon the acquisition of wealth. Socrates further suggests that the hopeful expectations of just and pious men tend to be realized, while those of unjust and impious men tend not to be realized. Accordingly, the illustrations attendant upon the hopeful expectations of pious men tend to be true, whereas those of impious men tend to be false. Since pleasure itself is taken in the illustrations, such pleasure, particularly of impious men, tends to be false. I will refer to the entire argument at 36c6-40e5 as the imagination argument, and the pleasures therein defended as imaginative pleasures or pleasures of the imagination.

The imagination argument raises many questions. What is Protarchus' initial position, which compels him to deny that there are false pleasures and then to reject the first argument? If Protarchus thinks that pleasures can be truth-apt, why does he believe that pleasures can be true, but not false? How is the first argument organized? What is the function of the analogy between judgment and pleasure? Since the first argument fails, what is its function within the imagination argument as a whole? How does Socrates convince Protarchus in the second argument? What is the function of the painter in contrast to that of the scribe? Why does Socrates focus on anticipatory pleasures? Precisely how does Socrates conceive of anticipatory pleasures? What is the function of the distinction between the expectations of pious and impious men? What sort of falsity is ultimately claimed for the false pleasures? To what extent is the imagination argument valid or sound?
II. **Status Quaestionum**

Before presenting my interpretation of the imagination argument, including my answers to these questions, it is appropriate and helpful to review prior contributions.

Gosling's discussion focuses on two criticisms of the imagination argument, one pertaining to the first argument, the other to the second. In the first argument, Gosling suggests that Socrates conflates two conceptions of incorrectness, falsity and inappropriateness. Protarchus admits that pleasures may err or be incorrect, but only in the sense that a joyful reaction to circumstances may be inappropriate. When Socrates attempts to argue that pleasures may be incorrect in the way that judgments are, namely, false, Protarchus resists. In the second argument, Socrates convinces Protarchus that anticipatory pleasures can be false, but only because he conflates false "pictures of pleasure" (Gosling's rendition of "ἡδοναὶ ἐξωραφημέναι" at 40b6-7) with pleasant picturings of those false pictures of pleasure.

Kenny rejects Gosling's view that Socrates conflates falsity and inappropriateness in the first argument. He maintains that Socrates is concerned with falsity. However, Protarchus initially assumes that a false pleasure is not a real pleasure. The analogy argument thereby serves two purposes: first, to clarify that a false pleasure, like a false belief, is nonetheless a real pleasure and, second, to clarify that pleasure can have a range of properties. Regarding the second point, I take it that Kenny thinks Protarchus initially assumes that pleasure is a simple quale. Regarding the second argument, Kenny thinks that both pious and impious men accurately predict future events, but that impious men fail to see that the events will not bring them pleasure. Accordingly, three elements in
Socrates' account are necessary to convince Protarchus: (1) a bad man (2) picturing (3) a future pleasure.9

Regarding Gosling's contention that Socrates conflates the picture of pleasure with the picturing of pleasure, Kenny maintains that there is no conflation; rather Socrates' argument depends upon a suppressed premise: impious men derive pleasure from false pictures of pleasure; pleasure derived from false pictures is false pleasure (suppressed premise); therefore, impious men experience false pleasure.10

In his response to Kenny, Gosling rightly submits the following criticism: "Kenny never tells us why pleasure taken in false pictures is false pleasure. Yet this is what <Socrates> must tell us."11 In other words, the suppressed premise in the argument that Kenny grants to Socrates requires defense. To appreciate the force of this criticism, it is crucial to understand that both Gosling and Kenny conceive of anticipatory pleasure as pleasure taken in or derived from anticipating some other pleasure. Since Gosling assumes that Plato's tendency is to conceive of pleasures as activities that are enjoyed, anticipating a pleasure is itself the activity that is enjoyed. But activities and so pleasant activities cannot be false or true. Thus, the inference from false picture of pleasure to false picturing of pleasure is illicit.12

Granting that Kenny has effectively challenged Gosling's treatment of the first argument, Dybikowski's 1970 discussion focuses on the second argument and the same problem with Kenny's account that Gosling criticizes: "the interpretive problem remains of how Socrates proceeds from the truth or falsity of pictures to the truth or falsity of pleasures …"13 Like Gosling, Dybikowski thinks that Socrates' argument is fallacious, and in fact Dybikowski reaches a conclusion that is nearly identical to Gosling's. A slight
difference between their views stems from Dybikowski's claim that "ἡδοναί ἐξωγραφημέναι" at 40b6-7 refers to the pleasures within the picture rather than to pictures of pleasure. Indeed, a literal translation of the Greek phrase is "pictured pleasures." The anticipatory pleasure is, then, the pleasurable anticipation taken in the pleasure depicted in the picture. Although he does not explicitly say so, I presume that Dybikowski thinks that Socrates and Protarchus admit that the pleasures the bad man pictures are false because the bad man will not experience corresponding pleasures. Finally, as per Gosling's interpretation, Dybikowski claims that Socrates conflates the falsity of the pictured pleasure with the falsity of the pleasure of anticipation.

Penner's 1970 piece, which appeared in the same volume of Phronesis as Dybikowski's, adds a new dimension to the debate. Penner develops the suggestion of Thalberg, who attributes to Plato in Philebus the view, that certain pleasures are propositional attitudes, namely, states of being pleased that $p$. Let us call these propositional pleasures. Penner combines Thalberg's idea with an idea from Williams in which the following distinction is drawn. Assume that one is pleased by a picture and that one believes this picture has been painted by Picasso, although it has been painted by Braque. One may be pleased by the picture: (A) but not because one judges that it was painted by Picasso, or (B) because one judges that it was painted by Picasso. In the case of (B), Penner suggests, "there seem to be grounds for saying that" the truth or falsity of the judgment about the author of the painting "infects" the pleasure with its truth or falsity. This is because "finding out that the <judgment> is false is liable to destroy the pleasure." In light of this, Penner draws a distinction between pleasure coming with and pleasure taken in judgment. Case (A) represents pleasure that comes with, but is not taken
in, judgment, while case (B) represents pleasure taken in, not merely coming with, judgment.

At the end of the analogy argument, Socrates suggests to Protarchus that pleasure "often seems to come to us not with a true judgment, but with (μετὰ) a false judgment."\(^{20}\) This, Penner suggests, gives Protarchus an "opening," for Protarchus can and then does respond by insisting that the falsity lies in the judgment, not the pleasure. Accordingly, Socrates' task in the second argument is to "re-direct Protarchus' attention to the idea of taking pleasure in a <judgment … which he does> by means of the scribe and painter similes."\(^{21}\)

Penner further maintains that "judgment," as well as "<propositional> pleasure," is ambiguous between a so-called process- and product-interpretation.\(^{22}\) Judgment qua process is the cognitive state or attitude of judging, while judgment qua product is the content of the judgment. Strictly speaking, Penner insists, only product-judgments and product-pleasures are truth-apt; thus, process-judgments and process-pleasures are merely true or false by extension. This is significant in light of Gosling's, Kenny's, and Dybikowski's concern over Socrates' move from false pictured pleasures or false pictures of pleasure to false pleasures taken in those pleasures or pictures. According to Penner, Socrates should have specified that the pleasures taken in the pictures, which are process-pleasures, are only true or false by extension.\(^{23}\)

Penner concludes by raising the question whether Socrates, that is, Plato was aware of the process/product ambiguity of "δοξα" and if so whether he consciously exploited it by planning the breakdown at the conclusion of the analogy argument. He
suggests that Plato was unaware of the ambiguity, and this explains why Socrates maintains that the propositional pleasure is false because its content is.²⁴

Frede's 1982 article develops Penner's interpretation of Socrates' anticipatory pleasure as propositional, emphasizing that the pleasures in question are taken in judgments.²⁵ She also emphasizes the salience of the concept of hope or expectation in Socrates' second argument, more precisely, clear hope or strong expectation, as opposed to merely vague or tentative ones. Her point is that clear hope or strong expectation is required for the pleasure Socrates has in mind. Compare Rumpelstiltskin's delight in anticipating that he will have the Queen's first-born child because he firmly believes that no one will be able to guess his name.²⁶ Thus, Frede maintains: "we take delight only when we regard the picture as true."²⁷

Although Frede admits that Socrates recognizes that propositional pleasures can be indexed to the past, present, or future, she explains that Socrates focuses on the future and thus on anticipatory pleasure because this facilitates the elucidation of the concept of propositional pleasure: "That pleasures are events with propositional content would be hard (and is hard) to explain to anyone who is not trained in philosophy and does not have the appropriate vocabulary at his disposition. What is special about future pleasures is not that only in their case do we have logoi but that we have only logoi … In addition, in the case of future pleasures it is quite obvious that often there is a wide discrepancy between what is enjoyed 'as a fact' and what is in fact going to happen."²⁸

In contrast to Penner, Frede maintains that Socrates is aware of the process/product ambiguity of "δόξα" and, by analogy, "ηδονή" and that he consciously exploits it. Given this and given that propositional pleasures are not just propositions or
pictures, but mental events, activities, taken in propositions, Frede cannot explain Socrates' attribution of truth and falsity to the attitudes, as Penner does.\textsuperscript{29} At this point in her otherwise fine paper, however, Frede's account becomes confused. She maintains that "in the \textit{Philebus} the basic model of pleasure is … that of a 'filling.'"\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, "fillings are … processes not propositions, even if propositions are involved."\textsuperscript{31} Given this, in answer to the question how processes can be true or false, she claims: "in the case of propositional pleasures … the filling, i.e. the thinking, believing, is what \textit{constitutes} the pleasure but not its intentional object."\textsuperscript{32} I would be inclined to take this last statement to mean that just as judgment remains judgment regardless of the truth or falsity of its propositional content, so propositional pleasure remains pleasure regardless of the truth or falsity of its propositional content. If this is what Frede means, then she provides no further explanation of how such processes can be true or false than, as Penner had suggested, by extension from the truth or falsity of their contents.\textsuperscript{33} Unfortunately, Frede's point does not seem to be this one, for in saying that "the filling, i.e. the thinking, believing, is what \textit{constitutes} the pleasure," she appears to conflate pleasure qua process with belief or judgment or thought qua process. Indeed, in her 1993 Hackett edition of \textit{Philebus} Frede suggests that on Socrates' view of propositional pleasure, pleasures are judgments or beliefs.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, as I suggested, Frede's conclusion regarding the falsity of anticipatory pleasure is ultimately confused.

Mooradian's 1996 article adds another new dimension to the inquiry. Mooradian begins by underscoring that Protarchus does not merely deny that pleasures can be false; he insists that pleasures are true.\textsuperscript{35} He argues that Protarchus' view of the truth of pleasure is based on the following relativistic or Protagorean conception: "pleasure cannot be false
because it is a kind of αἰσθήσεως and αἰσθήσις is always correct in relation to its objects. Mooradian derives this conception from Plato's *Theaetetus* where Socrates attributes to Protagoras the view that the interaction of perceptual subject and object gives birth to twins: a perception and a perceptual quality. Perceptual qualities such as color and taste are, then, not objective features of bodies that the perceptual faculties apprehend, but relational properties, functions of subject-object interactions, and extant only during episodes of perception. A consequence of the Protagorean perceptualist conception of pleasure is that a person cannot be mistaken about the pleasantness of an object so long as that person experiences the object as pleasant. Thus, Protarchus maintains that pleasure must be true.

Against Protarchus' position, "Socrates argues that anticipatory pleasures can be false on the grounds that they are an exception to the relativistic thesis advocated by Protagoras. They are an exception … because the description of how they arise does not entail the pleasurableity of the objects in which they are taken." In explaining this idea, Mooradian draws attention to Socrates' point at *Theaetetus* 178b-179d that even if one's present perceptions are infallible, one's judgment about one's future perceptions will not be. Anticipatory pleasure, likewise, depends upon a judgment about the pleasure of a future experience, and this judgment can of course be false. Accordingly, "since Protarchus is claiming that x is pleasurable for P at t if P takes pleasure in x at t, he will have to admit that there may be a fact, namely, that P takes pleasures in x at t, and that, if it is predicted that this fact will obtain or fail to obtain, that prediction will be true or false."
We come now to the familiar problem of how anticipatory pleasure itself can be false. Mooradian claims that the "pleasure of anticipation comes about through judging and picturing <a future> pleasure." That is, one derives pleasure from judging that one will experience a certain pleasure in the future and from picturing oneself enjoying that future pleasure. Given this, Mooradian claims that the falsity of the anticipatory pleasure lies in the fact that "taking anticipatory pleasure in x will not make it the case that x is pleasurable in the way in which it is felt to be pleasurable, since it will not make it the case that x has those features belief in which give rise to the anticipatory pleasure."\cite{41} Strictly speaking, Mooradian should have written: taking anticipatory pleasure in a picture of x will not make it the case that x itself is pleasurable in the way in which the picture of x is felt to be pleasurable, since it will not make it the case that x has those features belief in which give rise to the anticipatory pleasure. In short, the anticipatory pleasure that one takes in the picture will not make the corresponding event correspondingly pleasurable, assuming the event occurs.

The few scholars who have written on the imagination argument since the publication of Mooradian's article and who have commented on Mooradian's argument either agree with or are broadly sympathetic to the conception of pleasure he attributes Protarchus.\cite{42} On the other hand, they have not accepted his account of Socrates' conception of anticipatory pleasure.\cite{43} Delcomminette, Harte, and Evans all maintain that Socrates' conception of anticipatory pleasure is propositional. But Mooradian is at pains to argue against this view. This is surprising when one considers that Mooradian speaks of taking "pleasure in the pleasurable event that does not come about." On this point Mooradian comments: "to describe a mental state as being in an object or as having
intentional content is not the same as describing it as a belief or judgment. One can take pleasure in what is believed or be pained at it. Both are distinct intentional states, but the belief in question is the same.\textsuperscript{44} Evidently, Mooradian thinks, as Frede appears to, that propositional pleasure simply is belief or judgment. Indeed, this is confirmed by his following statement: "if one is willing to hold that certain pleasures … have propositional content, then one is accepting that they are judgments."\textsuperscript{45} Why Mooradian should hold such a view is unclear. Assume a propositional pleasure and a judgment have the same content; the propositional attitudes may, nevertheless, differ. For example, consider the proposition \textit{I am sunbathing on the beach at Punta Cana}. One may take pleasure in daydreaming of oneself, and thus not judging oneself to be, sunbathing on the beach at Punta Cana. Likewise, one may judge that one is sunbathing on the beach at Punta Cana, but not take pleasure in this.

Delcomminette's 2003 article agrees with Mooradian's thesis insofar as it argues that at least some pleasures are not forms of \textit{aiσθησις}.	extsuperscript{46} It disagrees with Mooradian's thesis insofar as it develops the view that the form of false pleasure for which Socrates argues in the imagination argument is propositional. Thus, Delcomminette maintains that the analogy argument is intended to distinguish the contents of a propositional attitude from the attitude itself.

Delcomminette, further, argues that for Socrates pleasure, or at least the sort of pleasure on which he focuses in the imagination argument, is not a form of perception (\textit{aiσθησις}), but rather of appearance (\textit{phantasia}). Socrates understands appearance, as per \textit{Sophist} 264a4-b5, as a mixture of perception and judgment. More precisely, appearance involves the application of a concept to a perception, which then makes the

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perception appear qua this or that. Consequently, "if the doxa varies, the appearance varies too"; and thus, the appearance may derive its falsity from the falsity of the doxa. Consequently, "if the doxa varies, the appearance varies too"; and thus, the appearance may derive its falsity from the falsity of the doxa. The image in which one takes pleasure is, then, a "quasi-perception" because it is based on perception, but produced in the absence of perception.

Delcomminette recognizes that for Socrates pleasure can be taken in such appearances whether they pertain to the future, present, or past. But, he maintains, Socrates focuses on anticipatory pleasures because they are the most common type. Furthermore, he emphasizes that "what we take pleasure in when we get a pleasure of anticipation is not merely an anticipated fact, but an anticipated pleasure. This is made very clear by the word <Socrates uses> προχαίρειν … when we get an anticipatory pleasure, we take pleasure in advance in a future pleasure." This, in turn, suggests that "the future pleasure is in some way present to our soul. Now it cannot be present as such, since it is precisely not occurring for the moment; the only way of making it present is by means of an anticipatory representation. This representation, which is a phantasma, is grounded on the doxa constitutive of anticipation, namely hope in this case; but it also supposes that this doxa is illustrated by means of a quasi-perception which compensates for the absence of actual perception constitutive of future pleasure. The anticipatory presentation of the future pleasure may be called the anticipated pleasure." Accordingly, Delcomminette's conception of Socrates' anticipatory pleasure as propositional pleasure may be distinguished from Penner's as follows. For Penner, one takes pleasure in the judgment that one will obtain a future pleasure. For Delcomminette, one takes pleasure in the imaginative representation of an expected pleasure. In the latter
case, the imaginary representation of an expected pleasure depends upon, but is not reducible to, the judgment (qua product).

Finally, regarding the question of how the anticipatory pleasure is false, Delcomminette writes: "<given that the phantasma is false if the doxa is>, how can falsity affect the anticipatory pleasure itself? Socrates does not explicitly elucidate this transition: he feels content with attributing the possibility of falsity to the 'painted pleasure' … namely to the anticipated pleasure <depicted by the painter> …" Even so, contra Gosling and Dybikowski, among others, Delcomminette insists, with Kenny, among others, that Socrates does not conflate the anticipated pleasure with the anticipatory pleasure. Rather, he explains, "the falsity of the <anticipated pleasure> necessarily implies that of <the anticipatory pleasure>. For as we have seen, the anticipated pleasure corresponds to the content of the anticipatory pleasure. Now as Socrates repeats here (cf. 40c8-d10), falsity can only concern the content of a pleasure; as for the ἴδεσθαι, at least the actual ἴδεσθαι, i.e. the fact that I really take pleasure now, it is as unquestionable as the fact that I judge when I judge. What can be false is only what I take pleasure in, and this corresponds, in the case of an anticipatory pleasure, to the anticipated pleasure. But when the content of a pleasure is false, one can say as well that the pleasure itself, i.e. the whole experience formed by the ἴδεσθαι and the ψεῦτο ἴδομενον ἴδεσται, is false. Hence the anticipatory pleasure taken in the representation of an unreal future pleasure can also be called false, since it is a pleasure taken in an unreal pleasure through the mediation of a false representation of the future." In short, since the propositional content is intrinsic to or a logical component of the propositional
pleasure, the truth-value of the propositional content implies the truth-value of the propositional attitude.\textsuperscript{58}

In her 2004 article, Harte suggests a view of Protarchus' initial position similar to Mooridian's: "a pleasure is true insofar as that in which it is taken is truly pleasant; and a thing being truly pleasant is a function of my finding it so."\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, Harte notes that her "account of Protarchus' position is similar to Mooradian's."\textsuperscript{60} But I detect a difference between Harte's and Mooradian's positions. For Mooradian, Protarchus' Protagorean conception of pleasure as a form of perception implies that pleasure must be true because perceptible qualities and perception of those qualities are ontologically bound so that misperception is impossible. But qua form of perception, pleasure involves taking an object to be a certain way, namely, pleasant. In contrast, in Harte's view of Protarchus' view, taking pleasure in something or finding something to be pleasant is not a matter of perceiving it to be a certain way. Rather, it is more akin to the projectivist view that the mind, as it were, projects properties onto objects by being oriented toward those objects in a particular way. As Hume famously puts it, in matters of taste, "a productive faculty <is at work> … gilding and staining all natural objects with the colors borrowed from internal sentiment."\textsuperscript{61}

If Harte holds some such view of Protarchus' conception, then pleasantness would not in fact be an object of perception. But then it is also unclear how we are to understand Protarchus' claim that pleasures must be true. Perhaps the claim will mean simply that one's attitude is truly, that is, genuinely an attitude of taking pleasure in something.\textsuperscript{62} This seems to be confirmed by Harte's following point. Harte believes that Protarchus' position creates a challenge for Socrates. As she says, "Socrates' challenge is to show that the
truth-value of a pleasure taken may be called into question and not simply the truth-value of that in which pleasure is taken.\textsuperscript{63}

Furthermore, Harte claims: "<Socrates> must show that, contrary to Protarchus' explicit reservation, a mistake can be made about that in which pleasure is taken that impacts on the evaluation of the pleasure therein, and not just on that of a related belief."\textsuperscript{64} Given Harte's view of Protarchus' position, this claim about the challenge Protarchus presents to Socrates must be construed as follows. A false pleasure would be a pleasure taken in something that was not pleasant. But something's being pleasant is a function of someone's taking pleasure in that thing. Thus, one cannot take pleasure in something that is not pleasant and thereby falsely enjoy that thing. Furthermore, one may take pleasure in something that is false, for example, the judgment that one is going to receive a large tax rebate. But the falsity of this thing in which one takes pleasure does not entail that the pleasure taken therein is false, for, again, if a false pleasure is a pleasure taken in what is not pleasant, taking pleasure in the judgment ensures its pleasantness.

In her account of how Socrates meets this challenge, Harte avails herself of Lovibond's conception of false pleasure, which Harte contrasts with Williams' conception.\textsuperscript{65} Recall that Williams' view informs Penner's position; on this view, a false pleasure is a propositional pleasure taken in a false belief, for example, that one will win the lottery. In contrast, Harte distinguishes the following two cases: one takes pleasure in the prospect of winning the lottery, and one in fact wins the lottery; however:

(A) winning the lottery produces unforeseen troubles and thus turns out to be unpleasant.
(B) winning the lottery produces the circumstances one had expected; however, between the time that one pleasantly anticipated the win and the circumstances consequent upon the win, one's values and thus attitude toward those circumstances have changed. Consequently, one no longer takes such circumstances to be pleasant.\(^6^6\)

In Harte's view, reasonably, the case of (A) more or less reduces Williams' view, for one has inaccurately predicted how events would unfold.\(^6^7\) In contrast, in the case of (B) events have turned out just as one had predicted. The change has occurred in the subject himself. This is significant, on Harte's interpretation of Protarchus' view, for it is one's attitude toward things that, so to speak, makes them pleasant. If one changes, one will no longer find the same things pleasant, and since one's finding them pleasant makes them so, they will no longer be pleasant.

Like Delcomminette, Harte maintains that on Socrates' conception, one who experiences anticipatory pleasure takes pleasure in the anticipated event, to some degree as he would were the event to occur at the moment he anticipates its occurrence: "an anticipatory pleasure is understood to be an advance installment of the pleasure anticipated …"\(^6^8\) Thus, when Socrates presents his example of a man enjoying picturing himself enjoying pleasures consequent upon the acquisition of wealth, his example "shows someone who thinks he will be pleased, and who, in thinking this, really does take <in advance the anticipated> pleasure. But the pleasure he takes is false insofar as he takes to be (going to be) pleasant what is not."\(^6^9\) That is, he takes pleasure in and thus finds pleasant something that ultimately he will not take pleasure in and thus not find to be pleasant.
I will engage Harte's explanation more critically at a latter stage in my discussion. For now, let the review of prior contributions suffice. Before I turn to my own interpretation of the primary evidence, I will here simply list my answers to the central interpretive questions of the imagination argument, introduced at the end of section I:

- Protarchus holds that pleasures are truth-apt and that they must be true. Protarchus holds this view because he is committed to a Protagorean relativist conception of pleasure. Protarchus holds that pleasure must be true because pleasure is a form of perception and the perceptual qualities that are the objects of perception are real. Thus, the truth of perception is a function of the ontological truth, that is, reality of the objects of perception.

- In the first argument, Socrates draws an analogy between pleasure and judgment. Socrates distinguishes between the objects (we would call them "contents") of pleasure and judgment and the psychological states (we would call them "attitudes") of pleasure and judgment. Socrates maintains, as Protarchus does, that the truth-value of the psychological states derives from the truth-value of their objects. Socrates then tries to persuade Protarchus that pleasure derived from false judgment is false. Protarchus rightly resists. The problem with Socrates' argument is that he fails to clarify the relation between pleasure and false judgment and thereby to show that the object of pleasure and thus the pleasure, not merely the judgment or object of judgment, may be false. This, then, becomes Socrates' objective in the second argument.

- In the second argument Socrates distinguishes the objects of pleasure from the objects of judgment through the distinction he introduces between the works of
psychological inscription and psychological depiction or imagination. The objects of pleasure are imaginative objects. These objects are derived from the objects of judgments and thus derive their truth-value from the objects of judgment, but they are distinct in form. In particular, imaginative objects are quasi-perceptual, whereas objects of judgment are phenomenally blank. Socrates hereby shows that pleasure's objects are not reducible to judgment's objects. Thus, if Socrates can convince Protarchus that pleasure's objects can be false, then he can convince Protarchus that pleasure can be false. Crucial to convincing Protarchus that pleasure's objects can be false is Socrates' view that pleasure's objects can be representationally false. In other words, Socrates introduces a conception of representational truth. Thus, he can consistently maintain that an ontologically true, that is, real pleasure is representationally false.

- Socrates' conception of false pleasures applies to present and past as well as future pleasures. But Socrates focuses on anticipatory pleasures, that is, pleasures pertaining to the future because human beliefs pertaining to the future and consequent expectations are often false. Thus, future-oriented psychological states provide a salient domain of falsehood.

- Socrates maintains that pious men tend to have true expectations and thus true anticipatory pleasures, while impious men tend to have false expectations and thus false anticipatory pleasures because Plato believes that future contingencies present a problem for the conception of representational truth. Precisely, in a non-deterministic universe, the future is not determined. Plato provisionally resolves this problem by introducing the gods. The gods fulfill the expectations of pious
men, thus ensuring the truth of those expectations, whereas the gods thwart the
expectations of impious men, thus ensuring the falsity of those expectations.

- The argument is, ultimately, valid, but perhaps unsound because the analogy
between judgments or beliefs and pleasures may not be defensible.

III. Protarchus' Initial Position: 36c6-e13

While Protarchus explicitly denies that pleasure can be false, he never directly
says that pleasure can be true. Still, there is good evidence that he believes pleasure can
be true. Consider the following exchange:

"(So:) We must investigate how we may have both true and false judgment, but
how truth alone belongs to pleasure; yet really judging and experiencing pleasure
occurs in both cases alike." (Pr:) Yes, we must investigate this."^70

Socrates is here assuming that Protarchus thinks that pleasure can be true; and in
assenting to Socrates' assertion, Protarchus affirms this assumption.^71

Given this, one question to be answered is why Protarchus thinks that pleasure
can only be true. I believe that Mooradian is right to suggest that Protarchus' position
conforms to the Protagorean relativist position developed at Theaetetus 152a-160e. The
main evidence Mooradian cites in support of his position is from Theaetetus 156b. In
describing Protagoras' theory of perception, Socrates includes pleasure and pain among
forms of perception:

"For the aiσθήσεις we have such names as sight, hearing, smelling, feeling cold
and feeling hot, and also what are called pleasures and pains, desires and fears;
and there are others besides, a great number that have names, an infinite number that do not."^72

The following additional evidence can be elicited to support Mooradian's thesis. Observe that Socrates includes certain emotions or motivational states among forms of αἰσθησία in the *Theaetetus* passage. When in *Philebus* Socrates questions whether there are true and false pleasures, he also suggests that there are true and false fears and hopes, and Protarchus denies that there are false fears and hopes.^73 Still further, in *Philebus*, to support his contention that there are false pleasures, Socrates appeals to the pleasures that people experience in dreams and that insane people experience.^74 This is consistent with Socrates' remark in the discussion of Protagoras' theory of perception at *Theaetetus* 157e-158a:

"We have not yet discussed the question of dreams and of insanity and other diseases, and also what is called mishearing, misseeing, and other cases of misperceiving. You realize, I suppose, that it would generally be agreed that all these cases appear to provide a refutation of the theory we have just expounded. For in these conditions, we surely have false perceptions. Here it is far from being true that all things that appear to the individual also are. On the contrary, none of the things that appear to him really is."

Assuming, then, that Protarchus' position conforms to the Protagorean relativist position, we need to clarify the truth-conception operative in the Protagorean view that all perceptions are true. This is one important aspect of Mooradian's position that no one, including Mooradian himself, has adequately treated.
At *Theaetetus* 152a2-8, Socrates interprets Protagoras' man-is-the-measure doctrine to mean that "as each thing appears to me, so it is for me; and as it appears to you, so it is for you." Socrates explains this point as follows:

"Now doesn't it sometimes happen that when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels cold and the other not? Or that one of us feels rather cold and the other very cold? … Well, in that case are we going to say that the wind itself by itself is cold or not cold? Or should we listen to Protagoras and say that it is cold for the one who feels cold and for the other not cold?"\(^{75}\)

Socrates then identifies something's appearing to someone (τι τινι φαίνεται) with someone's perceiving something (τις τινὸς αἰσθάνεται),\(^{76}\) and he concludes that "perception (αἰσθησίς) is always of what is (τοῦ ὄντος) and is without falsity (ἄφενδες) … as knowledge is (ὡς ἐπιστήμη ὁὐσία)."\(^{77}\)

Compare Socrates' suggestion here that knowledge is of what is (τὸ ὄν) with the same claim in *Republic* 476e7-477a1. Now, Socrates' claim in *Republic* V is notoriously ambiguous between existential, predicative, and veridical interpretations. In other words, it could mean that knowledge is of what exists; knowledge is of what is *F*; or knowledge is of what is true or is the case.\(^{78}\) I do not believe that Plato clearly distinguishes these various interpretations in the *Republic* passage. Rather, the various readings are conflated in the text because the primary truth-conception operative here and elsewhere in *Republic* is an ontological one. According to the ontological conception, truth is identified with reality; thus, what is exists is true; moreover, what exists is *F* and in no way not-*F*. This conception of truth and of knowledge is indebted to Parmenides.\(^{79}\) Insofar as Protagoras'
homo mensura dictum claims that perception is of what is, it may well be a response to Parmenides. At any rate, Plato appears to treat it as such at this point in Theaetetus.

The Protagorean conception of perception and of the truth of all perception may be understood by contrast with a certain naïve view. According to the naïve view, things inherently have perceptual qualities, for example, the claim that a wind is warm implies that warmth is an inherent property of the wind. It is the warmth, inherent in the wind, that, when perceived, is veridically perceived. In contrast, the Protagorean view maintains that perceptual qualities are not inherent in objects; rather, they are relational qualities, engendered when subjects and objects interact in a certain way. According to the naïve view, a true perception is a perception of some object as, say, warm conjoined with the fact that the object is indeed warm. This seems to be a representationalist view of perception: a true perception represents its objects correctly. But on the Protagorean view, perception does not appear to be representational, for there is nothing, certainly not a perceptual quality inherent in the object, that a perception can be said to represent. Rather, the notion of a true perception is to be understood as a perception that apprehends a quality that, simply, exists. In other words, the truth-conception operative in Protagoras' theory of perception is fundamentally an ontological one. Hereafter, I will refer to the following as a Protagorean perceptual principle:

(P) a perception is true if the quality perceived is ontologically true, that is, real.

Principle (P) employs the same truth-conception operative in Republic V and elsewhere in Republic and Plato's middle period. The difference, of course, is that Plato does not believe perception is an epistemic mode, nor that perceptual qualities are real in the way that Forms, the proper objects of knowledge, are.
Now, according to the wind-example that Socrates uses at *Theaetetus* 152a-b, the same object can engender two different perceptual qualities in two different subjects. This Protagorean position also implies that two different objects can engender one and the same perceptual quality in two different subjects. I suggest that this is precisely the position Protarchus affirms when, early in *Philebus*, he resists Socrates' suggestion that pleasures that derive from different sorts of activity differ:

"(So:) Think about it: we say that a debauched person gets pleasure and that a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. (Pr:) Well, yes, Socrates, the pleasures come from opposite things, but they are not at all opposed to one another."82

Protarchus is here asserting that the interaction of different objects and subjects can engender the same perceptual experience.

IV. Socrates' First Argument for False Pleasure: 37a1-38b2

Having clarified Protarchus' initial position, I now turn to Socrates' first argument against it. Socrates begins his first argument for false pleasure, the argument from analogy with judgment, with the following six premises.

(1) Judging is something we do.83
(2) Experiencing pleasure is something we do.84
(3) That which is judged is something.85
(4) That in which that which experiences pleasure experiences pleasure is something. (In other words, that in which pleasure is taken is something.)86
(5) That which judges (τὸ δοξάζον), if it judges correctly (ὁρθῶς) or if it judges incorrectly (μὴ ὁρθῶς), does not destroy the act of really (ὡς τε) judging (τὸ δοξάζειν).87

(6) That which experiences pleasure (τὸ ἡδόμενον), if it experiences pleasure correctly or if it experiences pleasure incorrectly, will not destroy (ἀπωλεῖ) the act of really experiencing pleasure (τὸ ἡδεσθαῖ).88

In (1)-(6) Socrates asserts that judgment and pleasure share three characteristics: both befall humans; both have what I will call "objects"; and both are ontologically independent of their possible truth-values.

At this point in the argument it is unclear whether what I am calling the objects of judgment and pleasure are extensional or intensional. For instance, regarding Socrates' earlier claim, considered at the end of the preceding section, that a sober-minded man takes pleasure in being sober-minded, Socrates could mean that such a man takes pleasure in sober-minded activity; and such activity could be the object of his pleasure. In the second argument in the imagination argument, Socrates clarifies that the objects of judgment and pleasure are situated in the soul. This might encourage us to understand them as intentional or intensional. But, again, at this point in the argument, the nature of the objects is unclear.

It should also be emphasized that Socrates does not employ a word akin to "object"— for which there is, in any case, no Greek equivalent— to characterize "τὸ δοξαζόμενον" and "τὸ ὥ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἡδεσθαί." He does not even speak of them as "things" (πράγματα or χρήματα). I will continue to use the word "object," but on grammatical, rather than ontological, grounds. For convenience, I will also refer to the
object of judgment as a doxastic object, and the object of pleasure as a hedonic object. Finally, I will refer to pleasure and judgment themselves as states of the soul or psychological states. I prefer "state" to "attitude" for the same reason I prefer "object" to "content"; the latter terms may have implications that Plato or his interlocutors do not recognize. "State" translates the Greek "ἐξί", which Socrates applies to knowledge and pleasure early in the dialogue.89

In light of (1)-(6), Socrates suggests that Protarchus and he must inquire into the following ideas:

(i1) (a) How judging and experiencing pleasure can be ontologically independent of the truth-value of a particular judgment or pleasure, (b) yet judgment can be either true or false, whereas pleasure can only be true.90

(i2) That falsity and truth are added to judgment and thereby each judgment becomes qualified (πολλα) in a certain way.91

(i3) That pleasure and pain, unlike some things we experience that are wholly qualified, are simply what they are and are unqualified.92

Clearly, neither Socrates nor Protarchus endorses all of the contents of (i1)-(i3). Neither Socrates nor Protarchus holds (i1). Rather, (i1a) and (i1b) seem to be inconsistent. Both Protarchus and Socrates hold (i2), and only Protarchus seems to hold (i3). Indeed, I can see no reason for Socrates' proposing that they consider (i3) other than that he takes Protarchus to be committed to it. Collectively, (i1)-(i3) present an aporia or puzzle, which is why, at this point in the argument, Socrates presents them as ideas that need investigation.
Being qualified and unqualified are central concepts in (i1)-(i3) and in the immediately ensuing premises. What do these concepts mean? Since Protarchus maintains that pleasure must be true and since on this view truth is a property of or rather—to put things in an ontologically neutral manner—belongs to pleasure, being qualified cannot be equivalent to having a property. Instead, I suggest that qualities are properties that entities may, but need not, possess. Thus, judgment may be, but need not, be qualified by truth. In other words, qualities are accidental properties. In contrast, since on Protarchus’ view, pleasure must be true, pleasure is not qualified by truth; and indeed, as he presently sees it, pleasure is unqualified.

As the argument resumes, however, Socrates draws Protarchus’ attention to the fact that pleasure and pain are qualified:

(7) Pleasure and pain are qualified (ποιώ).93

(8) Pleasure and pain can be great and small (μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί) as well as intense (σφόδρα).94

(9) If depravity (πονηρία) is added to pleasure or judgment, then pleasure or judgment is depraved.95

(10) If correctness (ὑγιής) or incorrectness is added to pleasure or judgment, then pleasure or judgment is correct or incorrect.96

(11) If that which is judged (τὸ δοξαζόμενον) is errant (ἀμαρτόμενον), the judgment, erring (ἀμαρτάνουσαν), is not correct, and it is not judging correctly (οὐδ’ ὑγιῶς δοξάζουσαν).97

(12) If a pleasure or pain errs with regard to that in which it is pleased or pain, it is not correct or useful "or some other fine attribute."98
(13) We often experience pleasure with false rather than with correct judgment.\textsuperscript{99}

(8)-(10) suggest various ways in which pleasure and pain may be qualified. Note that whereas (8) is expressed categorically, (9) and (10) are expressed hypothetically. (8) suffices to demonstrate that pleasure and pain can be qualified. Thus, the function of (9) and (10) is incrementally to suggest that pleasure and pain can be qualified with respect to their truth-value. Of course, Socrates has done little to convince Protarchus that this is true. So far he may only be said to have clarified how, on his own view, truth and falsity relate to pleasure and pain: truth and falsity relate to pleasure and pain as qualities.

Given the assumption, not explicitly expressed at this point in the argument, that incorrect, that is, false judgment does occur, (11) explains how judgment is false: if the doxastic object is errant, then the judgment is errant. This claim might be taken to indicate that by "that which is judged" (τὸ δοξαζόμενον), that is, the doxastic object, Socrates must be referring to an intensional or intentional object rather than an extensional one. This is simply because the concept of an errant extensional object seems incoherent. It will turn out, in the second argument, that "τὸ δοξαζόμενον" in fact refers to a mental entity. However, it may be noted that Plato is not averse to characterizing extensional objects as false or errant, for example, utterances, inscriptions, and paintings. Consequently, we should continue to treat "τὸ δοξαζόμενον," the doxastic object, as underdetermined with respect to intensionality and extensionality.

More importantly, at this point, Socrates does not explain how doxastic objects can be errant. In the second argument, from imagination, he implies that they can be errant insofar as they misrepresent things.\textsuperscript{100} In other words, doxastic objects can be errant qua representationally false. This truth-conception, representational truth (and
falsity), is one that Plato has labored, above all in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, to clarify. The central concept he employs, in *Sophist*, to work out the idea of representational truth and falsity is that of a copy or imitation.\textsuperscript{101} We can see the tension between ontological and representational truth-conceptions clearly operating in the following *Sophist* passage:

"(Th:) What in the world would we say a copy (εἰδωλον) is, sir, except something that's made similar to a true thing (τάληθνον) and is another thing that's like it?

(St:) You're saying it's another true thing (ἀληθνον) like it? Or what do you mean by 'like it'?

(Th:) Not that it's true (ἀληθνον) at all, but that it resembles <the true thing>. (St:) Meaning by 'true' (ἀληθνον) really being (ὁντωσ ὄν)? (Th:) Yes.

(St:) And meaning by 'not true' the contrary of true? (Th:) Of course. (St:) So you're saying that that which is like is not really that which is (ὁντωσ ὄν), if you speak of it as not true (μὴ ἀληθνον). (Th:) And yet it is, in a way (πως). (St:) But not truly (ἀληθδος), you say. (Th:) No, except that it really is a likeness (εἰκων ὁντωσ). (St:) So it's not really what is (οὐκ ὄν ... ὁντωσ), but it really is what we call a likeness (ἐστιν ὁντωσ ... εἰκόνα)? (Th:) Maybe that which is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν) is woven together with that which is (τῷ ὄντι) in some way like that— it's very strange."\textsuperscript{102}

In *Philebus* Socrates' conceptualization of the doxastic object as representational, that is, as a sort of copy or imitation, is crucial to resisting Protarchus' and the Protagorean view that pleasure, and all other αἰσθήσεις, must be true. Recall the Protagorean principle (P): the perception is true if the quality perceived is ontologically true, that is, real. The notion of representational truth and falsity enables Socrates to hold that the pleasure is false because the hedonic object is representationally false, while at
the same time maintaining, as he does, that representationally false pleasures are
(ontologically) true, that is, real. Thus, in the argument from analogy, (12) clarifies, by
analogy with (11), how if pleasure could be incorrect and thus false, it would be, namely,
by its object's being false.

Given (13), that pleasure can "come with false judgment," Socrates wishes to
infer that in fact pleasure can be incorrect and thus false. Protarchus blocks this inference
by insisting that in such a case the falsity lies in the judgment, not the pleasure. Is
Protarchus entitled to his resistance? As we have seen, Penner suggests that Socrates' use
of the expression pleasure "with (μὴ τάδ)," rather than in, false judgment provides
Protarchus with an opening. On this view, the argument does not commit Protarchus to
the conclusion that pleasure may be taken in false judgment, from which, ex hypothesi, it
can be inferred that the pleasure taken therein is false. Rather, the argument only commits
Protarchus to the view that pleasure occurs with false judgment. Thus, Protarchus may
insist that the compresence of pleasure and false judgment does not imply that the
pleasure is false.

I agree with Penner here. More precisely, the claim that pleasure is compresent
with false judgment leaves vague the relation between the pleasure and the false
judgment. Consider the following three ways of construing the relation:

(A) the hedonic object is a doxastic state whose doxastic object is false;

(B) the hedonic object is the same as the doxastic object;

(C) the hedonic object derives from the doxastic object.

Regarding (A), premises (11) and (12) conjointly suggest a more general principle: the
falsity of certain psychological states can be inferred from the falsity of their objects.
Still, nothing was said about inferring the falsity of certain psychological states from the falsity of other psychological states-cum-false-objects. Regarding (B), Protarchus may need convincing that two compresent psychological states can share the same object. His inclination might be to think that the object of one type of state cannot be the object of another type of state. In the case of (C), the preceding argument has done nothing to show how the object of one type of state may be derived from the object of another type of state. Thus, the argument has done nothing to show how the falsity of the object of one type of state may derive from the falsity of the object of another type of state. I suggest that concerns related to (C) lie behind Protarchus' resistance. Accordingly, Socrates' task in the second argument must be to show that (C) is possible and how it is.

V. Socrates' Second Argument for False Pleasure: 38b3-40e5

In light of our conclusions regarding the first argument for false pleasure, Socrates' objective in the second argument for false pleasure is to clarify the relation between pleasure and false judgment and to show that a certain type of pleasure accompanied by or derived from false judgment is itself false. Given Protarchus' commitment to a Protagorean conception of pleasure and perception generally, in the course of clarifying the relation between pleasure and false judgment, Socrates must also, contrary to (P), show that the object of pleasure can itself be false.

At the beginning of the second argument Socrates states that pleasure and pain often follow upon (ἐπεταί) true and false judgment. This claim is significant for it specifies that the alleged false pleasure occurs subsequently to the false judgment. At this point (38b12-39b2) Socrates proceeds to explain how perceptual judgment and the
process of reaching a perceptual judgment occurs. He claims that judgment and the attempt to reach a judgment derive from (ἐκ ... γιγνεθ) memory and perception. Socrates then presents an example to clarify how the process of forming a perceptual judgment and specifically a false perceptual judgment involves perception and memory. As many commentators have observed, Socrates' account is continuous with the discussion of false perceptual judgment in the second allodoxy argument at Theaetetus 191a5-195b8. The point of departure in the example in Philebus is someone seeing a man, but at a distance (πόρρωθεν) and so unclearly (μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς). Given this, the perceiver desires to determine (βούλεσθαι κρίνειν) what (τι) he is seeing. Determining what one is seeing, then, is equivalent to reaching a perceptual judgment. Thus, the conditions of the example should facilitate an explanation of how such judgment occurs.

The process of reaching a perceptual judgment is characterized, as thinking is in Theaetetus, as a sort of silent dialogue with oneself: the perceiver asks himself (αὐτὸν ... ἀνέροις) what appears to be standing there, and he answers himself (ἀποκρίνομενος ... πρὸς αὐτὸν). He may hit the mark (ἐπὶ τυχόν) and answer correctly that it is a man, or he may err (παρένεβείς) and answer that it is a statue erected by shepherds. The answer constitutes a judgment (δόξα), but Socrates does not in fact clarify how memory informs perception in reaching this determination. In Theaetetus, the process is described as involving the comparison of the perception with a memorial imprint. In this case, various reasons may explain occurrences of false judgment. For example, memorial imprints may be defective due to the qualities of the soul. Alternatively, the obscurity of the perception may mislead one to associate it with the wrong imprint.
At this point Socrates suggests that if the perceiver happens to be in the company of another man, he may express his judgment to his companion. In that case, the perceiver, "stretching what he has said to himself into sound" (τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνήν), makes an utterance, and "what we once called a judgment thus becomes a statement" (λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὖτως ὁ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν).\(^\text{111}\) I suggest that this seemingly odd point, which is never mentioned again in the argument, serves to introduce the idea that a judgment may produce another truth-apt entity, and that the truth-value of the entity produced from the judgment will depend upon the truth-value of the judgment.

In fact, there is a delicate point to be considered in this passage. I have said that the judgment produces another truth-apt entity, a statement. But Socrates' precise words are, as I have quoted them, that what the perceiver has said to himself is stretched into sound and that the judgment becomes a statement. This language suggests not merely that one thing produces another, but that one thing transforms into another. That point is significant, for it suggests that when a statement arises from a judgment, the process involves a single entity undergoing transformation. This entity can be nothing other than what we would call the content of the judgment.

Socrates never applies a label, such as some Greek equivalent of "content," to this entity. Nonetheless, given the role of the idea in the ensuing argument, I think it is reasonable to infer that Plato is aware of some such concept. Granting this, one might be inclined to characterize this content as a proposition. Indeed, as we have seen, since Penner, many commentators have maintained that in the imagination argument Socrates
is introducing the concept of propositional pleasure. For reasons I will give in the conclusion to the paper, I will resist attributing to Socrates the concept of a proposition.

Presently, I suggest that the language of transformation in 38e1-4 is not merely metaphorical. It has spatial connotations, although not entirely bodily connotations. The judgment itself is situated in the soul, which, according to Timaeus, is an extended, although not corporeal entity, and which is situated within the marrow (μυελός) of the brain. The spoken utterance is situated in the vicinity of the mouth and is bodily. Thus, in the transformation process, space between the brain and mouth is traversed. Accordingly, I wish to draw a distinction between the content of the doxastic and spoken objects and the form of these objects. Clearly, the doxastic object and the spoken object have different formal properties; for example, the former is inaudible, whereas the latter is audible; and the former is non-corporeal, whereas the latter is corporeal.

Resuming the argument now—Socrates contrasts the possibility of expressing the judgment as a statement to a companion with the possibility of being by oneself and considering the experience subsequent to its occurrence. As Socrates says, one might "think about this while one is alone a good deal of time" after the initial perception has taken place. In this case, Socrates' interest is to begin to draw a distinction between the perception and related memories as they inform a subsequent judgment and, as we will see, an image that is constructed on the basis of the judgment in the absence of perception. This work occurs at 38e12-39c6 and involves Socrates' clarification of two psychological functions, which he describes in terms of inscription and painting. In the first case, Socrates characterizes the soul as a kind of book (βιβλίω τινὶ) in which a scribe writes λόγοι. As he says: "memory converges with perceptions and related
affections and writes λόγοι in our souls." And "when the scribe writes true things, then true δόξα and true λόγοι result"; whereas when it writes false things, then false δόξα and λόγοι result. Precisely what λόγοι are is unclear. We can uncontroversially say at least this much: λόγοι are linguistic entities.

The work of psychic inscription must be assumed in the previous cases (where δόξαι are formed in the presence of perception and when the perceiver expresses his opinion to his companion). But Socrates has postponed his account to the present point in the argument in order to clarify, as he proceeds to do, the distinction and relation between two types of object, doxastic objects and objects associated with so-called psychological painting, that is, with the imagination.

At 39b3-c6, Socrates moves from the psychic function of doxastic inscription to the function of imaginatively depiction. The latter involves the creation of images (εἰκόνας) of the things judged and said when, as Socrates explains, the subject "takes the things that have been judged and said away from (ἀπ’ ... ἀπαγαγών) vision or any other form of perception (τίνος ἀλλῆς αἰσθήσεως)." In the example, Socrates focuses on visual perception and visual imagination, but, as many commentators note, the phrase "τίνος ἀλλῆς αἰσθήσεως" indicates that he is construing the painter as merely one perceptual form that imagination may take. Thus, although the word "εἰκών" that Socrates uses might be thought to apply specifically to visual images, it should be understood to stand proxy for any products of the imagination.

The images of visual imagination, like spoken utterances, are said to be true or false according to the truth or falsity of the judgments and specifically doxastic objects on the basis of which they are constructed. Granted this, just as the doxastic and spoken
objects have distinct forms, so the doxastic and what I will call imaginative objects have distinct forms. It seems to me that many commentators have not adequately appreciated this point. As we will see in the ensuing argument, it is the images, rather than doxastic objects, that are the objects of pleasure. Thus, it is wrong, as Penner and others do, to characterize the sort of pleasure Socrates here describes as pleasure taken in a judgment or belief. Pleasure is taken in an imaginative object, an image, which is based upon a judgment, more specifically on a doxastic object. Thus, the question must be considered why Plato thinks this extra dimension of imagination must be introduced to defend the concept of false pleasure. I will address this question in the conclusion.

Socrates has now secured Protarchus' agreement to the view that products of the imagination may be true or false. He proceeds to clarify that the imaginative objects, like doxastic objects, may be temporally indexed in various ways. In the example of the man seen at a distance, the doxastic object and imagined object can be indexed to the present or past. For example, if at the site where the perception occurs, on the basis of a judgment made about the identity of the object seen, one forms a mental image of that object, which is clearer than that which perception itself affords, then the judgment and the imagining will be indexed to the present: what I am seeing now is a man. In the case of the judgment and imagining formed after the fact, these will be indexed to the past: what I saw then was a man. But Socrates reasonably gains Protarchus' assent to the claim that such judgments and imaginings may be indexed to the future as well. As Protarchus says, "they pertain to all times equally."

Socrates explains his introduction of temporal indexicality and his particular interest in the future on the grounds that the second form of pleasure he introduced (at
32b-c), namely, pleasures of the soul itself are precisely indexed to the future. In other words, they are anticipatory pleasures. Moreover, the work of the scribe and painter will be especially devoted to this form of pleasure since, as Socrates says, anticipatory pleasures are "hopes of what is to come (ἐπιλίδες εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον) and we pass our whole lives full of hopes (γέμομεν ἐλπίδων)." In short, then, Socrates' explicit reason for focusing on judgments and imaginings pertaining to the future is their frequency. But I suspect that Plato also has Socrates focuses on the future-oriented pleasures because our expectations are often false. Thus, judgments and imaginings pertaining to the future provide a domain in which falsity is particularly salient.

Socrates' account of anticipatory pleasure depends upon the first kind of pleasure he describes. The first kind of pleasure is the restoration toward a harmonious condition from a depleted or disintegrated bodily state. The second kind of pleasure is a purely psychic pleasure; it is the hopeful (ἐλπιζόμενον) expectation of such restoration, which Socrates characterizes as itself pleasant ( bindActionCreators) and encouraging (θαρραλέον). In the imagination argument, Socrates says of such hopeful expectation that we "pre-enjoy" (προχαίρειν) the bodily pleasure that is to come. I take this to mean that we presently enjoy the imaginative object, which represents a future bodily restoration. Precisely what the relation is between the pleasure here experienced and the hedonic object, which is the imaginative object, is a question to which I will return in the conclusion. Presently, we can simply say that the objects of anticipatory pleasures are images pertaining to the future.

Socrates now, at 39e8-40c7, develops the final step in the argument that there are false pleasures. This last step has generated considerable puzzlement. Much of the
puzzlement derives, as we saw in our review of the secondary literature, from the problem of how false objects of pleasure imply false pleasures taken in those objects. And we will consider this problem in the conclusion. But the last step in the argument is puzzling for a further reason. Socrates could, at this point, argue that some of our firm expectations, including the images pertinent to them, are not realized; thus, they are false. But Socrates does not proceed by this direct route. Instead, he argues that the expectations and attendant images of good and pious men tend to be true, whereas those of bad and impious men tend to be false. The question, then, is why Socrates adds this dimension to the argument.

Evans, commenting on Frede, presents the problem well: "When Socrates claims here that the bad person's hope-based pleasures are false, he is not saying anything about whether these hopes are worthless or inadequate or reprehensible; he is saying only that they will not come about. And it is precisely this alleged evaluative silence that makes many commentators uncomfortable. Dorothea Frede expresses this general discomfort rather well when she writes: 'It is not likely that Plato <at 40B2-4> is merely referring to the … Greek folk wisdom that those whom the gods love <or hate> are those who prosper <or suffer> in life. He must also be implying that the moral content of foolish pleasures is mistaken, so that they represent a skewed view of life.' <Frede, 1993, 44> Frede's thought here, if I understand it correctly, is that the <argument's> classification of the bad person's hope-based pleasures as false must somehow outstrip the claim that these hopes will not be realized; it must encompass the additional claim that these hopes express bad values. Otherwise the explicitly established link between false hope and bad character would seem to have no rationale."123
I will refer to this aspect of the imagination argument as the *piety aspect*. In my review of secondary literature above I deferred discussion of the various views of the piety aspect for simplicity's sake. I will canvass several positions here.\textsuperscript{124} A first division can be made between those who hold that the piety aspect is not logically integral to the argument and those who hold that the piety aspect is logically integral to the argument. Only one scholar emphasizes that the piety aspect is not logically integral to the argument. In his 1959 piece, Gosling ignores this aspect of the argument; but in his 1975 edition of the dialogue, he suggests that it is a "moralistic digression."\textsuperscript{125}

Among those who view the piety aspect as logically integral to the argument, it is agreed that there is a link between the character, piety or impiety, of men and the truth and falsity of their expectations and pleasures. Positions then divide over the nature of this link. One set of commentators maintains that pious men tend to have true expectations and thus true pleasures because they are god-beloved and that impious men tend to have false expectations and thus false pleasures because they are god-hated. Another group of commentators maintains that good men tend to have true expectations and thus true pleasures because they are good and that bad men tend to have false expectations and thus false pleasures because they are bad. I will consider each of these groups in turn.

Dybikowski suggests that the piety aspect of the argument assumes something akin to "the Old Testament view that material prosperity is in direct proportion to piety."\textsuperscript{126} Gosling and Taylor suggest a similar view: "it would not be in the least odd for Socrates to suggest, and Protarchus to accept, the traditional view that the wicked, carried away by unrealistic expectations of worldly success, are likely to find these expectations
shattered by divine vengeance, whereas the good, who have curbed their expectations within the proper bounds, find those more modest expectations fulfilled by divine favor. Mooradian and Evans endorse a similar view. Note, however, that while both Dybikowski's and Gosling and Taylor's accounts explain why impious men's expectations are false, they do not exactly explain why Plato chose to attribute false anticipatory pleasures to impious men. After all, Socrates merely needs to convince Protarchus that some expectations and thus anticipatory pleasures are false; he does not need to clarify what sort of characters suffer from such expectations and pleasures.

Kenny, Harte, and Delcomminette are among those who hold that the truth and falsity of expectations and pleasures is intrinsic to the characters of good and bad men. As we discussed earlier, Kenny insists that Socrates' introduction of the bad man is crucial for convincing Protarchus that there are false pleasures: the bad man is precisely the sort whose expectations will be unrealized. Although the bad man will predict events with equal competence to the good man, the bad man will fail to see that he will not derive pleasure from these events. As such, he lacks self-knowledge and thus is laughable. Kenny appeals to a later passage in the dialogue, 48c5-10, where Socrates characterizes lack of self-knowledge as the root of bad character. In this later section of the dialogue, among two types of self-ignorance, Socrates also characterizes one kind as laughable. Indeed, in the imagination argument Socrates explicitly says that the bad man's false pleasures are "laughable imitations" of the good man's true pleasures.

As we have also seen, Harte maintains that bad men experience false pleasures because they take pleasure in and thus find pleasant the images or thought of things,
which upon actually obtaining they ultimately will not take pleasure in and thus not find to be pleasant. We may wonder, however, why bad people should suffer such a fate. In explaining her position Harte suggests the following, no doubt whimsical example.

Initially a bad man takes pleasure in the prospect of winning the lottery. As luck would have it, he in fact wins the lottery. But in the meantime he has taken courses in ascetic philosophy and re-evaluated his attitude to money. Thus, upon winning, he does not find the money to be pleasant. In this case—let us grant to Harte—the bad man's anticipatory pleasure will be false. But the falsity requires a subsequent positive transformation in the personality of the bad man. Thus, unless we think that bad men tend to undergo positive transformations in their personalities, we should have no reason to think that their anticipatory pleasures will tend be false.

In his 2006 book, Delcomminette, prompted by a passage in Boethius' Consolation to the effect that good men realize their desires, while bad men do not, suggests the following alternative explanation of the piety aspect. All desire is for the good. But good and bad men have different conceptions of the good; thus, they desire as well as expect and experience anticipatory pleasure in different things. Bad men do not fail to predict the pleasures that they anticipate any more than good men. But bad men envision different things than good men do, and specifically they envision the good under the false appearance of the pleasures they anticipate. Consequently, their anticipatory pleasures are false because they assume and envision that the realization of these pleasures will bring happiness (bonheur), but it does not.

There are several problems with interpretations that take the truth and falsity of expectations and pleasures to be intrinsic to the characters of good and bad men. One is
that they make Socrates' talk of piety and the gods irrelevant. Or at least, since they do, adherents of such interpretations should acknowledge that this feature of the piety aspect of the argument is not logically integral to the argument. Another is that they suggest that good men desire loftier things than bad men. Yet Socrates is explicit that the objects of anticipatory pleasures are those pleasures that he described in his account of the first form of pleasure at 31c-32b, namely, bodily pleasures, pleasures of natural bodily restoration. These include, for instance, the pleasures of eating, drinking, and warmth. Of course, bad men may, like Callicles in Gorgias, desire unhealthy excesses of such things, whereas good men may not. But this basic consideration at least puts a damper on the moralistic view of the good. Finally, as Evans has emphasized, earlier in the imagination argument, specifically when Socrates first characterizes true and false perceptual judgment, the examples he uses are entirely value-neutral. When one judges that one is seeing a man in the distance, then one judges truly; whereas when one judges that one is seeing a statue in the distance, then one judges falsely. This suggests that Socrates has the representational conception of truth in mind and that if this is not the truth-conception operative in the piety aspect, then the argument involves a fallacy of ambiguity.134

I believe that Socrates uses the representational conception of truth in both places in the imagination argument. Accordingly, I will suggest an alternative explanation of the piety aspect. My suggestion resembles one offered by Frede in a passing footnote in her 1985 paper. At the conclusion of her paper Frede recognizes and indeed emphasizes that propositional pleasures in particular can be subject to moral critique precisely because the propositions embedded in them express moral evaluations, but she offers quite a different explanation for the piety aspect: "I just want to suggest one very simple explanation
(though this may not be all there is to the passage): Protarchus had denied earlier that expectations (*prosdokiai*) are true or false. The divine backup would guarantee that there is antecedent truth and falsity.\(^{135}\)

Although, as we have seen, imaginative pleasures may be indexed to the present and past as well as the future, Socrates and Plato have independent reasons for focusing on false anticipatory pleasures, as opposed, say, to false memorial pleasures in the imagination argument. Granted this, the truth-value of judgments and images pertaining to the future, as opposed to the past or present, presents a special logico-cosmological problem: there is no state of affairs with which they correspond or, since they are supposed to correspond to a future state of affairs, it may not simply be epistemologically unclear what the future holds, but, on a certain view of the cosmos, the future may not be determined. This, at any rate, is a problem with truth-apt entities pertaining to the future that we know exercised a number of Greek philosophers. Aristotle discusses the problem in *De Interpretatione* 9, and the Epicureans and Stoics followed him.\(^{136}\) Aristotle and Epicurus appear to have denied the principle of bivalence in view of truth-apt entities pertaining to the future precisely on the ground that the cosmos is not deterministic, while the Stoics rejected this view on the ground that the cosmos is deterministic. We know that, in general, some of the material on language and truth in Aristotle's *Organon*, that is, in Aristotle's early works was informed by material in Plato's late dialogues such as *Sophist*. I propose that the piety aspect is introduced to head off an Aristotelian worry—one that, I am assuming, was alive in the Academy in the late years of Plato's life—that anticipatory pleasures cannot be true or false since the events that will constitute their truth-makers are not determined. By importing the gods into the argument at this point
and by linking the activities of the gods to the characters of the anticipators, Plato can head off the worry.

On this interpretation the truth-value of the anticipatory pleasures will be extrinsic to the character of those who experience them. At the same time, I would suggest that the assumption that the gods bring prosperity to the pious and foil the expectations of the impious need not be taken as straightforwardly reflecting a principle of Platonic theology. Rather, I suggest the piety aspect is a dialectical expedient, used either ad hominem or as a conventional assumption and thus best viewed as a lemma.

So much for the piety aspect of the imagination argument. We can summarize Socrates' position to this point as follows. Beliefs can be false, and their falsity derives from the falsity of their objects (doxastic objects). Although Socrates does not explicitly argue that the falsity of doxastic objects is representational falsity, this way of understanding their falsity seems clear from the form of the argument itself— especially when the argument is viewed in relation to aspects of *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. Granted this, the imagination creates objects (imaginative objects) based on doxastic objects, and the imaginative objects derive their truth-value from the truth-value of the doxastic objects. Some pleasures, for example, anticipatory pleasures may have imaginative objects. The expectations of impious men tend to be false. Thus, the pleasures that impious men take in imaginative objects tend to be false. Given this, Socrates undermines Protarchus' initial position, derived from (P), in the following way. Socrates shows Protarchus that pleasure's objects may be mental entities that are representational and thus capable of being false. Moreover, the falsity of such pleasures is consistent with their truly, that is, really being pleasures.
VI. Conclusion

The objects of Socrates' truth-apt pleasures are imaginative, not doxastic; therefore, as I have suggested, we should resist Penner's claim that Socrates' truth-apt pleasures are taken in belief or judgment. Imaginative objects may share content with the doxastic objects from which they are derived, but the forms of these objects differ. For instance, imaginative objects have quasi-perceptual properties, whereas doxastic objects lack such properties; the latter are, we might say, phenomenally blank.

Granting this, let us, for argument's sake, draw a distinction between pleasure taken in a doxastic object and pleasure taken in an imaginative object. For example, contrast being pleased upon learning that one will visit Rome next spring with taking pleasure in imagining oneself enjoying a gelato in the Piazza Venezia. In the latter case, imagination seems to evoke pleasure in a way that the former case does not. In the imagination argument Socrates says nothing about taking pleasure in a doxastic object, but let us assume he would grant the existence of such—let us call them—purely doxastic pleasures.

In contrast to both purely doxastic pleasures and the imaginative pleasures that Socrates proposes in the imagination argument, consider also what I will call purely imaginative pleasures, that is, pleasures taken in imaginative objects that are not derived from doxastic objects, for example, pleasures taken in daydreaming, sexual fantasy, or funny fantastical images or scenarios. If Socrates' aim in the imagination argument were merely to show that pleasures may be taken in imaginative objects that are not reducible to doxastic objects, then he could do so by appealing to such purely imaginative
pleasures. But Socrates doesn't merely want to show this, he also wants to show that pleasures taken in imaginative objects may be false. Granted this, why doesn't Socrates simply argue that purely imaginative pleasures are false? If I take pleasure in a sexual fantasy, then the imagined fantasy qua fantasy is false insofar as it does not correspond to any state of affairs. And if pleasure is false if the object of pleasure is, then this pleasure is false. Proceeding by way of purely imaginative pleasures would avoid the difficulty of having to show that the hedonic object does not reduce to a doxastic object and thus avoid Protarchus' worry that belief rather than pleasure is false. In short, Socrates seems to make trouble for himself by arguing for false pleasures whose objects are derived from doxastic objects.

I do not have an answer to the question why Socrates proceeds in this troublesome manner. I would, however, like to address Frede's suggestion that the sort of pleasure that concerns Socrates here requires firm belief that the event will occur. Recall Frede's claim: "we take delight only when we regard the picture as true."¹³⁷ If this were so, it would explain Socrates' investment in arguing for false pleasures whose objects are derived from doxastic objects. But, as the case of purely imaginative pleasures suggests, we can take delight without regarding the products of the imagination as true. In that case, it might be proposed that Socrates does not argue for false pleasures in view of purely imaginative pleasures just because he fails to notice purely imaginative pleasures. The problem with this proposal, however, is that later in Philebus Socrates mentions the pleasures of comedies, and one doesn't have to believe that the events portrayed in a comedy are real to enjoy them. So, again, I am left without an answer to the question why Socrates argues for false pleasures that are based on false judgments.
Let me now turn to a second concern, which relates to soundness of the analogy between pleasure and judgment. Assume that what we have been calling doxastic objects simply are, as we would now say, doxastic contents. On a familiar, although not undisputed, conception of propositional attitudes, judgment or belief involves a certain relation between an attitude and the contents of that attitude. It is not clear to me, however, that Socrates' false pleasures and their objects stand in the same relation. Hedonic objects, which are imaginative objectives, are quasi-perceptual objects; they are quasi-perceived; we might say, envisioned. Consider Socrates' visual language at 40a9-12: "There are also the painted images, <which are derived from the λόγου that are hopes>. And often a man sees (ὁρᾶ) himself acquiring a bounty of gold and many pleasures attendant upon the acquisition. Moreover, he observes (καθορᾶ) himself enjoying himself immensely."

The quasi-perceptual nature of the objects of pleasure conforms to the particular species of anticipatory pleasure Socrates is here proposing. In principle, one might anticipate pleasures of various kinds. For example, one might anticipate an intellectual pleasure, say, the pleasure of a lecture on Plato's *Philebus*. But Socrates is specifically concerned with anticipations of bodily pleasures. Recall that Socrates first introduces anticipatory pleasure as a second kind of pleasure and that this second kind depends upon the first kind, bodily restoration. The pleasure of bodily restoration is perceptual, for, as Socrates explicitly defines it, perception is a bodily motion that produces an equivalent motion in the soul. Now, anticipatory pleasure of bodily pleasure depends upon memory of bodily pleasure; and memory, as Socrates defines it, is the preservation of a perception. Thus, imaginative objects, which are produced through the employment of
memories, share properties with the perceptual experiences on which the memories are based. I take it, it is precisely in virtue of such shared properties that the imaginative objects are able to elicit perceptual experiences such as pleasure. Granted this, deriving pleasure from envisioning a picture would then seem to involve a causal process, in which case the picture exists independently of and specifically prior to the pleasure it evokes. Thus, as I said, the relation between pleasure and its object will differ from that of belief or judgment and its object.

Now, perhaps the problem lies in my construal rather than Socrates' conception. Perhaps Socrates understands the imaginative depiction as intrinsically hedonic in the following sense. It is not the case that a pleasing picture precedes one one's being pleased by the picture. Rather, one is pleased by things as one imagines them. So one does not derive pleasure from an object, which may exist independently of one's pleasure; rather, one takes pleasure in an object, whose existence depends upon one's taking pleasure in it. This way of conceptualizing things might enable Socrates to sustain his position; however, I doubt whether I am now providing an attractive rational reconstruction of Socrates' position as opposed to an accurate historical reconstruction.

Related to this problem is the fact that both Protarchus and Socrates think that their respective conceptions of pleasure apply to a wide range of other psychological states. When he initially resists Socrates' suggestion that pleasure may be false as well as true, Protarchus maintains that fears and expectations, as well as pleasures and pains, cannot be false. At the end of the imagination argument, after having convinced Protarchus that pleasures and pains may be false as well as true, Socrates suggests: "And the same account holds in the case of fear, anger, and everything else of that sort, namely,
that all of them can at times be false.\textsuperscript{140} Socrates' inclusion of anger "and everything else of that sort" suggests that Protarchus' initial position, against which the imagination argument is directed, applies to a broad range of psychological states. This also conforms to the Protagorean identification of a broad range of psychological states as forms of perception in \textit{Theaetetus}, including "… desires and fears; and … others besides, a great number that have names, an infinite number that do not." The question, then, is how Protarchus can understand states such as desire, anger, and fear to conform to the Protagorean theory and how Socrates can understand them to conform to his account of imaginative pleasure.

In Protarchus' case, the thought must be that the objects of desire, anger, fear, and so on are perceptual qualities, which are engendered during certain subject-object interactions, just as perceptual qualities are engendered in the cases of pleasure, pain, and the familiar sense-perceptual states, seeing, hearing, and so on. But this is problematic. Desire, anger, fear, and so on seem to require a different explanation. Anger and fear, in particular, seem to be caused by perceptions, not to be perceptions. For example, one may perceive an object, say, a coal as hot and consequently fear it. Thus, even if it were correct to maintain, with Protarchus, that fear and so on had perceptual qualities as objects— for example, one might fear the heat, and this fear would then be true since the heat truly existed— Protarchus would still be failing to see that fear and other such states are not perceptual states in the same way that sense-perceptual states and (perhaps) pleasure and pain are.

Turning now from the problem with Protarchus' position to Socrates' position. Apparently, Socrates' view that a wide-range of psychological states can be true and false
is encouraged by the following sort of analogies: $s$ judges that $p$; $s$ is pleased that $p$; $s$
desires that $p$; $s$ fears that $p$; and so on. In all cases $p$ is some sort of mental object,
crucially, a representational one, and thus capable of being either true or false.
Moreover— and here, as we have seen, is the crucial move— Socrates attributes truth-
value to the state on the basis of the truth-value of the object of the state.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, for
example, if $s$ fears that $p$ and $p$ is false, then $s$ has a false fear.

Socrates' position does not have the same problem as Protarchus' position,
namely, that fear, desire, and certain other psychological states are caused by more
primary states that have objects. But Socrates' position does present a related concern.
For a given psychological state that takes an object, is that state primary or rather caused
by or dependent upon some other psychological state that takes an object? For example,
in most cases, fearing or being angry that $p$ implies believing that $p$. In such cases,
someone might object, as Protarchus does, that the falsity belongs to the doxastic object
and thus the belief or judgment rather than the fear or anger.

Beyond the preceding, a fundamental difference between Socrates' and
Protarchus' positions lies in how they understand the objects of the psychological states:
Socrates views them as representational, Protarchus does not. Now, it is a question
whether the representationality of the psychological states Socrates endorses is due to
their having propositional content. I suggest that it is not due to their having propositional
content. Basically, there is no clear and compelling evidence that Plato has a concept
equivalent to our concept of a proposition. In particular, our current concept of a
proposition is multifunctional with respect to speech and psychological acts. For
example, the proposition \textit{Theaetetus is sitting} can function as the content of the belief that
Theaetetus is sitting, and it can function as the content of the question whether Theaetetus is sitting. There is no clear evidence, however, that Plato conceived the objects of psychological states as being multifunctional in this way. For example, there is no evidence that Plato conceived the doxastic object *Theaetetus is sitting* to be functional as the object of a question.

Consideration of the Stoics' view provides some helpful historical perspective here. The Stoics maintain that assertibles (ἀξιωματα) are one kind of sayable (λεκτόν) and that assertibles have rather limited functions, namely, functions conforming to assertorically or declaratively structured sentences. For instance, one can utter the assertible *Theaetetus is sitting* as a declaration, and one can believe the assertible *Theaetetus is sitting*. On the other hand, one cannot question this assertible. In other words, the Stoics conceived of whether *Theaetetus is sitting* as a different kind of sayable. In the absence of positive evidence that Plato's view of objects or contents is equivalent to our concept of a proposition, I incline to assume that it is not.

Finally, let us return to the central problem in the history of the interpretation of the imagination argument since Gosling's 1959 paper: Is Socrates right to infer from the falsity of the imaginative objects, the false painted pictures, to the falsity of the pleasure taken in the pictures? It is clear from the argument from analogy that Socrates distinguishes between the psychological state and the object— which we would call content— of that state. Moreover, Socrates argues to the truth-value of the state from the truth-value of the object or content. More precisely, Socrates argues from the truth-value of judging based on the truth-value of the doxastic object to the truth-value of enjoying based on the truth-value of the hedonic object. The question is whether this move is
defensible. Let's focus on judgment first. It is generally agreed that while doxastic content is truth-apt, judging is not truth-apt. But consider the following argument for the truth-aptness of judging. Judging requires content. In other words, judging ontologically depends upon doxastic content. Thus, the truth-aptness of the doxastic content applies to the judging. Compare the following analogous case. Assume a sign exists with the wording: "This is a site for toxic dumping." Assume the wording is true. I want to suggest that the sign is true because its wording is because if the wording did not exist the object would no longer be a sign.

Assuming this argument is persuasive, it is questionable whether it can be applied to other propositional attitudes, and specifically in the context of the present discussion to so-called propositional pleasures. The problem here turns on whether the enjoying is ontologically dependent upon the content enjoyed. There is a problem at this point. One might admit that if the content were different, the pleasure would cease. For example, to return to Penner's discussion, if one takes pleasure in the belief that the museum has purchased a painting because one believes that Picasso painted the painting, then learning that Picasso did not in fact paint the painting would destroy the pleasure. But here the pleasure is construed as taken in a belief. In Socrates' example, the object (or content) of the pleasure is not doxastic. Let us, then, take the case of a purely imaginative pleasure, pleasure derived from a sexual fantasy. In this case, the pleasure seems to require the imaginative content insofar as, in the absence of that content, the pleasure would cease to exist. But, one might argue, it is still logically possible for the feeling of pleasure to exist in the absence of any content. In this case, however, the issue is no longer whether the attitude can genuinely be said to have truth-value if its object or content does. Instead,
what is now at issue is whether some kinds of pleasure are, genuinely, propositional attitudes. This itself is a reasonable question.

1 Sext. Adv. math. 8.11.


3 The goal of Socrates’ argument is not merely to confirm that there are false pleasures, but that pleasures are bad insofar as they are false. Thus, the second argument continues, at 40e6-41a4, that since beliefs are good and bad insofar as they are true and false, pleasures are good and bad insofar as they are true and false. Protarchus, however, resists this final step, and Socrates, temporarily drops this final point and proceeds to describe a second type of false pleasure. This aspect of the argument has most recently and admirably been the focus of Evans (2008).

4 I emphasize that the view that the preceding list canvasses the fundamental questions of the passage is itself the product of a particular interpretive framework and historical moment. Accordingly, not all papers on the imagination argument address all these questions. In some cases, the author's ambitions are narrower, but in some cases it is because the author does not recognize a problem as such.

5 The following review of secondary literature may be profitably supplemented by consideration of Bravo (1995). Bravo's discussion mainly focuses on contributions from the sixties and seventies, although he briefly discusses earlier treatments and includes valuable bibliographical references.

6 “At this point in the dialogue, then, <Socrates> has called attention to an analogy between pleasure and <judgment> which he felt to be valid <namely, that both can be incorrect>, though he was not quite clear about it; it is sufficiently natural for Protarchus to accept it, but not close enough to make it obvious that falsity can be directly applied to pleasure also, and so Protarchus rejects the last step.” (1959, 51)

7 “… it would seem that <Socrates> is taking it that there is no difference between picturing a future pleasure to myself and enjoying that pleasure in anticipation; thus in
these cases the pleasure and the picture are run together, and the picture of a pleasure and the pleasure of a picture are taken to be the same." (ibid., 52) Generally speaking, I find Gosling and Taylor's account of Gosling's 1959 position more lucid. Gosling's account of the problems of the second argument can be distilled to the following: 1. pleasures are activities that are enjoyed. (Plato's preferred conception of pleasure); 2. thus, the enjoyment of (imaginative) picturing = the act of picturing. (from 1); 3. the content of the picturing = the act of picturing. (a "natural error") 4. hence, the content of the picturing = the enjoyment of the act of picturing. (by transitivity of identity) "… on this interpretation the crucial error lies in the identification of the content of a picture with the act of picturing." (Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 438)

8 "<The purpose of the analogy> is to break down two possible defenses which are open to Protarchus. Someone who objected to any talk of false pleasures might say (a) that if a pleasure was false, then it would not be a pleasure; (b) that pleasure was not the sort of thing that could have qualities at all." (1960, 46)

9 "There must be a reference to future pleasure, because Protarchus still holds, and Socrates has not yet challenged, the belief that a man cannot be mistaken about a present pleasure. This future pleasure must be pictured, and not just predicted, for Plato seems to have thought, reasonably enough, that a mere belief about future pleasure without any accompanying exercise of the imagination would not give rise to any pleasure of anticipation." (51) Finally, the bad man errs, not in thinking the event will come to pass, but in thinking that the event coming to pass will be enjoyable. "He gets this wrong because he is an evil man, and the root of all evil— as Socrates explains later on, at 48c5-
10— is not knowing oneself. Which includes not knowing what one will really enjoy."

( Ibid., 52)

10 Cp. Gosling and Taylor's comment: "since this premise is suppressed, and since it is open to the objection that it depends on the very conflation which Gosling had identified <between false pictures and false picturings>, it is unclear how this interpretation differs from Gosling's other than verbally." (1982, 439)

11 (1961) 44.

12 For Gosling's account of the distinction between the conception of pleasure he attributes to Plato and the conception of pleasure he takes Kenny to attribute to Plato, see Gosling (1961) 44-45. The gist of the difference is that, in Gosling's view, pleasure is an activity, whereas, in Kenny's view, pleasure is something "that is got out of" experience. (1970) 152.

14 Cp. Gosling and Taylor (1982, 439): "In his view the crucial phrase hédonai ezôgraphémenai is to be read not as in the Gosling/Kenny view as 'pictures of pleasure' but literally as 'pictured pleasures', i.e. the pleasures … which the bad man anticipates."

15 "A pleasure of anticipation consists in the pleasurable anticipation of pleasure and in this case the pleasurable anticipation is the pleasure the good and bad man take in their pictures. The anticipated pleasure, however, is that pleasure within the picture, the latter being, while pictured, not a pleasure experienced at all, but something giving rise to the pleasure of anticipation." (1970, 164) Gosling and Taylor misleadingly claim that Dybikowski thinks of anticipatory pleasure as "a sort of shadowy precognition of full-blooded bodily pleasure." (1982, 439)
"My thesis is the following. Socrates has made a mistake in this passage (40b6-7). Instead of claiming that the pleasure taken in the picture is false, he makes the claim about the pictured pleasure, the pleasure within the picture. But the character of the mistake provides us with an explanation of why Protarchus might assent to the conclusion. For Protarchus can readily grant that the pictured pleasure is false, since he has agreed that for the bad man what is pictured is false. But neither Socrates nor Protarchus see that a very difficult claim has to be established in order to show that there can be false pleasures. But it is an understandable mistake. For in mentioning the pictured pleasure, it would have been easy to slip into supposing that a reference had been made to a pleasure which is experienced; and in the absence of a clear discussion of the distinction between the pleasure of anticipation and the anticipated pleasure, it would not be plain which was under discussion." (164-5) Thus, on Dybikowski's interpretation, Socrates' argument runs as follows: 1. "hêdonai ezôgraphêmenai" means "pictured pleasures"; 2. pictured pleasures are the pleasures that the bad man anticipates; 3. thus, pictured pleasures are anticipated pleasures; 4. the pictured pleasures are false; 5. thus, the anticipated pleasures are false; 6. anticipated pleasures = pleasures of anticipation (Socrates' conflation, admitted by Protarchus); 7. thus, some pleasures of anticipation are false.

"After I explain Plato's view of false pleasures and answer the more obvious objections to it, I shall argue that his strange doctrine illuminates the neglected propositional aspect of the moods we characterize as 'enjoyment,' 'amusement,' or 'pleasure.' … I intend to classify pleasure that and similar states as 'propositional attitudes' …" (1962, 65, 73) Strictly speaking, "being pleased that" is factive (cp. Harte, 2004, 116, n.2)— or at least it
is on one interpretation of what may be an ambiguous expression. For example, "I am pleased that I have been promoted" implies on a de re interpretation that I have been promoted, whereas on a de dicto interpretation I might falsely believe that I have been. Thalberg evidently interprets the expression de dicto: "A statement describing a pleasure that is a propositional attitude— for instance, 'Mr. Jones is pleased that Mr. Jones's horse won the handicap'— is 'referentially opaque': within the scope of 'pleased that' we cannot always substitute coextensive terms without changing the truth value of the whole statement." (1962, 73)

18 On the translation of "ἀνεπίμπλασαν" at 42a9 as "infect," Penner follows Gosling and Hackforth: "apparently in the metaphorical use for 'infect' which can also be seen at Apol. 32c, Phd. 67a, Thucydides II.51." (1970, n.2, p.167)

19 "One way in which this distinction might be referred to is in terms of whether or not the belief 'involved' in either case, namely that this picture before me is a (Picasso), does or does not 'infect' the pleasure with the truth or falsity of the belief. There seem to be grounds for saying that in the case <of (B)> the truth of falsity does, and that in the case <of (A)> the truth or falsity does not— namely, that finding out that the belief is false is liable to destroy the pleasure in <(B)>, but not to destroy the pleasure in <(A)>." (ibid., 167)

20 Philb. 37e10-11.

21 (1970) 175.

22 Note that Penner, as well as some other commentators, translates "δόξα" by "belief" rather than "judgment." I have used "judgment" throughout my discussion, though in a
case such as the present one, if judgments are not identical to beliefs, the account may be disturbed.

23 Cf. Frede's remark on Penner: "Had Plato been fully aware of the ambiguity, so Penner claims, he would have chosen product-<judgments> and product-pleasures and have realized that process-<judgments> and pleasures are only true by extension." (1985, 169)

Cf. also Gosling and Taylor's remark on Penner's interpretation: according to Penner, "what is shown to be false is not any enjoyment which the wicked man has, but rather his state of mind of being pleased that he will have certain pleasures, when, ex hypothesi, he will not in fact have those pleasures …" (1982, 441) Gosling and Taylor criticize Penner's interpretation on the grounds that the attribution of the conception of propositional pleasure to Plato requires a demonstration that "Plato distinguishes between being pleased that \( p \) (Penner's view) on the one hand and enjoying the thought of \( p \) (Gosling's view) on the other. But not only does Plato's language nowhere suggest a grasp of this very subtle distinction; even more damaging to Penner's thesis is the fact that the example on whose description the argument turns is clearly seen as that of someone enjoying the picturing of future pleasures, gloating over the picture in Gosling's phrase. The vocabulary of 'experiencing pleasures in advance' etc. … is appropriate to the description of anticipatory enjoyment, but inappropriate to the description of simply being pleased that one will have some future enjoyment, which may come to no more than this, that one believe that one will have the enjoyment and regards the fact that one will have it as something to be welcomed … nothing justifies the contention that he is really concerned with being pleased that one will have \( E \), rather than enjoying anticipating \( E \)." (ibid., 441)
On the hand, Penner maintains that Plato does have a "clear conception of the
perceptual or cognitive analogy" between the attitudes of judging and enjoying, on the
one hand, and the contents of these attitudes, on the other. Cf. ibid., 175-8.

Thus, she comments on the use of "ἀνεπίμπλασαν": "the true and false beliefs fill the
pains and pleasures with their predicament.' Gosling and Kenny translate it by 'infect,' but
that might be too weak because this may just mean that that [sic] they have an impact
while a merger seems rather to be what Plato has in mind." (n.32, p.166)

Compare the idea that firmly believing one is going to be killed is necessary for a
certain sort of fear or pain, in contrast to merely daydreaming about the event.

ibid., 174.

ibid., 174-5.

ibid., 169.

ibid., 176.

ibid., 176.

ibid., 177.

Cp. her remark: "The experiencing itself, the being falsely pleased, when it refers to the
process, is then indeed false in a derivative sense." (ibid., 179)

In a footnote on Socrates' suggestion that there are true and false fears, expectations,
and judgments at 36c10-11, Frede writes: "In spite of his careful preparations for these
pleasures of the soul alone, Socrates has an uphill fight to prove that they can be true and
false in the same sense as judgments. It will turn out that certain pleasures are themselves
judgments." (n.2, p.38) More confusing still, in her piece in Kraut's Cambridge
Companion to Plato she writes: "the whole enjoyment provided by the soul's inner
dialogue or the painter's work consists in nothing but the logoi or pictures in the soul."
(1992, 445-6) In other words, here she identifies pleasure with the product, rather than
the process. Cp. Evans' remark: "Frede <claims> that Socrates does not observe any
 distinction between the falsehood of content and the falsehood of attitude." Evans here
cites Frede's statement at 1992, 445-6, and continues: "This view is mistaken, I think,
since Plato … takes such care to distinguish between being pleased on the one hand and
what pleases on the other." (2008, n.18, p.100)

35 In contrast, Mooradian claims that his predecessors attribute to Protarchus the
"Humean" position that pleasures are not the sort of mental state that can represent states
of affairs and hence cannot be true or false. This criticism is actually unjustified or at
least misleading. It is true that insofar as they address the question, Gosling, Kenny,
Dybikowski, Penner, and Frede, deny that Protarchus initially holds that pleasures are
representationally truth-apt. However, some of these scholars clearly recognize that
Protarchus thinks pleasures can be true, and they attempt to account for this fact. For
example, Kenny writes: "Socrates attributes to Protarchus the belief that while belief can
be true and false, pleasure can only be true; and this is accepted without demur. Again at
38a2 Protarchus denies merely that pleasures can be false. Nowhere is he made to deny
that pleasures can be true." (1960, 47) And Gosling and Taylor write: "That this is in fact
Protarchus' position is unequivocally established at 37b5-9; we have therefore still to find
the senses of 'true' and 'false' according to which Protarchus thinks the former applicable
to pleasures and the latter inapplicable." (1982, 432)

36 (1996) 94.

(1996) 94. Cp. n.5, p.94: "It will thus follow that anticipatory pleasure is either not an \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) or that certain \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\) can be false. Since Plato in the \textit{Philebus} treats \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\) as motions in the body that reach the soul, and he describes anticipatory pleasures as arising independently of the body, the term \(\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) thus strictly defined (i.e., at \textit{Phlb.} 34a, as bodily motion reaching the soul) will not apply to them."

39 ibid., 110.

40 ibid.

41 ibid., 111.

42 Cf. Delcomminette: "the discussion about false pleasures can be compared to that of the definition of knowledge as perception in \textit{Theaetetus}. Moreover, N. Mooradian has proposed to interpret the initial position of Protarchus as being close to that of Theaetetus in the first part of the dialogue … For Protarchus only refuses to apply the predicate 'false' to pleasure and pain, not the predicate 'true' … according to him, all pleasures are true, just as all perceptions are true according to Theaetetus and Protagoras." (2003, 220-21) Cp. also Harte: "There is … good evidence that Protarchus … maintains that pleasures are always true, and never false … What Protarchus thinks, I suggest, is this: a pleasure is true insofar as that in which it is taken is truly pleasant; and a thing being truly pleasant is a function of my finding it so … My account of Protarchus' position is similar to Mooradian's … although we differ over how he gets there." (2004, 118, 120, n.6)

43 For example, Delcomminette writes: "I cannot agree with the subsequent interpretation he proposes of Socrates' refutation of <Protarchus'> position (cf. 110-11)." (2003, n.10, p.220) Harte does not explicitly comment on this aspect of Mooradian's paper, but in light of her treatment of the argument, it is evident that she disagrees with Mooradian's
interpretation. Likewise Evans (2008), whose position is basically in agreement with that of Penner.


45 ibid., 101. Cf. Evans' remark: "But if 'judgments' here is standing proxy for 'beliefs', then this claim is unmotivated. Mooradian has given us no good reason to think that Plato cannot hold both that some pleasure-attitude has the same content as some belief-attitude, and that these attitudes are not of the same type." (2008, n.13, p.95)

46 "<Socrates' argument> proceeds by distinguishing three different kinds of false pleasures, each of which is based on the demonstration that pleasure cannot be reduced to mere perception (aiσθησις) …" (2003, 219) "<Socrates> will show that contrary to what Protarchus thinks, pleasure is not a perception, but an appearance (where an appearance 'cannot be reduced to belief but includes doxa as a constitutive component'); as such, it includes doxa, which introduces the possibility of falsehood in it." (ibid., 220)

47 However, strangely and indefensibly he suggests, at least at this point in his discussion, that the content of propositional pleasure is its qualitative feel, "what is felt as pleasure."

"Now if this interpretation is correct, it implies, in virtue of the analogy, that 'what that which takes pleasure takes pleasure in' does not correspond to the object of pleasure (i.e. the extensional object), but rather to its content— that is, not to the pleasant object, but to what is felt as pleasure." (ibid., 218) "And we shall see, what is invoked as a criterion for true and false pleasures is … the actual condition of the body (or the soul) of the person who feels a pain or a pleasure, the representation of which corresponds to the content of the pain or the pleasure as it is felt. I shall therefore argue that the falsity of pleasures and pains arises from the absence of correspondence between the affective state as it is felt
and the actual condition of the body (or the soul) to which it refers." (ibid., 219) Cp.

Evans' critical remarks: "Like Penner, Delcomminette concludes that these constructions <in the analogy argument> are intended to mark off the contents of attitudes. But Delcomminette seems to have a non-standard way of understanding what these contents are. He specifies 'the mere fact of taking pleasure' as a pleasure's 'form' and what is felt as pleasure' or '[that] which makes me feel this or that pleasure' or 'the pleasure as it is felt' as pleasure's content. I would agree with Delcomminette here if he were simply observing that pleasures are partially individuated by their contents. But I suspect that he is trying to say something more, namely, that the content of a pleasure just is its qualitative feel. I think this would be a mistake. For we should not assume at the outset of the discussion that (according to Plato) pleasures with different qualitative feels cannot have the same content, or that pleasures with the same qualitative feel cannot have different contents. The operative notion of content here, I think, is that in which a pleasure is taken, not (necessarily) the way a pleasure feels." (2008, n.12, p.95)

48 "'Appearance' is essentially different from mere perception, since it supposes that the perception is 'mixed', that is to say structured by a doxa. This doxa <I would have said 'mixing with a doxa'> corresponds to the application of a concept to the perception, which makes it appear qua this or qua that. This 'qua' is not contained in mere perception; rather, it originates in the activity of the subject to whom it appears, namely in his doxa: it is because I consider it qua this or qua that that it appears to me qua this or qua that." (2003, 223)

49 "Now this definition of appearance implies that if the doxa is false, the appearance itself is false." (ibid., 224) Furthermore, the falsity of the doxa may be due to two
different causes: "First, one can be mistaken because the perception is too 
underdetermined and provides no solid ground for interpreting it *qua* this rather than *qua* 
that. This is the case of the *figure under the tree in Socrates’* example, since Socrates 
says that he sees a figure from a distance and not very clearly. But there is another reason 
why an appearance can be false, namely if the concept applied to the perception is itself 
false. For concepts are not given: they are acquired by education …" (ibid., 224)

50 As per *Sophist* 235c9-236c8, this quasi-perception is an *eiκών* as well as a *φαντάσμα*. 
It is an *eiκών*, a faithful reproduction, when considered in relation to the judgment, but a 
*φαντάσμα*, an imperfect copy, when considered in relation to the real event. Cf. ibid., 
225-6.

51 Delcomminette is actually not explicit on this point. But cp.: "Now this power <of the 
imagination> is not confined to the future: it can as well concern the past or the present … 
One should therefore conclude that this analysis of anticipatory pleasures is only a 
paradigm for all pleasures felt apart from the body <I would say, not all, since some 
intellectual pleasures should be explained differently>, even though these pleasures 
<anticipatory ones> are the most common, since ‘we are full of hopes throughout our 
lifetime’ …" (ibid., 229)

52 ibid., 228.

53 ibid., 228.

54 ibid., 230.

55 Delcomminette also cites J. Ferber, "Platos Polemik gegen die Lustlehre," *Zeitschrift 
für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 148 (1912) 168.

56 Delcomminette also cites McLaughlin (1969) 60.
Cf. also Evans' remarks: "<Socrates'> claim … is that pleasures, fears, angers, and the rest are like beliefs in that they can have false content: just as what is believed can be false, so can what scares, what angers, and what pleases. And if having false content is sufficient to make an attitude of belief false, then— according to Socrates— having false content is also sufficient to make an attitude of pleasure false." (2008, 100)

Harte's discussion actually veers off in a slightly different direction at this point: "I agree with those commentators who take Socrates to portray the pleasures he takes to be capable of falsity as propositional attitudes. And if truth is propositional, it is necessary for pleasures to be true or false that they have propositional content. But this view of pleasures would not suffice to show them truth-apt." (2004, 120) In a footnote, Harte explains: "There remains the question of what Searle, e.g., calls 'direction of fit' … the underlying affinity between Protarchus' view and an outright denial of truth-aptness like that of Searle relates to its implications for direction of fit." (n.8, p.120) Harte's concern with direction of it provides further evidence that her view differs from Mooradian's view in being quasi-projectivist rather than perceptualist.

Against this view, Harte argues: "How should this falsity be thought to affect the pleasure I take? The pleasure I take is certainly vulnerable to the falsity of the belief. I would not have taken the pleasure I did were it not for my false belief. And one might for this reason call the pleasure false by analogy with what one says of the belief. But it is not obvious that one must do so, nor what one would say to convince a reluctant Protarchus. For, although the example <of being pleased that many people have come to attend one's talk, when in fact they haven't> calls into question my taking pleasure, given the falsity of the presupposition on which the pleasure I take is based, it is not obvious that the pleasure I take is otherwise called into question. This pleasure— the pleasure I take— is justified on its own terms, as it were. Were I right in my belief about how many people have come to my talk, I would have just the same pleasure, without its being had under false pretences, and there is nothing in what we have said thus far to call it into question." (2004, 121)

"... <a view supported,> for example, by <Socrates'> use of the verbs προχαίρειν and προλυπείσθαι in 39d4." (ibid., 125, n.12)

Additional support may be derived from the following exchange: "(So:) Should we say that these pains and pleasures are true or false, or that some are true and others not? (Pr:) How would pleasures or pains be false, Socrates?" (36c6-9) The fact that Protarchus' denial is limited to pleasures and pains being false suggests that he thinks pleasures and pains can be true.
"We observe that the extension of the relativistic thesis to desires and fears at 156b rests on the analysis of \( a\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) according to which the perceptible property comes into existence in the act of perception. The details of this account fit the pleasures and pains of sensation quite well, but are less applicable to fears, desires, and the pleasures and pains of the soul, since these, as the Protagorean must be aware, are not assignable to any particular sense organ. Nonetheless, the Protagorean includes them in the class of \( a\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\varepsilon\iota\varsigma \), which indicates that this difference appears to him a point of detail with no particular bearing on the tenability of the position. Hence, we may assume Protarchus to be giving expression to the thesis in just this form." (1996, 106) Cp. also Mooradian's remark: "when Socrates compliments Protarchus as being an eager proponent of the view that pleasure cannot be false, Protarchus replies that he is only saying what he hears (38a). This indicates that Protarchus is a vehicle for expressing a philosophical view that Plato means to develop and criticize." (n.26, p.106)

More precisely, Protarchus denies that there are true and false fears and hopes. But given the earlier passages cited, this may be interpreted to mean that Protarchus thinks that fears and hopes may only be true.


"From this mundane starting point it is inferred that the color white, for example, is not inherent in the object, not a feature which characterizes the object in itself; white exists only in relation to a given observer, 'between' their eye and the object (154a), and it is therefore private to them (154a; cf. 161d, 166c), something of which only they can be aware." Cp. David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism, Oxford University Press, 2004, 42.

81 My explanation of the Protagorean view that all perceptions are true in terms of an ontological conception of truth is novel. Among secondary literature on the relevant passages in Theaetetus, commentators, insofar as they explain the operative truth-conception, treat it as representational. Cp. Sedley (2004, 43): "Each perception, whatever our current state, truly represents how things instantaneously are (or, more accurately, become) for the instantaneous parents that generate it." Cp. Nicholas Denyer, Language, Thought, and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Thought, Routledge, 1991, 87: "… a thought of yours is true for you not just in virtue of your having that thought, but in
virtue rather of there existing outside your mind some fact distinct from your thought and recorded in it. Protagorean truth is correspondence with facts." The problem is not adequately considered in Burnyeat (1990); but consider Mi-Kyoung Lee, *Epistemology after Protagoras*, Oxford University Press, 2005, 30-45.

82 *Phlb.* 12c8-d6.

83 *Phlb.* 37a2-4

84 *Phlb.* 37a5-6.

85 *Phlb.* 37a7-8.

86 *Phlb.* 37a9-10.

87 *Phlb.* 37a11-b1. It is slightly odd that Socrates uses the phrases "τὸ δοξαζομένον" and "τὸ δοξάζειν", and the hedonic equivalents—although it is clear that he means that judgment is judgment regardless of its truth or falsity. Perhaps his expression occurs as it does because, say, a person or a part of a person's soul is responsible for a judgment occurring and thus if, contra the claim, judging falsely were not judging, the person or part of the soul would be responsible for the annihilation of judging since it was responsible for the falsity.

88 *Phlb.* 37b2-4. Note the future tense in "ἀπολεῖ." This suggests that an inference is being made from the character of judgment to the character of pleasure.

89 *Phlb.* 11d4. More precisely, Socrates is non-committal at this point whether knowledge and pleasure are ἐξισός or διαθέσεις. The word "ἐξισός" is also used at 40d5, but in that case to refer to the condition of admitting truth and falsity.

90 "We must consider, then, why if really judging and experiencing pleasure both occur alike, judgment is willing to be both true and false, whereas there is only truth of
It is hard to make sense of this question except in the following way. Pleasure and judgment are analogous in several respects. Thus, it is curious that they are disanalogous in this respect. And so, there is reason to question why this disanalogy exists and indeed whether it does.

"We must also consider the fact that falsity and truth are added to judgment and that because of these things judgment does not exist alone (or: there is not only judgment), but each judgment is in a certain way qualified (ποια)." (Phlb. 37b10-c2) I take this to mean that although judgment qua judgment is neither true nor false, all judgments are either true or false. In other words, all judgments are truth-aptly qualified, but being true or being false is not a necessary condition of being a judgment. (Rather, we might say, being truth-apt is a necessary condition of being a judgment. Compare: being a human does not imply being a male or being a female, but anything that is a human is a male or a female. As such, the question might pertain to the relation between a type and its differentiae, as Aristotle would put it.)

"Furthermore, we must reach an agreement on whether some things we experience are entirely qualified, whereas pleasure and pain are only what they are and do not become qualified in a certain way." (Phlb. 37c4-6)

Phlb. 37c4-8.

Phlb. 37c9-10.

Phlb. 37d2-5.

Phlb. 37d6-9.

Phlb. 37e1-4.

Phlb. 37e5-7. Protarchus responds here by saying: if pleasure errs.
Perhaps "states of affairs" would be preferable to the vague "things," but I am hesitant to commit Socrates to too much ontology without further justification.

The concept of a copy or imitation is, of course, familiar in the Platonic corpus from the introduction of Forms as models.


The word "

I discuss this point further in the conclusion.

*Phlb. 39b9-c2. Frede mistranslates this line, losing the sense of "

Contrast Gosling (1975, 35-6): "I am thinking of when a
person isolates what he previously judged or said from sight or any other form of
perception and as it were sees in his mind's eye the images of what was judged and
stated."

116 Phlb. 39c4-5.

117 Thus, I agree with Delcomminette (2003).

118 Phlb. 39c12; cf. 39c10-11, 39d7-e2.

119 Phlb. 39d1-5.

120 Phlb. 39e4-6.

121 Phlb. 32b9-c2. Observe that the concept of hope is added to the concept of expectation
(προσδόκημα) since, as Socrates proceeds to say, expectations of pain will be fearful and
painful. (32c2)

122 Phlb. 39d4.


125 "These remarks about the wicked being beset by false pleasures come as a surprise.
We have almost reached the end of some careful argument for the conclusion that
pleasures can be true and false, and suddenly there comes this moralistic digression.
Worse, it is not at all obvious why wicked men have also to be so inept as
characteristically to experience false hopes." (1975, 111) Cp. Delcomminette's opening
remark on the piety aspect: "Socrate effectue cet examen d'une manière apparemment très
étrange, en y mêlant des considerations à connotation religieuse qui semblent
particulièrement déplacées." (2006, 391)
Dybikowski draws this phrase from Kenny (1960, 51), who explicitly rejects this interpretation.

They continue: "NB. 40b2-4; good men have the truth written in their souls 'because they are dear to the gods'; cf. Rep. 560b7-10. For evidence of the traditional view in e.g. Herodotus and Aeschylus see Lloyd-Jones *The Justice of Zeus* index s.v. 'atē'." (ibid.) Gosling <and Taylor> must, however, still think that the piety aspect is rather logically unnecessary to the argument, for they begin their discussion of it by saying: "As a footnote to this discussion of false pleasures of anticipation, it is worth asking why we should suppose that the wicked man's anticipations of pleasures will be for the most part false." (ibid., 441)

Cp. Evans' remarks: "According to <interpreters such as Hackforth, Harte, and Russell>, the falsehood of the bad person's hopes is *intrinsically* guaranteed by the badness of his character. On a view of this sort, the bad person's hopes would be false even if—*per impossibile*—there were no gods around to hate him. But must we agree that the link between false hope and bad character is as strong as this? I think not. For we can just as easily hold that the falsehood of the bad person's hopes is *extrinsically* guaranteed by the badness of his character. On this alternative view, it is not the case that the bad person's hopes would be false even if there were no gods around to hate him, because the role of the gods is precisely to ensure that the bad person's hopes will not be realized. This falls short of 'Greek folk wisdom', as I understand it, because the Greek folk think that the will of the gods is more or less whimsical, and obviously Plato does not. But he may well think that the gods, knowing what is best, intervene in the world frequently enough (or imbue the world with enough justice) to ensure that the hopes of
the bad are generally thwarted." (2008, 103) Mooradian (1996) also agrees that the gods reward those who are pious.


130 Phlb. 49b-c.


132 "On comprend aisément que la seule manière d'expliquer ce fait est de supposer que le bon et le méchant n'espèrent pas la meme chose." (2006, 393)

133 "Le désir du bien est presupposé par tout désir particulier, et par conséquent même si l'objet du désir du méchant paraît se réaliser, il manquera toujours son but, puisqu'il ne lui procurera pas le bonheur. Les phantasmes en lesquels le méchant prend plaisir seront donc toujours nécessairement faux, non pas parce que dieu les lui enverrait tels ou agirait sur le cours de l'histoire pour les invalider, mais bien plutôt en raison de sa proper ignorance, qu'il lui fait apparaître le bien sous une apparence fausse de plaisir—ou plus exactement sous forme de phantasme faux de plaisir. Quant au bon, dans la mesure où il connaît et possède le bien, ses espoirs de bonheur sont nécessairement fondés, et, s'il a des plaisirs d'anticipation, ceux-ci seront nécessairement vrais." (ibid., 394-5)

134 "For if 'false' in <the piety aspect> has a special evaluative meaning, then clearly it does not have the same meaning as 'false' <earlier in the argument>. <Earlier> Socrates applies 'true' and 'false' to propositions such as 'it is a man' and 'it is a statue' … Here he gives no indication whatsoever that he expects these propositions to be assessed according to some non-veridical, evaluative standard." (2008, 102)

135 (1985) n.34, p.167. In support of this point Frede refers to Prt. 345c; Smp. 212a-b; Phdr. 273e; Ti. 53c; and Leg. 730c.
Recall (11) and (12) as exemplifying this principle.

Cp. Suzanne Bobzien, "The Stoics" in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, K. Algra et al, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1999, 93, n.48: "… assertibles differ from propositional content or the common content of different sentences in different moods. For a positional content is as it were multifunctional: it can not only be stated, but also asked, commanded etc. In contrast, assertibles are unifunctional: one cannot ask or command them etc."
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