Epicurus on Εὐφροσύνη and 'Ενέργεια (DL 10.136)

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I Introduction

Miroslav Marcovich’s Teubner edition of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers prints the following doctrine from Epicurus’ On Choices:

(e) ἧ μὲν ψυχῇ ἄταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικὴ ἐίσιν Ἡδοναί·

ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κάνησιν ἑνεργεῖα βλέπονται.

In the Loeb edition, whose Greek is the same, R. D. Hicks renders (e) as:

Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.

I do not entirely agree with Hicks’ rendition of (e), nor do I regard (e) itself as textually sound, but both are adequate points of departure for the present discussion.

I am grateful to an anonymous referee for an outstanding set of comments on a previous draft; these compelled me to rethink many aspects of my argument.

1 On the title of Epicurus’ work, see n. 5.
2 Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum, B. G. Tuebner, 1999, vol. 1, 800 (= 10.136)

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Diogenes cites (ε) in the context of his discussion of the distinction between Epicurus' and the Cyrenaics' conceptions of pleasure:

Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics with respect to pleasure. They do not recognize katastematic <pleasure>, but only pleasure in motion (ἐν κίνησι). He recognizes both, <and in each case>4 of the soul and the body, as he says in his works On Choice and Avoidance,5 On the End, in the first book of On Lines, and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene. Likewise, Diogenes in the seventeenth book of Selections and Metrodorus in his work Timocrates say the following: 'pleasure is conceived (νοούμενης ήδονής) both as kinetic (κατά κίνησιν) and as katastematic (τῆς καταστηματικῆς).6

(e) immediately follows this passage. Thus, the function of (ε) is to provide evidence that Epicurus distinguished between katastematic and kinetic pleasures.

The first clause of (ε) is clear enough: ἀπαραξία and ἀπονία are katastematic pleasures of soul and body respectively. The second clause contains a number of difficulties. First, on the assumption that the second clause parallels the first in distinguishing a psychological and a somatic species of the distinct hedonic genus, χαρὰ would seem to be kinetic pleasure of the soul, whereas εὐφροσύνη would seem to be kinetic pleasure of the body. However, it has been thought odd that Epicurus would use the word εὐφροσύνη to refer to bodily pleasure since the φρο-root of the word suggests a psychological condition.

Second, it is unclear how to understand ἐνέργεια. The phrase 'κατά κίνησιν' seems functionally equivalent to 'καταστηματικά' in the first clause and thus to contain adequate information by itself to distinguish this genus of pleasures. Consequently, the conjunction of 'ἐνέργεια' and 'κατά κίνησιν' seems redundant. For example, David Bradshaw comments: 'This statement is slightly puzzling, for ἐνέργεια does not seem to add anything not already said by κατά κίνησιν.' On the other hand, if 'ἐνέργεια' does have a different meaning from 'κίνησις', it is unclear what that meaning is. Certainly, Hicks' insertion of a conjunction, 'in motion and activity', is unfaithful to the Greek and testifies to the awkwardness of the text.8

Long and Sedley lament that ἐνέργεια has never been satisfactorily explained.9 Since the original Greek texts would have been written in capitals and without accents, they note that ἐνέργεια would have been composed as 'ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙ and that this is ambiguous between the dative singular and the nominative plural. Consequently, they render the noun as ἐνέργειαι and take the phrase 'κατά κίνησιν' to modify this noun; viz.: 'joy and delight are regarded as kinetic activities.' I agree that this makes better sense than (ε). Moreover, Long and Sedley's rendition better accords with the citation from Metrodorus immediately preceding it: 'νοούμενης δὲ ήδονής τῆς τε κατά κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς'. Consequently, I suggest that (ε) should be emended to:

(E) ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀπαραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικά εἶλαν ἡδονάι· ἢ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἐὐφροσύνη κατά κίνησιν ἐνέργεια βλέπονται.

I render (E) as:

For tranquility and freedom from pain are katastematic pleasures, whereas joy and delight are viewed as kinetic activities.

Hereafter, I will focus on (E).

Granted this, the first problem remains: it is unclear why Epicurus should use the word ἐὐφροσύνη to refer to a bodily pleasure. Furthermore, part of the second problem remains: the phrase 'kinetic activity' seems redundant. Indeed, in the quotation from Metrodorus' Timocrates, the contrast between 'κατά κίνησιν' alone and 'τῆς καταστηματικῆς' is

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5 As we have seen, at 10.136 Diogenes also mentions a work by Epicurus with the title On Choices. In the catalogue of Epicurus' writings at 10.27, Diogenes also lists a work entitled On Choices and Avoidances. All three titles are commonly taken to refer to a single work.

6 10.136
sufficient. This paper attempts to provide a satisfactory interpretation of (E) by addressing these two problems of the second clause.

The discussion is organized into the following sections:

I  Introduction
II  Pleasures of the Soul
III  Prodicus and His Successors on Εὐθροσύνη
IV  'Εὐθροσύνη to the Time of Epicurus
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VI  "Ευργεία? 
VII  The Status Quaestionis on Epicurus on Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasures
VIII  Nikolsky’s Arguments
IX  Gosling and Taylor’s Arguments
X  Diano’s, Merlan’s, Rist’s, Long and Sedley’s, and Warren’s Arguments
XI  ‘Ενέργεια’ in Aristotle and in (E)

In sections III-V, I argue that Epicurus uses the word ‘εὐθροσύνη’ in (E) to refer to kinetic bodily pleasures. In sections VII-XI, I argue that Epicurus uses the phrase ‘κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργεια’ in (E) to mean ‘kinetic actualizations’. Kinetic actualizations correspond to what Aristotle, in On the Soul, calls secondary actualities. Kinetic actualizations thus contrast with primary actualities or static actualizations, namely katastematic pleasures.

II  Pleasures of the Soul

It is necessary to begin with a word about psychological pleasures, by which I mean pleasures of the soul. Through most of the Greek philosophical tradition, perception and feeling are conceived as functions of the soul. Indeed, for Epicurus perception and feeling are functions of the soul. Consequently, so-called somatic pleasures such as those of eating and drinking, which are or involve perceptions or feelings, are psychological. In this respect, the distinction between somatic and psychological pleasures collapses. Still, one may preserve a distinction between bodily and psychological pleasures on the ground that the body plays a relatively salient causal role in the production of so-called bodily pleasures, whereas the soul plays the correspondingly salient causal role in the production of so-called psychological pleasures. Whether this distinction is tenable, however, depends upon how the notions of the body and soul playing distinct, salient causal roles in the production of respective pleasures are understood. Consequently, it is necessary to say more about Epicurus’ conception of the soul.

The Epicureans, like most ancient philosophers and schools, distinguish parts of the soul. Specifically, the Epicureans distinguish two parts of the adult human soul: one rational, the other irrational.11 The rational part, whose location is restricted to the chest,12 is the site of belief and reason and is the source of agency. Insofar as emotion involves belief, the rational part of the soul is also the site of emotion. Thus, the scholiast to DL 10.66 claims: ‘the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and joy.’13 In contrast, the irrational part, which is dispersed through the entire body, receives sense-impressions, but is not responsible for their interpretation or for deliberate reactions to them.

The Epicureans regard both parts of the soul as sites of pleasure and pain. Consequently, so-called bodily pleasures, which are experienced by means of the irrational part of the soul, may also be conceived as perceptual pleasures. Likewise, so-called psychological pleasures, which are experienced by means of the rational part of the soul, may also be conceived as mental pleasures. But this distinction and the distinction between rational and irrational parts of the soul is complicated by the further fact that according to the Epicureans there are six, rather than five types of perception (ἀναφεύγει). In addition to the five familiar sensory modes, the Epicureans recognize mental or dianoetic perception (διανοετική). Mental perception, like visual perception, has images directly derived from the external world as its objects.14 Moreover, as Elizabeth Asmis emphasizes, διανοετική ‘does not imply the use of rea-

11 K apud DL X 66; Diog Oen Frag 37, 15-7; Lucr III 136-44; VH VII 17 col. 22 (= Us 313); Aetius 4.4.6 (= [Plut 4.4.3)
12 K apud DL X 66; Ath IV 4, 6 p. 390d; Lucr III 140
13 This account is complicated by the fact that the sense organs play an active role, through λαμβάνειν, in the formation of ἀναφεύγει. Cp. Elizabeth Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method, Cornell University Press, 1984, 118-40.
14 Cp. ibid., 106: ‘What is strikingly peculiar about the Epicurean position is that all thought consists of images produced by particles entering from outside a person.’
son. The images that occur in (διανοία) may be rationally organized by λογισμός (reasoning)... but (διανοία) includes also such irrational processes as dreaming, daydreaming, and hallucinating.

Consequently, while I will sometimes follow the Greeks and use the phrases ‘pleasures of the body’, ‘bodily pleasures’, or ‘somatic pleasures’ and ‘pleasures of the soul’ or ‘psychological pleasures’, in the case of the Epicureans these phrases should be understood to refer to perceptual and rational pleasures pleasures respectively, phrases I will also use. Moreover, perceptual pleasures should be understood to include pleasures derived from διανοία in those cases such as dreaming, daydreaming, and hallucinating where λογισμός is not involved in the perceptual process.

Finally, observe that since pleasures of the body are perceptual and thus psychological, albeit of the irrational part of the soul, the concern that ‘εὐφροσύνη’ should not refer to somatic pleasure because the φόο-root indicates that the noun must refer to psychological pleasure should be recast and in fact put more strongly as follows. The φόο-root suggests that the noun must refer not merely to psychological pleasure, but specifically to rational pleasure. Thus, if the second clause of (E) is functionally equivalent to the first clause in distinguishing bodily and psychological, that is, rational, species of a hedonic genus, it is odd that Epicurus would use ‘εὐφροσύνη’ to refer to bodily or perceptual pleasure.

Given this difficulty with the use of ‘εὐφροσύνη’ in (E), I now turn to consider the use and conceptualization of ‘εὐφροσύνη’ in pre-Epicurean philosophical contexts.

III Prodicus and His Successors on εὐφροσύνη

In Plato’s Protagoras the character Prodicus delivers a speech whose purpose is to encourage Socrates and Protagoras to resume their sus-

16 An anonymous referee has suggested that my distinction between mental and perceptual pleasures may be jeopardized by a case such as daydreaming over past good times. I take it that this situation may be redescribed as musing over memories. The slim evidence for Epicurus’ conception of memory suggests, however, that memories, like daydreams, hallucinations, and so on arise through dianoetic perception of extra-mental ἐπιθέλη. No doubt, this is an extraordinary view, but see Lucr IV 722-815 and Diog Oen fr. 9. (I am grateful to Liz Asmis and James Warren for discussing this point with me.)

17 Prt 337c1-4. The use of ‘διανοία’ here is of course not Epicurean.

18 The earliest surviving philosophical distinction occurs among the fragments of Democritus. Democritus speaks of bodily pleasures (B127, 178, 189, 214, 235) and psychological pleasures (B146, 194, 207, 210, 232).


20 Ti 80b4-8

21 Crt 419d4-9
ing the distinction that he himself has Prodicus introduce in Protagoras or rather that he is following a Prodicean distinction that had gained some currency among philosophers.

In fact, there is evidence that the distinction between ‘εὐθυροούνη’ and ἦδονη’ in Protagoras does not faithfully follow Prodicus. Rather the distinction in Protagoras is a Platonic appropriation from Prodicus, deployed for the purpose of parody. In Topics Aristotle suggests a criticism of an interlocutor who mistakenly treats co-referring expressions as though one could be predicated of the other:

In addition, look and see if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself, taking it to be different because it has a different name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy (χαρά), good-cheer (τέρψις), and delight (εὐθυροούνη); for all these are names for the same thing, pleasure (ήδονη). And if anyone says that being joyful (τὸ χαίρειν) is an accident of being delighted (τὸ εὐθυρανεσθαι), he would be declaring it to be an accident of itself.

Compare Alexander’s comments on the passage:

For ἦδονη and χαρά and εὐθυροούνη and τέρψις are the same thing with respect to their underlying nature and significance. But Prodicus tried to distinguish particular significances for each of these words, just as the Stoics did: for they say that χαρά is rational elation, whereas ἦδονη is irrational elation, and that τέρψις is ἦδονη through the ears, while εὐθυροούνη is ἦδονη through discourse.

Alexander’s report slightly differs from Aristotle’s since Alexander claims that Prodicus distinguished ἦδονη from χαρά, εὐθυροούνη, and τέρψις, whereas Aristotle mentions that Prodicus only distinguished χαρά, εὐθυροούνη, and τέρψις’. Aristotle seems to be more trustworthy, for at least two reasons. First, Alexander’s accompanying report on the Stoics contains mistakes. For the Stoics, εὐθυροούνη is a rational emotion (εὐπαθεία), not an irrational emotion (πάθος); as such, εὐθυροούνη is a species of χαρά, not of ἦδονη. Second, in his commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, Hermias’ account of Prodicus’ distinction between pleasures conforms to Aristotle’s: ‘... Prodicus invented discrimination between words; for example, regarding the difference between τέρψις, χαρά, and εὐθυροούνη, he said that τέρψις is pleasure (ήδονη) of fine things through the ears, χαρά is pleasure of the soul, and εὐθυροούνη is pleasure through the eyes.’ Hermias, thus, corroborates Aristotle’s claim that Prodicus distinguished τέρψις, χαρά, and εὐθυροούνη, and he clarifies that Prodicus distinguished these pleasures as fine auditory, psychological, and visual respectively. Hermias’ and Aristotle’s testimonies, along with Alexander’s, albeit partly confused, support the conclusion that Prodicus himself did not distinguish between ἦδονη and εὐθυροούνη as bodily and psychological pleasure respectively. Rather, as I have suggested, Plato adapted some of Prodicus’ distinctions for parodic effect. Indeed, the distinction between bodily and psychological pleasure in Protagoras conforms to the broader distinction between body and soul that is emblematic of Socratic and Platonic thought. For example, in his Memorabilia Xenophon reports that Socrates kept control over the pleasures of his body (τῶν διὰ τῶν σώματος ἦδονῶν), and in book one of Republic Plato has Cephalus say: ‘as the pleasures of the body (αι ἐκείναι τῆς υπόλοιπος) wither, my desire for conversation and its pleasures grows.

In sum, Prodicus did distinguish εὐθυροούνη from some other kinds of pleasure; however, there is no good reason to believe that Prodicus identified εὐθυροούνη as a psychological, let alone mental pleasure. Plato adapted Prodicus’ distinction, whatever it was, and in the process created a distinction, partly on etymological grounds, between εὐθυροούνη as intellectual pleasure and ἦδονη as bodily pleasure. Aristotle dismissed both Plato’s and Prodicus’ distinctions, perhaps on the ground that for Aristotle all pleasures are identical qua unimpeded activities of the natural state. Finally, the Stoics, perhaps under the in-


23 In Arist top II p.96 (= SVF 434)

24 See DL 7 115 (= SVF 431); [Andronicus] On Passions 6 (= SVF 432).

25 Comm in Plt Phdr 238.22-239.2. Note that this testimony is not cited in Diels-Kranz.

26 We have no explicit or good evidence to think that it is inaccurate, save for the fact that Hermias is a late source.

27 Xen Mem 15.6.3

28 R 1328d2-3
fluence of Plato, adapted the ἦδον-εὐφροσύνη distinction within their conception of πάθη and ἐπιθείαν, maintaining that ἦδον is a kind of vicious irrational judgment, while εὐφροσύνη is a species of virtuous rational emotion.

IV 'Εὐφροσύνη to the Time of Epicurus

The results of the preceding section provide us with a context for the philosophical use of 'Εὐφροσύνη'. Since Prodicus appears not to have distinguished εὐφροσύνη as a psychological pleasure, Epicurus at least had Plato as a precedent. On the other hand, if Epicurus did use 'Εὐφροσύνη to refer to bodily pleasure of some kind, his usage would be both un-Platonic and un-Stoic. Of course, Epicurus was hardly sympathetic to the Old Academy and the Stoa, but we need better reason than this to think that indeed he appropriated the word 'Εὐφροσύνη to refer to a species of bodily pleasure.

Reason to think that in On Choices Epicurus used the word 'Εὐφροσύνη to refer to bodily pleasure derives from the fact that this usage conforms to the traditional use of 'Εὐφροσύνη. 'Εὐφροσύνη is very rare in pre-Hellenistic philosophy. It does not occur in any Presocratic fragment. It occurs four times in Plato, at least twice under the influence of Prodicus; once in Aristotle, again, citing Prodicus; once in Heraclides Pontus, and in no other surviving philosophical work or fragment until Epicurus' On Choices. Indeed, in prose through the third century, 'Εὐφροσύνη is, with one exception, very rare. The word does not occur in Thucydides, Isocrates, or in any Attic orator, except on one occasion where Demosthenes cites from Solon's elegies.30 It occurs once among Hippocratic writings datable prior to the third century,31 once in a fragment from the astrolabe Critodemus,32 and four times in a treatise on palomancy (divination by muscle twitches) attributed to Melampus.33 The only prose author through the third century in which 'Εὐφροσύνη occurs with some frequency (18 times) is Xenophon,34 who thus seems to have an idiosyncratic predilection for the word. I will discuss Xenophon's uses below, following the discussion of 'Εὐφροσύνη in poetry.

In contrast to its rarity in prose and philosophical texts, 'Εὐφροσύνη is relatively common in Archaic and Classical poetry. For example, it occurs in Homer's Odyssey, the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, Theognis, Anacreon, Solon, Pindar, Bacchylides, Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, and Euripides' Helen and Bacchae.35 In Greek mythology Εὐφροσύνη is one of the three Graces.36 For example, in his fourteenth Olympian ode Pindar relates that the gods would not order a banquet or dance without the assent of the Graces, and he describes Εὐφροσύνη as 'φυλοϊμίλε' (a lover of dance).37 Pindar's epithet is consistent with a tradition that associated Εὐφροσύνη the divinity and εὐφροσύνη the experience with festivities. For example, in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, Hermes gifts Apollo with a lyre and enjoins him: 'From now on bring <the lyre> confidently to the rich feast, the lovely dance and glorious revel, a delight (εὐφροσύνη) by night and day.'38 Likewise, in Apollonius Rhodius, the Argonauts burn a bonfire throughout the night 'in celebration

29 Fr. 55.24 Wehrli (= 39 Schütrumpf), apud Athen 512a, from Heraclides' dialogue On Pleasure
30 19.255
31 De morb sac 14.2. The only other occurrence in the Hippocratic corpus is at Lex 4.5, but this is a late text, and the usage is under Stoic influence.
32 8.1, p.259.7; here the word is conjointed with θλιψία and θυμία.
(ἐὐφροσύνην) of their victory. 39 Apollonius is in fact the only poet of the fourth or third centuries in whom the word occurs. This suggests that ἐὐφροσύνη is, above all, at home in Archaic poetry and as such that in subsequent centuries ἐὐφροσύνη might have been a word of elevated diction.

A particularly clear, late example of the traditional festive connotations of ἐὐφροσύνη occurs in Philo: ‘Among forms of perfect excellence, ἐὐφροσύνη is a festival (ἐορτή) of the soul. But only the wise man celebrates (ἐορτάζει) such a festival (ἐορτήν).’ 40 Here the author conjoins the traditional sense of the word with a philosophical idea drawn from the Stoics. The festive sense of ἐὐφροσύνη is well captured by the translation ‘good-cheer’. Throughout the paper, I have, however, opted for ‘delight’, mainly because its semantic range is broader and because it is grammatically more accommodating.

The contexts in which ἐὐφροσύνη occur in the medical, astrological, and mantic texts cited above are too vague to enable us to determine the meaning of the word just from those passages. However, the sense of ‘good-cheer’ or ‘festive delight’ is compatible with all of them. 41 Xenophon uses ἐὐφροσύνη in a more varied way. Sometimes, he uses ἐὐφροσύνη as a semantic equivalent to ἱδονή. 42 Sometimes, ἐὐφροσύνη has the traditional festive sense. 43 On two occasions, ἐὐφροσύνη is used to distinguish better or higher pleasures from ἱδονή. 44 Finally, in addition to the uses I have noted as tradition­ally festive, Xenophon uses ἐὐφροσύνη to refer to perceptual pleasures. 45

This review of the use of ἐὐφροσύνη up to the time of Epicurus demonstrates that ἐὐφροσύνη was not traditionally associated with rational pleasures such as those of reasoning and contemplation, but rather with festive pleasures such as those associated with eating, drinking, and dance, in other words, with bodily pleasures. Plato is the only author prior to Epicurus who uses ἐὐφροσύνη to refer to rational pleasures. Plato’s use is, indeed, informed by the etymology of the word, but this is idiosyncratic. Consequently, the objection that ἐὐφροσύνη at DL 10.136 cannot refer to bodily pleasures since the φο-root of the word implies intellectual or rational pleasure is untenable. Epicurus could very well have appropriated ἐὐφροσύνη to refer to bodily or perceptual pleasure; indeed, the fact that ἐὐφροσύνη belongs to an elevated semantic register would have further legitimized this appropriation.

V Epicurean Ἐὐφροσύνη

If in DL 10.136 Epicurus could have used the words χαρά and ἐὐφροσύνη to refer to pleasures of the soul and body respectively, it may be questioned whether elsewhere in his writings he did and also whether his Epicurean successors did. With regard to χαρά, Plutarch reports Epicurus as claiming that ‘the stable state of the flesh and the confident expectation of this contain the highest and most secure joy (χαράν) for those who are able to reason.’ 46 Here, confident rational expectation yields joy. 47 Recall the comment of the scholiast on Diogenes Laertius 10.66: ‘The rational <component of the soul> is located in the

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39 4.69. The word also occurs at 2.1149, 4.1037, and 4.1167.
40 de sac Al et Cain §11 vol. 1 p.247, 9 Wendl (= SVF 609)
41 Cp. Diogenes Laertius’ claim that the Epicurean sage ‘will take more delight (ἐὐφροσύνη) than others in spectacles.’ (10.120)
42 Hiero 1.18.4; Cyrop 8.7.12.2; Ap 9.1
43 Hiero 6.1.2; Cyrop 7.4.7.1
44 Hiero 7.5.1; Cyrop 8.1.32.4 (however, in this case the word ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ is explicitly modified by the phrase ‘ὦν τῷ καλῷ’). It is perhaps also noteworthy that ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ occurs at Mem 2.1.29.3 where Socrates is paraphrasing Prodicus’ Choice of Heracles to Aristippus in admonition of Aristippus’ hedonistic life-style. David Sansone, ‘Heracles at the Y’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 124 (2004) 125-42, has argued that Xenophon is here transmitting Prodicus verbatim. I agree with Vivienne Gray’s skeptical reply, ‘The LinguisticPhilosophies of Prodicus in Xenophon’s Choice of Heracles?’ Classical Quarterly 56 (2006) 426-53. More to the present point, there is no indication that the use of pleasure-terms in Xenophon’s representation of Prodicus’ Choice of Heracles is systematic, let alone consistent with the distinctions Hermias attributes to Prodicus. In Xenophon’s version all four pleasure terms (ἡδονή, χαρά, τέρπις, and ἐὐφροσύνη) occur. But, for instance, Vice says that Heracles will taste all pleasures (τερπώνων) and will delight (τερπότεινης) in sounds and sights. (Mem 2.1.23, 24); Vice speaks of enjoying (ἐὐφροσύνων) sex, then later criticizes the hard-won pleasures (ἐὐφροσύνων) that Virtue recommends (Mem 2.1.24, 29).
45 Mem 3.8.10.4; Smp 8.21.6; Cyrop 7.2.28.3; Hiero 1.29.3; perhaps also Rep Lac 7.6.4
46 non posse viv sec Ep 1089d (= Us 68.34-6)
47 Cp. ibid. 1087b (= Us 433): ‘When some people shouted, ’always the banquet-table is dear to you’ he replied, ‘every delightful movement through the flesh yields a certain pleasure (ἡδονήν) and a joy of the soul (χαράν ψυχῆς).’
breast, \(<\text{a fact}\) clear from fears and joy (χαράς).’ And compare this with Lucretius: ‘<the rational part of the soul (animus)> has its seat fixed in the middle region of the breast. Here we feel the palpitation of throbbing fear, here the soothing touch of joy (laetitiae).’ I emphasize that Lucretius uses the word ‘laetitia’, rather than ‘volentias’. There is also one instance of a cognate of ‘χαρά’ in Epicurus’ own writings. In his Letter to Idomenius Epicurus writes that ‘his soul’s joy’ (τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον) overcomes his physical suffering. Here Epicurus is referring to joys derived from recollection of past philosophical discussions. Thus, there is some positive evidence that Epicurus and his successors used the word ‘χαρά’ to refer to pleasures of the soul, that is, rational pleasures, and there is no strong negative evidence that they did not or could not use the word in this way.

In the case of ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’, the evidence is still more scarce. Indeed, one reason why puzzlement surrounds the instance of ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ in (E) is that this is the only instance of the noun among Epicurus’ surviving texts. The participle ‘ἐὑψοψωμ’ has been reconstructed from a fragment of Epicurus’ On Nature. However, the text is too fragmentary to extract a sense of the context and thus the participle’s meaning. There is one instance of the verb ‘ἐὑψοψωμοθεύ’ in Sententia Vatica 48: ‘We must endeavor to make what lies ahead better than behind, so long as we are on the road (ἐν ὁδῷ). And whenever we reach the limit (πέρας), we should with equanimity take delight (ἐὑψοψωμοθεύς).’ On this, Cyril Bailey comments: ‘Another rather commonplace aphorism, which in the topic of life and death has a connection with that which precedes.’ The preceding aphorism, Sententia 47, to which Bailey here refers, concludes: ‘And when compulsion drives us, spitting on life and those who vainly cling to it, we will depart with a glorious song of triumph, shouting that we have lived well.’ Accordingly, in the case of Sententia 48, Bailey treats ‘ὁδὸς’ as the road of life and ‘πέρας’ as death, its limit. Moreover, one may suspect that Bailey has in mind Epicurus’ own death, at which time, as we saw above, he wrote to Idomeneus that the joys of recollecting his past philosophical conversations overcame the physical pains of his illness. In this case, the festive connotations of ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ are clearly present. On the other hand, there is no indication that the delight Epicurus proposes one take is bodily rather than mental; rather, it clearly appears to be rational. Still, in defense of my proposal that ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ in (E) is used to refer to bodily pleasure, it must be emphasized that in Sententia 48 Epicurus does not use the noun ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’, only the cognate verb.

Two instances of ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ do, however, occur among the fragments of Diogenes of Oinoanda. In fragment 153 Diogenes distinguishes empty and natural desires and says of the latter: ‘Now those <desires> that are natural seek after such things as <are necessary> for our nature’s delight (τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐὐφροσύνης).’ Compare fragment 155, which reads: ‘<For what is natural is easy to obtain,> while what is empty is difficult to obtain.’ Fragments 153 and 155 are influenced by sections 127-31 of the Letter to Menoeceus, wherein Epicurus distinguishes natural and empty desires and proceeds to compare the pleasures of plain fare to those of a luxurious diet. The scholiast to Sententia 29 provides further clarification: ‘Epicurus regards as natural and necessary those desires that bring relief from pain, for example, drink when we are thirsty.’ The fragments from Diogenes of Oinoanda in fact simplify Epicurus’ tri-fold distinction between natural necessary, merely natural, and empty desires since they do not draw a clear distinction between necessary natural desires and merely natural desires. However, Diogenes clearly has necessary natural desires in mind when he contrasts natural and empty desires. This suggests that by ‘our nature’s delight’ (τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐὐφροσύνης) in fragment 153, Diogenes means perceptual pleasures such as those of eating and drinking plain fare.

48 3.141-2
49 DL 10.22
50 The noun occurs in Us 359, but here Hippolytus is describing, not quoting Epicurus’ position. For other similar examples of the cognate verb, see Plut non posse 1092d-e, 1095c, 1097e-f. I owe these examples to Purinton (1993, n.17). Note that Purinton does not discuss the two instances of ‘ἐὐφροσύνη’ among the fragments of Diogenes of Oinoanda. I discuss these in section V.
51 PHerc 1431 in VH VI 84 col. 3,7
52 C. Bailey, Epicurus. The Extant Remains, Clarendon Press, 1926, 383
53 19-13 (Martin Ferguson Smith, The Epicurean Inscription, Bibliopolis, 1993, 342)
54 Ibid. 421. This, of course, is also comparable to SV 15.
55 However, as Smith observes, Diogenes ‘seems not to have followed Epicurus in saying that some natural desires are necessary and others merely natural.’ (1993, 584)
56 DL 10.149
The other instance of 'εὐφροσύνη' occurs in fragment 10:

... <since in our dreams,> as also when we are awake, we ejaculate, it is no good arguing that the delight (εὐφροσύνη) we derive from them is unreal because we are asleep. Therefore, one must not call these visions empty, since they actually possess such great power.57

Diogenes is here referring to wet dreams in the context of an argument that dream-images are not, as the Stoics claimed, ontologically vacuous. Diogenes insists that dream-images must be substantial since they possess power great enough (δύναμις τοῦτοῦ) to produce ejaculation and its attendant pleasure. Compare this idea with Diogenes Laertius' comment on Epicurus' view of the ontology of dream-images: 'And the visions of madmen and dreamers are true, for they cause movement; whereas that which does not exist does not cause movement.'58 Note also that use of 'εὐφροσύνη' in Diogenes Oinoanda in reference to ejaculation is consistent with passages in Xenophon where 'εὐφροσύνη' is used in reference to sexual pleasure. For instance, in Xenophon's Symposium Socrates remarks that 'a boy does not share in sexual delights (τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄφοροδοις εὐφροσύνην) with a man as a woman does.59

The following objection has, however, been suggested against the interpretation of 'εὐφροσύνη' in Diogenes fragment 10 as referring to bodily pleasure: in the case of wet dreams the 'sex' is in our heads, so to speak; the stimulation that leads to ejaculation in these circumstances would seem more properly described as 'rational', in contrast to the physical stimulation of actual intercourse with another person. But however we might conceptualize pleasure experienced in wet-dreams, in Epicurean psychology, as discussed in section II, dream-images, which are derived from the external world, are objects of perception, albeit mental perception (διανοία). Moreover, dreams are irrational processes; they do not involve λογισμός. As such, the psychological source of the pleasure is irrational and thus the pleasure cannot be a pleasure of soul, where this means a pleasure of the rational part of the soul. Moreover, the proximate source and salient cause of the pleasure of ejaculation, whether this occurs when the subject is dreaming or awake, is the physical process of ejaculation. As such, the pleasure of ejaculation is a tactile perceptual pleasure. Moreover, the pleasure does not derive from the contact of the sexual organ with an external body; rather, it derives from the rush of semen through and out of the subject's body.60 Consequently, whether irrational διανοία or ejaculation is the cause of the pleasure that occurs in a wet-dream, Diogenes Oinoanda's fragment 10 supports the case that Epicurus may use 'εὐφροσύνη' in (E) to refer to kinetic bodily, that is, perceptual pleasure.61

Finally, let me emphasize that I am not arguing for the strong thesis that the words 'χάρα' and 'εὐφροσύνη' are technical Epicurean terms for kinetic pleasures of the soul and body respectively. I am only arguing for the weaker thesis they are used in (E) to refer to kinetic pleasures of the soul and body respectively. In other words, the uses of 'εὐφροσύνη' in Diogenes Oinoanda support the view that Epicurus could and did use the word 'εὐφροσύνη' in (E) to refer to kinetic pleasures of the body.

VI 'Εναργεία?

Let us now turn to 'Ενεργεία' in (E) — or rather, as a preliminary to the discussion of 'Ενεργεία', let us pause over a possible emendation of 'Ενεργεία'. At least twice in the manuscripts of the Letter to Herodotus, we read 'Ενεργεία' when in fact the text clearly should be emended to Epicurus' epistemological term 'Ενέργεια'. For example, at §48, we read: 'For there is nothing in this that is contradicted by perceptions, if one should look (βλέπον) in some way at τὰς Ενέργειας.'62 The original must have read '... τὰς Εναργείας' and thus must have referred to clear perceptions. It is worth considering whether a similar emendation

59 Smp 8.21.6. At Hiero 1.29.3, Hiero says: 'In his sexual relationships with boys, even more than with women, the tyrant experiences fewer delights (τῶν εὐφροσύνην).'
60 Cp. the remark by the scholiast on DL 10.66: 'Semen is derived from the entire body.' One of the explanations of the intensity of sexual pleasure current in the fourth century, arguably derived from the Hippocratic On Generation, was based on the panspermatic theory, that is, the view that sperm is derived from the whole body. Cp. Aristotle's examination and rejection of this explanation at GA723b.
61 Cp. also the use of 'καταθεοπαθεύ' at fr. 43.III.7-8 in reference to dream-images.
62 The other example is at §52.
should occur in (E), viz., ‘έναργεια βλέπονταί’. Accordingly, the clause could be rendered: ‘joy and delight are seen with clarity (or through clear evidence) as kinetic <pleasures>.’ The use of the instrumental dative ‘έναργεια’ with ‘βλέπονται’ is also attractive since it would help explain the syntactical asymmetry between the first and second clauses of (E). The first clause reads: tranquility and freedom from pain are (έλον) katastematic pleasures. So it is questionable why the second was not composed to read: joy and delight are kinetic pleasures.

Now, the verb ‘βλέπειν’ means ‘see’. But seeing may be understood more concretely as a visual event in which one directly views a scene by looking at it or less concretely as when one understands something or gains insight into a situation. As Liddell and Scott note, the core sense of ‘βλέπειν’ is the more concrete one. Hicks’, Bailey’s, and Long and Sedley’s translations of ‘βλέπονται’ in (E) all favor a non-concrete sense: joy and delight are ‘seen to consist in motion and activity,’63 are ‘considered as active pleasures involving motion,’64 and are ‘regarded as kinetic activities.’65 As such, the implicit subject of the action of the verb is not the subject who experiences joy and delight. Indeed, if there is an implicit subject at all, it is the reader who comprehends the identification of joy and delight that Epicurus articulates. But, more likely, in the passive voice the verb is functioning impersonally, as ‘φασινεύομαι’ may, to convey that something appears, comes to light, or simply is the case.

Purinton is exceptional in translating ‘βλέπειν’ as ‘experience’: ‘joy and delight ... are experienced in activity.’66 In this case, the implicit subject of the action described by the verb is the subject of the experience of joy and delight. The Greeks’ general term for experience, ‘αισθημα’, can be used to mean ‘perception’ or ‘feeling’. Indeed, until Epicurus Greek philosophers did not employ words to distinguish feeling from perception. Thus, following Purinton, it might be argued that ‘βλέπειν’ in (E) functions in its concrete sense and in fact more specifically serves to convey feeling. However, there is a compelling reason against translating ‘βλέπονταί’ with the meaning of ‘experience’; all of Epicurus’ uses of ‘βλέπειν’ in the passive have the less concrete sense.67 In view of this, I suggest that we follow Hicks, Bailey, and Long and Sedley; and so I have translated ‘βλέπονταί’ as ‘are viewed’.68 In short, (E) stands, and we need to give an account of ‘ένεργεια’.69

63 Hicks (1925) 661
64 Bailey (1926) 121
65 Long and Sedley (1987) Vol 1, 118
68 Cp. Purinton who does not take joy or delight to be a kind of pleasure, but rather an intentional state whose object is pleasure (1993, 287). Thus, he interprets (E) to mean that joy and delight, which are taken in kinetic pleasures, are experienced in activity; that is, joy and delight ‘arise as states of consciousness in virtue of kinetic pleasures (288). But Purinton also observes: ‘This still leaves unanswered ... one final question: what distinction, if any, are we to make between χαίρω and εὔφορον, either when, as here, they are modified with the phrase εἰκόνη χαίρειν or when, as elsewhere, they appear without modification? This question, I confess, I am not sure how to answer’ (290). Purinton offers two possibilities. One, εὔφορον is a species of χαίρω. This view, as he notes, follows the Stoics, who regard χαίρω as a τοποθετημένον specifically as a rational judgment of the presence of goodness. Accordingly, εὔφορον is the rational judgment of the presence of self-controlled actions. See SVF 432, which happens to be identical to the definition given in the Platonic Definitions 413e, and see SVF 431. Two, χαίρω is an episode of joy at a pleasure, whereas εὔφορον is ‘the name for the continuing mental state which one has for the whole time that one is enjoying a series of pleasures’ (291). Purinton provides little support for this distinction, although he says ‘If I had to commit myself to one of these views, I suppose it would be to the (second)> (291). Purinton’s position is also to be compared with Bollack’s (1975, 186) where the distinction between between kinetic and katastematic pleasures in (E) is characterized as follows: ‘On distingou du corps, les “mouvements” de l’âme qui se situent à l’intérieur de l’ataraxie, sans l’adjonction de la jouissance d’un autre objet sensible. Objectivant un état positif qui se distingue du simple plaisir catastématique de la deliverance du mal, et qui est en acte parce qu’il implique la conscience de cet état, l’espirit l’assimile par analogie au mouvement des plaisirs physiques, qui seuls nous procurent l’idee du bien.’
69 As such, I have no explanation for the shift from ‘έλον’ to ‘βλέπονταί’ in the first
VII The Status Quaestionis on Epicurus on Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasures

In considering what Epicurus means when he refers to 'εὐφροσύνη' and 'χαρά' in (E) as 'κατά κίνησιν ἑνέργεια', we need to consider the concepts κίνησις and ἑνέργεια as they pertain to hedonic theory. In order to do this, we first need to examine the relation between katastematic and kinetic pleasures in Epicurus' hedonic theory.

Debate persists over Epicurus' view of katastematic and kinetic pleasures. The heart of the debate can be summarized as follows. First, the majority of scholars accept that Epicurus in some fashion distinguishes between katastematic and kinetic pleasures. Yet several scholars, Justin Gosling, Christopher Taylor, and Boris Nikolsky, maintain that Epicurus does not draw this distinction or, as Gosling and Taylor say, that it is not an important one for Epicurus. Second, among the majority who accept that Epicurus distinguishes between katastematic and kinetic pleasures, some scholars, Carlo Diano, John Rist, Elizabeth Asmis, and Jeffrey Purinton, maintain that kinetic pleasures presuppose katastematic pleasures. Others, Ettore Bignone, Cyril Bailey, Anthony Long and David Sedley, James Warren, and Raphael Woolf, maintain that kinetic pleasures may occur anterior or posterior to katastematic pleasures, and thus that kinetic pleasures do not depend upon katastematic pleasures.

and second clauses of (E). An anonymous referee suggests that perhaps no explanation is needed beyond noting that Epicurus wasn't a particularly elegant writer.

Gisela Stiker might also agree to this view, although it is difficult to be sure since she does not situate her contribution in relation to others. She maintains that kinetic and katastematic pleasures share the property of being free from pain. However, kinetic pleasures differ from katastematic pleasures in that the former have objects, whereas the latter are objectless. Moreover, kinetic pleasures are episodic, whereas katastematic pleasures are, in principle, lasting states ('Epicurean Hedonism', in Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 3–17, at 16–17). Michael Erler and Malcolm Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics', in K. Algra et al, eds., The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 642–674, seem sympathetic to this view, although they suggest that 'perhaps Epicurus himself never indicated how he would classify pleasures of restoration of the body's natural state ...' (655).

Malte Hossenfelder holds a related view. He maintains that katastematic pleasure is the limit of the intensity of pleasure and that kinetic pleasure is pleasure that increases as it approaches katastematic pleasure or that decreases in intensity as it recedes from katastematic pleasure. ('Epicurus — hedonist malgré lui', in Norms of Nature, G. Striker and M. Schofield, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1986, 245–63, at 254–6) The rather sui generis positions of three additional scholars deserve mention. Michael Stokes, 'Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures', in Cicero the Philosopher, J. Powell, ed., Clarendon Press, 1999, 145–70, maintains that, in addition to katastematic pleasure, Epicurus distinguishes two types of pleasure, which Stokes calls sensualist pleasures and kinetic pleasures. Sensualist pleasures are pleasant movements of perceptual faculties; as such, they seem to presuppose katastematic pleasures. But kinetic pleasures are restorative pleasures. Gabriele Giannantoni, 'Il piacere cinetico nell’etica epicurea’, Elenchos 5 (1984) 25–44, maintains that katastematic pleasures are satisfactions of necessary desires, whereas kinetic pleasures are satisfactions of natural, but non-necessary desires. In this case, Giannantoni understands desire-satisfaction in phenomenological terms, as the feeling of thirst slaked. In contrast, Philip Mitsis, Epicurus' Ethical Theory, Cornell University Press, 1988, 45–51, maintains that Epicurus conceives of pleasure not as a feeling, but as an attitude toward things, in particular the realization of goods and satisfaction of desires. Accordingly, katastematic pleasure is an attitude whose object is a certain katastematic condition, say, bodily health or mental tranquility, while kinetic pleasure is an attitude whose object is some activity such as the stilling of hunger or the tasting of honey.
ring to bodily pleasure, 'it is hard to understand what meaning ... the word εὐτρησμός would have.' Objection (2) is a non-starter. The use of 'εὐτρησμός' in (e) or 'ἐνέργεια' in (E) may be puzzling regardless of whether 'εὐφροσύνη' and 'χαρά' both refer to pleasures of the soul or whether one refers to pleasure of the body. At any rate, in section XI, I offer an interpretation of 'ἐνέργεια' in (E) that is consistent with an Epicurean division between katastematic and kinetic pleasures.

Regarding objection (1), Nikolsky takes 'εὐφροσύνη' to refer to pleasures of the soul. His reasons are as follows: 'the accepted meaning of this word ('εὐφροσύνη'), its etymology (from φρονί 'mind') and the history of its usage [here Nikolsky cites Plato, Protagoras 337ff.], as well as an express statement by Plutarch, who examined the use of this concept in the Epicurean school ... all run counter to such an interpretation.' Thus, Nikolsky, like others, has mistaken Plato's Prodician use of 'εὐφροσύνη' at Protagoras 337c as being representative of the use of 'εὐφροσύνη'. We have seen that 'εὐφροσύνη' in (E) refers to kinetic bodily pleasure.

Regarding Plutarch’s use, Nikolsky cites the following passage from Plutarch’s A Pleasant Life Impossible:

Relaxations of the flesh and the mind in enjoyment <that is, the sorts of pleasures Plutarch claims that the Epicureans principally extol>, if they are moderate, are in fact neither great nor remarkable; and if they are excessive, then we regard them as based on empty and unstable ground and as vulgar and reckless. One should speak of them neither as psychic nor as joys (χαράς), but as bodily pleasures (ζωσά), grinings and luxuries, so to speak, in which the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς) also has some share. But justly deserve to be called εὐφροσύνας and χαράς are pure and free from pain, unmixed with throbbing or stinging, and without regret. The good in these things belongs to the soul, and this goodness is truly psychic and noble, not alien or irrational,

but rational to the highest degree, for it derives from the theoretical and philosophical or the practical and honorable parts of the mind.76 Plutarch is criticizing Epicurean somatic hedonism and describing the sorts of pleasure (εὐφροσύνας καὶ χαράς), pleasures of the mind, that the Epicureans fail to enjoy. Plutarch clearly uses the words 'εὐφροσύνη' and 'χαράς' to refer to rational pleasures. However, there is no reason to think that Plutarch’s choice of 'εὐφροσύνη' in reference to rational pleasures reflects Epicurean usage. Rather, in using 'εὐφροσύνη' to refer to rational pleasures, Plutarch is using his own, probably Platonic, although perhaps Stoic-influenced, language. Moreover, contrary to Nikolsky’s claim, there is no evidence that Plutarch has expressly 'examined the use of this concept (εὐφροσύνη) in the Epicurean school.' Plutarch uses 'εὐφροσύνη' several additional times in the text,77 but never in paraphrasing an Epicurean idea, let alone in quoting from an Epicurean.78 Consequently, Nikolsky’s argument that Epicurus does not distinguish between katastematic and kinetic pleasures in (E) fails.

IX Gosling and Taylor’s Argument

Gosling and Taylor present four objections to the view that Epicurus regards the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures as ‘important’.79 By expressing the problem in terms of importance, Gosling and Taylor are hedging or fudging the issue. The question whether Epicurus regards the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures as important differs from the question whether Epicurus recognizes a distinction between these kinds of pleasure. I will consider the relevance of their four objections to the view that Epicurus does not distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasures.

First, at Tusculan Disputations 3.18.41-2, Cicero refers to the Epicurean statement, 'For my part I cannot understand what the good is if

74 (2001) 456

76 1092d-e
77 1097f2, 1099f3, 1100f2, 1107a3
78 Cf. Purinton (1993, n.17) who says that Plutarch does not recognize a distinction between 'εὐφροσύνηι' and 'χαράς'. This is correct, but irrelevant to the question whether Epicurus used the word 'εὐφροσύνη' in (E) to refer to bodily pleasure.
79 (1982) 366-71
one subtracts those pleasures perceived by taste, those from hearing and music, and those sweet movements too got from visual perception of shapes, or any of the other pleasures generated by any sense in the whole man... Cicero's line derives from a passage in Epicurus' On the End: 'I do not know how to conceive the good if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, sex, hearing, and the sweet movements (κινητές) of the sight of form.'

Gosling and Taylor interpret this to mean that absent these perceptual pleasures, which are kinetic pleasures, there would be no good. But in that case, they argue, if Epicurus distinguishes katastematic pleasures from kinetic pleasures, one would expect Epicurus to know perfectly well what would be left among the goods if sensory, that is, kinetic pleasures were subtracted: ataraxia and aponia.

Second, given Epicurus' view that the senses are the criterion of goodness, commitment to the view that katastematic pleasure is the greatest pleasure and good 'makes it hard for Epicurus consistently to hold that the good is given in perception.' Gosling and Taylor here assume that katastematic pleasure is not perceived or felt.

Third, Gosling and Taylor follow Cicero in suggesting that if Epicurus distinguishes between katastematic and kinetic pleasures, then Epicurus is cheating by using the word 'pleasure' to refer to two quite different conditions. Moreover, even if katastematic pleasure is the recognition of lack of pain, as, for example, Philip Merlan thinks, 'what the senses reveal as good is in fact something quite different from what is really good, for <the senses> give experience of kinetic pleasures whereas it is the quite different katastematic kind that is the good.'

Observe that this objection depends upon the preceding one. That is, Gosling and Taylor's main concern here is that whereas the senses are regarded as the criterion of the good, perceptual pleasure cannot be the good, since katastematic pleasure is. Consequently, either Epicurus is inconsistent or he doesn't in fact distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasure.

Fourth, Gosling and Taylor argue that 'it would be somewhat surprising to find Epicurus allowing the existence of a state of a living thing lacking both pain and sensory pleasure <that is, katastematic pleasure>.' In arguing thus, Gosling and Taylor seem to have a view of the life of the Epicurean sage as one whose blissfulness is unrelated to and independent of perception. Here again, Gosling and Taylor find this inconsistent with Epicurus' commitment to the view that πάθη are criteria of good and bad. Moreover, as they emphasize, according to Epicurus, life is characterized by perception since it is precisely the absence of άνθος that grounds Epicurus' claim that 'death is nothing to us.'

With regard to the first and second objections, Gosling and Taylor misconstrue Epicurus' claim in On the End that he cannot conceive of the good absent perceptual pleasures. Epicurus does not mean that perceptual pleasure is the only good. Nor does Epicurus mean that it is theoretically impossible to distinguish kinetic and katastematic pleasures. Rather, I suggest he means that perceptual pleasures reveal katastematic pleasures. Perceptual pleasures reveal katastematic pleasures because, as I maintain, perceptual pleasures depend upon katastematic pleasures. The smooth functioning of the perceptual faculties indicates the correlative katastematic conditions. Given this, Epicurus can also consistently maintain that πάθη are criteria of good and bad.

My simple answer to Gosling and Taylor's third objection is that kinetic and katastematic pleasures share the property of being free from pain. This, in Epicurus' view, constitutes pleasure. I discuss this point further below.

Regarding the fourth objection, while the Epicurean sage is, like a god, unperturbed and tranquil, his life is replete with perceptions and thoughts, as the life of all humans must be. Given his άταραξία, many of his thoughts and mental activities are kinetic pleasures of the soul;
for example, he enjoys teaching and the company of friends. Likewise, insofar as he is healthy, many of his perceptions are kinetic pleasures of the body; for example, he enjoys his meals. Thus, one may ask exactly what Gosling and Taylor mean when they speak of Epicurus ‘allowing the existence of a state of a living thing lacking both pain and sensory pleasure <that is, katastematic pleasure>.’ By recognizing such a condition Epicurus does not mean to suggest that the sage who achieves it lives in the absence of kinetic pleasures. The following ethical fragment indicates that he does not: ‘Wellbeing and blessedness are not contained in a bounty of riches or in a heap of possessions, nor in political offices or power, but in freedom from pain (μυστία), in gentle affections (προϊόντα πάθων), and in a disposition of soul that recognizes nature’s limits.’ I take it that ‘μυστία’ refers to katastematic bodily pleasure, ‘προϊόντα πάθων’ refers to kinetic, if not more specifically perceptual pleasures, and ‘a disposition of the soul that recognizes nature’s limits’ refers to katastematic mental pleasure.

In sum, Gosling and Taylor’s objections fail to show that Epicurus does not distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasures.

X  Diano’s, Merlan’s, Rist’s, Long and Sedley’s and Warren’s Arguments

I now turn to the evidence for the view that kinetic pleasures presuppose katastematic pleasures. Diano’s argument, the point of departure for the treatment of this question in modern scholarship, fundamentally rests on the following point: Epicurus holds that pleasure is unmixed with pain. Three pieces of explicit evidence support this view. First, in his commentary on Plato’s Philebus Olympiodorus comments: ‘Unlike Plato who maintains that certain pleasures are mixed with pain, Epicurus does not believe that pain is mixed with pleasure.’ Support for this purity of pleasure principle from Epicurus himself comes from Kyria Doxa 3: ‘As long as pleasure is present, so long as it is present, there is no pain, either of body or soul or both at once.’ As Diano argues, the notion of restorative pleasure would contradict this purity principle since restorative pleasure would involve a pleasure counteracting a pain. Consequently, pleasure in restoration cannot be construed as kinetic pleasure anterior to katastematic pleasure.

Third, in On the Nature of Things Lucretius describes the pleasure of eating as follows: ‘the pleasure derived from taste is confined to the palate. Once the food has plunged down through the throat and is all being channeled into the limbs, there is no pleasure.’ Diano emphasizes that here the pleasure of eating is specifically located in the gustatory faculty, not in the nutritive faculty. Thus, pleasure is not derived from the restoration of the deficit itself, and so there is no restorative pleasure properly speaking.

The first scholar to criticize Diano’s position was Merlan, in 1960. Merlan begins his criticism of Diano with two objections. These objections rely on appeals to what Merlan takes to be commonsense. First, ‘if the pleasure of eating and drinking is one of the palate alone, it would follow that the palate alone should be able to experience pleasure regardless of whether or not another part of the organism experiences the pain of hunger and thirst.’ Rist rightly criticizes this objection: ‘We all know ... that it is possible to eat and enjoy eating when we do not need to eat, and if we overeat to excess the pleasure may continue in the palate while we feel pain elsewhere ...’

Second, Merlan objects: ‘The explanation of the fact that the pain of hunger and thirst is removed only gradually becomes very intricate. We must assume that by ‘gradual removal of pain of hunger’ we mean that more and more parts of the organism, all of which felt that pain, are restored to the condition of katastematic πάθων so that ‘gradual removal’ means that the pain of hunger is felt in fewer and fewer parts of

90 This is how Diano characterizes Bignone’s account: ‘la detrazione del dolore avrebbe per una specie di lotta tra piacere e dolore; quando questo è vinto, seque il piacere katastematico, il quale essendo da lui inteso come la forma, non sarà έλωσ, ma temporaneamente, ultima del piacevole, comprrenderebbe quindi sotto di sé anche il cinetico.’ (Note epicuree’, in 1977, 228-9)

91 = Us 421
the organism.\textsuperscript{95} Indeed, according to Diano, this is Epicurus’ position.\textsuperscript{96} And surely being intricate is no good reason to reject an interpretation. In fact, one may question whether the account is intricate.

Merlan’s appeals to commonsense are weak. But Merlan’s argument also depends on textual evidence, specifically on the following passage from \textit{On Ends} in which Cicero is interrogating his Epicurean spokesman Torquatus:

\begin{quote}
Tell me then,” I said, “in the case of one who is thirsty, is drinking a pleasure?” “Who would deny it?” “Is it the same pleasure as having a quenched thirst?” “No, it is quite a different kind. A quenched thirst (\textit{restincta sitis}) is a static pleasure, whereas the pleasure of having one’s thirst quenched (\textit{ipsius restinctionis}) is kinetic.”\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Merlan maintains that, on Diano’s interpretation, the kinetic pleasure must refer not to the pleasure of tasting and being hydrated, but to the pleasure of tasting alone. This is because being hydrated cannot be a kinetic pleasure, but must be a katastematic pleasure whose scope widens as dehydrated organs are increasingly restored to their natural, hydrated state. But Merlan finds it difficult to believe that “\textit{voluptas restinctionis}’ can refer to the pleasure of tasting alone.\textsuperscript{98} Indeed, adherents of the view that Epicurus recognizes restorative pleasures and thus kinetic pleasures antecedent to katastematic pleasures often cite this passage in defense of their position.

I agree with Merlan that, \textit{ceteris paribus}, it would be more natural to take the word ‘\textit{restinctionis}’ to refer to the process of being hydrated, whether or not this includes this activity of tasting. However, as Rist emphasizes, in the immediately succeeding paragraph of \textit{On Ends} kia-
pleasures as a species of kinetic pleasure. Gladness that a deficit is being restored is an attitude toward a restorative process. If Epicurus recognized such an attitude as a pleasure — itself a controversial claim — it would be a non-restorative, albeit kinetic, rational pleasure, not a physiological pleasure of remediating a nutritional deficit. But restorative pleasures are physiological pleasures of remediating deficits.

Long and Sedley also comment on Diano’s use of Lucretius’ passage on the pleasure of eating: ‘Diano’s influential theory is unconvincing in general, and not even plausible for this passage.’\(^{102}\) In rejecting Diano’s theory ‘in general’, Long and Sedley once again provide no evidence. But with regard to the Lucretius passage specifically, they emphasize that the passage ‘implies nothing about the pleasure of actually replenishing one’s stomach, to which taste makes no difference.’\(^{103}\) It is true that when Lucretius writes that once the food descends down the throat there is no pleasure (nulla voluptas est), he means that there is no pleasure of taste. Moreover, it is true that absence of pleasure of taste does not imply absence of pleasure of replenishing one’s stomach.\(^{104}\) However, one must ask why Lucretius is making his claim. Can he merely be stating that once we have swallowed our food, we do not derive pleasure from tasting it? This is too obvious to warrant stating. It makes more sense if Lucretius’ purpose in making the claim is to emphasize that pleasure in eating derives from the exercise of the gustatory faculty rather than the replenishment of a nutritional deficit.

Long and Sedley’s insistence that Epicurus recognizes restorative pleasures is especially surprising in view of the fact that in their presentation of Epicurus’ hedonic theory they state that ‘a reading of the Aristotelian material <on pleasure> will give the proper historical perspective <to Epicurus’ theory>.’\(^{105}\) It is Aristotle who vigorously rejects the Platonic view of Republic IX and Philebus that pleasures are restorations to the natural state. For example, in Chapter 12 of Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues:

The processes that restore us to our natural state are only accidentally pleasant; for that matter the activity at work in the appetite for them is the activity of so much of our state and nature as has remained unimpaired. Indeed, there are actually pleasures that involve no pain or appetite, e.g., those of contemplation, the nature in such a case not being defective at all.\(^{106}\)

In the wake of Aristotle, Plato’s restorative conception of pleasure could not simply be accepted. Indeed, in section XI, I will argue that Aristotle influenced Epicurus’ hedonic theory, including his distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure and his use of the phrase ‘κατά κίνησιν ένεργεια’ in (E).

Warren is one more recent commentator who attempts to argue that some kinetic pleasures are restorative: ‘it is clear that kinetic pleasures are pleasures which are involved in the process of removing a pain or lack. The pleasure experienced in taking a drink and removing thirst would be a paradigmatic case.’\(^{107}\) Warren’s claim is based on his reading of the following passage from Cicero’s On Ends:

(i) The pleasure which we pursue is not just that which moves our actual nature with some gratification and is perceived by the senses in company with a certain delight <namely, kinetic pleasure>. The greatest pleasure, we maintain, is that which is perceived once all pains is removed <namely, katastematic pleasure>. (ii) For when we are freed from pain, we rejoice in the actual freedom and absence of all distress; but everything in which we rejoice is pleasure, just as everything that distresses us is pain. (iii) Therefore, the complete removal of distress brings forth pleasure as its consequence. So quite generally the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place. Thus, Epicurus did not hold that there was some halfway state between pain and pleasure. Rather, that very state which some deem halfway, namely the absence of all pain, he held to be not only true pleasure, but the highest pleasure.\(^{108}\)

This argument can be distilled as follows. (i) claims that the greatest pleasure is katastematic, not kinetic; and katastematic pleasure is iden-

\(^{102}\) (1987) Vol 2, 125

\(^{103}\) Ibid.

\(^{104}\) Ibid.

\(^{105}\) (1987) Vall, 121

\(^{106}\) EN 1152b32-3a2

\(^{107}\) Note that I am quoting from an English draft of Warren’s paper, which was subsequently translated into French and published as ‘L’éthique’, in Lire Épicure et les épicuriens, A. Gigandet and P. -M. Morel, eds., PUF, 2007, 117-43.

\(^{108}\) 1.37-8. I have added Roman numerals to the passage to facilitate exegesis.
tified as a state wholly free from pain. (ii) presents an argument that a state wholly free from pain is pleasure. And (iii) claims that complete removal of pain produces pleasure, not an intermediate state that is neither pleasant nor painful. In view of this, two basic points should be made against Warren’s interpretation. First, the pleasure produced by complete removal of pain is not kinetic, but katastematic. Thus, if drinking is the cause of the removal of the pain of thirst, there is no claim here to the effect that drinking produces kinetic pleasure. Second, the passage does support the view that drinking and eating remove the pain of thirst and hunger. But diminution and dissolution of pain do not imply restorative pleasure. Consequently, the passage provides no evidence that kinetic pleasures are restorative.

Similarly, when in the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus writes that ‘(i) plain fare brings as much pleasure as a costly diet once the pain of want has been removed, (ii) while bread and water produce the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips,’ he means by (i) that once that katastematic state is achieved, kinetic gustatory pleasures can only vary the pleasure, not increase it, and by (ii) he means any nutritious diet, regardless of its refinement, will restore the nutritive faculties to their katastematic condition, which is the highest possible pleasure.

In the absence of any further arguments for the view that some kinetic pleasures are restorative, I conclude with Diano, Rist, Asmis, and Purinton, that Epicurus does not recognize restorative pleasures and thus that kinetic pleasures presuppose katastematic pleasures. Kinetic pleasures are events in which the perceptual or rational faculties are smoothly or gently stimulated or activated. The smoothness or gentleness of such stimulation or activation occurs within the parameters or boundaries of a katastematic condition of freedom from pain. The katastematic condition of freedom from pain is one in which the perceptual or rational faculties are intact, that is, in the case of the perceptual faculties, healthy, or, in the case of the rational faculties, undisturbed. Compare Kyria Doxa 3: ‘The removal of all pain is the boundary (δόξος) of the magnitude of pleasures.’ By this, I take Epicurus to mean two things. First, as stated, it is a condition on anything that is a pleasure that it is free from pain. Second, some pleasures, for example, certain perceptual pleasures, may be accompanied by more intense feeling-tones than others; however, they are pleasures so long as they remain within the boundaries of freedom from pain; in other words, so long as they supervene upon ἀποστία or ἀπαρξία.

XI ‘Ενέργεια’ in Aristotle and (E)

In light of the foregoing conclusion we are now in a position to explain Epicurus’ use of the phrase ‘κατά κόλαν ἐνέργεια’ in (E). First, Aristotle coined the word ‘ἐνέργεια’. Indeed, the earliest instances of ‘ἐνέργεια’ outside of Aristotle’s writings occur almost exclusively among Peripatetics: Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Strato. Moreover, outside of the Peripatos, in the fourth and first half of the third centuries, the word ‘ἐνέργεια’ appears almost exclusively in the works of philosophers: once in Naussiphanes, once in Epicurus, namely in (E), and twice in Polystratus. This suggests that in (E), which was probably composed a few decades after Aristotle’s death, ‘ἐνέργεια’ is a technical philosophical term of Aristotelian pedigree.


112 TPhr CP 1.12.5.2, 4.1.3.5, 6.7.3.7, 6.7.5.3, 6.8.3.11, 6.8.8.5; Metaph 5a7, 5b23, 7b13, 8a11, 9a4, 10a11; fr. 153a-c Fortenbaugh; Eudem fr. 37a; Strat fr. 74, 134. Bradshaw (2004) 50, claims that after ‘Theophrastus, energiea rapidly passed into neglect among Peripatetics’ and that the instances in Eudemus and Strato are ‘minor.’ But the verbian fragments of Eudemus, Strato, and other early Peripatetics are so scanty that this conclusion seems unwarranted. It is, however, suggestive that only one instance of the word occurs in the Peripatetic Problems 920a6.

113 Naussiph fr. 1.4; Polystr 15.1.1, 31.12 Indelli. The first extant instance of the word by a non-philosopher occurs c. 260 in a grammatical fragment (407.152) of Callimachus, that is, in an extraordinarily erudite author. There is one instance in Antigonus Carystus (168.1.6), but it is difficult to assign a date to his Collectio. The word also occurs once among the fragments of Aristophanes of Byzantium and in Hieracides’ Descriptio Graeciae, also difficult to date with any precision. Given the frequency of the word in Polybius, it is reasonable to infer that by the second century, ‘ἐνέργεια’ had been accepted into non-theoretical writing. Compare Bradshaw (2004) 51-3, who suggests that Polybius uses the word with the sense of ‘vividness’ or ‘vigor’.

109 130-1. I have added Roman numerals to facilitate exegesis.
Most commonly among the early philosophical uses outside of Aristotle, ἐνέργεια is contrasted with δύναμις. For example, Stobaeus quotes the following line from Strato: ‘That which perfects (τον ἐνεργουντα) that has an architect’s condition (ἐπιτεύχθη), nor do we merely look at the production (ἐνέργειαν) itself, rather we look at the ability (το δύναμθαι) that the man has, when taking up the wood and appropriate tools, to fashion a product (ἐργαν) on the basis of his architectural skill.'116 And Philodemus quotes Nausiphanes as saying: ‘we are not claiming that it is only the man who creates a product (τον ἐνεργουντα) that has an architect’s condition (ἐπιτεύχθη), but rather we look at the ability (το δύναμθαι) that the man has, when taking up the wood and appropriate tools, to fashion a product (ἐργαν) on the basis of his architectural skill.’116 In short, ‘ἐνέργεια’ is most commonly used to convey the idea of actuality, in contrast to potentiality.

In Aristotle himself ἐνέργεια has a special association with pleasure. In the context of hedonic theory, ἐνέργεια is specifically contrasted with κίνησις. Aristotle draws the distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις most explicitly in Metaphysics Θ 6. He asserts that a κίνησις is a process that is oriented toward an end (τελειος) or limit (πέρας), but which is not an end in itself. In contrast, an ἐνέργεια is complete and an end in itself. Aristotle uses a number of examples to clarify this distinction. For instance, building a house, a κίνησις, contrasts with a built house, the correlative ἐνέργεια. But Aristotle also characterizes seeing as an ἐνέργεια. This may seem inconsistent with the example of a built house, for in the case of seeing the ἐνέργεια seems to be an activity, whereas in the case of a built house it is a state. However, Aristotle’s view is that an ἐνέργεια is not simply an activity, but, as translators often put it, an actuality or actualization. As Aristotle himself puts it, when one sees, one has seen, that is, has achieved the sight of something.118 Thus, an ἐνέργεια is the realization of an end, whether that realization assumes the form of a static product such as a built house or a dynamic function such as seeing. And thus, with regard to pleasure, as Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics VII 14: ‘There is not only ἐνέργεια of motion (κίνησις), but also of lack of motion (ὑποκίνησις); indeed, there is more pleasure in stillness (ἡμοίας) than in motion (ἐν κίνησιν).’119 Note that here Aristotle uses the word ‘κίνησις’ in its conventional sense, rather than in the technical sense he deploys in contrasting κίνησις and ἐνέργεια.

On the basis of the distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις in Metaphysics Θ 6, in Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle argues that pleasure is an ἐνέργεια rather than a κίνησις.120 Precisely, he claims that pleasure is the unimpeded ἐνέργεια of the natural state. Since Aristotle denies that plants and non-living things experience pleasure, David Bostock is right to emphasize that Aristotle cannot mean that pleasure is the unimpeded activity of any natural state, but more precisely of the psychological faculties of perception and intellection.121 Aristotle articulates his conception of pleasure as an ἐνέργεια of perception and intellection specifically in contrast to Plato’s view, expressed in Republic IX.

114 However, Theophrastus also recognizes the sense of ‘ἐνέργεια’ as the actualization of form, on which cp. Metaph 8a11 and Bradshaw (2004) 48-9.


116 Phil Rhet II p.48 Sudh c 34 (= DK 75B1 =Nausiph fr. 1). This instance of ‘ἐνέργεια’ in Nausiphanes is intriguing vis-à-vis (E) since Nausiphanes was a teacher of Epicurus. David Bradshaw suggests that Aristotle’s Protrepticus ‘is clearly the likeliest source of direct influence’ on Nausiphanes’ use. Whether Nausiphanes introduced Epicurus to Aristotle’s Protrepticus or whether Epicurus encountered Aristotle’s concept of ἐνέργεια by some other means, Epicurus must have been compelled by the conception of pleasure that Aristotle defends in this exoteric work: ‘perfect (τελειας) and unimpeded activity (ἐνέργεια) contains enjoyment (το χαρευς)’ (58.15-16 Pistelli). Moreover, since Aristotle’s primary aim is to encourage the pursuit of philosophy, he argues that the exercise of reason is both the supreme form of human activity and the most pleasant: ‘Therefore, living pleasantly and experiencing true enjoyment belongs either only or at least most of all to philosophers’ (59.11-13 Pistelli). The passage continues: ‘For the actualization (ἐνέργειαν) of the true thoughts, which is replete with what is most real and which always steadfastly preserves its endowed perfection (τελειας), this of all things is also most productive of delight (ἐνφοροφοιν). Consequently, it is also for this reason, to enjoy (το χαρευς) true and good pleasures, that those who possess reason (νοιωτα) should practice philosophy’ (Pistelli 59.13-18). If Aristotle composed the passage, it would be the only one in the surviving corpus where he uses the word ‘ἐνφοροφοιν’ in proprios persona. The only other instance of the word is the one we have seen in Topics. However, D. S. Hutchinson, M. R. Johnson, ‘Authenticating Aristotle’s Protrepticus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2005) 193-294, at 267, have recently attributed these lines to Iamblichus. While this is consistent with their results more broadly, unfortunately they do not comment on this passage specifically.

117 See 1048a26-b36.

118 It is controversial just how coherent Aristotle’s distinction is.

119 1154b7-8

120 Cp. Aristotle’s remark in EN X: ‘εκ τοιουτον δε δηλον και δι την καλους λεγονας κινους η γενους ειναι θυσιν’ (1174b9-10).

121 This is the main point of his paper ‘Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle’s Ethics’, Phronesis 53 (1988) 251-72.
Timaeus, and above all Philebus, that pleasure is a κίνησις or γένεις. More precisely, Plato argues that pleasure is a restoration to the natural state, where by 'natural state' is meant a state of physical or psychological integrity or wholeness, such as bodily health or psychological happiness. Thus, for example, on Plato's view, drinking when one is thirsty is pleasurable because one is restoring a nutritional deficit. In contrast, Aristotle argues that so-called restorative pleasures are only accidentally (κατά συμβόλης) pleasant. By this Aristotle means that the process of restoration may coincide with a pleasant activity, but that the restoration is not responsible for the pleasure. In the case of drinking water when thirsty, drinking restores a hydration deficit by supplying needed water, but the pleasure derives from the activity of the drinking, not from the restoration of the hydration deficit — even though drinking the water restores the hydration deficit. Aristotle supports this view, for instance, by pointing to the fact that people who are not thirsty derive pleasure from drinking. As such, the pleasure of drinking derives from the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the gustatory faculty, assuming this faculty is in a good condition, that is, in its natural state. For example, a sick person might experience a drink as bitter that would normally taste sweet. Moreover, in the case of the healthy person who is thirsty, the restoration of the hydration deficit is not responsible for the pleasure of drinking, but rather for the diminution of the pain of thirst.

The debate between Aristotle and Plato over the question whether pleasure is a κίνησις or an ἐνέργεια is significant in the face of Epicurus' claim in (E) that certain pleasures are 'ἐφισσων ἐνεργεια'. Given Aristotle's distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις, 'κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργεια' might appear to be an oxymoron. Indeed, in one sense it is. Yet we have also seen that Aristotle retains the conventional use of 'κίνησις' when, in Nicomachean Ethics VII 14, he contrasts ἐνέργεια of κίνησις with ἐνέργεια of ἄκαμπτες. Accordingly, I suggest that, under Aristotle's influence, Epicurus in (E) is claiming that ἐφισσων and χαρά are kinetic actualizations.

The concept of a kinetic actualization is to be understood by contrast with that of a katastematic condition of freedom from pain, which, in Aristotelian terminology, is a static actualization. In other words, a katastematic condition of freedom from pain corresponds to Aristotle's notion of primary actuality, whereas kinetic actualization corresponds to Aristotle's notion of secondary actuality. Ἐφισσων and χαρά, then, are smooth operations or functionings of perceptual and rational faculties respectively when these faculties are intact.