Epicurus on Pleasure and the Goal of Life

Introduction

Epicureanism is the signal form of hedonism in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. But the hedonic theory that informs the ethical theory is puzzling in many ways. According to Epicurus, the goal (τέλος) of human life is to live pleasantly.¹ Human life extends over many years. But most pleasures are fleeting. If one could string together fleeting pleasures just as well as achieve a single or small set of perduring pleasures, the difference in the eudaimonistic value of the two lives might be negligible.² But Epicurus holds that the one life cannot be achieved just as well as the other. A

¹ Living pleasantly is also the goal of non-human animal life. But humans have unique psychological and specifically affective capacities. These capacities engender unique lives and practical considerations. Throughout this discussion, I focus on the goal of human life.

² Cp. KD 10. Among other considerations is whether some pleasures are more pleasant than others and exactly what eudaimonistic value consists in. I will touch on the former, but ignore the latter.
fundamental concern of Epicurean hedonism, then, is what pleasures to pursue or cultivate.

Let us call "telic" those pleasures that contribute to the goal of human life. I say "those pleasures" and not "that pleasure" because Epicurus speaks of a plurality of telic pleasures (equivalently, of a plurality of pleasures constitutive of the genus telic pleasure). In addition, the members of the telic set can, at least to some degree, be ranked in terms of their relative contributions. So the set of telic pleasures are those that, among all pleasures, contribute to the goal; but among telic pleasures, some contribute more than others.

The familiar answer to the question "Which pleasures are telic?" is: those pleasures that Epicurus calls "katastematic." In conformity with tradition, I maintain that katastematic pleasures are telic. Bucking tradition, I argue that certain kinetic pleasures are also telic. Consideration of katastematic pleasure raises at least two further questions. First, Epicurus seems to maintain that katastematic pleasure is merely absence of pain. Without committing to the existence of such pleasure, let us use the phrase "analgesic pleasure" to mean "pleasure that is merely absence of pain." Epicurus' Cyrenaic critics maintain that mere absence of pain is not pleasure. Does Epicurus hold that katastematic pleasure is analgesic pleasure? If so, what justifies the view? Second, hereafter, unless otherwise noted, I use "goal" to refer to the goal of human life. There are, to be sure, a number of other fundamental questions for Epicurus' hedonic theory. For example, what is Epicurus' conception of kinetic pleasure? How does he conceive of the relation between katastematic and kinetic pleasure? And what does he take all pleasures to have in common in virtue of which they are pleasures? These questions are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Epicurus distinguishes mental and corporeal katastematic pleasures. In some passages he maintains that mental and corporeal katastematic pleasures are both telic; but on the basis of other passages, his view seems to be that a pleasant life is possible, at least for stretches, in the absence of katastematic bodily pleasure. How should we understand the relation between the two views?

Epicurus' answers to the preceding questions are obscured by the dearth of primary textual evidence. With the exception of sparse fragments, the principal texts in which Epicurus originally presented his hedonism and hedonic theory have perished. The extant Letter to Menoeceus, Sovereign Maxims, and Vatican Sayings convey his views in oversimplified terms. Hence, sensitive and sympathetic contemporary interpreters have

5 Throughout the chapter I refer to Epicurean corporeal and mental pleasures. All pleasures for Epicurus are psychological in the sense that they involve the soul (ψυχή) in some way. But some pleasures involve the rational part of the soul, which is to say, the mind. I call these "mental" pleasures. Other pleasures involve the body. Those that involve the body also involve the irrational part of the soul. I refer to these pleasures as "corporeal," rather than "bodily" or "somatic," simply in acknowledgement of the fact that Epicurus views the soul itself as a kind of σώμα. Epicurus in fact sometimes speaks of pleasures of the flesh (ἐν τῇ σαρκί), e.g., in KD 4, precisely to avoid speaking of somatic pleasure. However, this is not always the case. For example, consider the phrase "τὸ μὴ τ᾽ ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σώμα" at Ep. Men. 131. Unfortunately, there is no good English adjective corresponding to "flesh." "Carnal" has the wrong connotation, as does "sensual." Strictly, "corporeal" is of course unsatisfactory too since this just means "relating to the body." However, the term is less natural than "bodily," and thus serves to emphasize the special reason for which it is here used.
struggled with a lack of evidence; while the ancients, who in principle had access to 
more text, often based their interpretations and criticisms on salient or striking claims 
rather than a careful and thorough scholarly examination. My own efforts to answer the 
questions are limited to the same textual evidence as my contemporaries. However, I 
hope to show that this evidence, particularly some of the fragments from lost Epicurean 
works, can be more effectively employed.

A Doxographical Consideration

The doxographical tradition attributes to Epicurus a distinction between two 
kinds of pleasure: kinetic (ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονή or ἡ ἐν κινήσει ἡδονή) and katastematic (ἡ 
καταστηματική ἡδονή). Most scholars accept that Epicurus is committed to the 
distinction, but they contest its nature. One scholar, Boris Nikolsky, has questioned 
whether the attribution is merely a product of the doxographical tradition. I side with 
the majority here, but Nikolsky's claim is worth pausing over. There is only one passage 
among Epicurus' surviving texts and fragments that uses the phrase "ἡδονή 
kαταστηματική." This is a fragment from On Choice and Avoidance, which Diogenes 
Laertius cites in the context of distinguishing Epicurus' position from the Cyrenaics':

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while admitting the distinction, claim that it is not "important" to Epicurus.
"[Epicurus]7 differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. The Cyrenaics do not recognize katastematic (καταστηματικὴν) pleasure, only kinetic (ἐν κινήσει) pleasure. But he recognizes both [and in each case]8 of the soul and body, as he says in On Choice and Avoidance, in On the Goal, in the first book of On Lives, and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene. Likewise, Diogenes in the seventeenth book of Selections and Metrodorus in Timocrates say: 'And pleasure is conceived as both kinetic (κατὰ κίνησιν) and katastematic (καταστηματικῆς).’ And Epicurus, in On Choice and Avoidance, says: 'On the one hand, freedom from mental disturbance (ἀταραξία) and absence of corporeal pain (ἀπονία) are katastematic pleasures (καταστηματικαὶ ἡδοναί); on the other hand, delight (εὐφροσύνη) and joy (χαρά) are viewed as involving stimulation (κατὰ κίνησιν) through activation.'9

The fragment from Metrodorus’ Timocrates, which perhaps Diogenes the Epicurean cited in his Selections,10 does not by itself confirm that Epicurus recognizes both katastematic

7 Here and throughout the paper I use straight brackets to add content to aid intelligibility. I use parentheses to give translations, Greek for English and vice versa, and for explications.


9 DL 10.136.

10 In suggesting this, I am influenced by Diogenes' claim that "they say" (λέγουσιν), that what they say is identical, and that what Diogenes the Epicurean says occurs in a work called Selections, which suggests selections from seminal Epicurean texts, including those of Epicurus and his successors.
and kinetic pleasures. It states that pleasure is conceived in these two ways. It might still be questioned who conceives pleasure as such and in particular whether Epicurus does. Of course, Diogenes Laertius quotes the passage in support of Epicurus' recognition of katastematic and kinetic pleasures. But, the skeptic may object, the doxographical tradition is littered with misconstrued and misused citations.

The fragment from *On Choice and Avoidance* seems to me less subject to doubt. To be sure, some aspects of this fragment are contested. It is questionable whether Epicurus recognizes mental as well as corporeal forms of kinetic pleasure and whether the word "ἐνεργείᾳ," translated here as "through activation," has been correctly transmitted. But the fragment clearly identifies ἀταραξία and ἀπονία as katastematic pleasures.

It is also noteworthy that Diogenes Laertius mentions that Epicurus expresses the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasures in several other works: *On the Goal*, *On Lives*, and in the *Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene*. The number of works here is significant, and so is their character. As far as we can judge on the basis of the titles and sparse fragments, all were substantially ethical in content, in other words, good places for Epicurus to discuss the hedonic distinction.11

Still, if the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure were central to Epicurus' hedonic theorizing, one wonders why it is not explicit in Epicurus' summary of his ethical doctrines, the *Letter to Menoeceus*. In fact, among surviving Greek texts, outside of the fragment from *On Choice and Avoidance* and Diogenes' citation from Metrodorus' *Timocrates* and Diogenes the Epicurean's quotation of that, the adjective

"καταστηµατικόν" occurs only twice before Diogenes Laertius.\(^\text{12}\) Notably, the word does not occur in any of the surviving fragments from other Epicureans in the five or six centuries between Epicurus and Diogenes Laertius.

This, then, should give us pause. And one might wish to propose the following. Epicurus recognizes some distinction between two hedonic kinds. Moreover, in several lost works he refers to the distinction using the expressions "καταστηµατικόν" and "κατὰ κίνησιν" or "ἐν κινήσει." Yet Epicurus need not have anchored this hedonic distinction in, let alone limited his distinction to, these terms. Instead, from among various formulations Epicurus employed to articulate the hedonic distinction, doxographers fixed on the terminological distinction between pleasures that are "καταστηµατικόν" and those that are "κατὰ κίνησιν." Thus, this expression of the distinction crystallized within the doxographical tradition, say, at some point in the later Hellenistic period.

Nikolsky’s thesis might be resubmitted in this modified form. But I will push for a stronger position. I will argue that Epicurus probably coined the terms "κατάστηµα" and "καταστηµατικόν," and that he did so and deployed this terminology precisely to articulate his conception of certain conditions which he took to be pleasures, indeed telic pleasures, but which his predecessors and contemporaries had not recognized or regarded as such. To be sure, it may then seem strange that no mention of katastematic pleasure, by that name, occurs in the *Letter to Menoeceus*, *Sovereign Maxims*, or *Vatican Sayings*. But this absence may be explained on the grounds that these were popular works, in which Epicurus wished to avoid technical terminology, especially terminology

\(^{12}\) Philo *Leg. all.* 3.160.5; Plut. *TG* 2.2.3.
that he himself created. Moreover, I suggest that we do find Epicurus expressing the
distinction between hedonic kinds that correspond to katastematic and kinetic pleasures
in the *Letter to Menoeceus*, albeit using different terms.

**Some Epicurean Expressions of Telic Pleasure**

I turn now to consider some of the ways that Epicurus characterizes telic
pleasure. Let's begin with the following passage from the *Letter to Menoeceus*:

"When we say that pleasure is the goal (τέλος), we are not speaking of the
pleasures of prodigals and those that lie in amusement, as some ignorant,
dissenting, or hostile opponents believe. Rather, [we mean] not being in
corporeal pain (τὸ μὴτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα) and not being in a state of mental
disturbance (μὴτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν)."

Here, Epicurus characterizes telic pleasure as a complex of corporeal and mental
constituents. Moreover, Epicurus' terms for the corporeal and mental constituents of
telic pleasure are almost identical to those in the fragment from *On Choice and Avoidance*.
Recall that in the fragment Epicurus claims that freedom from mental disturbance

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13 Another example of a central Epicurean term introduced by Epicurus himself is
Epicurean Preconception," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy*

14 This leaves the question why the term doesn't survive in Epicurus' successors.
According to Diogenes Laertius, the term does occur in Metrodorus. Beyond this, I
conjecture that the remains are too fragmentary.

(ἀταραξία) and absence of corporeal pain (ἀπονία) are katastematic pleasures. Taking the fragment and the passage from the Letter to Menoeceus together, we have reason to believe that Epicurus regards katastematic pleasures as telic. In addition, note that insofar as telic and katastematic pleasure are characterized in analgesic terms, telic and katastematic pleasure appear to be analgesic pleasure.

Despite the near identity of language in the passage from the Letter to Menoeceus and the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance, I think the descriptions "absence of corporeal pain" and "freedom from mental disturbance" merely point toward, but do not adequately capture Epicurus' conception of telic or katastematic pleasure.

Consider the following fragment from Epicurus' On the Goal:

"For the stable constitution of the flesh (τὸ ἑωσταθὲς σάρκος κατάστημα) and the reliable expectation concerning this (τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἐλπίσμα) contain the highest and most stable joy (τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ βεβαιοτάτην χαρὰν) for those able to reason it out (τοῖς ἐπιλογίζωσθαι δυναμένοις)."

Here, Epicurus identifies the "highest and most secure joy" with a complex of corporeal and mental constituents: a stable constitution of the body and a reliable expectation of that stable corporeal constitution. Given the phrase "highest and most secure joy," I assume that Epicurus takes this complex to constitute telic pleasure. But note that "stable corporeal constitution" means and refers to something different from "absence of corporeal pain." Likewise, "a reliable expectation of a stable corporeal constitution" means and refers to something different from "freedom from mental disturbance." 17

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16 fr. 68, apud Plut. non posse, 1098d.

17 Absence of corporeal pain may be short-lived. Additionally, given anaesthesia, freedom from corporeal pain may occur although the body is damaged.
Consider also the following two passages that occur elsewhere in the *Letter to Menoeceus*:

"Health of the body (τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν) and freedom from mental disturbance (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν) ... is the goal of living blessedly (τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν τέλος)."\(^1\)

"We do all things so as not to suffer (ἄλγωμεν) or be afraid (ταρβῶμεν)."\(^2\)

In the first passage, the corporeal component of telic pleasure is described in positive terms as "corporeal health" rather than "absence of corporeal pain," in other words, not in analgesic terms. In the second passage, the mental component is described more precisely as "freedom from fear" rather than "freedom from mental disturbance." It is questionable whether freedom from fear exhausts the mental component of telic pleasure, or whether freedom from fear is just a significant, perhaps the most significant, aspect of it.

In short, Epicurus seems to view telic pleasure as a complex of corporeal and mental pleasures. Moreover, these pleasures seem to be katastematic, as they are called in the fragment from *On Choice and Avoidance*. However, Epicurus describes corporeal and mental telic, analgesic, and katastematic pleasures in somewhat different ways in different passages. Thus, it remains to clarify precisely how he views the pleasures that contribute to the goal of human life.

\(^{18}\) For example, one might have a reliable expectation of bodily health, but also a reliable expectation of dementia, and this might cause mental disturbance.

\(^{19}\) 128.

\(^{20}\) 128.
The Cyrenaic Criticism of Analgesic Pleasure

In pursuing Epicurus' conception of telic pleasure, I will use an ancient criticism of Epicurus as a foil. Recall Diogenes Laertius' testimony, which states that the Cyrenaics do not recognize katastematic pleasure. In the doxography of the Cyrenaics in book 2 of his Lives Diogenes reports that the Cyrenaics do not recognize analgesic pleasure:

"[The Cyrenaics hold that] the removal of pain is not pleasure, as Epicurus claims. Nor is the absence of pleasure pain. For both pleasure and pain ... consist in stimulation (ἐν κινήσει), whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not stimulation, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep."22

Clement of Alexandria provides a similar testimony:

"These Cyrenaics (namely, the Annicerians) reject Epicurus' definition of pleasure, that is, the removal of what causes pain, stigmatizing it as the condition of a corpse ..."23

In considering these reports of the Cyrenaic criticism, observe the distinction between two assumptions. A weaker assumption is that Epicurus admits that some pleasure is analgesic. A stronger assumption is that Epicurus holds that pleasure is analgesic pleasure. Since the focus of our discussion is telic pleasure and not pleasure in general, our interest lies in the weaker assumption.

21 I will justify the translation of "ἐν κινήσει" as "in stimulation" below.

22 DL 2.89.

23 Clem. strom. 2.21.130.8.
In ancient hedonic theorizing, the distinction between pleasure and absence of pain goes back at least to Plato. In *Republic* 9, Socrates examines the place of pleasure in the just life, and he draws a trifold distinction between pleasure, pain, and calm (ἡσυχία). He distinguishes pleasure and pain from calm on the grounds that pleasure and pain are κινήσεις. More precisely, the κινήσεις are painful departures from or pleasant restorations to states of bodily health or psychological wellbeing. But Plato holds that bodily health and psychological wellbeing themselves are not hedonic states.

Similarly, in the doxography Diogenes reports that the Cyrenaics distinguish "intermediate conditions" (μέσας καταστάσεις) between pleasure and pain: ἀθδονία (absence of pleasure) and ἀπονία (absence of pain). I take it that here "ἀθδονία" and "ἀπονία" denote the same condition, although the senses of these terms differ. The Cyrenaics and Plato thus have similar views, and perhaps Plato's view informs the Cyrenaics'.

In short, the Cyrenaics think that absence of pain is not pleasure, but an affect-neutral intermediate condition.

The Cyrenaic criticism of the view, which they attribute to Epicurus, that absence of pain is pleasure in fact comprises several points. It will be useful to distinguish and discuss these individually. Consider first what appears to be the most tendentious aspect of the criticism: analgesic pleasure is like the condition of one who is asleep or one who is dead. Here, the criticism is that unconscious entities do not experience pain, yet they do not thereby experience pleasure. The basic defect in the criticism and the

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24 *Rep.* 583c.

25 *DL* 2.90.

26 Cp. Callicles' criticism of Socrates that a life free of replenishments would be that of a corpse or stone. (*Grg.* 494b)
reason it is tendentious is that Epicurus obviously holds that only animate entities can experience pleasure. This disposes of the criticism that analgesic pleasure is like being dead.

I take the Cyrenaics to intend their criticism that analgesic pleasure is like being asleep in the same spirit as their criticism that analgesic pleasure is like being dead. But the former criticism prompts an interesting consideration. At the end of the *Letter to Menoeceus*, Epicurus writes:

"Exercise yourself in these and related precepts day and night ... Then, never, neither in waking nor in a dream (οὐθ᾽ ὑπάρ qυτ᾽ ὄναρ), will you be disturbed (διαταραχθῆση ..." 27

Freedom from mental disturbance is, thus, supposed to characterize one's dream states as well as one's waking states. Consequently, if consciousness is a condition on analgesic pleasure, we must understand consciousness broadly here to include dream states. I will. Precisely, the term that best corresponds to consciousness in Epicurus is "σιθησις" (in one of its uses). For instance:

"Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad lies in consciousness (ἐν σιθησει), and death is the deprivation of consciousness (σιθησεως)." 28

Epicurus has a perceptualist theory of dreams. That is, he believes that dream images derive from εἰδωλα in the external environment that are apprehended by means

27 135.

of mental or noetic perception. Moreover, Epicurus holds that individuals with a certain frame or disposition of mind are more or less susceptible to disturbing images and hence disturbing dreams. Compare Diogenes Laertius' comment: "[The Epicurean sage] will be like himself even when he is asleep." In short, for Epicurus, consciousness—broadly construed to include dream-states—is necessary for pleasure.

A second point in the Cyrenaic criticism of analgesic pleasure may now be introduced by means of the following question: Is a conscious being who is not in a state of pain experiencing pleasure? There seem to be many occasions where we are simply in an affect-neutral state, neither pleased nor pained, neither enjoying ourselves nor in a state of discomfort. Hence, it seems perverse to include such conditions within the extension of the term "pleasure" or "ἡδονή." What exactly, then, is Epicurus committed to when he speaks of telic or katastematic pleasures, in a conscious being, in analgesic terms? Let's return to the fragment from Epicurus' On the Goal:

"For the stable constitution of the flesh and the reliable expectation concerning this (τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστῶν ἔλπισμα) contain the highest and most stable joy for those able to reason it out (τοῖς ἐπιλογίζονται δυναμένοις)."

Two aspects of this fragment suggest that Epicurus does not hold that mere absence of pain in a conscious being constitutes pleasure. First, the telic pleasure here described is said to be accessible "to those able to reason it out." This suggests, though it does not entail, that such pleasure depends on reasoning. I say it "suggests" but does not "entail"

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30 10.120.
because the phrase may be interpreted in at least two broad ways. According to one, the import of the phrase is strictly epistemological: such-and-such is telic pleasure, and one can come to know this fact by reasoning. According to the other, the import of the phrase is metaphysical: such-and-such is telic pleasure, and the attainment of telic pleasure requires reasoning. The metaphysical interpretation in turn admits further interpretations. According to an instrumental interpretation, once one comes to know that such-and-such is telic pleasure, one can apply the knowledge in the effective pursuit of telic pleasure. According to a constitutive interpretation, the attainment of telic pleasure requires a certain knowledge because such knowledge is partly constitutive of telic pleasure. I will argue that Epicurus is committed to the metaphysical interpretation, but remain agnostic between the instrumental and constitutive interpretations. By way of preliminary support for the metaphysical interpretation, consider the following two passages from Epicurus' *Sovereign Maxims*:

"The mind having grasped the reckoning (τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν) of the goal (τοῦ ... τέλους) and limit of the body and having banished fears of temporal existence has provided a completely perfect life."\(^{31}\)

"We must reason (ἐπιλογίζεσθαι) about the end (τέλος) that exists and every piece of clear evidence to which we refer our beliefs. For if we don't, everything will be full of obscurity and disturbance (ταραχῆς)."\(^{32}\)

Consequently, the achievement of telic pleasure requires a certain cognitive development, one only accessible to adult humans.

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\(^{31}\) *KD* 20.

\(^{32}\) *KD* 22. Cp. also the use of "ἐπιλογίσεως" at Plut. *non posse* 1091b, which is cited later in discussion.
The second aspect of the fragment from *On the Goal*, which suggests that Epicurus does not hold that mere absence of pain in a conscious being constitutes pleasure and which also supports the metaphysical interpretation, is this. The telic pleasure here described entails a reliable expectation of corporeal health. In other words, the telic pleasure here described does not merely require a present-oriented awareness of absence of pain; it requires a future-oriented understanding of the security of this condition. Once again, this is a higher cognitive state accessible, in principle, only to beings with a certain cognitive development.

Further confirmation of this point comes from the following passage in the *Letter to Menoeceus*:

"[The pleasure (ἡδονὴ) that is the goal (τέλος)] is sober reasoning (λογισμός), searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs from which the greatest tumult seizes the soul."

Consider also the following *Sovereign Maxim*:

"It is impossible (οὐκ ἔστων) to live pleasantly without living wisely (φρονίωσι) and finely and justly ... Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives finely and justly, it is impossible (οὐκ ἐστιν) for him to live pleasantly."

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33 The content in brackets derives from "Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν ..." (Ep. Men. 131)

34 132. This passage might be used in support of the constitutive interpretation, but again I remain agnostic.

35 *KD* 5. I assume that "live pleasantly" (ἡδέως ζῆν) means "live a life of pleasure."
Shortly, I will say more about the reasoning and wisdom of which Epicurus here speaks. But first I want to draw attention to the fact that the claim that telic pleasure requires reasoning or wisdom depends upon telic pleasure having a mental component. We have seen several passages that suggest that telic pleasure is a complex of mental and corporeal constituents. This entails — what I have explicitly assumed — that the telic pleasure in question specifically pertains to the human τέλος.

Let's consider, then, the reasoning and wisdom that Epicurus requires for telic pleasure. This epistemic component comprises an understanding of Epicurus' own philosophical doctrines. The doctrines in question are physical and epistemological. These doctrines serve to securely allay fear and, in conjunction with Epicurus' ethical-psychological doctrines, govern desire. These points pervade Epicurus' surviving letters. Here are some examples from the Letter to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus:

"I recommend constant study of nature; and with this activity more than any other I bring calm (ἐγγαληνίζων) to my life. That is why I have composed for you this summary of the basic principles of the entire set of doctrines."\(^{36}\)

"Moreover, one must believe that it is the task of physics to work out precisely the cause of the most important things, and that blessedness (τὸ μακάριον) lies in this and in knowing the natures that are observed in the meteorological and astronomical phenomena ..."\(^{37}\)

"Freedom from mental disturbance (ἀταραξία) ... involves a continual remembrance of the general and most important points [of Epicurean physics]."\(^{38}\)


\(^{37}\) Ep. Hdt. 78.

\(^{38}\) Ep. Hdt. 82.
"First of all, do not believe that there is any other goal to be achieved by the knowledge of meteorological and astronomical phenomena ... than freedom from mental disturbance (ἀταραξίαν) and a stable conviction (πίστιν βέβαιον), just as with the rest [of the study of physics]."³⁹

"We must also reason through (Ἀναλογιστέον) the fact that among desires, some are natural, others are empty. And among natural desires, some are necessary, while others are merely natural. And among necessary [natural] desires, some are necessary for flourishing; others are [necessary] for freedom from bodily distress; still others are [necessary] for life itself. An unwavering (ἀπλανής) comprehension of these things can direct every choice and avoidance toward the health of the body (τὴν τοῦ σώματος υγίειαν) and the freedom from mental disturbance (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν), since this is the goal of living blessedly."⁴⁰

For convenience, I'll say that all of the doctrines that constitute Epicurean physics, including the meteorology and astronomy and the empirical epistemology on which the former are based, as well as the ethical-psychological doctrines constitute wisdom. In short, contrary to the Cyrenaic criticism, analgesic pleasure is not merely absence of pain in a conscious being. For Epicurus, analgesic pleasure requires absence of pain in a conscious being who possesses wisdom. Now, of course, the Cyrenaics may still object that such a condition is not pleasure or does not directly produce pleasure. In considering this point, I turn to a third aspect of the Cyrenaic criticism.


The Cyrenaics maintain that pleasure requires κίνησις, whereas analgesic pleasure is an a-kinetic condition. To understand this criticism, we must clarify what the Cyrenaics mean by "κίνησις." "Κίνησις" is usually rendered as "motion" or "change." Accordingly, analgesic pleasure is often taken to entail the absence of change. Compare Cicero's rendition of the Epicurean distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures as "voluptas movens" and "voluptas stans."41 "Change" has both a process and product sense. The sense of "change" in question is certainly processive. Motion is a process of change; however, it is questionable whether the process in question is specifically motion. More fundamentally, it is questionable how the process of change is involved in kinetic pleasure.

Consider Cicero's criticism of Epicurus in relation to the Cyrenaic view, represented by Aristippus the elder:

"Epicurus should have defended this pleasure, which Aristippus does, namely, where the sense (sensus) is gently and joyfully moved (movetur), that which animals, if they could speak, would call 'pleasure."42

Here, the κίνησις that pleasure involves is a process of change of the sense organ. Compare this with Lucretius' description of gustatory pleasure and displeasure:

"When the particles of trickling savor are smooth (levia), they touch the palate pleasantly and pleasurably tickle all the moist regions of the tongue in their circuitous flow. Others, in proportion as their shape is rougher, tend more to prick and tear the sense (sensum) by their entry."43

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41 de fin. books 1-2 passim.
42 de fin. 2.18.
43 4.622-27; cp. 2.400-423.
Here, atoms or atomic complexes constitutive of the food or drink affect the atoms or atomic complexes constitutive of the sense (*sensus*). In both quotations, something is moved or altered. Does "*sensus*" here refer to the sense faculty, a part of the soul, or the sense organ, a part of the body? Do the quotations permit us to interpret a distinction?

The sense faculty qua part of the soul must be altered insofar as experience occurs. But the sense organ must be altered insofar as sense-perception requires a corporeal alteration as well as a psychological one. Presumably, two alterations are involved in the experience of corporeal or sense-perceptual kinetic pleasure: the corporeal affection and the irrational soul's perception of the corporeal affection. This is, at least, true for an Epicurean. Compare Epicurus' description of sense-perception in the *Letter to Herodotus*:

"[The body] does not possess the capacity [for sense-perception] by itself, but another thing (the soul) congenital with the body provides it. And this other thing, when the capacity it possesses has been realized through stimulation (κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν), at once produces in itself a sense-perceptual quality and through its joint affection and collaboration transmits [this quality] to the body."^44

Since the Cyrenaics were not atomists and, more generally, disregarded inquiry into nature (φυσιολογία), I doubt that they would have explained or sought to explain the κίνησις of kinetic pleasure in the sort of physical terms that Lucretius does. In fact, when they claim, as they do, that pleasure is a smooth (λεία) κίνησις, while pain is a rough (τραχεῖα) one, it may be questioned whether smoothness and roughness as well as the κίνησις of which these are characterized are to be understood in experiential

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^44 64.
versus physical or corporeal terms. In this case, a better translation of "κίνησις" may be "stimulus" or "stimulation." Indeed, this is consistent with the fact that the Cyrenaics conceive of pleasure and pain as πάθη, where "πάθος" is here understood as an affection, that is, as a condition of being affected by something. Precisely, then, the Cyrenaics conceive of pleasure and pain as processes of psychological affection, in other words, ways that the soul is affected. Hence, I suggest that when they claim that pleasure and pain are κινήσεις, we may take this to mean that pleasure and pain are forms of stimulation.

Consequently, an a-kinetic pleasure would be one derived from the body or soul (or a corporeal or psychological part) in a case where that entity was not being affected or changed. In other words, it would be pleasure derived from a part of the individual that was absent stimulus. In short, this aspect of the Cyrenaic criticism of analgesic pleasure is a criticism of stimulus-free pleasure.

This aspect of the Cyrenaic criticism happens to be well encapsulated in the following passage from Philo of Judaea, where he is commenting on a passage in Genesis:

"[Moses (the presumed author of the book)], therefore, does well when he adds: 'You will go upon your breast and belly.'45 For pleasure is not one of the things that is calm (ἡρεμούντων) and stationary (ιστατέων). It is rather a thing that is in motion (κινουμένων) and full of disturbance (ταραχῆς). For as flame is in motion (ἐν κινήσει), so an affection (πάθος), when it is in motion (ἐν κινήσει) in the soul, like a flame, does not permit [the soul] to rest (ἡρεμεύν). Consequently, [Moses] does not agree with those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

45 The reference here is to Gen. 3.14.
(καταστηµατικῆν). For calm (ἡρεµία) is akin to stones and wood and everything that lacks a soul, but it is alien to pleasure; for [pleasure] tends toward tickling and convulsions, and in some cases it requires not calm (ἡρεµίας), but intense and violent motion (κινήσεως)."46

The question may now be raised why the Cyrenaics maintain that pleasure requires κίνησις. Is this criticism conceptually or rather empirically motivated? It is unclear to me how the motivation could be conceptual. I assume that it is empirical. That is, I assume that the Cyrenaics conclude on the basis of their experience that pleasure occurs when we are affected by something in such a way that we are stimulated smoothly. For example, pleasure occurs when we eat and drink certain things, but not when the mouth or tongue stands in an un-stimulated state. Thus, for the Cyrenaics, the mere experience or awareness of one's corporeal or mental condition, absent stimulation, is not a hedonic condition. The crux of the Cyrenaic criticism, then, is that stimulus-free analgesic conditions are not hedonic conditions.

Having pursued the Cyrenaic criticism, as I say, as a foil, I now turn to an Epicurean rebuttal of the criticism. The basic thrust of the rebuttal is that the Cyrenaics under-characterize Epicurus' position. Epicurus maintains that katastematic pleasure requires absence of pain and freedom from distress, but he holds that there is more to katastematic pleasure and more to telic pleasure than this. In addition, katastematic pleasure and telic pleasure consist of a well-founded sense of security and — an aspect particularly under-appreciated in the scholarly literature — a sense of gratitude. As a preliminary to the discussion, I first consider the terms "κατάστηµα" and "καταστηµατικῶν."

46 Leg. all. 3.160.
"Κατάστημα" and "Καταστηματικόν"

The phrase "ἡ καταστηματικὴ ἠδονή" is often taken to mean stable pleasure. Cicero's Latin "stans" embodies this interpretation; and Philo seems to assume the same when he says that "pleasure is not one of the things that is ... stationary (ισταμένων)."

This is also the way that some contemporary translators have rendered the terms. For example, in her Italian translation of Usener's Epicurea, Ilaria Ramelli translates the phrase as "piacere stabile."47 But I doubt that the term "καταστηματικόν" means stable or the like; nor, more importantly, do I think that Epicurus understood the term this way. Consider once again the fragment from On the Goal, specifically the phrase "the stable constitution of the flesh." Here, the word for "stable," which could also be rendered as "well-established," is "εὐσταθές." "Κατάστημα" is the word I've rendered as "constitution." Consequently, as I see it, a literal rendition of "ἡ καταστηματικὴ ἠδονή" should be "constitutional pleasure."

Of course, it is questionable whether "constitution" is the right rendition of "κατάστημα." So let's consider the Greek term. It is an extraordinary fact — unnoticed by scholars — that there is no compelling evidence that the word "κατάστημα" was used before Epicurus. A chronologically indexed word search using the TLG yields six instances of "κατάστημα" before Epicurus. But in fact all of these instances derive from

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post-Epicurean, mainly Late Antique, texts. One is a testimony in Diogenes Laertius concerning a pre-Epicurean figure, Anaxarchus.\textsuperscript{48} Another derives from spurious fragments of Eudoxus' \textit{Twelve Year Lunar Orbit}.\textsuperscript{49} A third comes from a scholiast on Speusippus.\textsuperscript{50} A fourth occurs in Damascius' report on Eudemus of Rhodes' \textit{History of Theology}.\textsuperscript{51}

The remaining two instances are from a so-called fragment of Diocles of Carystus. Versions of the alleged fragment occur in Pseudo-Plutarch's \textit{Placita}, Pseudo-Galen's \textit{History of Philosophy}, and Stobaeus.\textsuperscript{52} The proximate source of these passages is, then, Aëtius' lost \textit{Placita}. The word "κατάστημα" occurs in two of the versions:

"Diocles says that most diseases occur through an imbalance of elements in the body and of the constitution (καὶ τοῦ καταστήματος)."\textsuperscript{53}

"Diocles says that most causes of disease occur through an imbalance of elements in the body and of the constitution of air (καὶ τοῦ καταστήματος ἀέρος)."\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{48} DL 9.61.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Placita} 5.30; \textit{Historia} 132; Stobaeus 4.29-31. I am citing from Philip J. van der Eijk, \textit{Diocles of Carystus}, vol. 1, Brill, 2000, 104-7.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Placita} 5.30.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Historia} 132. The Stobaeus passage reads: "Diocles said that most diseases occur through an imbalance."
\end{flushleft}
The basic problem is that we have no good reason to think that the passages provide a fragment rather than a *doxa* or testimony. Moreover, the content of the passages does not appear to be consistent with what else we know of Diocles' nosology. Philip van der Eijk concludes his commentary on these texts:

"This concise report on Diocles' views of the causes of diseases corresponds only to a small extent to what the more specific evidence from other sources suggests… Many of Diocles' causal explanations of diseases do not refer to elements or to climactic forces at all, and apart from fr. 52… nowhere do we find explanations in terms of 'imbalance of the elements.' The present report is, therefore, to be used with caution; and the fact that it is preserved in Aëtius suggests that it is the product of considerable doxographic simplification."\(^{55}\)

I conclude that we cannot use the so-called fragment of Diocles as evidence of a pre-Epicurean instance of "κατάστημα."

Consequently, there are no surviving pre-Epicurean uses of "κατάστημα." There are two possible explanations for this fact: "κατάστημα" was used before Epicurus, but no instances survive; alternatively, Epicurus coined the term "κατάστημα." It is not crucial to my argument that Epicurus coined the term. But if the term was used before Epicurus, it is reasonable to believe that it was a rare expression; and in that case Epicurus appropriated the rare expression. I will try to show, however, that there is a reason, appropriate to Epicurus' hedonic theory, for him to have employed the term "κατάστημα"; and this lends some support to the hypothesis that he actually coined the term for hedonic-theoretical purposes.

Since Epicurus speaks of "ἡδοναί καταστηµατικαί" there is strong reason to believe that he deployed the term "κατάστηµα" specifically for the purpose of hedonic theorizing and precisely in order to distinguish the kind of pleasure that he conceives to be a crucial constituent of the goal of human life from other kinds of pleasure. The term "κατάστηµα" is cognate with "κατάστασις," and the two are obviously closely related. Moreover, *LSJ* indicates that there are senses of "κατάστασις" that are equivalent to senses of "κατάστηµα." For example, one primary and long-standing sense of "κατάστασις" is "constitution." (Note also that "κατάστασις" as "constitution" is used both in a process and product sense. That is, it is used to refer to the process of constituting as well as to the product of that process.) We may then put the following question: Why did Epicurus not avail himself of the term "κατάστασις" and speak of "katastatic" pleasures?

One possibility relates to the fact that the word "κατάστασις" was used by certain of Epicurus' philosophical predecessors within the context of hedonic theorizing and specifically used in a manner from which Epicurus wanted to differentiate himself. Precisely, Plato and Aristotle use "κατάστασις" and forms of the verb "καθίστηµι" to refer to the idea, of Platonic origin, that pleasures are processes by which the body or soul is constituted in a certain way. For example, in *Philebus* Socrates says:

"We have agreed that when we undergo a process of being constituted (καθιστήται) toward our nature (εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν), this constituting (κατάστασιν) is pleasure."\(^56\)

More precisely, then, Socrates characterizes the constituting process that is pleasure as one in which we are brought "toward our nature." Basically, by "our nature" Socrates

\(^{56}\) *Phlb.* 42d5-7. Cf. 46c6.
means a state of corporeal or psychological wellbeing; and Socrates' use of the phrase "εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν" is significant since there are constituting processes that yield unnatural states.

Consider also Timaeus' description of pleasure in *Timaeus*:

"Pains [occur] when [bodies] are alienated from [their natural condition], and pleasures [occur] when they undergo constitution (καθιστάµενα) back to the same condition (εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν)."\(^{57}\)

Compare Aristotle's description of pleasure in *Rhetoric*, which draws on Plato's views in *Philebus* and *Timaeus*:

"Let us submit that pleasure is a certain change (κίνησις) of the soul and a swift and perceived process of constituting (κατάστασιν) [the soul] toward its prevailing nature (εἰς τὴν υπάρχουσαν φύσιν), and pain is the opposite. And if this is what pleasure is, it is clear that what is productive of the condition described is pleasant, while what is destructive of it or productive of the opposite constituting process (τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως) is painful."\(^{58}\)

Aristotle's use of the phrase "τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως" corroborates the point that "κατάστασις" itself cannot be taken to entail a constructive or positive construction process. Thus, again, the prepositional phrase "toward our nature" or "toward the prevailing nature" is a significant clarification of the kind of constituting process that Plato and Aristotle (at least in this *Rhetoric* passage) take to be pleasure.

Morphologically, the "-σις" ending on nominal roots typically serves to convey the idea of process or activity. In contrast, the "-μα" ending typically serves to convey the

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\(^{57}\) *Ti*. 64e6-65a1.

idea of product or result. Accordingly, the "-μα" ending in "κατάστημα" should convey the product or result of the process characterized by the idea of the root "καθιστα-" or "κατα + ἱστα-." If, accordingly, Epicurus deliberately deployed "κατάστημα" in contrast to "κατάστασις" within the context of hedonic theorizing, then his intention would have been to convey the product or result sense of the "constituting process," that is, constitution qua product of that process. I will continue to render "κατάστημα" as "constitution" and understand it in this sense. Accordingly, I suggest that Epicurus' conceives of "katastematic" pleasure as "constitutional" pleasure. That is, Epicurus conceives of katastematic pleasure as pleasure derived from the corporeal or mental constitution, where such constitutions are conceived as states or products rather than as processes of change or constituting processes. Compare this with a conception of kinetic pleasure as involving stimulation of the body or mind. Stimulation of the body of mind — assuming it is not destructive — supervenes on the constitution. Furthermore, since bodily or mental stimulation typically has its source external to the body or mind, we may also note that the source of katastematic pleasure is necessarily internal, whereas the source of kinetic pleasure is often, although not necessarily, external.59

We know that Epicurus recognizes both corporeal and mental constitutions. But since there are various kinds of constituting process, both body and mind can be variously constituted. Hence, the adjective "εὔσταθὲς" in the fragment from On the Goal is significant in indicating that the corporeal constitution that Epicurus takes to be constitutive of the corporeal component of telic pleasure is well constructed. In this case, 59 A fuller discussion of kinetic pleasure would consider whether Epicurus admits restorative pleasure, which would appear to be neither simply stimulative nor constitutional.
a well-constructed corporeal constitution is a state of corporeal health. Obviously, Epicurus holds that the mental constitution constitutive of the goal must also be well constructed. As we have seen, Epicurus holds that such good constitution requires wisdom. But consider also the following fragment, which contains the one other instance of "κατάστημα" among Epicurus' extant writings. Note that Arrighetti had assigned the fragment to a letter from Epicurus to Metrodorus, but Adele Guerra has more recently argued that it belongs to On the Goal. The textual source of the fragment is not important for my argument. For convenience, I will refer to the text as the Metrodorus fragment:

"When the opportunity for expectation (ἐλπίδος) has been stripped away and [the opportunity] for pleasure in the flesh and for gratitude at the preservation [in memory] of things past has been removed, what sort of natural constitution (κατάστημα φυ[σικόν]) would I still retain, Metrodorus?"

Here Epicurus indicates that the following are necessary for a natural constitution: security, corporeal pleasure, and gratitude at the memory of certain things past. Hence,

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I retain Arrighetti's reading. Contrast Adele Tepedino Guerra, "PHerc. 1232, fr. 6: una testimonianza del libro 'Sul Fine' de Epicuro?" CErC 17 (1987) 85-88. And cp. Jeffrey S. Purinton, "Epicurus on the Telos," Phronesis 38 (1993) 281-320, at n.30: "κατάστημα ψυχ[ῆς] is Guerra's new reading. Previous editors read κατάστημα φυ[σικόν]. The papyrus, notes Guerra, shows only a vertical mark under the line, which could be either a phi or a psi. And the Neapolitan apograph has a phi, while the Oxford has a psi. The main argument for psi, then, is that ψυχ[ῆς] would make better sense here. But Guerra also compares Soranus, Gyn. 1.39, where one finds mention of τὸ ποιῶν τῆς ψυχ[ῆς] κατάστημα." Both readings are in fact compatible with my argument.

\[61\] PHerc. 1232 = fr. 73.10-17 Arrighetti.
Epicurus appears to be referring to telic pleasure. Support for this point comes from the fact that, with the exception of gratitude, the constitutional components here described resemble those described as constituting the highest and most secure joy in the fragment from *On the Goal*. The corporeal component in the fragment from *On the Goal* is a stable constitution of the flesh, in other words, corporeal health. In the Metrodorus fragment, Epicurus speaks of corporeal pleasure. But we have seen that Epicurus elsewhere identifies corporeal pleasure, that is, katastematic pleasure of the body, with corporeal health. The mental component in the fragment from *On the Goal* is a reliable expectation (ἐλπίσμα) concerning absence of corporeal pain.62

The fact that Epicurus includes gratitude at the memory of things past among requirements of a natural constitution of the soul further supports my argument above that in merely speaking of absence of corporeal pain and freedom from mental distress Epicurus under-describes the constituents of katastematic or telic pleasure. But my present point is that Epicurus conceives of a reliable expectation of corporeal health and gratitude at the memory of certain things past as components of a natural constitution of adult humans and hence as telic pleasures.

Natural corporeal and mental constitutions are stable or at least relatively stable. Hence katastematic pleasures are stable or at least relatively stable. But the stability of katastematic pleasure is a function of the pleasure deriving from a constitution in its natural state, not from the meaning of the word "καταστηματικόν."

62 Cp. "The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. If one has these things and expects that he will have them (ἐλπὶξῶν ἐξεῖν), he would rival Zeus for happiness." (SV 33)
With these points in mind, let us turn to Epicurus' views regarding the contributions that a well-founded sense of security and gratitude make to the human τέλος.

A Well-Founded Sense of Security

I suggest that Epicurus views a well-founded sense of security as a constituent of telic pleasure. By "well-founded" I mean that one's sense of security correlates with the fact that one is secure in the way one takes oneself to be. In other words, one is not deluded in taking oneself to be secure, nor in the way in which one takes oneself to be secure.

Although "κατάστημα" does not mean "stable condition," constitutional pleasure is supposed to be a secure and hence stable condition. One succinct and explicit piece of evidence for this comes from the description of telic pleasure in the fragment from On the Goal: "the stable (εὔσταθές) constitution of the flesh and the reliable (πιστόν) expectation concerning this contain the most secure (βεβαιότατην) joy." Another piece of evidence comes from Sovereign Maxim 7:

"Some men have wanted to become famous and renowned, thinking that they would thereby gain security (ἀσφάλειαν) through [the support of] other men. If the life of such men really is secure (ἀσφαλής), they have attained the natural good (τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄγαθον). If, however, it is insecure (μὴ ἀσφαλής), they have

63 Note that the phrase "τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλείαν" does not here mean safety from the threat of other people, but safety derived from the support of other people. On this point, see G. Roksam, Live Unnoticed: On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine, Brill, 2007, 38-39.
not attained that for the sake of which, in accordance with what is congenial by nature (τὸ τῆς φύσεως οίκεῖον), they set out."

This maxim makes clear that the natural good (τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν) is security (ἀσφάλειαν). I take it that the natural good here is telic pleasure. So the security in question is equivalent to telic pleasure.64

The well-founded sense of security is rooted in the epistemological security at the foundations of wisdom. As Epicurus says in the Letter to Herodotus: experience, which includes "our sense-perceptions and affective-states," provides "the most stable conviction" (ἡ βεβαιότατα πίστις). The stability of this conviction ensures peace of mind.

For instance, as Epicurus says in the Letter to Pythocles: "if one is at odds with clear evidence, one will never be able to achieve genuine freedom from mental disturbance (ἀταραξίας γνήσιου)."66 Note the adjective "γνήσιου" here. It is possible to experience peace of mind in the absence of wisdom. But Epicurus holds that in the absence of

64 What is congenial according to nature is also pleasure, albeit not necessarily katastematic pleasure. Cp. "[pleasure] is our first and kindred (συγγενικὸν) good." (Ep. Men. 129) "All pleasure, because it has a congenial nature (φύσιν ἔχειν οίκείαν), is good." (ibid.)

65 63. Cp. "So, if one refers all of these calculations concerning the soul to the affective-states and sense-perceptions and remembers what was said at the outset, one will see the points comprehended in outline with sufficient clarity to be able to work out the details from this basis with precision and firmness (βεβαίως)." (Ep. Men. 129) "... For in this way the mind will grasp the stability of the earth more securely and more soundly in relation to the sense-perceptual appearances." (Pap. 154 25 III = 42.10.II Arrighetti)

66 96.
wisdom such states are unstable. Hence, by "genuine" freedom from mental disturbance, Epicurus means freedom from mental disturbance engendered in such a way so as to ensure its stability. From the claims that there are genuine and non-genuine forms of ἀταραξία and that genuine ἀταραξία constitutes the mental component of telic pleasure, it follows that there are genuine and non-genuine katastematic pleasures. Precisely, genuine katastematic pleasure is pleasure engendered in such a way so as it ensure its stability.

Consider, further, Vatican Saying 14:

"Even though security (τῆς ἁσφαλείας) through [the support of] other men comes to some extent (μέχρι τινός) by means of the power to repel [attacks] and by means of prosperity, the security (ἁσφάλεια) that comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many is the purest (εἰλικρινεστάτη)."

I take it that by "εἰλικρινεστάτη" here, Epicurus intends to convey that the security in question is not sequentially mixed, that is, interspersed and riddled, with periods of insecurity. In other words, the security in question is continuous, which is another way of saying that it is stable. It follows that since the security that is the natural good is of the purest kind, so telic pleasure is of the purest kind. On this point, consider Sovereign Maxim 12:

"It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the cosmos but still suspicious about the subjects of myths to dissolve (λύειν) his fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible, without knowing natural science, to attain pleasures that are unmixed (ἀκεράίους τὰς ἱδονὰς)."

I presume that Epicurus here means that the pleasures that a person who is ignorant of Epicurus' physical doctrines experiences will be short-lived. That is, these pleasures will
be brief respites from the pains engendered by empty fears.\textsuperscript{67} Such a person will, then, not dissolve (λύειν) his mental disturbances, but merely temporarily distract himself from them.

In short, the well-founded sense of security that wisdom engenders is accompanied by a well-founded sense of confidence and of self-confidence. One is confident in the security of one's wellbeing and in one's ability to ensure that security.

Finally, what is the significance of the fact that the sense of security is well founded? In contrast to momentary or transient pleasure, telic pleasure pervades one's life. But if one's sense of security were false or poorly founded, then the hedonic condition to which it contributes would inevitably be undermined. Recall the following passage from the \textit{Letter to Pythocles}:

"If one is at odds with clear evidence, one will never be able to achieve genuine freedom from mental disturbance."

Relatedly, as we observed in \textit{Sovereign Maxim} 5:

"It is impossible (οὐκ ἔστιν) to live pleasantly without living wisely (φρονίμως)."

As I suggested earlier — and it should now be clear — by "live pleasantly" Epicurus means "live a life of pleasure."

\footnote{\textsuperscript{67} Cp. "If the things productive of profligates' pleasures really freed them from fears of the mind … if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be free from all pain …" (\textit{KD} 10); "No pleasure is bad by itself. But things productive of some pleasures bring troubles greater than the pleasures." (\textit{KD} 8)}
In short, it is for the stability and perdurance of the hedonic condition that the sense of security must be well-founded.

**Gratitude**

Among the works that Diogenes Laertius lists in his catalog of Epicurus' writings is a treatise *On Gifts and Gratitude* (Περὶ δῶρων καὶ χάριτος). Unfortunately, no testimony refers to a fragment from this treatise or comments on its content. Hence, we also cannot securely attribute any unspecified fragments to the treatise, even though we have some whose content fits the title. Nonetheless, since the theme of gratitude is expressed in a number of texts, we have means to reflect on Epicurus' view of the topic and its significance. Consider the following passage from the *Letter to Menoeceus*:

"Therefore, both old and young ought to philosophize, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things through his gratitude at things past (διὰ τῆν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων) ... So we must exercise ourselves in the things that bring wellbeing (εὐδαιμονίαν), since if that is present, we have everything ..."

The passage suggests that gratitude at things past is partly constitutive of wellbeing. Moreover, since Epicurus says that when we have wellbeing, "we have everything" (πάντα ἔχουμεν), it appears that gratitude is a telic pleasure. We have seen that the Metrodorus fragment expresses a similar idea: "gratitude at the preservation (in


\[69\] 122.
memory) of things past" (ἐπιμνήμησις τῶν γεγονότων χάριτος) is necessary for the "natural constitution" (κατάστημα φυ[σικόν]).

Pleasure derived from memories is distinct from pleasure derived from gratitude at memories. For convenience, I refer to the former as "memorial pleasure" and the latter as "memorial gratitude." Compare the fragment from the Letter to Metrodorus, which speaks of memorial gratitude, with the following fragment from the Letter to Idomeus:

"On this blessed day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity. But against all this is the joy in my soul at the memory of my past conversations with you (ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡµῖν διαλογισµῶν μνήµη) ..."

Epicurus speaks here of pleasure derived from memory. But possibly in speaking of memorial pleasure, he also means to convey memorial gratitude. I will tentatively assume so and adduce grounds to support the assumption below.

The objects of gratitude are not restricted to the past. Nor does Epicurus hold that the gratitude constitutive of telic pleasure is limited to memorial gratitude. For example, Diogenes Laertius transmits a doxa suggesting that the Epicurean sage feels

The security of the reconstruction may also be questioned in the following respect.

This is the only instance of the noun "ἐπιμονή" in Epicurus' surviving writings. However, the verb "ἐπιμιµηήσκοµαι" occurs once elsewhere: "καὶ γὰρ τῶν θεῶν ἐπιµηήστε[όν ὡς αἴ]τίων πολλῶν [ἄγαθῶν] [ὅµων]." (Letter to Polyainos, fr. 86 Arrighetti). Moreover, the phrase "χάριν τῶν γεγονότων" occurs in the Letter to Menoeceus 122. And compare the phrase "χάριτι τῶν ἀπολλυµένων" in SV 55.

fr. 30 Bailey (= DL 10.22).
gratitude toward "friends, present and absent ..." In addition, consider the following maxim from an unspecified Epicurean work preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology*:

"Let there be gratitude (χάρις) to blessed nature, because she has made what is necessary easy to acquire and what is difficult to acquire unnecessary." The fragment itself does not indicate whether Epicurus held such gratitude to be a constituent of telic pleasure, but there is a passage from the *Letter to Menoeceus* with very similar content that more closely connects the maxim to the goal of living pleasantly:

"We hold that self-sufficiency is a great good, not so that in all cases we should make use of little, but so that if we do not have much, we are contented with little, since we are genuinely persuaded that those have the greatest enjoyment of luxury who have least need of it, and that whatever is natural is easy to acquire, while what is empty is difficult to acquire." In short — and although there is much in the preceding passages whose interpretation I have passed over and that remains difficult to understand — we can confidently affirm that Epicurus holds at least some forms of gratitude to be constitutive of telic pleasure. Precisely, this includes gratitude at the memory of past goods and benefits and gratitude specifically toward nature for its past and continued provision of the means to a pleasant life.

Granted this, the passage from the *Letter to Menoeceus* and the fragment from the *Letter to Idomeneus* (as I am proposing to interpret it) suggest that memorial gratitude

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72 DL 10.118.

73 fr. 66 Bailey, apud Stob. 17.23.

74 130.
may contribute to the goal in a special way. They connect memorial gratitude with old age or infirmity. Consider also Vatican Saying 17:

"It is not the young man who is to be viewed as blessed (μακαριστός), but the old man who has lived well. ... The old man has set anchor as though in a harbor; and the goods about which he previously lacked confident expectation (τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα) he has fastened (κατακλείσας) with a secure sense of gratitude (ἀσφαλεῖ χάριτι)."  

I presume that the goods spoken of here are whatever the young man thought would *de re* constitute a well-lived life. These, the old man has achieved. Hence the old man has achieved telic pleasure. The maxim also further confirms that memorial gratitude is constitutive of telic pleasure.

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75 It is difficult to know whether "ἀσφαλεῖ χάριτι" is a dative of instrument or accompaniment. This is the only instance of "κατακλείω" in Epicurus. The verb "κλείω" occurs at Ep. Hdt. 43. There the accompanying dative is instrumental. But there are different senses of instrumentality. Compare fastening two pieces of wood with glue using a vice. Both the vice and glue are instrumental.

76 I say that the young man conceives of these goods *de re*. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the old man has achieved these goods and what the old man has achieved are genuine goods.

77 Cp. also Theon's statement in Plutarch: "Epicurus says that the nature of the good is begotten from the very escape from what is bad and from the memory of, reasoning through, and gratitude for (τῆς μνήμης καὶ ἐπιλογίσεως καὶ χάριτος) the fact that this has come into being for oneself." (non posse 1091b)
In addition to connecting memorial gratitude with old age, a number of the passages suggest that such gratitude may play a special auxiliary role. In considering this role, observe that while wisdom, particularly wisdom concerning desire, can raise the probability of bodily health and thus the absence of bodily pain, it cannot ensure ἀπονία. This is true throughout life, but especially as one ages. The physical maladies that Epicurus suffered in old age attest to his recognition of this point. Epicurus maintains that memorial gratitude has value in the face of such difficulties. Recall his statement in the Letter to Idomeneus: the joy in his heart at the memory of his past conversations with Idomeneus overcomes his physical suffering. Accordingly, Epicurus holds that the mind is able to preserve its freedom from disturbance and thus preserve at least the mental component of telic pleasure, despite corporeal pain.

As I noted, in the Letter to Idomeneus Epicurus speaks of memorial pleasure, not gratitude. However, I suggested that Epicurus there intended to convey the value of memorial gratitude. This interpretation is supported by Epicurus' expression of the auxiliary role of memorial gratitude in Vatican Saying 55:

"Misfortunes must be cured by a sense of gratitude (χάριτι) for the things that have perished (τῶν ἄπολλυμένων) and the knowledge that the past (τὸ γέγονός) cannot be undone (that is, the goods from our past are secure achievements of our life)."

If this interpretation of the auxiliary role of memorial gratitude is correct, however, it yields the following difficulty: in various passages discussed earlier, Epicurus characterizes telic pleasure as consisting of a complex of corporeal and mental constituents; yet Epicurus now appears committed to the view that telic pleasure does not require corporeal health or absence of corporeal pain. I flag the problem and will
return to it below.\textsuperscript{78} First, I want to examine another question concerning memorial gratitude.

We have seen that Epicurus recognizes both memorial and non-memorial gratitude as constituents of telic pleasure. Non-memorial gratitude seems, like a sense of security, to be a perduring condition that yields a generalized hedonic state of mind or pleasant mood. Such gratitude, thus, again like a sense of security, seems to be constitutional and so constitutive of katastematic pleasure. In contrast, the auxiliary role of memorial gratitude seems episodic and deliberately targeted to mitigate occasions of physical distress. At least in this circumstance, then, memorial gratitude seems kinetic. In short, the question is whether in its auxiliary role memorial gratitude is a katastematic or a kinetic pleasure. Given the complexity of the question, I devote a separate section to it.

**Memorial Gratitude as Kinetic Pleasure**

Several scholars have suggested that Epicurus conceives of memory as a function of $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda$ impinging on the mind. As such, Epicurus' conception of memory is perceptualist. If the imagery that constituted the memories that figure in memorial gratitude derived from occurrent mind-independent $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda$, then the pleasure of such gratitude would be the product of mental stimulation and thus would be kinetic rather than constitutional. Consequently, a perceptualist theory of memory might yield the

significant and surprising result that since memorial gratitude is a constituent of telic pleasure, telic pleasure is not equivalent to katastematic pleasure. In other words, telic pleasure consists of katastematic and kinetic pleasures. In the following, I argue that telic pleasure does consist of both katastematic and kinetic pleasures. However, I also argue that Epicurus is committed to a conceptualist, rather perceptualist, theory of memory. In particular, the fundamental components of memory are non-imagistic, and these components are, as commonsense would have it, preserved in the mind. To this extent, recollection with gratitude is an act of hedonic self-stimulation. At the same time, this does not entail that the pleasure of such grateful recollection is constitutional; and that is because constitutional pleasure is stimulus-free. Thus, the pleasure that one takes in recollecting with gratitude is a case of kinetic pleasure whose source of stimulus is internal.79 In pursuing the argument, let's turn to Epicurus' conception of memory.

The very idea of a perceptualist theory of memory relates to a broader Epicurean theme, namely, a perceptualist theory of mental imagery. Epicurus does hold a perceptualist theory of dream imagery and of what I will call "willed imagery." Important discussion of these topics occurs in Lucretius. At 4.722, Lucretius begins an explanation of "what things move the mind" (quae moveant animum res). In his ensuing account, he explains both dream imagery and what I propose to call "willed imagery," that is, the mind's ability to "conceive of (cogitetur) anything it wishes (quod cuique libido venerit)."80 Common to the explanation of both types of imagery is the omnipresence of

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79 It should be noted that kinetic pleasure with an internal source of stimulus is hardly limited to memorial gratitude in its auxiliary role; the philosophical pleasure of theoretical reflection is a signal example.

80 4.779-80.
innumerable in the environment proximately surrounding the subject of experience. These εἴδωλα constitute the imagistic objects of dreaming and of mental imagery generally. For example, in the case of willed imagery, the mind, through its particular orientation and interests, is receptive to specific εἴδωλα and sequences of εἴδωλα that it wishes to behold. By "orientation and interests" I mean that the mind is prepared, that is, trained or conditioned in advance of particular episodes of imagistic cognition to apprehend specific εἴδωλα and sequences of εἴδωλα. Imagistic recollection or remembering would seem to operate in this fashion. Through the interest in thinking of, say, an absent acquaintance, the mind is poised to receive εἴδωλα of that person.

Granted this, the perceptualist explanation of willed imagistic cognition is cogent only insofar as it presumes some non-perceptual, hence, non-imagistic content. Moreover, that non-perceptual content must be genuinely memorial, that is, already stored in the mind. For example, assume again that the mind wishes to imagistically cognize, in other words, envision an absent acquaintance. On pain of vicious regress, the content or object of the conative attitude cannot itself require an εἴδωλον of that acquaintance.

It is here, I think, that the Epicurean epistemological notion of preconception (πρόληψις) and cognitively derivative kinds must play a role. Diogenes Laertius characterizes πρόληψις as follows:

"By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension (κατάληψιν) or correct opinion (δόξαν ὁρθὴν) or concept (ἐννοιαν) or universal conception (καθολικὴν

\[^{81}\text{Cp. Bailey's note: "But, as Giussani points out, Lucr. never explains what it is which causes the mind to wish to make this selection; what is the original libido." (Lucretius De Rerum Natura, Clarendon Press, 1947, vol. 3, 1275)}\]
νόησιν) stored (ἐνσαπεμένην); and this is a memory (μνήμην) of something that has often appeared from the external environment; for example, such-and-such a thing is a human (τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος). For as soon as the word 'human' is spoken, we cognize (νοεῖται) the schema (τύπος) of human, which is derived from episodes of sense-perception that have occurred previously ... And we would not have inquired into what we were seeking (that is, we would not have wondered whether, for example, something in the distance is a human), if we had not already known this (that is, had that preconception of human).”\(^{82}\)

In this passage, Diogenes exemplifies preconception using a natural kind, human. But there are particular or singular as well as generic preconceptions. For example, exposure to a particular human can produce a preconception of that particular human.\(^{83}\)

On the basis of generic and singular preconceptions, I suggest, memories with more complex content are formed. Given this, let us return to Lucretius and his explanation of dream images. Consider what Lucretius says when he explains why in a dream state the mind does not balk at the fantastic cinema of images it apprehends:

"Nature constrains this to come to pass just because all the senses of the body are checked and at rest throughout the limbs, nor can they refute the falsehood by true facts. Moreover, memory lies at rest and idle in sleep (meminisse iacet

\(^{82}\) DL 10.33.

\(^{83}\) Cp. Asmis: "just as we associate the outline (= schema) of a human being with the words 'human being,' so we associate an outline of Socrates with the word 'Socrates.' We use this notion (= preconception) whenever we form any sort of belief about Socrates." ("Epicurean Epistemology," Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 260-94, at 277.)
languetque sopore); nor does it argue against us that he, whom the mind believes that it beholds alive, has long ago become prey to death and doom."

Memory is said to be incapacitated here and thus to be incapable of contradicting the content of the dream. Observe, further, that the content of the memory is propositional and singular: a particular person is not longer alive. In short, then, I suggest that Epicurus is committed to the existence of conceptual memory. Such memory includes propositional contents, presumably dependent on more basic non-propositional preconceptions, all of which are, consistently with commonsense, stored or retained in the mind.

The claim that Epicurus is committed to a conceptualist theory of memory is further supported by a common point in his letters, namely, that the reader should commit the contents of those letters to memory. Consider a couple examples from the Letter to Herodotus:

"For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared a summary of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve the memory (κατασχεῖν τὴν μνήμην) of enough of

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84 4.762-7.

85 Note, in passing, that the existence of such memory does not jeopardize Epicurus' empiricism, for two basic reasons. First, memorial contents are perceptually based. Second, as Lucretius' discussion of dream contents shows, not every mental content must correspond to an object, that is, a body present in one's environment. Beliefs, even the most rudimentary beliefs, about one's experience, for example, that a human is present, are supported by a complex array of information, including sense-perceptual, preconceptual, and doxastic (which is to say, propositional memorial) information.
the principal doctrines ... We must continuously return to the [principal doctrines] and must memorize them (ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ ποιητέον) ...”86

"And these [epistemological and physical doctrines], if set in memory (ἐν μνήμῃ τιθέμενα), will be a constant source of aid.”87

Assuming then that Epicurus is committed to a conceptualist theory of memory, memory is partly constitutive of one's psychological constitution. This point is corroborated by the following passage from the Letter to Herodotus:

"Freedom from mental disturbance (ἀταραξία) is a release from all of these [fears] and possession of persistent memory (συνεχὴ μνήμην ἔχειν) of the general and most important [doctrines of the system].”88

In this case, Epicurus is speaking precisely of memory that is partly constitutive of a well-founded mental constitution. And since such memory is partly constitutive of ἀταραξία, which is constitutive of telic pleasure, the memorized contents are partly constitutive of telic pleasure.

Now, in this case, the memorized contents are the doctrines that constitute Epicurean wisdom. So these are not the contents that constitute memorial gratitude, at least not the memorial gratitude that I have been discussing. We need, then, to draw a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of generic and memory of particular content. For example, the memory of the principle that pleasure is the good is generic memory. The memory of once reading a token sentence with that content is particular


88 82, with my italics.
memory. Accordingly, we can also distinguish between generic and particular memorial gratitude. An example of the former is this: an old philosopher in Antioch may be grateful for having been able in his youth to spend time studying in other cities. In the fragment from the Letter to Idomeneus, Epicurus appears to have particular memorial gratitude in mind (assuming, once again, that he has memorial gratitude and not merely memorial pleasure in mind). But in Vatican Sayings 17 and 55, he might also have generic memorial gratitude or both generic and particular memorial gratitude in mind.

Assuming that memorial gratitude is hedonic, we now return to the question whether such gratitude in its auxiliary role in responding to corporeal suffering is a katastematic or kinetic pleasure. I suggest that Epicurus regards such gratitude as kinetic pleasure. Although the memory, at least the non-imagistic content of the memory, derives from one's constitution, that content is precisely activated in episodic mental acts of recollection. By "activated" I mean that the content becomes an object of focal awareness. Such acts, I take it, involve stimulation of the mind, in this case self-stimulation.

I emphasize that my claim here, that such memorial gratitude is a kind of kinetic pleasure, is an inference based on principles of Epicurus' psychology and hedonic theory. But although Epicurus does not in any surviving text characterize such pleasure as kinetic, confirmation of the claim derives from the following Cyrenaic criticism:

"And yet [the Cyrenaics] claim that pleasure is not engendered by the memory of goods (κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἁγαθῶν) or by expectation, which is a doctrine of Epicurus. For they claim that the movement of the mind (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα) is weakened (ἐκλύεσθαι) through time (τῶν χρόνων)."\(^{89}\)

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Since the criticism is precisely that the psychological movement (κίνησις) that recollection involves is inadequately robust to constitute pleasure, the assumption is that Epicurus holds that the memorial pleasure is constituted by mental κίνησις. Since the criticism involves anticipatory as well as memorial pleasure, it also invites reflection on whether the sense of security that Epicurus takes to be constitutive of telic pleasure might include kinetic as well as katastematic components. I note the point, but will not pursue it here.

More broadly, it is worth observing that the Cyrenaic criticism is indicative of a more fundamental distinction between Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonic theory and thereby Cyrenaic and Epicurean hedonism. Epicurus holds that the affective capacities of the mind are greater than those of the body. This view is precisely entailed by the auxiliary role of memorial gratitude in responding to corporeal pain. In contrast, the Cyrenaics hold that the affective capacities of the body are greater than those of the mind. For example, while the Cyrenaics do recognize some mental pleasures and pains, they maintain that the corporeal pleasures and pains are much more robust:

"Not all mental (ψυχικὰς) pleasures and pains depend upon corporeal (σωματικὰς) pleasures and pains. For example, there is joy (χαρὰν) in the impersonal prosperity of our country just as in our own prosperity ... However, they say that corporeal pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and corporeal pains far worse than mental pains. This is the reason why offenders are punished with corporeal pains ... For these reasons they expended more on the management of the one (namely, corporeal pleasures and pains)."\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{90} DL 2.89-90. Incidentally, the Cyrenaic admission of mental as well as corporeal pleasures and pains also shows—something that has not been appreciated in the
Returning now to the view that Epicurean memorial gratitude in its auxiliary role is a kinetic pleasure—it may also be admitted, concordantly with Epicurus’ view of mental imagery, that such recollection can induce images pertaining to the non-imagistic memorial content. That is, in recollecting one may prompt the mind to apprehend relevant εἰδωλα. In such cases, which presumably are common, the subject experiences a complex kinetic pleasure. In fact, the kinetic pleasure is complex in two respects: the sources of stimulation are both internal and external, and the content is both conceptual and imagistic.

The preceding result in turn implies the following significant and surprising conclusion. Since memorial gratitude in its auxiliary role is a kinetic pleasure and since it is also constitutive of telic pleasure, telic pleasure is constituted by both katastematic and kinetic pleasures. More precisely, since corporeal maladies are typical rather than necessary conditions in human life, the preceding accounts implies that telic pleasure is typically constituted by both katastematic and kinetic pleasures.

**Conclusion**

What is it about telic pleasures that enable them to contribute to living pleasantly? Consider katastematic pleasures. Katastematic pleasures are stable or relatively stable. Mental katastematic pleasure is exceptionally stable. Corporeal katastematic pleasure is less stable, but certainly more stable than the pleasures of prodigals and those that lie in amusement. One central reason for their stability is that they are constitutional. Contrast this with pleasures that depend on certain forms of scholarly literature— that they must have been committed to at least a bipartition of the soul.
external stimulus. One’s mental and corporeal constitutions are ever-present, whereas
the presence or accessibility of certain forms of external stimulus is not reliable. Second,
the wisdom on which mental katastematic pleasure depends and on which bodily health
and thus corporeal katastematic pleasure relies is itself a powerful and perduring
formation. It stands much like a fortress against the vicissitudes of life. Bodily health is
less invulnerable and less certain to perdure, but it is the natural condition of the body.
Hence, pursuit and maintenance of bodily health has nature as a powerful ally. In
contrast, the pleasures of prodigals are, signally, destructive.

The kinetic pleasure of memorial gratitude in its auxiliary role shares
dependability with mental katastematic pleasure since the former derives from one’s
mental constitution. More precisely, it derives from secure contents of one’s mental
constitution. This point is emphasized in Vatican Saying 17: "[the old man] has fastened
[those goods about which, as a young man, he lacked confident expectation] with a
secure sense of gratitude." Likewise, in Vatican Saying 55 Epicurus emphasizes that the
past that we remember with gratitude is something that "cannot be undone" (ἄπρακτον).
In other words, those goods, once achieved, become a permanent part of the record of
our lives.

Among telic pleasures, mental katastematic pleasure clearly contributes most to
the goal. In addition to its superlative stability and to the fact that the wisdom on which
it depends governs one’s life as a whole, mental katastematic pleasure owes its
preeminence to at least two further factors. One, which we mentioned above, is the
superior affective power of the mind relative to that of the body. In other words,
Epicurus believes that the rational psyche feels more robustly than the irrational psyche.
Second and relatedly, the existential anxieties that Epicurean wisdom overcomes are
psychologically deep. Hence, their alleviation is psychologically deep. Accordingly, we may say that the katastematic pleasure that the sage achieves is profound. Using a different metaphorical scale, Epicurus speaks of it as the "highest" (ἀκροτάτην) pleasure.91

These considerations should also make it clear that katastematic pleasure is not analgesic pleasure.92 But we have given further reasons against that Cyrenaic criticism above. First, pleasure requires αἰσθήσεις, that is, consciousness. But consciousness must have, as we would call it, phenomenal character. Such character needn't be affective. One may have sense-perceptions that have sensory phenomenal character, but that are affectively neutral. However, the consciousness that pleasure entails is not affectively neutral. Moreover — to confirm that this claim does not beg the question against the Cyrenaics — we have shown that the mental katastematic pleasures constitutive of telic pleasure include a sense of security and a sense of gratitude. Experience confirms that there is something it is like to feel a deep sense of security and gratitude. Moreover, such psychological states are surely positive and perhaps pro-attitudinal. However, I have not examined whether they are specifically hedonic or what means Epicurus had to defend that view. Consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, among other reasons because it requires an explanation of Epicurus' conception of pleasure and not merely telic pleasure. However, I conclude with some preliminary remarks.

91 Ep. Men. 130; fr. 68. It is, perhaps, more natural for us to speak of this as a profound sense of contentment or tranquility. But Epicurus believes that such contentment or tranquility is a form of pleasure.

92 Pace Purinton (1993).
According to Epicurus, telic pleasure consists of at least four constituents. The first is itself a complex condition: freedom from mental distress and absence of bodily pain. The second is a well-founded sense of security in the perdurance of such freedom. This second component also includes well-founded confidence that although absence of corporeal pain cannot be secured, occurrences of corporeal pain can be managed and will not unsettle ἀταραξία. The third component is a well-founded sense of gratitude at the past and present goods that constitute one's life and wellbeing. The fourth consists of occasional episodes of memorial gratitude. The question is whether these constituents are hedonic. For convenience, I will limit my brief comments to the second and third constituents.

In contemporary hedonic theorizing, two hedonic kinds have been distinguished. Reference to these can aid our consideration of the problem. The hedonic kinds are enjoyment and being-pleased-that. Both are intentional states. The former takes experiences or activities as objects. The latter takes propositions or facts. For example, one may enjoy listening to a symphony, and one may be pleased that one is at the symphony. The objects of gratitude are not activities or experiences. It is less clear whether they are propositions or facts. One is grateful to someone for something. For example, one is grateful to a stranger for help towing one's car. However, if one renders this propositionally — one is grateful that a stranger helped tow one's car — the sense alters. The personal object of gratitude becomes impersonal. That one is grateful that a stranger helped tow one's car is consistent with one being grateful that some stranger or

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another helped tow one's car. In this case, the object of gratitude is actually the world treated as a benefactor. But in fact one is grateful to a particular stranger, a particular person, for the help. A second consideration bearing on the question whether gratitude is hedonic is that gratitude is something that one, as it were, bestows upon another person. But pleasure is certainly not like that. One can take pleasure in another person, that is, in being with that person or in thinking about that person. But such pleasure is not bestowed upon that person. Gratitude is certainly a pro-attitude, but these are at least two reasons to suspect the view that it is a kind of pleasure.

One often speaks of feeling secure about some object. But the object of security may be propositional; for example, one may feel secure that one is out of harm's way or that one's son is not endangering his life by traveling to Khartoum. However, security per se does not seem hedonic. One may feel utterly secure, but affect-neutral or bored. It is rather in the particular case where one's sense of security comes as a sense of relief that one may be pleased that one is secure. This is the kind of case Epicurus seems to have in mind when he speaks of the security and confidence of mental pleasure. But it may be questioned whether such a hedonic feeling of security as relief would perdure through the life of the sage. It would seem rather that with the passage of time the sense of relief would dissipate and that one would be left with a sense of security and confidence that one's wellbeing was intact and would perdure. Again, such feelings of security and confidence are surely positive states of mind and perhaps pro-attitudes. But it is doubtful whether they are hedonic states.

These considerations provide some reason to think that what Epicurus conceives as telic pleasure may not in fact be a hedonic state. If so, then, in a sense, the Cyrenaics'  

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94 By this I do not mean to imply that gratitude is deliberate or voluntary.
criticism is ultimately vindicated, although not in their terms. But perhaps the following line of defense lies open to Epicurus. The logic of the hedonic concepts of enjoyment and being-pleased-that suggests that Epicurean telic pleasure may be not pleasure. But perhaps the concepts of enjoyment and being-pleased-that mislead us. Perhaps pleasure must be identified phenomenologically. And perhaps telic pleasure, as Epicurus conceives it, has a hedonic phenomenal character. Moreover, Epicurean telic pleasure may share this phenomenal character with non-telic pleasures as well as what we call "contentment," "tranquility," or "peace of mind." In other words, possibly, all of these states share a hedonic quality. Arguably, it is this quality that "pleasure" or "ἡδονή" essentially designates.

If this hypothesis were correct, then when Epicurus speaks of pleasure as "πάθος" (in one of the senses in which he uses that word), he would be referring to a certain affective quality. It should be clear now that effective pursuit of this hypothesis requires examination of both Epicurus' conception of pleasure and of what we are prepared to call "pleasure."