EMPEDOCLES AND HIS ANCIENT READERS ON DESIRE AND PLEASURE

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A: What are Plato, Socrates, and Menedemus up to? . . . What weighty thought, what line of argument are they now investigating? . . .

B: I can tell you about these fellows for sure, since at the Panathenaea I saw a group of youngsters in the exercise grounds of the Academy and heard them speaking, indescribable, astonishing! They were propounding definitions about nature and separating into categories the forms of life of animals, the nature of trees, and the classes of vegetables. And in particular, they were investigating to what genus one should assign the pumpkin . . . One of the boys said it was a round vegetable; another that it was a grass; another that it was a tree. When a Sicilian doctor heard this, he dismissed them contemptuously as talking nonsense. (Epicrates) 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent decades have witnessed concerted re-examination of the ancient doxographical tradition. 2 This paper contributes to this trend of scholarship. It examines a set of Empedoclean doxographical passages in relation to a relevant set of Empedoclean fragments. 3 The doxographical material purports to give Empedocles' views of desire, pleasure, and pain; the fragments include the concepts of desire, pleasure, and pain. 4

Beginning most saliently with Hermann Diels' Doxographi Graeci and Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5 scholars have studied doxographical material to elucidate philosophers or schools whose work is fragmentary or lost. 6 This approach to doxography may be called 'reconstructionist'. Such reconstructionism is backward-looking. Somewhat analogously to the stemmatic method of textual criticism, it attempts to work through later accounts to a hypothetical archetype. Consequently, the interpreter's main concern is the reliability of the doxographical material.

Much of the research on the Empedoclean doxography for this paper was undertaken in a reconstructionist spirit. But one of the paper's central conclusions is that the doxographers tend to oversimplify and mislead. Thus, according to a reconstructionist agenda, the doxographical material largely lacks value. On the other hand, showing that the material has these defects certainly is valuable, in respect of reconstructionism generally and otherwise.

In contrast to reconstructionism, doxographical material may be studied from the perspective of reception. From the standpoint of the hypothetical archetype, receptionism is forward-looking. Its interest is now and why later philosophers, commentators, and doxographers proper interpret and report on their predecessors.

Temporini, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, II, 36.4 (Berlin, 1990), 2935-3035; J. Mansfeld, "Doxography and Dialectic: The Sitz im Leben of the "Placita", in Haase and
Consequently, receptionism does not discard unreliable doxographical material, for unreliable interpretations are no less interpretations than reliable ones.

The opening paragraph of this paper speaks of examining Empedoclean doxographical material 'in relation to' Empedocles' fragments. The expression was chosen to welcome reconstructionist and receptionist interests. Although their aims are distinct, the work of reconstructionism and receptionism clearly overlaps; thus, the two approaches can be complementary. Indeed, the paper's negative reconstructionist results serve as positive points of departure for further examination along receptionist lines; discovery that a doxographical passage is misleading prompts the question why.

To some extent, receptionism has been undertaken in the course of the discussion. I say 'to some extent' because the project of an adequate receptionist interpretation is especially demanding. For example, envision a book-length study whose chapters were devoted to Plato's interpretation and use of Empedocles, Aristotle's, Theophrastus', and so on. Such a study would facilitate a deep explanation of, say, any one of Aristotle's Empedoclean opinions. Thus, from a receptionist perspective, the efforts of this paper to explain the doxographical material should be viewed as preliminary.

Finally, we may distinguish a third approach to doxography, an approach that to some extent combines reconstructionism and receptionism. Such an approach, which might be called 'dialogical', seeks to understand both the archetypal work, figure, or school and its descendants. This is the main difference between the dialogical approach and receptionism: the dialogical interpreter does not abandon the archetype, even though the doxographical tradition is errant. The dialogical approach precisely seeks to clarify by contrast the distinctiveness of the archetype and the descendants. This is akin to studying, for instance, the ancient economy in order to understand the modern economy and vice versa. This approach will be particularly fruitful when successors' interpretations of their predecessors are inaccurate. But that seems to be the rule in antiquity.

In sum, this paper examines, from several perspectives, a set of Empedoclean doxographical passages in relation to a relevant set of Empedoclean fragments. From a reconstructionist perspective, the paper assesses the reliability of the doxographical material. From

Osborne, Rethinking, is a good example of receptionist scholarship.

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a receptionist perspective, it attempts to clarify the history of the doxographical material, specifically to identify significant contributions and to trace their lines and characters of influence. From a dialogical perspective, it attempts to clarify how the doxographical tradition diverges from the archetype and thus to elucidate by contrast the archetype and its heirs.

The following discussion is organized into two parts, each including several sections:

1. THE DOXOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL

1. Post-Aétian doxographers on Empedocles on desire and pleasure
2. Aétius' conjunction of Empedocles' views on desire, pleasure, and pain
3. Theophrastus on Empedocles on perception, pleasure, and pain
4. Complications in Aétius' and Theophrastus' accounts
5. Aristotle and Plato on Empedocles on homogeneous elemental attraction
6. Speculation on Greek sources for Empedocles on appetite
7. Ibn Lūqī and pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5. 28
8. Aétius' Empedoclean opinions on appetite as botanical appetite
9. Aristotle's On Plants and Aétius' Empedoclean opinion on botanical appetite
10. Conclusion to the doxographical material

II. EMPEDOCLES' FRAGMENTS

1. Some terminology and general remarks
2. Empedocles' fragments on the motivations of the roots
3. Empedocles' fragments on the motivations of stuffs
4. Empedocles' fragments on pleasure and pain
5. Conclusion to Empedocles' fragments

These follow a General Conclusion. The remainder of this introduction highlights the central claims and objectives of these sections.

Section I.1 uses pseudo-Plutarch 5. 28 and Stobaeus 1. 50. 31 to reconstruct the Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain from Aétius' lost Placita. Section I.2 argues that Aétius conjoined Empedoclean opinions on desire with Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and pain. The remainder of Part I attempts to reconstruct the two pre-Aétian doxographical lineages of Empedocles' views of desire and of pleasure and pain.

Sections I.3-4 focus on the pre-Aétian doxographical lineage of Empedocles' view of pleasure and pain. Section I.3 argues that
while Aëtius derives his Empedoclean opinion on pleasure and pain from Theophrastus' *On the Senses*. Aëtius interprets Empedocles' opinion on pleasure and pain differently from Theophrastus. Theophrastus primarily construes Empedocles' conception of pleasure and pain in terms of the structural conformity and non-conformity of perceptible effluences and perceptual pores; Aëtius construes Empedocles' conception of pleasure and pain in terms of elemental homogeneity and heterogeneity. I argue that Aëtius' transformation of Theophrastus' view is due to Aëtius' combination of Empedoclean opinions on desire with those on pleasure and pain. Section I.4, essentially an appendix to Section I.3, argues that Theophrastus' and Aëtius' respective views are in fact more complex than Section I.3 suggests. Theophrastus does discuss Empedocles' theory of perception in terms of elemental homogeneity and heterogeneity, and elsewhere in the *Placita* Aëtius attributes to Empedocles the view that perception occurs through the structural conformity of effluences and pores. Section I.4 suggests a way of integrating these complexities.

Sections I.5–9 focus on the doxographical lineage of Empedocles' views of desire. Section I.5 argues that Aristotle, following Plato, attributes to Empedocles a cosmological principle of elemental attraction according to which elementally homogeneous entities are attracted to one another. However, Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on desire specifically refers to nutritional desire, i.e. appetite, and this is not reducible to the cosmological principle. Consequently, Section I.6 speculates on pre-Aëtian doxographical sources that might have applied the cosmological principle in formulating Empedocles' view of appetite. Aristotle himself, Theophrastus, Strato, and Meno are examined as possible sources; and while no evidence points conclusively to one of these authors, all the evidence points to the Peripatetics.

The overarching objective of Sections I.7–9 is to suggest a more precise identification of the pre-Aëtian source of Empedocles' opinion on appetite. Section I.7 introduces a neglected source in the manuscript tradition of pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita*, Qustā ibn Lūqā's Arabic translation. Ibn Lūqā's translation helps emend corruptions in the Greek manuscripts of pseudo-Plutarch 5.28. On the basis of the emendations and consideration of the broader context of pseudo-Plutarch 5.28, Section I.8 argues that the Empedoclean opinion on appetite specifically derives from doxographical material on appetite in plants. Subsequently, Section I.9 uses Nicolaus of Damascus' adaptation of Aristotle's *On Plants* to argue that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on botanical appetite derives from Aristotle's lost botanical treatise. The conclusion in Section I.9 thus confirms the speculations in Section I.6 that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on nutritional desire derives from the Peripatetics.

Part II of the paper compares the results from the doxographical tradition with Empedoclean fragments in which the concepts of desire, pleasure, and pain occur. Section II.1 introduces some convenient terminology and makes some general remarks about Empedocles' conception of the cosmos and the place of desire, pleasure, and pain within it. One fundamental difference between Empedocles and his Peripatetic doxographers is that Empedocles attributes psychological states, including desire, pleasure, and pain, to the material elements of his cosmos, whereas for Aristotle such psychological capacities exist only among organically complex beings. Another fundamental difference is that Empedocles identifies Love and Strife, which are regarded as independent entities, as the principal sources of motivation in other beings, whereas Aristotle regards the *ψυχή* itself as the source of motivation.

Section II.2 focuses on the motivations of Empedocles' roots and argues that the roots have both positive and negative motivations, desires and aversions, to congregate with both homogeneous and heterogeneous roots. Thus, the doxographical tradition oversimplifies in attributing to Empedocles only the attraction of like for like. In addition to the motivational influences of Love and Strife on the roots, several fragments suggest that the roots have certain intrinsic kinetic tendencies and combinatorial dispositions. Section II.2 concludes with a discussion of these fragments and consideration of their relation to the influences of Love and Strife.

Section II.3 turns to the motivations of stuffs, i.e. elementally complex entities, and specifically focuses on fragments concerning appetite, albeit zoological rather than botanical appetite. I argue that appetite is not for an elementally homogeneous entity, but rather an elemental portion in which the stuff is deficient. The discussion includes an account of the disjunctive and conjunctive roles of Strife and Love in the digestive process.

Finally, Section II.4 argues that, contrary to Theophrastus' suggestion, Empedocles is not interested in pleasure and pain as mere sensations. Rather, so far as related concepts occur within the frag-
ments, Empedocles is concerned with the emotions of joy and suffering. Furthermore, Love and Strife are responsible for joy and suffering respectively, which means that, contrary to the doxographical tradition, Love is responsible for pleasure in so far as Love concours heterogeneous entities.

1. THE DOXOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL

1.1. Post-Aétian doxographers on Empedocles on desire and pleasure

The doxographical material that purports to give Empedocles' views of desire, pleasure, and pain is divisible into two sets, post-Aétian and pre-Aétian. The post-Aétian material comes from Stobaeus' *Anthology* and pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita*.

Stobaeus' *Anthology*, book 1, chapter 50, is professedly devoted to opinions concerning perception, the objects of perception, and whether perceptions are true. Sections 28-33 of chapter 50 concern pleasure and pain. Section 31 attributes the following opinion to Empedocles:


Empedocles says that like things derive pleasures from like things and that (they aim) at a refilling in accordance with the deficiency. Consequently, desire is for that which is like because of that which is lacking. And pains occur because of opposites. For things that differ are hostile to one another in accordance with both the combination and the blending of elements.⁸

A similar passage occurs in pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita*, book 5, chapter 28. This chapter contains or rather once contained opinions pertaining to the question 'Whence in animals are desires and pleasures derived?' One opinion, Empedocles', has survived in the Greek tradition:

(A1) Desire arises through lack of a certain element and is directed at the element that is lacking.

(A2) Pleasure arises through mixing of like elements.

(A3) Pain arises through mixing of opposite elements.

(A1–3) might be conjoined and elaborated into the following account. Subjects of desire, pleasure, and pain are composed of a set of elements. The diminution in one of the elements evokes desire in that subject. The subject desires the kind of element whose quantity is diminished. Pleasure arises as the subject regains the elemental kind in which it is deficient. Precisely, pleasure arises because the portion of the regained element mixes with the diminished portion of the same kind of element. On the other hand, if a deficient subject obtains an elemental portion that is opposite in kind to the element in which it is deficient, pain arises. Precisely, David Wolfsdorf

'Εμπεδωκλῆς οἱ μὲν ὡξίκαις γίνονται τοὺς ὡξικάς κατὰ τὰ ἀναλήμφρα τῶν ἀναλήμφρων ἑκατέρων σύγκρουσις. τὰς δὲ ὡξικάς εἰς ὑποκείαν κατὰ τὰ τῶν ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὑποκειμένην κράσια, τὰς δὲ αὔξησις καὶ τὰς ἀλληρουοῦσιν [3] ἀλληρουοῦσθαι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα ὡστὰ διαφέρει κατὰ τὰ τῶν σύγκρουσι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑνεκίνεσι κράσιν.

Empedocles holds that desires occur in animals according to their deficiencies in those elements that complete each one. And pleasures come from what is congenial according to the blends of related and like (elements), while disturbances and (pains from what is uncongenial).¹⁰

The Greek text on which this translation is based contains problems, which I shall discuss in Section 1.7. For the time being, this rendition, based on Diels's *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, should suffice.

Clearly, the contents of Stobaeus 1. 50. 31 and pseudo-Plutarch 5. 28 are similar; in fact they derive from a common source. Following Diels, this common source is conventionally identified as Aétius' lost *Placita*. Pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* is an epitome of Aétius' *Placita*, and Aétius' *Placita* is a major source for the material assembled in Stobaeus' *Anthology*. Drawing on the contents of Stobaeus 1. 50. 31 and Pseudo-Plutarch 5. 28, and without the benefit of perspective from the pre-Aétian doxographical tradition or consideration of Stobaeus' *Anthology* or pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* and their textual traditions, a first attempt to reconstruct Empedocles' opinions concerning desire, pleasure, and pain from Aétius' lost *Placita* might run as follows:


2. ἢπετεν αἱ ὑγείες γίνονται τοὺς ὡξικάς καὶ ὡξικάς (5. 28).

10 This is the text that Diels prints at *Fragmenta*, 31 A 95.
pain arises because the portion of the acquired element mixes with the diminished portion of the opposite kind of element.

This interpretation of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain is not intended to be accurate, only plausible on the mere basis of Stobaeus 1. 50. 31 and pseudo-Plutarch 5. 28, without the perspective of the pre-Aëtian doxographical tradition or further consideration of Stobaeus and pseudo-Plutarch. In fact, Aëtius' opinions are confused and oversimplified. This can be shown by directly comparing (A1–3) with Empedoclean fragments pertaining to desire, pleasure, and pain. I shall discuss those fragments in Part II. But there is good reason to believe that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain were not directly based on an interpretation of Empedocles' poem *On Nature*, even though Aëtius must have had access to the poem. In other words, Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain, derive from earlier doxographers.

Over three hundred references to Empedocles occur in extant Greek literature between the time of Empedocles himself (fifth century BC) and Aëtius (first century AD). Additionally, we know that many authors whose works are now lost discussed Empedocles. For example, Diogenes Laërtius mentions or cites references to Empedocles from eighteen authors who had written by the first century AD: Aristotle, Theophrastus, Heraclides of Pontus, Hippobotus, Heraclides of Lemnos, Timaeus, Hermarchus, Hermippus, Apollodorus, Satyrus, Favorinus, Neanthes, Alcidas, Hieronymus, Xanthus, Diodorus of Ephesus, and Demetrius of *Troizen*. Most of these authors' works are lost or extremely fragmentary.

Among extant literature and presumably much that was written by lost authors such as those whom Diogenes lists, references to and discussions of Empedocles lack philosophical content. For

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instance, several references to Empedocles occur among the fragments of Timaeus' *Histories*, but these are biographical and political. Among references that have philosophical content, most occur in Aristotle's corpus (134 references). The second most numerous, but much fewer, occur in Theophrastus' works (14 references). Apropos of (A1–3) in particular, Aristotle and Theophrastus are the only extant pre-Aëtian authors to speak of Empedoclean doctrines concerning desire, pleasure, and pain. This encourages the view that ultimately (A1–3) depend on other sources. Indeed, I shall suggest that (A1–3) ultimately derive from the early Peripatetic doxographical tradition. I shall also suggest that Plato influenced an aspect of the Peripatetic doxographical tradition on Empedocles.

I.2. Aëtius' conjunction of Empedocles' views on desire, pleasure, and pain

Before turning to the pre-Aëtian doxographical material, I want to clarify Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions further. I want to suggest that Aëtius himself conjoined Empedoclean doxographical material on desire, on the one hand, and pleasure and pain, on the other.

In 1. 50. 28–33 Stobaeus transmits the views on pleasure and pain of several other individuals and schools: Epicurus, the Peripatetics, Chrysippus, Anaxagoras, and 'others'. While sections 28–33 all concern pleasure and pain, sections 28–30 in particular form a coherent subset. Section 28 attributes to Epicurus the view that pleasures and pains are perceptual; section 29 attributes to the Peripatetics the contrary view that they are cognitive; and section 30 attributes to Chrysippus an intermediate position according to which generic pleasure is cognized, while specific pleasure is perceived. Thus, sections 28–30 can be viewed as responding to the question whether pleasure and pain are perceived or cognized. Diels, perhaps rightly, situates 1. 50. 28–30, along with a number of other sections in Stobaeus, within Aëtius' *Placita* book 4, chapter 9, under the rubric 'Whether perceptions are true'. At least, the question whether pleasure and pain are perceived or cognized is clearly relevant to the question whether perceptions are true. For example, at 1. 50. 17 Stobaeus attributes to Pythagoras,

11 TLG gives 344 references. To these should be added several from the Peripatetic *On Plants*, which is not part of the TLG database. I discuss the relevant references from *On Plants* in sect. 1.8. The TLG search was based on explicit references to Empedocles, which were checked for completeness against the sources of the A and B fragments in Diels, *Fragments*.

12 Aristotle (D.L. 8. 54. 77); Hippobotus (51, 54, 60); Timaeus (51, 54, 60, 63–6, 71); Heraclides of Lemnos (51, 54, 53, 58, 60, 61); Apollodorus (54); Satyros (53, 58, 59, 60); Favorinus (53, 73); Neanthes (55, 58, 72); Theophrastus (55); Hermippus (56, 60); Alcidas (58); Hieronymus (58); Xanthus (60); Heraclides of Pontus (67); Diodorus (70); Demetrius (70). The *Suda* attributes to Zeno of Elea a work on the interpretation of Empedocles, but I assume this attribution is mistaken; cf. J. P. Hershbell, 'Plutarch as a Source for Empedocles Re-examined', *American Journal of Philology*, 92 (1971), 156–84 at 156 and n. 3.

13 Diels, *Doxa*, 396. Note that Diels derives the basic structure of books and chapters of Aëtius' *Placita* from pseudo-Plutarch's epitome.
opinion in pseudo-Plutarch's Placita is more accurate relative to Aëtius' Placita than its location in Stobaeus' Anthology. That is to say, the contents of pseudo-Plutarch 5. 28 did not appear in Aëtius 4. 9 under the rubric 'Whether perceptions are true' but in Aëtius 5. 28 under the rubric 'Whence desires and pleasures are derived'.

As we shall see, the possibility that Aëtius himself conjoined Empedoclean views on desire and on pleasure and pain is strengthened by the fact that the pre-Aëtian doxographical materials on the topics of desire, on the one hand, and of pleasure and pain, on the other, derive from distinct sources. The material on pleasure and pain derives from Theophrastus' On the Senses. The material on desire does not; indeed, its pedigree is much more obscure. I shall begin with the material in Theophrastus' On the Senses.

I.3. Theophrastus on Empedocles on perception, pleasure, and pain

Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions concerning pleasure and pain, but not desire, derive from Theophrastus' On the Senses. In that work Theophrastus categorizes Empedocles' views of perception under the division of those who explain perception according to the principle of likeness. Regarding pleasure and pain, Theophrastus reports:

[Empedocles says] that we experience pleasure [μέγεθε] through things that are alike [τα ὑπόστασεις] in accordance with both their parts and blending [καὶ τα μορία] and [τὰ κράσαν], while we experience pain [μεγεθεία] through things that are opposite [τα ἀνωτάτα]. (§ 9)

And again:

[Empedocles says that we] experience pleasure [μέγεθε] through things that are alike [τα ὑπόστασεις], and pain [μεγεθεία] through things that are opposite [τα ἀνωτάτα].

Likewise, Stob. 1. 50. 25 is misplaced within Stobaeus' Anthology itself; it does not belong in a chapter devoted to perception, but in the lost chapter devoted to nourishment and growth (1. 46). Moreover, the content of Stob. 1. 50. 25 must derive from Aëtius' chapter on nourishment and growth, 5. 27.

G. M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (London, 1917), 74, follows G. Schneider (ed.), Theophrastus Enneae qua supernunt [Theophrastus] (Leipzig, 1818–21) ii. 617, in adding τα μορία καὶ τὰ κράσαν. I take Theophrastus to mean that pleasure arises through a relation of two entities a and b, wherein the parts of a and b are alike and a and b blend.
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opposite [τοῖς ἔνωσισι]. . . Moreover. . . kindred things [οὐσίασ] above all produce pleasure through contact, as he says . . . (§ 16)

Theophrastus hereby appears to supply later doxographers with the view that Empedocles held that pleasure arises through the blending of like elements, while pain arises through the blending of opposite elements.19 Yet whereas Actius and his followers speak of pleasure and pain as the blending of like and opposite elements, this is actually not the meaning of the Theophrastean passages cited. In his discussion of Empedocles’ account of perception in On the Senses, Theophrastus primarily—I emphasize ‘primarily’, not ‘only’20—treats likeness and opposition in terms of structural conformity or nonconformity between perceptible effluences and perceptual pores.21 Theophrastus begins his account of Empedocles’ theory of perception as follows:

Empedocles has a common method of treating all the senses. He says that perception occurs because (the effluences) fit into [ἐναλλάττον] the pores of the particular perceptual faculty. (§ 7)

Subsequently, he claims:

For it is clear that what fits in [ἐναλλάττον], as he puts it, is what is alike [τὰ ὀμοιόν]. (§ 10)

Thus, Theophrastus interprets structural conformity (ὁμοιότης) between perceptible effluences and perceptual pores as likeness (ὁμοιότης).

We can understand Theophrastus’ subsequent criticism of Empedocles accordingly:

19 In § 16 Theophrastus supports his account of Empedocles’ views on pleasure and pain by reference to B 23. 5–6: ‘hostile, they are most separate from one another, in both and mixture and in moulded forms’. The verses continue: ‘[they are] entirely unfit to be together and are [are] much pains’. Here it suffices to note that Empedocles is not speaking of the mixture of unlike elements, but of entities that are separate from and antagonistic to one another and, in particular, resistant to blending.
20 The following section will suggest that Theophrastus’ account of Empedocles’ theory of perception is more complex.
21 A. A. Long, ‘Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or Materialism?’, Classical Quarterly, 38 (1968), 256–76 at 261, claims that although ‘there is no necessary connection between like constituents and symmetry of pores (and effluences) . . . the distinction between the two forms of likeness probably would have been unnoticed’ (at the time that Empedocles composed his poem). I reject this suggestion on the grounds that it assumes that Theophrastus’ interpretation of Empedocles is accurate.

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(Empe... explanation of pleasure and pain is inconsistent, for he ascribes pleasure to the action of like things, while pain he derives from opposites . . . Pleasure and pain are thus regarded . . . as perceptions or as occurring with perception; consequently, the perceptual process does not in every case arise from likeness. (§ 16)

Theophrastus claims that Empedocles is inconsistent because he presents a general account of perception in terms of the structural conformity of effluences and pores, yet he also explains the distinction between pleasure and pain in terms of likeness and opposition. Consequently, in the case of pain, the perception of pain must be explained according to the structural conformity of effluences and pores, but the perception of pain must be explained according to the structural nonconformity of effluences and pores.22

Evidently, between Theophrastus and Aëtius a significant transformation in the reporting of Empedocles’ opinions concerning pleasure and pain occurred. In the light of the disparity between Theophrastus and Aëtius, it is especially noteworthy that Aëtius’ report on Empedocles’ view of pleasure and pain is conjuncted with an account of Empedocles’ view of desire, whereas Theophrastus’ On the Senses makes no mention of Empedocles’ view of desire. Stobaeus transmits Aëtius’ claim that according to Empedocles desire is for that which is like because of a deficit. As suggested in Section 1.1, this means that desire is directed towards a kind of element in which the elementally homogeneous subject of desire is deficient. For convenience, I shall hereafter speak of elemental likeness as elemental ‘homogeneity’. Consequently, Aëtius’ conjunction of Empedocles’ view of pleasure and pain with his view of desire plays an important role in Aëtius’ opinion that the likeness involved in pleasure is elementally homogeneity, rather than Theophrastus’ view, structural conformity of effluences and pores.23

22 Incidentally, it is not clear to me that this is such a cogent criticism, within the terms of Theophrastus’ own interpretation. One might respond that, say, all olfactory perception requires some conformity of effluences and pores. But pleasant smells occur when the conformity is precise, whereas unpleasant smells occur when the conformity is relatively imprecise.
23 This claim also assumes that Aëtius’ opinion is consistent with Stobaeus’ in suggesting that the object of desire is the subject of desire. I defend this assumption in sect. 1.8. Note also that while Aëtius’ conjunction of Empedocles’ views of desire, pleasure, and pain produces an incoherent conception of pain, Theophrastus’ account does not
I.4. Complications in Aëtius' and Theophrastus' accounts

While Aëtius' and Theophrastus' accounts of Empedocles' conception of pleasure and pain diverge according to their distinct conceptions of likeness, elemental homogeneity, and structural conformity respectively, their accounts are actually more complicated than the preceding section indicates. Here, I discuss two complications with Theophrastus' and Aëtius' accounts respectively.

In discussing Theophrastus' account of Empedocles' theory of perception, I said that likeness and opposition are 'primarily', but not only, treated in terms of structural conformity or nonconformity between perceptible effluences and perceptual pores. Theophrastus' treatment of likeness in Empedocles' psychology is complex. Theophrastus also suggests that Empedocles' psychological theory, including the experiences of pleasure and pain, involves likeness understood as elemental homogeneity. In section 10 of On the Senses, Theophrastus reports that Empedocles conceives of knowledge in terms of likeness:

[i] [Empedocles] also speaks of knowledge [ἴσθιμαι] and ignorance in the same way (as he speaks of perception). For he says that knowing is due to like things [τοῖς ἰσμοῖς] and being ignorant is due to unlike things [ἄνυμοι], for in his view knowledge is the same as or close to perception. [ii] For after he enumerates how each (element) recognizes each [Theophrastus is here alluding to B 109], [iii] he concludes by adding that from these (elements) 'all things having been fittingly conjoined [πάντα περὶ πέρας ἐμφανίζοντα], and by means of these they have knowledge and experience pleasure and pain [ἴδιον ἤδε ὁ ἰσμόν] [= B 107]. [iv] Therefore, it is principally by means of the blood that we know, for in the blood the elements [ὁμογενεία] are blended more fully than in (our other) parts.

After making the general point in [i] that Empedocles was committed to the view that knowledge, as well as perception, is based on likeness, Theophrastus alludes in [ii] to the following verses of Empedocles' poem (B 109):

For it is with earth that we see earth; with water, water; with air, divine air; with fire, destructive fire; with love, love; and with grim strife, strife.

In [iii] Theophrastus cites fragment B 107. But since Theophrastus introduces B 107 with the words 'he concluded by adding' (ἐν τοῖς περὶ πέρας ἐμφανίζοντα), and this follows the allusion to B 109, Heinrich Stein, followed by other commentators, proposes appending B 107 to B 109, viz.:

For it is with earth that we recognize [ἐρωταίει] earth; with water, water; with air, Divine air; with fire, destructive fire; with love, love; and with grim strife, strife... all things having been fittingly conjoined, and by means of these [τοὺς] they have knowledge and experience pleasure [ἴδιοτ'] and pain [междунаτα].

Granted this relation between B 109 and B 107, we can infer that Theophrastus interprets Empedocles' view of cognition as follows. Blood is responsible for cognition because the material elements, air, water, fire, and earth, that enter the blood through the perceptual pores are recognized by homogeneous elements that constitute the blood. Blood also recognizes Love and Strife—Theophrastus appears to believe Empedocles is claiming—in so far as Love and Strife inhere in the blood as well. Finally, Theophrastus' interpretation implies that Empedocles understands pleasure and pain like cognition, and this suggests that pleasure and pain arise through the conjunction of homogeneous elements. Consequently, Theophrastus' interpretation of pain in B 107 is inconsistent with the view, which he also attributes to Empedocles, that pain arises through the blending of opposites, for in that case opposition implies structural nonconformity. Furthermore, it is unclear how pain and pleasure can be understood analogously to cognition since pain and pleasure are not material elements that can contact one another.

Theophrastus' interpretation of B 109 and B 107 must be confused. I agree with David Sedley that 'Theophrastus' identification

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16 Note that Theophrastus is here indebted to Arist. D 4 427.22.
17 I translate ἰδούτα here following my interpretation of Theophrastus' interpretation of the verse. I suggest an alternative translation in sect. II.4.
18 I have added roman numerals to facilitate exegesis.
19 The same problem may arise in the case of Love and Strife if Love and Strife are not material elements.
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of structural conformity with likeness and his conflation of the likeness of structural conformity and the likeness of elemental homogeneity are a function of Theophrastus' 'Aristotelianism', that is, Theophrastus' 'imprisonment in' an over-schematized doxographical view, according to which Empedocles has got to come out as a like-by-like theorist'.

Theophrastus' view that Empedocles was committed to a theory of cognition based on likeness does derive from Aristotle. In On the Soul Aristotle writes:

All those... who looked to the fact that what has soul knows or perceives what exists, identify soul with the principle or principles of nature...

Thus, Empedocles declares that soul is formed out of all his elements, each one itself being a soul; his words are... (DA 404a8-12)

Aristotle now cites B 109. Again, in Metaphysics Γ Aristotle cites B 109 within the context of a series of criticisms of Empedocles. Aristotle claims that if, as Empedocles maintains, knowledge is of like by like, then god would be less intelligent than others: since strife does not inhere in god, god would fail to recognize and so lack knowledge of strife (100c3-9).

In short, Theophrastus' account of Empedocles' view of knowledge and at least some forms of perception, namely pleasure and pain, includes both conceptions of likeness, structural conformity and elemental homogeneity; and in the latter case, Theophrastus follows Aristotle.

Let us now turn to a corresponding complication in contemporary matters. Although Aëtius' conjunction of Empedocles' views of desire and of pleasure and pain suggests that the likeness involved in pleasure is elemental homogeneity, Aëtius also elsewhere reports that for Empedocles perception involves the structural conformity of effluences and pores. The evidence for this comes from pseudo-Plutarch 4. 9:

'Εμπεδοκλής 'Ηρωδείδης παρὰ τὸ συμμετρία τῶν πόρων τὰς κατὰ μόροις αιθήτας γίνεισθαι τοῦ εἰκός τῶν αιθητῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀρμόλιτος.

Empedocles and Heracleides claim that the particular perceptions (that is, of structural conformity) occur when there is commensuration [τὰς συμβατές] with the pores, when each proper object of perception fits in with the (appropriate) faculty of perception.'

perceptions of the particular senses) occur when there is commensuration [τὰς συμβατές] with the pores, when each proper object of perception fits in with the (appropriate) faculty of perception.'

It is questionable whether this passage can be reconciled with the passage in pseudo-Plutarch 5. 28. Here is one possibility. In contrast to seeing, hearing, and the functions of the other specific sensory modalities, experiencing pleasure and pain are common to all the senses. Thus, while pleasure and pain occur through elemental homogeneity, perception by means of specific sensory modalities occurs through structural conformity of effluences and pores. Thus, for example, the pain experienced in touching a burning coal may be explained, as a form of tactile perception, as involving structural conformity of pores and effluences, and, hedonically, as involving heterogeneous elements. This interpretation is also compatible with 'Theophrastus' claim that for Empedocles pleasure and pain either are perceptions or 'accompany perception' (συν' αἰσθήσεως).

Finally, one may ask whether this characteristic interpretation of Aëtius is accurate. The main difficulty is that it requires us to maintain that Aëtius either deliberately improved upon Theophrastus, perhaps in defence of a more coherent account of Empedocles, or that he improved upon Theophrastus rather accidentally. If the argument in Section 1.2 is sound, that Aëtius himself conjoined Empedoclean opinions on desire and on pleasure and pain, then this provides some support for the claim that Aëtius was a rather active constructor of opinions. That, in turn, supports the view that Aëtius' improvement on Theophrastus was intentional. But corroborating this suggestion would require comparison of other Aëtian opinions with those of his predecessors.
I turn now from the pre-Aëtian doxographical material on Empedocles on pleasure and pain to the pre-Aëtian doxographical material on Empedocles on desire. Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on desire specifically concerns nutritional desire, that is, appetite. Granted this, it is difficult to identify a pre-Aëtian source for this Empedoclean opinion. Among our Greek sources, we have material on Empedocles' views on desire, on botanical nourishment, even a bit on digestion. The pseudo-Aristotelian On Plants attributes to Empedocles the view that plants are moved by desire (ἐνθύμεις κινεῖσθαι, 815’16).11 and this implies nutritional desire; however, no explanation of this appetite is given. Moreover, nothing from the Greek tradition of the doxographical material on these other topics, desire, botanical nourishment, or digestion, can straightforwardly be constructed into the doctrine on appetite. There is a lacuna here. Arabic sources will ultimately help illuminate the Greek tradition and fill, or at least partially fill, this lacuna. But, for expository and heuristic reasons, it will be valuable to begin by focusing exclusively on the Greek tradition.

First, consider the following analysis of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite. Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite concerns the physiology of nutrition, precisely the view that appetite arises through nutritional deficiency and is directed towards that which is like its subject, where likeness implies elemental homogeneity. This nutritional principle is analysable into two components. One is nutritional deficiency as the cause of desire; the other is the homogeneity of the object and subject of desire. The first component may be particular to nutritional processes. The second is a species of what I shall call 'the cosmological principle of homogeneous elemental attraction'. The cosmological principle of homogeneous elemental attraction is the view that homogeneous elements are attracted to one another.

I shall begin my examination of the pre-Aëtian doxographical tra-
11 The Greek phrase ἐνθύμεις κινεῖσθαι is a translation of the Latin phrase 'desiderio moveri'. As H. J. Drossaert, Lulofs and R. L. J. Poortman note: 'thia is an elaborate translation of a single Arabic substantive (Niccolini Danicae: De plantis, Fitz Translata) [Plants] (Amsterdam, 1869), 245. I discuss the text and textual tradition of De plantis further in sect. 1.9.
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in Lysis of conceptions of friendship and also desire according to likeness and opposition.

Granted this, it is unclear how we get from Aristotle’s Empedoclean cosmological principle of elemental attraction to the nutritional principle in Aëtius. Between Aristotle and Aëtius there is no extant reference to Empedocles as a proponent of the cosmological principle. Presumably, either Aristotle’s view influenced others who wrote on Empedocles on nutritional desire and thereby informed Aëtius, or some lost Aristotelian work itself discussed Empedocles on nutritional desire.

I.6. Speculation on Greek sources for Empedocles on appetite

Here, I entertain several possible sources for Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on appetite, three relating to the Peripatetic tradition and a fourth relating to the medical doxographical tradition. The Peripatetic and medical traditions actually overlap since the Peripatetics were also involved in medical doxography. However, for expository reasons it is convenient to segregate the traditions.

Our first guess might be that Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on appetite derives from Theophrastus. As we noted above, however, it clearly does not derive from Theophrastus’ On the Senses since that work contains no account of Empedocles’ view of desire. Alternatively, Theophrastus’ Physical Opinions might have contained a discussion of nutrition, including appetite. However, there is no explicit evidence that it did. Indeed, nothing in Theophrastus’ surviving works or fragments concerns Empedocles and desire. Moreover, none of the works attributed to Theophrastus by ancient authors or in Diogenes Laërtius’ catalogue of Theophrastus’ works is a reasonable candidate for the source of Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on appetite. Since it is widely believed that Theophrastus’ Physical Opinions is a major source for Aëtius’ Placita, we still should not exclude the possibility that Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on desire derives from Theophrastus. None the less, we need to consider alternatives.

Aristotle offers another avenue. In book 2 of On the Soul Aristotle briefly discusses nutrition (415b22–416b31). Therein he criticizes Empedocles’ view of nutrition and growth in plants (415b27–416a18). Aristotle’s criticism says nothing about Empedocles’ view of desire or nutritional desire in plants or animals. Yet Aristotle concludes his treatment of nutrition in On the Soul by saying: ‘We have now given an outline of the nature of nourishment; further details must be given in the appropriate place’ (DA 416b30–1). This reference to an appropriate place for a detailed discussion of nutrition is puzzling. Elsewhere in Aristotle’s corpus there are references to a discussion of nutrition that has already occurred (backward references) and that will occur (forward references), but there is no independent treatise dedicated to the subject. Moreover, none of the ancient catalogues of Aristotle’s writings lists such a work. Of course, the references to a discussion of nutrition need not refer to an independent treatise; they could refer to discussions of nutrition within other works, in particular On the Generation of Animals. However, although nutrition is sporadically discussed in the corpus, nothing qualifies as a sustained, detailed examination of the topic.

Pierre Louis has attempted to explain Aristotle’s backward and forward references to discussions of nourishment by arguing that Aristotle composed one treatise on the subject early in his career, then planned to supplant the treatise with another that he ultimately never wrote, and the original treatise was lost before Aristotle’s corpus was compiled and edited. An alternative explanation is that the references to discussions of nourishment in Aristotle, whether made by Aristotle or editors of Aristotle, are to works composed in Fortenbaugh) seems to be based on Theophrastus’ On Fatigue (see the note on lines 2–3 in the critical apparatus on p. 124).

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by other members of the Peripatos. James Lennox offers this suggestion in remarks on PA 650b10,46 citing Aristotle’s references to discussions of plants, which may well refer to Theophrastus’ works.47

Further, albeit limited support for Lennox’s idea derives from Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes’ catalogue of Strato’s writings includes a treatise in one book entitled On Nourishment and Growth.48 This is the only Peripatetic work on the subject we know of. Perhaps some of the Aristotelian references to discussions of nourishment allude to this work. Unfortunately, no other reference to Strato’s treatise survives.49 Consequently, even granting that Aristotle’s references to discussions of nourishment allude to Strato’s work, the idea that Aëtius derived his claim about Empedocles on nutritional desire from Strato, and perhaps also used Strato for his opinions on nourishment and growth, must remain speculative.

Another possibility is that Aëtius’ opinions on nutrition and nutritional desire derive from the medical doxographical tradition. There is some general and some specific support for this suggestion. Generally, most opinions attributed to doctors in Aëtius’ Placita occur towards the end of book 5, where the Empedoclean opinions on nourishment and growth and on nutritional desire occur.50 Furthermore, in some cases nutritional desire was discussed within discussions of nutrition in medical literature. Perhaps the most telling example is also the earliest. In chapter 39 of the Hippocratic Diseases IV, which may be dated to c.420 BC,51 we find a conception of nutritional desire and even pleasure that resembles the views Aëtius attributes to Empedocles. The Hippocratic author, probably Hippocrates’ son-in-law Polybus, relates desire and pleasure to his conception of physical health as equilibrium of the humors:

46 ‘The manner in which the parts grow at the expense of blood and indeed the whole question of nutrition will find a more suitable place for exposition in τοῖς περὶ γενεσίων καὶ ἐν ἐρέσι.’
48 D.L. 5, 59. Cf. Aristotle’s statement at GA 784b2: ‘We must speak further of this explanation ἐν τοῖς ἐπὶ αὐθεντικοι καὶ τοιούτοι.’
49 None is included in Fritz Wehrli’s edition, Straton von Lampsakos (Basle, 1950).
50 Dioscorides, De materia medica 5, 10, 4 attests that Strato held that disease arises from an excess of nourishment. But it is questionable whether this reference derives from Strato’s On Nourishment and Growth.

In his commentary, Iain Lonie suggests that ‘the author is simply giving his own physiological form to a theory of pleasure and pain which’ so far as we know . . . was first expressed by Empedocles.’52 However, in support of the association of the Hippocratic claims with Empedocles, Lonie cites Aëtius’ opinion at 5.28. Obviously, it would be question-begging for us to endorse Lonie’s claim. Consequently, we should say that the Hippocratic passage contains significant correspondences with Aëtius’ opinion at 5.28. Thus, I appeal to these correspondences only in support of the speculation that Aëtius’ discussion of nutritional desire may derive from a medical doxographical tradition.53

In considering the medical doxographical tradition upon which Aëtius might have depended, a good first guess is Meno’s Medical Collection (Iatriciāς συγγεγραμμένα).54 An immediate objection is that most of the doctors to whom Aëtius attributes opinions are contemporaneous with or post-date Meno’s collection,55 and this might tell against Aëtius’ use of Meno’s collection more generally. However,

53 Lonie, Hippocratic, 298.
54 Cf. the Hippocratic explanation of appetite in L. Garofalo (ed.), Anonymī medicī de morbis acutis et chronīmis, trans. B. Fuchs (Leiden, 1997), § 11. P van der Eijk, Dioscorides of Neapolis (Boston, 2000), ii, 70, suggests that the author’s reference to Hippocrates alludes to the spurious Acut. 54, but I see nothing there to confirm this.
55 It has been suggested that Meno’s collection focused on pathological rather than physiological conditions such as healthy appetites and digestive processes (D. Manetti, “Aristotle” and the Role of Doxography in the Anonymous Londinensis (Petrīkov Inv. 137), in van der Eijk (ed.), Medical, 65–141). If so, Meno’s collection could not be Aëtius’ source. But the view that Meno’s collection discussed only pathological conditions lacks justification. The testimonies pertaining to Meno’s collection, assembled in W. H. S. Jones, The Medical Writings of Anonymous Londinensis (Cambridge, 1947), 5–6, reveal almost nothing about the contents.
56 Runia, ‘Placita’, ref.?.
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the authorities whose opinions on nourishment and growth and on desire and pleasure Aëtius cites, namely Parmenides, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, are all Presocratic. Thus, the speculation that Aëtius used Meno for these opinions remains viable.10

In sum, on the basis of the Greek tradition of the doxographical material alone, we can do no better than speculate on Aëtius' source for the Empedoclean opinion on appetite. Yet with respect to both the medical and the non-medical doxographical traditions, the evidence points towards the Peripatos.

I.7. Ibn Lūqā and pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5. 28

Fortunately, our quest for the source of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite need not end in speculative obscurity. Arabic sources illuminate the Greek doxographical tradition. We shall approach these by way of pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita 5. 28. In Section I.1 I mentioned that in that passage, which is devoted to the question ‘Whence in animals are desires and pleasures derived?’, only one opinion, Empedocles, has survived in the Greek tradition. I presented an English translation of the opinion based on Diels’ presentation of the Greek in Fragmenta. The first part of the opinion, on Empedocles on desire, is unproblematic: ‘Empedocles (says that) desires occur in animals according to their deficiencies in those elements that complete each one.’11 I rendered the second part, on pleasure and pain, as: ‘And pleasures come from what is congenial according to the blends of related and like (elements), while disturbances and (pains from what is uncongenial).’ This rendition is based on the following Greek of Diels' Fragmenta:

(D) τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐξ οἰκεῖων κατὰ τὰς τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ ὁμοίων κράσεις, τὰς δὲ ἀθλήσεις καὶ τὰς (ἀληθῶν καὶ άνωκείων).

As Diels indicates, the Greek manuscripts break off after κατὰ τὰς. However, Diels’ presentation in Fragmenta is misleading because problems in the Greek manuscripts begin immediately after τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς. The manuscripts actually read:

98 Several other medical treatments of nourishment pre-date Aëtius and could have contained doxographical material on nutrition and desire. Cf. the fragments of Phylotimus' On Nourishment, in E. Steckel (ed.), The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cor and his School (Leiden, 1928), 109–20, and the so-called physiological section in the Anonymous Londinensis, esp. § 22 ff.

(E) τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐξ ἑγραύοντα καὶ τὰς τῶν κυθῶν καὶ ὁμοίων κυήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἀθλήσεις καὶ τὰς .

In Doxographi Graeci, Diels inserts a cruux after τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐξ and claims: ‘corrupta archetypo oblitterato viis restituui possunt’ (Dox. 440). Diels then offers the emendation and supplementation of (E) that yields (D). When Diels published Fragmenta in 1903, he reproduced his rendition of pseudo-Plutarch’s opinion from Doxographi Graeci, but failed to acknowledge that the corruption of the text begins immediately after τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐξ. Thus, Fragmenta gives the false impression that oικεῖον κατὰ τὰς τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ ὁμοίων κράσεις conforms to the manuscript tradition.

It would be misleading to say that most scholars have agreed with Diels’ assessment that (E) is corrupt and that they have followed Diels’ reconstruction—but only because (E) or (D) is not treated in most works on Empedocles. Among those who do treat (E) or (D), Bollack is exceptional. Bollack acknowledges that (E) is incomplete, but he maintains that it is not otherwise corrupt. Thus, he criticizes Diels: ‘La phrase [(E)] n’est malheureusement pas achevée dans les manuscrits. On a platement corrigé ce précieux témoignage . . . ’12 Bollack retains the text of (E) and suggests adding a phrase such as ἐκ πυρῶν after τὰς δὲ ἀθλήσεις to correspond to the function of ἑπραύον in the first clause;13 viz.:

tὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐξ ἑγραύον καὶ τὰς τῶν κυθῶν καὶ ὁμοίων κυήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἀθλήσεις (ἐκ πυρῶν) καὶ τὰς . . .

10 The text stops after κατὰ τὰς. On this Diels, Dox. 440 n. 21, writes: ‘spatium sesquialterius versus relinquunt BC’.


12 Empédocle (Paris, 1965), iii. 469.

13 I shall clarify the function of these phrases shortly.
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But while Bollack’s effort to preserve the manuscript reading is admirable, on grounds of both grammar and content his interpretation cannot be accepted. On Bollack’s interpretation, τὰς δὲ ἵδιας εἰς ὑγροῦ is an independent clause. Some verb must therefore be understood, e.g. γίνεσθαι; viz. τὰς ἵδιας εἰς ὑγροῦ γίνεσθαι. The phrase εἰς ὑγροῦ is familiar enough among the doxographical literature; it occurs elsewhere in the Placita and in Stobaeus as well as in Diogenes Laertius and Hippolytus. In all cases it appears to have an Aristotelian pedigree. Pseudo-Plutarch reports that ‘Thales maintains that all things have their origin εἰς ὑγροῦ.’ Similarly, Hippolytus reports of Hippo of Rhegium that soul comes into being εἰς ὑγροῦ. The phrase εἰς ὑγροῦ is used in these cases to describe water or moisture as the source from which all things or soul are derived. But this is clearly not the sense in which on Bollack’s interpretation the phrase is used in the clause τὰς ἵδιας εἰς ὑγροῦ (γίνεσθαι). Rather, on this interpretation—and despite Bollack’s own translation ‘à partir de’—Empedocles is said to hold that pleasures arise out of water, in the sense that pleasures follow the replacement of the cold of water by the heat of fire. Surely, this is an extraordinary amount of information to pack into the phrase εἰς ὑγροῦ.

On top of all this work to make sense of εἰς ὑγροῦ, it is jarring to have to take τὰς τῶν κυδόνων καὶ ὁμοίων κύκλωσις as an accusative of respect syntactically parallel to εἰς ὑγροῦ. Furthermore, κύκλωσις is an exceedingly vague word for the idea that Bollack reads in the text. By ‘movements of dangers and the like’ we are supposed to understand ‘actions in which dangers and the like are overcome’. But can κύκλωσις possibly be used with the genitive of separation to convey Bollack’s idea? A search on TLG reveals that in fact there is no other instance of the phrase ἦ τοῦ κυδόνων κύκλωσις in extant Greek literature through the sixth century AD. Consequently, either we force an extraordinary interpretation out of a syntactically strained text or we admit that the text is corrupt. I maintain with Diels that the text is corrupt.

In viewing (E) as corrupt, Diels agreed with his predecessors

Bollack translates:

Quant aux plaisirs, ils se produisent à partir de l’humide, de même que les transports qu’on éprouve dans les situations périlleuses et pour des causes du même genre, quant aux tristesses et aux . . . (Empédocle, ii. 202)

This approach is attractive because it leaves the text intact and attributes a prima facie plausible conception of pleasure to Empedocles. Bollack explains:

εἰς ὑγροῦ: de l’eau ou du froid. Ce froid règne dans l’état précédant le plaisir (cf. εἰς). La corps demande alors un supplément de chaleur: le ‘même’ qu’il n’a pas . . . (Quant aux ‘situations périlleuses’) il s’agit sans doute de l’exaltation guerrière surmontant un sentiment de crainte: l’échauffement, pareil à celui du plaisir, succède alors au froid. Les sentiments belliqueux sont assimilés à des plaisirs dans cette classification homérique. (Empédocle, iii. 468)

Thus, Bollack suggests that (E) is valuable because it reveals that Empedocles’ poem contained ‘une étude des passions (et des apathies)’ In other words, the report refers not simply to sensations of pleasure and pain, but to emotions of joy and grief. Regarding the concept of grief specifically, Bollack emphasizes that the word in (E) is χαλασμός, not ἀθάνατος or λύπα.

In support of his interpretation, Bollack appeals to Empedocles’ fragment B 21. 3–5: ‘the sun, bright to look on and hot in every respect, and the immortals which are drenched in heat and shining light, and rain, in all things dark and cold’. But this is feeble support. The relation between the content of B 21. 3–5 and Bollack’s interpretation of (E) is obscure. Bollack might have found stronger support for his interpretation of (E) in DK 31 A 85:

Empedocles says that sleep occurs by a moderate cooling of the heat in the blood, and death by a total cooling . . . Empedocles says that death is a separation of the fiery from things whose combination was compounded for man . . . And sleep occurs by a separation of the fiery. (Aetius 5. 24. 2; 5. 25–4)

This testimony, at least, associates vitality with heat and its opposite with cold. Given this, Bollack might find support for the view that Empedocles associated vitality with pleasure and morbidity with pain.

** Empédocle, iii. 468–9.
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Gottlob Schneider and Simon Karsten. In a comment on his edition of Theophrastus’ works, published in 1818–21, Schneider writes of (E): ‘ubi verba disiecta et defecta sensu ex hoc loco restitutae aliquatentus liebent: tás de ἡδονὰς διὰ τᾶς τῶν ὁμοίων κινήσεως, τάς δ’ ὀχλήσεις διὰ τᾶς τῶν ἐναυσίων.' In his Philosophorum Graecorum reliqua, published in 1838, Karsten cites the lines from pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita up to tás de ἡδονὰς and writes: ‘sed quae sequuntur, ut prorsus corrumpit, ommo.’ Then in a subsequent footnote Karsten offers his own tentative emendation and supplement: tás de ἡδονᾶς εξεχειρέθηκα κατά τᾶς τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ ὁμοίων κινήσεως, τάς δ’ ὀχλήσεις καὶ τάς ἀληθῶς τοῖς ἐναυσίως. In short, Diels’ rendition of (E) as (D) does not report the gospel truth, only an interpretation of it. This misleading impression can easily be rectified by re-editing to indicate that Diels emended and supplemented the text from tás de ἡδονὰς εξ. But still, it is questionable how (E) should be reconstructed.

In justifying his rendition of (E) over those of Schneider and Karsten, Diels, in Doxographi Graeci, writes: ‘propius a traditio abesse haec: . . .’ (p. 440), and he refers to the passage from Stobaeus i. 50. 31:

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τάς ἡδονὰς γινέσθαι τοῖς μὲν ὁμοίως τῶν ὁμοίων, κατά δὲ τὸ ἔλεησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀναλήψιν, ὅτε τῷ ἔλεησιν ἢ δρέξιν τοῦ ὁμοίου. τὰς δ’ ἀληθῶς τοῖς ἐναυσίως: [?] ἀλληλοῦθεν γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα ὧν διαφέρει κατὰ τὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ τὴν τῶν στοιχείων κράσιν.

Granting Diels that Aéticus is the common source of Stobaeus and pseudo-Plutarch, if Stobaeus is to be the basis of a reconstruction of (E), presumably we should adhere even more closely to Stobaeus. For example, we might reconstruct (E) as:

(S) tás de ἡδονὰς γινέσθαι κατά τὰς τῶν ὁμοίων συγκρίσεως καὶ κράσεως, τάς δὲ ὀχλήσεις κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἐναυσίων (συγκρίσεως καὶ κράσεως).

But further light is thrown on the reconstruction of (E) from another piece of evidence, unavailable to Diels and unknown to more recent editors of Empedocles. In his book-list al-Führst, composed in ad 978, ibn an-Nadim, a bookseller from Baghdad, mentions Quṣṭā ibn Lūqā as a translator of pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita. Ibn Lūqā (d. ad 912) was a Christian doctor, philosopher, and astronomer originally from Bavbek in Syria, with command of Arabic and Greek. During his stay in Baghdad, he translated into Arabic Greek texts he had acquired in Asia Minor. Copies of ibn Lūqā’s Arabic translation of pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita came to light only in the thirties, forties, and fifties of the twentieth century. In 1980 Hans Daiber published an edition of ibn Lūqā’s Placita with facing German translation.

Our earliest Greek manuscripts for pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita are centuries later than the text ibn Lūqā used: A = Par. 1671, AD 1296; E = Par. 1672, shortly after AD 1302; F = Par. 1957, s. xi; and M = Mosqu. 501, s. xii. In their discussion of the tradition of pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita, Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia conclude that the source of ibn Lūqā’s translation ‘cannot be reduced to any other of our texts, whether in direct or indirect tradition . . .’. Indeed, ibn Lūqā’s source diverges from the rest of the Greek manuscript tradition in numerous noteworthy ways.

Regarding Placita 5. 28 and specifically (E), ibn Lūqā’s text reads:

ammā l-ladhdhātī fa-inmahā mina l-rutibati min kahābī ahtariyatī l-mutahābīhati fid-jins, wa-ammā l-adhdī fa-mīn qibali l-aškyā’ī l-muhālāfatī fid-l-amsī wa-l-mulāqātī.

As for pleasures, they come from moisture due to movements of growth that are similar in genus. As for pain, it arises due to opposite things coming into contact and mixing.

In contrast to the Greek manuscript tradition, in the Arabic translation the second clause, on pain, is complete. Moreover, the Arabic corresponds almost exactly with our reconstruction (S) based on Stobaeus: tās de ὀχλήσεις κατά τὰς τῶν ἐναυσίων συγκρίσεως καὶ κράσεως.

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* This information derives from Daiber, Arabus, 5–6.
* Aětiana, 161.
* Cf. ibid. 156–60.
* There is one trivial difference: the Arabic word for ‘pain’, l-adhdī, is singular, whereas the Greek is plural, tās ὀχλήσεις.
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The first clause, however, is more problematic. First, it contains a grammatical ambiguity. The Arabic word for ‘similar’, mutashābihati, can modify either the word for ‘movements’, harakāti, or the word for ‘growth’, 1-tarbiyati. This is the case even though harakāti is plural and 1-tarbiyati is singular. My translation preserves this ambiguity. Second, the Arabic version conforms with the Greek manuscript tradition’s readings of ἕξ ὑγραὶ καὶ κυνῆες. Third, the Arabic version contains nothing corresponding to τῶν κυνῶν in the Greek manuscript tradition. Rather, the Arabic version has 1-tarbiyati (corresponding to the Greek τῆς αὐξήσεως), which has no equivalent in the Greek manuscript tradition. Fourth, the Greek manuscript tradition’s ὁμοῖοι does not agree with the Arabic mutashābihati because, as we have said, mutashābihati modifies either harakāti or 1-tarbiyati; however, ὁμοῖοι and κυνῆεις are in two different cases, and ὁμοῖοι does not agree with τῆς αὐξήσεως in number. Fifth, the Greek also has two conjunctions καὶ . . . καὶ . . . , which correspond to nothing in the Arabic version. In the light of these five points, the Greek manuscript from which Ibn Lūqā worked must have looked very close to the following:

(A) τὰς δὲ ἰδονάς ἕξ ὑγραἰ κατὰ τὰς τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν ὁμοῖων κυνῆες, τὰς δὲ χνάρας κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀνατίων συγκρίσεις καὶ κράσεις.70

Let us now compare the problematic sections in the first clauses of (E), (S), and (A):

(E1) ἕξ ὑγραὶ καὶ τὰς τῶν κυνῶν καὶ ὁμοῖοι κυνῆες

(S1) γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν ὁμοῖων συγκρίσεις καὶ κράσεις

(A1) ἕξ ὑγραὶ κατὰ τὰς τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν ὁμοῖων κυνῆες

Comparison suggests the following points. First, γίνεσθαι should be left implicit. Second, κατὰ, rather than the first καὶ in (E1), is correct. Third, τῶν κυνῶν in (E1) is corrupt. I suggest συγκρίσεις instead. Fourth, the presence of τῆς αὐξήσεως in (A1) may be conceptually relevant to the remaining content—certainly more than τῶν κυνῶν—but its role in (A1) is still unclear. Fifth, κυνῆεις may be a corruption of κράσεις or vice versa. Sixth, (A1) corroborates the presence of ἕξ ὑγραὶ in (E1), but ἕξ ὑγραὶ remains puzzling.

70 Perhaps because ibn Lūqā could not make sense of the genitive phrase τῶν ὁμοῖων in relation to τῆς αὐξήσεως and τὰς κυνῆες, he translated it with deliberate ambiguity, capable of modifying either harakāti or 1-tarbiyati.

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Evidently, these considerations alone do not clarify how we should reconstruct the archetype of the Empedoclean opinion on pleasure in pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita 5. 28. But further help comes from considering the broader context of Placita 5. 28 and ibn Lūqā’s translation of material in that broader context.

I.8. Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on appetite as botanical appetite

Recall how pseudo-Plutarch’s report at 5. 28 begins:

Empedocles says desires occur τοῖς ζῴοις according to their deficiencies in those elements that complete each one.

Compare this with Stobæus:

Empedocles says that like things . . . (aim at) a refilling in accordance with the deficiency. Consequently, desire is for that which is like because of that which is lacking.

One difference between pseudo-Plutarch’s and Stobæus’ formulations is that pseudo-Plutarch speaks of desires occurring τοῖς ζῴοις, whereas Stobæus does not identify the subjects of desire; Stobæus merely speaks of like things (τοῖς ὁμοίοις). This raises the question whether Aëtius’ opinion referred specifically to ζῷα or rather to a broader set of entities. In particular, up to this point I have translated τοῖς ζῴοις as ‘animals’,71 but is this what τὰ ζῷα means here? Could τὰ ζῷα be used here more broadly to mean ‘living things’?

The Peripatetic treatise On Plants reports: ‘Anaxagoras and Empedocles say that plants are moved by desire [ἐπιθυμία] and that they also experience perception and feel pain [ἐπιστήμην] and pleasure [ἴδεσθαι]’ (815.15–18). Indeed, the Peripatetic author reports: ‘Anaxagoras and Democritus and Empedocles have said that plants possess mind [νοῦς] and understanding [γνώσεις]’ (815.16–17). Compare these testimonies with Timaeus’ position in Plato’s eponymous dialogue.72 Timaeus rejects the attribution to plants of belief (βλέπει), reasoning (λογισμός), and mind (νοῦς), but he too maintains that plants partake of ‘pleasant and painful perceptions’ as well as

71 Likewise in the question ἔθεα ἄι ὀφθέα γινόμενα τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ἱδιοῖς;
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Desires (ἐνδυνάμεια) (77 B 5–6). Furthermore, Timaeus deliberately refers to plants as ζωή on the ground that anything that ‘partakes of life’ (τοι ἀνείφη) is entitled to be called a ζωή (77 B 1–3).

Plato’s conception of plants as ζωή follows a number of other Presocratics. In contrast, in On the Soul Aristotle argues, against his predecessors, that plants lack the capacity for perception, let alone cognition (424a32–b3). Thus, as we move from the Presocratics to Aristotle, the set of entities that count as ζωή shrinks and the psychological functions attributed to plants are reduced. If, then, Aëtius’ opinions are based on Peripatetic sources, if those sources follow Aristotle in denying perception and so on to plants, and finally if pseudo-Plutarch’s identification of the subjects of desire with animals correctly represents Aëtius’ opinion, then we can conclude that Aëtius’ opinion expressly concerned desire in animals and not plants. Indeed, this conclusion seems to be confirmed by the content of Aëtius’ Placita 5. 26, which fall under the rubric ‘How plants grow and whether they are animals [πῶς γειτηθεὶς τὰ φυτὰ καὶ εἰ ζωή]’. The fact that Aëtius poses the question in this way indicates that he takes ζωή to mean ‘animal’.

Yet in the case of Empedocles’ opinions on desire and plants in ζωή at Placita 5. 28, the question remains complicated. Pseudo-Plutarch’s chapter 5. 26, devoted to the questions how plants grow and whether they are ζωή, begins with the claim that Plato and Thales regard plants as ἐμφυάζει ζωή, whereas although Aristotle regards plants as ἐμφυάζει, he denies that they are ζωή. Pseudo-Plutarch, then, proceeds to give a lengthy account of Empedoclean opinions, beginning with the claim: ‘Empedocles says that trees were the first ζωή to grow up from the earth.’ This at least permits the interpretation that the Empedoclean opinion on desire and

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pleasure at 5. 28 includes plants. In fact, I want to argue for the stronger claim that Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion at 5. 28 specifically concerns desire and pleasure in plants and that Aëtius derived the opinion from doxographical material on plants—regardless of whether Aëtius employs the opinion within a chapter on the question of the source of desire and pleasure in animals.

Aëtius’ Placita 5. 27 concerns nourishment and growth; the rubric at pseudo-Plutarch 5. 27 is Περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αὔξησεως. Observe that this rubric does not specify the subjects of growth and nourishment. In the Greek manuscript tradition of pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita, 5. 27 contains an Empedoclean opinion on nourishment and growth and then begins with one from Anaxagoras, Ἀναξαγόρας τρέφεσθαι μὲν... At this point the manuscript breaks off. The passage runs as follows:

Ἐμπεδόκλης τρέφεσθαι μὲν τὰ ζωή διὰ τὴν ἐντόσοιν τοῦ οίκειου, αὐξιότα τε δὲ τῷ παρωνάσι τοῦ ζωητικοῦ, μείναθαι δὲ καὶ φθονέω διὰ τὴν ἐκάλεσιν ἐκατέρων τοῦ δὲ νὰ ἀριθμούσι τοῖς πρῶτοι συμβασιλεύοντες ἄρασιν ἐκείνοις. Ἀναξαγόρας τρέφεσθαι μὲν... (Diels, Dox. 440)

[i] Empedocles (says that) τὰ ζωή are nourished through the settling down of that which is akin [τοῦ οἴκειου] and that they grow through the presence of heat; they diminish and perish [μείναθαι καὶ φθονέω] through the lack of each one [ἐκάλεσιν ἐκατέρων]. [ii] But humans of today in comparison with the first humans have the form of newborns. [iii] Anaxagoras (says that) ... are nourished...

Ibn Lūqā’s text differs from that of the Greek manuscript tradition in several respects. First, ibn Lūqā begins with the Anaxagorean opinion [iii] and completes it:

Anaxagoras believed that animals (δεινομάνθη) are nourished from moisture (μεθαμφατικαῖς) which each of their organs draws in during feeding and

and plants [ὡς ζωή καὶ τῶν φυτῶν] did not still consist of whole-natured forms... (Diels, Dox. 430; likewise ibn Lūqā, on which see Daiber, Aphor. 334–35).

Diels, Dox. 440, represents the rubric at Stob. 1. 46 as Περὶ τροφῆς. In Phothis’ catalogue in Wachsmuth and Hense, Anthologia, 5. 5, it is listed as Περὶ τροφῆς καὶ δηρέως. Evidently, Stobaeus conjoined opinions on nourishment (as well as growth) and desire.

The Greek word ἐντόσοιν refers to the process by which the elements of foods, disintegrated through digestion, are distributed to the appropriate organs or parts of the body.

40 I have added roman numerals to facilitate exegesis.
Considering these claims in conjunction with the opinion at 5.27, we can infer that plants grow vertically through the absorption of heat, derived from fire, and that they are nourished by moisture, derived from water. These inferences conform with Ibn Lūqa’s presentation of the Empedoclean opinions in 5.27 that “τὰ ζωὰ are nourished through the settling down of moisture [τοῦ ὠροῦ]“ and that they grow through the presence of heat”. This conclusion, in turn, supports the conclusion that the Empedoclean opinion on nourishment and growth at 5.27 pertains to plants.  

Consequently, I suggest that we can make the following sense of the opinion at 5.28. First, in view of the comparison of (E1), (S1), and (A1) from the preceding section, now considered in conjunction with our discussion of the broader context of pseudo-Plutarch in the Greek and Arabic traditions, we should render the clause pertaining to pleasure at 5.28 as:


The phrase ‘each one’ (ἐκατέρων) can now be seen to refer to moisture and heat respectively. On this reading, moisture is responsible for nourishment in the sense of increase of bulk, while heat is responsible for vertical growth. The phrase ‘each one’—that is, moisture and heat (rather than that which is akin and heat)—further confirms that ὠροῦ is the correct reading.

As we have seen, pseudo-Plutarch 5.26 concerns the generation of plants and whether they are animals. A long Empedoclean opinion on this subject includes the following claims:

... Trees grow by being raised out by the heat in the earth... Fruits are excesses of water and fire in the plants. Those (plants) that are deficient in moisture because it is evaporated by heat in summer drop their leaves... Differences in flavors come from variations in the earth and seasons and from the plants drawing in different homoeometries from their source of nourishment...

11 I am providing an English translation of Dacier’s German (Arabus, 245): “Αναξαγόρας glaubte die Lebewesen werden durch die Feuchtigkeit ernährt, welche jedes seiner Organ durch das Verziehen und in der Ernährung heizt. Sie wachsen, wenn zu ihnen viel Nahrung gelangt, werden aber schwach und siehnen dahin, wenn das was von ihnen zehrte viel ist.” Thus—I note in passing—Ibn Lūqa provides a new Anaxagorean testimony. This is noted by Dacier, Arabus, 515, but the passage is not included in, for instance, Patricia Curd’s recent edition, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia (Toronto, 2007).

12 I discuss [ii] separately at the end of this section.

13 Dacier, Arabus, 245, translates: ‘Empedokles glaubte, daß die Ernährung durch die Besenheit und das Bleiben der Feuchtigkeit (möglich) ist...”

14 Not τοῦ ὠλείου as the Greek tradition has it.

15 Of course, the doxographical tradition could have viewed Empedocles’ opinion on growth and nourishment as pertaining to animals as well as plants, so long as the tradition admitted the reasonable point that blood is the moisture in animals analogous to water in plants. Thus, τὰ ζωὰ in 5.27 could be read to include plants and animals. But while this may be, the evidence for Empedocles’ view of the role of heat and moisture in growth and nutrition derives from the opinion on plants, not animals.

16 I temporarily postpone rendering the final clause on pain.
replenishment of moisture, which pleasure accompanies, occurs (in some unspecified way) in accordance with the process of growth. Perhaps this can be taken to mean that when plants absorb moisture, they do not merely increase in bulk, but their increase in bulk conforms to their vertical growth.

Let us now consider the rendition of the last clause of 5. 28 on pain. Ibn Lügā’s Greek text probably read: τὰς δὲ ὀξύλας κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων συγκράσεις καὶ χρώσεις. This is similar to the final clause at Stobaeus 1. 50. 31:

(τὰς δ’ ἀνηρίδιας τοῖς ἐναντίοις [τὰς δὲ ὀξύλας] κατὰ τὰς συγκράσεις καὶ τὰς τῶν στοιχείων χρώσεις.)

Thus, pseudo-Plutarch’s Empedoclean opinion on pain might be rendered in English as: ‘pains come from the blending and mixing of opposite elements’. But if this is approximately correct, it is also problematic in the light of our preceding conclusion regarding the opinion on pleasure; for if pleasure arises not only from the blending of like elements, but from moisture in accordance with movements of growth, then one would expect some correlative point about pain: for example, pain arises from the blending of opposite elements, but also from lack of moisture or movements antithetical to growth. One explanation of this problem is that pseudo-Plutarch’s Empedoclean opinion on pain is abbreviated. Indeed, pseudo-Plutarch generally abbreviates Aetius. If so, however, then Stobaeus’ report must also be abbreviated. This is, at least, consistent with Mansfeld and Runia’s general conclusions regarding Stobaeus’ method of excerpting. But since Stobaeus’ and ibn Lügā’s formulations of the Empedoclean opinion on pain are nearly identical, there should be a more reasonable explanation for why the opinion on pain does not precisely correlate with the opinion on pleasure.

A second explanation derives from the view, defended in Section 1.2, that Aetius himself was responsible for combining Empedoclean opinions on desire, on the one hand, and pleasure and pain, on the other. In doing so, Aetius seems to have been under the influence of a familiar conception of pleasure related to desire-satisfaction. As we have seen, the Empedoclean opinion identifies desire as arising from a lack and pleasure as accompanying the remedy of the lack. The desire-satisfaction conception of pleasure is relatively easy to square with a conception of pleasure based on the blending of like elements, since the remedying of a lack can be understood as supplying a deficient elemental portion with a replenishing homogeneous elemental portion. But the desire-satisfaction conception of pleasure squares less easily with a correlative conception of pain based on the blending of opposite elements. In this case, pain is understood to arise when, following desire, an elemental supply of one kind mixes with a deficient elemental portion of a heterogeneous kind. However, this conception does not explain the pain of lack itself, assuming, as the desire-satisfaction model typically does, that pain arises precisely from a lack. Consequently, the failure of precise correlation between pseudo-Plutarch’s, and thus Aetius’, Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and on pain may reflect an inherent difficulty in Aetius’ combination of opinions on desire, on the one hand, and on pleasure and pain, on the other.

We now have good reason to believe that the Empedoclean opinion on desire at Aetius’ Placita 5. 28 concerns botanical appetite, regardless of whether the opinion was put to use to explain appetite in animals as well as plants. However, we still have not identified the source of this Empedoclean opinion. The main purpose of this section has been to show that the Empedoclean opinion on desire essentially concerns botanical desire and to emphasize the role of the Arabic tradition in illuminating this point. In the following Section 1.9 I suggest the identity of the source of Aetius’ Empedoclean opinion on desire. Before we turn to that discussion, however, one outstanding issue concerning pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita 5. 27 deserves consideration.

Recall [ii] from pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita 5. 27: ‘But humans of today in comparison with the first humans have the form of newborns.’ We have noted that in the Greek tradition, [ii] follows the Empedoclean opinion on nourishment and growth [i]; however, in ibn Lügā’s translation [ii] follows the Anaxagorean opinion on nourishment and growth [iii]. Two questions, thus, present themselves. First, to whom does [ii] belong? And second, does the fact that [ii] concerns humans not complicate, if not undermine, the argument that the Empedoclean opinion [i] at Placita 5. 27 concerns botanical nourishment and growth?

The contents of [ii] are not consistent with any of the testimonies.

**Notes:**

88 Aetiana, 170, item (3).
or fragments of Empedocles or Anaxagoras. Thus, it seems likely that [ii] belongs to another philosopher and that indeed it is misplaced in both the Greek and Arabic traditions. The most likely candidate as the proponent of [ii] is Anaximander, for testimonies attribute to him the opinion that the first humans emerged fully formed from fish or fish-like creatures, accordingly, in comparison with the first humans, humans of today would look like new-born. At pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.19, whose rubric is 'Concerning the generation of animals, how animals were generated and whether they are destructible', the Anaximanderian testimony is described of the first land animals (ζώα), not humans specifically; however, in Censorinus and Plutarch it is described of humans. Since, most likely, [ii] is not an opinion of Empedocles or Anaxagoras and does not belong at Placita 5.27, it should not further complicate our argument that the Empedoclean opinion on nourishment and growth at 5.27, that is [i], concerns plants. Consequently, I now turn to the source of Aristotle's Empedoclean opinions on botany.

1.9. Aristotle’s On Plants and Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on botanical appetite

A work On Plants in two books is listed in Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue of Aristotle’s writings (5.25). Alexander says that the work was lost,25 thus lost, at least to Alexander and his circle, by the late second century AD. Aristotle himself refers to such a work nine times, sometimes obliquely, sometimes directly.26 Fragments from the work compiled by Rose are negligible. However, as H.J.

Unfortunately, it is not discussed in David Sedley's Creators of Creation and its Critics (Berkeley, 2007).

Censorinus, De die nat. 4.7; Plut. Quaest. comp. 730 b–c; cf. [Plut. 5.19.

It is also possible that [ii] derives from a lost Anaximanderian opinion from Placita 5.21, 22, or 23, whose rubrics are 'At what time are animals formed in the womb?'. From what elements are our specific parts composed?', and 'When does a human being reach maturity?' respectively.


De met. 1397a5; 332a20; Som. 442b25; De long. v. 469b4 (direct reference); De oun. 458c31; HA 539c20 (direct reference); GA 716b5, 731c29, 783c20. I owe these references to Drossaert Luolos and Poortman, Plants, 14 n. 1, however, their reference to PA 650e2c does not seem to me a good one.

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Drossaert Luolos has argued, fragments from Aristotle’s On Plants can be gleaned from the Aristotelian On Plants.95 The treatise On Plants in the Aristotelian corpus has an extraordinary pedigree, it is a thirteenth-century Greek translation, perhaps by Maximus Planudes,66 of a late twelfth- or early thirteenth-century Latin translation, by Alfred of Sarazael,67 of an Arabic translation made some time before the ninth century, by šīhāq ibn Hūnas,68 of a Syriac translation of uncertain date or authorship, of a lost Greek original by the Peripatetic Nicolaus of Damascus, who lived during the Augustan age and thus composed the work in the late first century BC or early first century AD. Since the Syriac translation survives only in fragments,69 the Arabic translation, as Drossaert Luolos says, 'ought to be regarded as the central text on which all others depend'.70 The Arabic translation gives the following title: 'The Treatise on Plants by Aristotle: An Adaptation of Nicolaus'. Indeed, as Drossaert Luolos has argued, Nicolaus’ work is an adaptation of Aristotle’s On Plants, which also heavily depends on Theophrastus’ botanical works.71

For our purposes, the most significant passages of the Syriac–Arabic–Latin–Greek work are the doxographical ones, which occur at the beginning of book 1. Nicolaus refers to botanical opinions of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato.10 While Theophrastus occasionally cites the botanical opinions of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato in his own botanical works,11 none of the botanical opinions attributed to these pre-

Drossaert Luolos, Plants; Drossaert Luolos and Poortman, Plants.

Cf. Drossaert Luolos and Poortman, Plants, 56, where Drossaert Luolos alternatively suggests 957–8 Planudes’ contemporary Manuel Holothulos.

On Alfred’s dates see ibid. 470–3.


Drossaert Luolos and Poortman, Plants, 17–47.

In addition, we have a Hebrew translation from the Arabic made in 1314 by Š alām b. Š alom, a Hebrew epigraph, and an anonymous Hebrew commentary on §§1–53, on which see ibid. 147–86.

Drossaert Luolos, 'Plants', 77, indicates a number of borrowings from Theophrastus’ Historia plantarum.

In the Syriac fragments, see Drossaert Luolos and Poortman, Plants, 56, 68, 70: in the Arabic, see 146, 148a, 14, 140, and (cf. 218a, 220); in the Hebrew, see 390, 448, 450, 454; in the Latin, see 517, 518.

Empedocles at CP 1.7.1, 1.2, 1.12, 5.6, 1.13, 2.3, 1.21, 5.8, 1.24, 2.6; Anaxagoras at HP 3.1.4, CP 1.5.2.6; Democritus at CP 1.8.2.2, 1.11.7; Plato at CP 6.1.4.2.
Aristotelian theorists in Nicolaus' *On Plants* derives from Theophrastus. This strongly suggests that this doxographical material from Nicolaus' *On Plants* derives from Aristotle's *On Plants*. In particular, Nicolaus refers to the views of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato on the psychological capacities of plants. We cited several of these above. In brief, Empedocles and Anaxagoras are said to maintain that plants have perception and experience pleasure and pain. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus maintain that plants have reason and understanding. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Plato attribute desire to plants. And Anaxagoras maintains that plants are animals. These opinions are then contrasted with the Aristotelian view that plants do not have these higher psychological capacities. Thus, it appears that one of the topics Aristotle discussed in *On Plants* was the range of psychological capacities of plants, and it appears that, presumably early in book 1, Aristotle discussed and criticized the views of his predecessors Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato on the subject. This well conforms to Aristotle's doxographical habits in his surviving works.

Finally, one doxographical passage in Nicolaus' *On Plants*, which I assume derives from Aristotle's *On Plants*, is paralleled in Aëtius 5. 26. The Empedoclean opinion at Aëtius 5. 26 begins: 'Empedocles says that trees were the first ζύτα to grow up from the earth, before the sun was unfolded around it and before night and day were separated.' The Arabic translation of Nicolaus' *On Plants* reports: 'the statement of Empedocles is excellent, namely that plants were generated when the world was incomplete'.

In the Arabic in Drossaert Lulofs and Poortman, *Plants*, 127; cf. the Hebrew commentary at p. 448. In the Latin, the nonsensical name 'Abrucalis' occurs where 'Empedocles' should (p. 517; on this see p. 493). In the Syriac fragment (p. 71) only pleasure and pain are mentioned and the opinion is attributed only to Anaxagoras.

In the Arabic, p. 129; likewise in the Syriac, p. 69, and Latin, p. 518. In the Arabic, pp. 127, 129; likewise in the Latin, p. 517; only Plato in the Syriac, p. 217.

In the Arabic, pp. 127, likewise in the Syriac, p. 71, and Hebrew commentary, p. 448, and Latin, p. 517.

P. 220; in the Hebrew (p. 322) the author of the statement is unspecified; in the Latin it is, again, 'Abrucalis' (p. 528). Drossaert Lulofs and Poortman note (p. 519): 'The statement ascribed to Empedocles is similar to the quotation (or rather paraphrase) in Aëtius Dox. 5. 26. 6.' Compare also the following two passages. In L. Lüqi's translation of Anaxagoras' opinion on nourishment at Placita 5. 27 runs: 'Anaxagoras believed that animals are nourished from moisture which each of their organs draws in during feeding and nourishing. They grow when they acquire a lot of nourishment, but become weak and infirm when they lose a lot.' Nicolaus reports (p. 125): 'Anaxagoras naively asserts that plants are animals and that they feel joy and sadness, and he cites as proof the shedding of their leaves in due season.' The affinities I see in these latter two passages lies in the correlations between weakness and infirmity, sadness or pain, and the shedding of leaves. (Note also that 'he cites as proof the stretching of their leaves and twigs in their time towards moisture and their withering from the opposite' is a variant of manuscript 6, on which cf. the Hebrew, p. 448.)

The dotted line between Aristotle's *On Plants* and his *Nicomachean Ethics* is intended to acknowledge that Aristotle does not use himself as a doxographical source—an odd notion—but just that the Empedoclean cosmological principle in *Nicomachean Ethics* is an analytic component of the hypothetical Empedoclean nutritive principle of botanical appetite in *On Plants*. Likewise, the dotted line between Ibn Lüqi's *Placita* and pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* is intended to acknowledge that Ibn Lüqi's *Placita* does not use pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* as a doxographical source.
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one, albeit for us humans especially important, instance of a much more general condition ... φιλία is analyzed as a two-place relation whose participants (φιλεῖ) may or may not be humans." For example, Socrates considers one theory in which the wet desires the dry and the cold desires the hot (Lys. 215 e).

ibn Lūqā’s Placita

pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita

Stobaeus’ Anthology

Nicolaus’ On Plants

Aristotle’s On Plants

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Theophrastus’ On the Senses

Plato’s Lytis

Aristotle’s On the Soul/Metaphysics

Empedocles’ On Nature

**Fig. 1. Stemma of the doxographical tradition**

In *Nicomachean Ethics* 8 Aristotle appropriates the cosmological principle of elemental attraction from *Lysis*, also deploying it in an examination of friendship and also within the Platonic framework of a dichotomy between conceptions of friendship based on likeness and opposition. Aristotle explicitly attributes the principle to Empedocles. In contrast to Plato, however, Aristotle himself would not have regarded the cosmological principle as a principle of desire, since Aristotle denies that entities more psychologically basic than animals have desires.

Ibn Lūqā’s Arabic translation of pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita helps illuminate the view that Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on desire more specifically concerns appetite in plants. The Syriac–Arabic–Latin–Greek tradition of Nicolaus of Damascus’ *On Plants* supports the view that the source of Aëtius’ Empedoclean opinion on

botanical appetite is book 1 of Aristotle’s lost treatise *On Plants*. Given this, Aristotle’s account of Empedocles’ conception of botanical appetite was presumably informed by Aristotle’s own conception of Empedocles’ commitment to the cosmological principle of homogeneous elemental attraction. Indeed, the cosmological principle is an analytic component of the nutritional principle. The nutritional principle supplements the cosmological principle with the interrelated concepts of deficiency and completion and the interrelated concepts of subjective and objective complements within a physiological system.

Strictly speaking, the doxographical lineage on Empedocles on pleasure and pain begins with Theophrastus’ *On the Senses*; however, Aristotle’s *On the Soul* significantly influences Theophrastus’ treatment. In *On the Soul* Aristotle interprets Empedocles’ fragment B 107 to imply that Empedocles was committed to a conception of knowledge and perception involving the elemental homogeneity of subject and object. Since B 107 speaks of knowledge as well as ἡστῶσα καὶ ἀναίσθῃ, Theophrastus applies Aristotle’s interpretation of B 107 to these Greek concepts, concepts Theophrastus himself interprets, within the context of his discussion of the physiology of perception, as sensations of pleasure and pain.

This Theophrastean interpretation of Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and pain is, however, only one of two in *On the Senses*, and a minor one at that. Theophrastus simultaneously maintains—still under the influence of Aristotle’s schematization, although perhaps on the basis of his own interpretation of Empedocles—that Empedocles’ conception of perception depends upon likeness. But here likeness is understood as structural conformity between effluences and pores. Furthermore, Theophrastus applies this interpretation to pleasure and pain so that pleasure is understood to arise through the structural conformity of effluences and pores, while pain arises through nonconformity. I doubt that Theophrastus regards these two interpretations of pleasure and pain as compatible, especially since he criticizes as itself inconsistent Empedocles’ conception of pain based on structural nonconformity of effluences and pores. Still, in what survives, Theophrastus does not explicitly address the relation between the two interpretations.

Aëtius appropriates Theophrastus’ conceptual framework for the interpretation of Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and pain based on likeness and opposition. Yet Aëtius understands likeness and
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Opposition here is not as structural conformity or nonconformity of effluences and pores. Elsewhere in the Placita, Aetius also appropriates Theophrastus’ Empedoclean account of perception as structural conformity between effluences and pores, but that account does not figure in Aetius’ Empedoclean opinion on pleasure and pain.

Aetius himself appears responsible for uniting the doxographical lineages on Empedocles on desire or appetite and on pleasure and pain. One consequence of this unification is precisely the exclusion of the Theophrastean conception of Empedoclean pleasure as involving likeness understood as structural conformity of effluences and pores. This seems to be due to Aetius’ understanding of Empedocles’ conception of pleasure according to a desire-satisfaction model and because the object and subject of desire are elementally homogeneous. Thus, pleasure arises through the restoration of a deficit, and that restoration involves the conjunction of homogeneous elements.

Two final points about the doxographical tradition. First, Figure 1 above is based on knowledge and hypotheses that are limited by the paucity of extant texts. For example, it has been thought that Theophrastus’ On the Senses is a constituent of Theophrastus’ Physical Opinions; however, the jury remains out. If it were confirmed that On the Senses is one of the books of the Physical Opinions and if Theophrastus’ Physical Opinions included sections on plants and their psychological capacities that were indebted to Aristotle’s On Plants, our account and the accompanying diagram would change. More generally, the diagram should not be interpreted to suggest definitively that there were no intermediate sources between Aetius and Aristotle’s On Plants, on the one hand, and Theophrastus’ On the Senses, on the other. For example, whether Aetius derived Aristotle’s Empedoclean nutritional principle directly from Aristotle’s On Plants or from an intermediate source is unclear.

The second point concerns the role of diatresis based on likeness and opposition within the doxographical material. One such diatresis is explicit in the cosmological principle in Plato and Aristotle. Who knows whether some such diatresis informed Aristotle’s discussion of appetite in On Plants? Another such diatresis is explicit in Theophrastus’ doxography of theories of perception and knowledge. While Theophrastus’ account of Empedocles’ conception of cognition and perception is, in this respect, specifically indebted to Aristotle, no passage in the Aristotelian corpus confirms that Aristotle himself is responsible for initiating such a diatresis in doxography on perception and cognition generally. Likewise, no such evidence derives from Plato’s dialogues. None the less, Plato’s formative role in what may be called diatretic doxography should be appreciated. This role is confirmed by the diatresis in Lysis itself and the fact that Plato is responsible for the introduction of the diatretic method in dialectic generally.

II. EMPEDOCLES’ FRAGMENTS

II.1. Some terminology and general remarks

I begin the discussion of those Empedoclean fragments in which the concepts of desire, pleasure, and pain occur by introducing some terminology and making some general remarks about the place of desire, pleasure, and pain in Empedocles’ cosmos.

Empedocles uses the word ‘roots’ (μερόπωσις) to refer to earth, water, air, and fire, the material elements of the cosmos (B 6. 1). The word ‘root’ only loosely corresponds to the doxographers’ word ‘element’ (οὐσία) since the word ‘element’ is used to refer to Love and Strife as well as to the roots. In contrast to the doxographers, I shall use the word ‘principle’ to cover the four roots plus Love and Strife.

It will be convenient to speak of ‘radical portions’ as well as ‘roots’. By a ‘radical portion’ I mean ‘a part of a root’. To some extent, this phrase is supported by Empedocles’ own language at B 22. 1–2, where ‘the gleam (of the sun), earth, sky, and sea’ are described as ‘fitted together with their own parts (μερόπωσις)’. Admittedly, the phrase ‘radical portion’ is somewhat misleading since Empedocles himself understands the four roots qua roots to be ingredients of things. As such, a root may be and usually is a portion of a complex. Consequently, the reader should understand that I am using the phrase ‘radical portion’ in contrast to ‘radical mass’, where, for instance, the Earth, understood as the aggregation of all earth in the cosmos, constitutes a radical mass of earth and thus the root earth in a fully unified state; earth as a radical portion

111 This, for instance, is Balthussen’s conclusion (Theophrastus, 245).

112 Cf. also the ontological diatresis at Thetæt. 152 b.
Empedocles and his Ancient Readers on Desire and Pleasure would be any part or subset of this radical mass, from a handful to a mountain.

I shall distinguish desires and aversions as two motivational attitudes. The motivation of one entity to congregate with another, I shall call a 'desire'; the motivation of one entity to separate from another, I shall call an 'aversion'. I shall speak of an entity's desire for a heterogeneous entity as a 'heterogeneous desire', e.g., a portion of fire's desire to congregate with a portion of air. I shall speak of an entity's desire for a homogeneous entity as a 'homogeneous desire', e.g., a portion of fire's desire to congregate with another portion of fire. Accordingly, I shall also speak of heterogeneous and homogeneous aversions. For example, a portion of fire's motivation to separate from a portion of water is a heterogeneous aversion, while a portion of fire's motivation to separate from another portion of fire is a homogeneous aversion.

Now, some general remarks about the place of desire, pleasure, and pain within Empedocles' conception of nature. First, it must be emphasized that, in a way, the doxographers mislead us by the very fact that they suggest that Empedocles had opinions on the subjects of desire, pleasure, and pain. This is misleading in so far as Empedocles nowhere deliberately sets out to answer questions such as 'Whence do desires and pleasures derive?' While desire, in particular, plays a salient role within the cosmological and perhaps botanical and zoological aspects of Empedocles' poem, the distinction of desire, pleasure, and pain as explicit topics of ontological and psychological enquiry arises only later in the Greek theoretical tradition. Consequently, it is more accurate to speak less abstractly of the role that the concepts of desire, pleasure, and pain play within Empedocles' poem, Empedocles' understanding of these concepts, his commitments associated with them, and the contexts in which they are deployed.

For Empedocles, the roots are alive and divine. The roots are alive in so far as they have psychological functions, including motivation, emotion, and reason. In so far as the roots are ungenerated and indestructible, they are divine. In contrast, what we call biological kinds, in particular plants and animals, are not divine, but gene-

ated and destroyed within phases of the endless cosmic cycle. On the other hand, since plants and animals are composed of complexes of radical portions, they are alive and possess higher psychological functions. The relation between the psychological capacities of radical portions themselves and the heterogeneous complexes of radical portions that they constitute is, however, not examined in the fragments in a systematic way—although such relations are understood to exist and explained in some instances.

Empedocles certainly has a theory of perception, especially visual perception, but no fragments suggest that he had a particular interest in explaining pleasure and pain as sensations or dimensions of perception. In contrast, desire or rather motivation is a salient concept in his thought about the roots and compounds (assuming, as I do, that it is wrong and anachronistic to dismiss talk of motivations as mere metaphor). To take a pertinent point of contrast—in Aristotle's physical treatises, the examination of desire occurs within the context of explaining psychological functions and differentiating forms of life. In the sublunary sphere, ψυχή itself and higher psychological functions largely correlate with increasing organic complexity. For example, Aristotle grants plants ψυχή and specifically the psychic functions of nutrition and growth, but he denies that plants have desire or perception, in part because they lack adequate capacity for thermodrivation. Moreover, Aristotle wholly denies ψυχή to the basic material elements and homoiomeri. For Empedocles, interest in motivation seems to arise in the context of explaining change and the dynamics of the cosmos more broadly. The phenomena we group under kinematics and dynamics, on the one hand, and the psychology of motivation and behaviour, on the other, Empedocles largely does not conceive as subject to different forms of explanation. In addition, the sources of motivation in roots and complexes of radical portions are, for the most part, not conceived as intrinsic to subjects, in the sense that the ψυχή of subjects are not conceived as their primary sources. Rather, the principles of Love and Strife, which are also divinites and conceived as ontologically independent from the roots, are the primary causes and sources of desire and aversion respectively. As such, Empedocles' conception of motivation has strong

114 Strictly speaking, then, it makes little sense to speak of a root's desire for a homogeneous root.
115 I do not mean to suggest that this is the only characteristic of the roots that identifies them as divinities.

116 I ignore the role of desire in the ethical treatises.
117 Cf. Murphy, 'Aristotle', 331.
118 Cf. ibid. 336–8.
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affinities to the archaic conception of anthropomorphic divinities responsible for producing psychological states in humans and animals. Empedocles' conception of the elements and forces of nature is more anthropomorphic than Aristotle's, even while it is less so than Homer's.

In order to show how the doxographical tradition differs from the primary evidence for Empedocles' views on motivation and hedonic experience, I now turn to a critical survey of that evidence, beginning with the motivations of the roots.

11.2. Empedocles' fragments on the motivations of the roots

In Empedocles' fragments radical portions have heterogeneous desires. Indeed, Empedocles repeatedly speaks of love as mixing and blending heterogeneous radical portions:

... at one time all coming together into one by means of love. (B 17. 7)
... from the blending of water and earth and air and fire, the forms and colours of mortals came to be, which have now come to be, fitted together by Aphrodite... (B 71)

As Cypris, then, when she had moistened earth in rain, gave it fierce fire to strengthen, while preparing shapes... (B 73)\(^{119}\)

Love does not merely blend heterogeneous radical portions, she influences the desires of heterogeneous radical portions so that these portions desire to blend and mix. For example, at B 21. 8 we read that the roots 'come together in love and are desired’ by one another. Consequently, the cosmological principle of the formation of homogeneous radical portions — implicit in Plato, explicitly attributed to Empedocles in Aristotle, and an analytic constituent of Aetius' opinion — is incomplete; in Empedocles' poem radical portions are described as having heterogeneous as well as homogeneous desires.

At least two fragments directly support the view that radical portions have homogeneous desires. In B 62. 6 fire is said to rise up, 'wanting to reach its like’ (θέλειν πρὸς ὁμοίον ἱκεθάναι). Similarly, in B 110. 9 things are said to 'desire to reach their own familiar kind’ (θελεῖν γινέσθαι γενέσθαι). I suggest that ‘things', the subject in B 110. 9, refers to the roots. In B 110 Empedocles is encouraging Pausanias to cultivate stable wisdom. Stable wisdom is understood to consist of certain mixtures. Empedocles cautions Pausanias that if his thoughts are distracted by worthless [ἀδικήματα] matters, the mixtures constitutive of wisdom will dissolve and the radical portions will disperse and recongregate with their own kinds.

Observe that in B 110 and in B 62 radical portions or roots are characterized as desiring to arrive at (ἐρπεῖ... or ἥν... ἱκεθάναι) homogeneous radical portions. Neither B 62 nor B 110 nor any other fragment speaks of radical portions desiring to mix (μεσοῦσαι) or blend (κοπαυσάμενοι) with homogeneous radical portions.\(^{110}\) In other words, Empedocles uses μετεχο and ἱπαρχεῖν to refer to conjunctions of heterogeneous entities. Among the surviving fragments, there is no distinct term for homogeneous conjunction. Hereafter I shall continue to use the words 'conjunction' and 'congregation' to cover both homogeneous and heterogeneous conjunction or congregation. The homogeneous desires of radical portions, then, are homogeneous desires for congregation or conjunction, but not for mixture or blending.

B 110 expands upon the idea that unattended mixtures of radical portions in the mind, if neglected, may dissolve, desiring to arrive at their own kind: ‘for... all things have intelligence [φνώνησις] and a share of thought [νῶον ἐγείροντο]' (B 110. 10). Wright comments: 'the basic φνώνησις... exhibited by earth, air, fire, and water is an awareness of another part like itself and a tendency to move toward it.'\(^{111}\)

Thus, Wright suggests that radical portions have homogeneous desires. Moreover, he suggests that these homogeneous desires are, in some sense, intrinsic to the radical portions. Carl Müller — although not in commenting on this passage — also maintains that radical portions have motivations of self-love (Eigenliebe).\(^{112}\) But Müller's position differs from Wright's since Müller attributes this self-love to love.\(^{113}\) In other words, Müller does not suggest that such ho-
mogeneous desires are intrinsic to radical portions. It is worthwhile to
determine which view is correct.

While B 62 and B 110 provide evidence that radical portions
have homogeneous desires, these fragments do not per se indicate
that these homogeneous desires are intrinsic. The source of rad-
cial portions' homogeneous desires is, therefore, questionable. In
considering this matter, it helps to distinguish the homogeneous
desires of radical portions, whether or not intrinsic, from their hет-
rogenous aversions. Consider the following fragments:

And in wrath all (the roots) are distinct in form and separate. (B 21)

And at another time again all (the roots) being borne apart separately by
the hostility of Strife. (B 26)

These fragments suggest that radical mixtures separate under the
influence of Strife and thus that Strife influences radical portions' move-
tations to separate. Precisely, Strife is responsible for radical portions'
heterogeneous aversions. Consequently, the conjunction of homogene-
ous radical portions must be explained by two motivations: the aversion
due to Strife that motivates the radical portion to separate from heterogeneous radical portions and the desire to con-
gregate with homogeneous radical portions. These two motivations
are indeed distinct since in a cosmos in which only Strife's motiva-
tional influence existed, radical portions would be separated
from heterogeneous radical portions, but would not also con-
gregate with homogeneous radical portions. Such a universe might
appear mottled and consist of randomly ordered and sized radical
portions; there would be no guarantee that congregation of hetro-
ogeneous radical portions would occur.

So, again, the question is whether the homogeneous desire is
intrinsic, as Wright suggests, or due to Love and as such extrinsic,
as Müller suggests. Müller supports his position by referring to
B 22, which begins:

For all these things—the gleam (of the sun) and earth and sky and sea—are
fitted together [ἀρθρισμός] with their own parts, which had become separated
from them in mortal things.

Müller suggests that the word ἀρθρομα, here used to describe
the conjunction of radical portions, implies that Love is responsible
for the conjunction of the homogeneous radical portions because
the word ἀρθρομα is used elsewhere among the fragments to refer
to the conjunctive activity of Love.114 In support of this, Müller
cites B 17. 23:

... by her [Love] they think loving thoughts and accomplish conjunctive
[ἀρθρισμός] deeds.115

This is strong evidence. Thus, I suggest that Wright is wrong:
radical portions' homogeneous desires are not intrinsic; it is not the
radical portion itself, but Love, albeit within the radical portion,
that is responsible for the radical portion's homogeneous desire.

Granted this, the question whether homogeneous desires of rad-
cial portions are intrinsic may be posed again, but according to a
different and weaker sense of 'intrinsic'. The homogeneous desire
may not be intrinsic because its source is not the radical portion
itself, but it may be intrinsic because its source is Love as Eigenliebe,
homogeneous desire, that is ever-present in radical portions. There
is good reason to think that radical portions' homogeneous desires
are not intrinsic in this alternative sense either. If homogeneous
desires were ever-present in radical portions and Love were re-
ponsible for these desires, then a radical portion's separation from
homogeneous portions and conjunction with heterogeneous rad-
cial portions through the influence of Love would be impossible.

In this case, Love would simultaneously be responsible for two
conjointly unrealizable motivations: a homogeneous and a hetro-
genous desire.116 Consequently, when Love prevails upon a radical
portion to mix, Love must then relinquish influence upon that rad-
cial portion's homogeneous desire. Thus, homogeneous desire is not
intrinsic to a radical portion in this second sense of 'intrinsic' either.

Homogeneous desire is not ever-present in radical portions.

From this it follows that there is an apparent asymmetry between
the motivational influences of Love and Strife on radical portions.
Dissolution of mixture requires a homogeneous desire, due to Love,
and a heterogeneous aversion, due to Strife. But while the forma-
tion of mixtures requires heterogeneous desire due to Love, it does

114 "[D]as Wort ἀρθρομα [findet sich an anderer Stelle als Bezeichnung für die
"Werke" des Liebe angewandt." (Götches, 36).

115 Müller also refers to B 91. 'Water' is more easily conjuncted [ἐ-ἀρθρισμός] with
wine, with oil it does not want to mix.' But since Love is not mentioned or vaguely
implied in this fragment, it cannot be used to support the thesis. I discuss B 91
further below.

116 I emphasize that this is different from Love's responsibility for a radical portion's
desires simultaneously to mix and congregate with a radical mixture containing
some homogeneous and some heterogeneous radical portions.
not require a complementary homogeneous aversion due to Strife. Indeed, Müller emphasizes: 'das Gleichartige kann sich nicht verfeinden'.\(^{122}\) I would more cautiously say that there is no evidence in the fragments that radical portions are subject to homogeneous aversions.

Given the preceding account of the motivations of radical portions, it remains to consider a complication pertaining to the role of radical portions' intrinsic properties. At the culmination of Strife's influence, the cosmos is composed of concentric spheres of earth, water, air, and fire, thus ordered from the centre to the periphery. We have seen that this organization of the roots or their radical portions results from heterogeneous aversions due to Strife and homogeneous desires due to Love.\(^{123}\) However, this organization of the concentric spheres cannot merely result from these extrinsic aversions and desires, for these extrinsic motivations alone do not explain this particular ordering of the concentric spheres. For instance, why at the apex of Strife's power should the cosmos not be composed of concentric spheres of air, water, fire, and earth, thus ordered from its centre to its periphery? To explain the order Empedocles proposes and which loosely corresponds to the present state of the world, geocentrically conceived, Empedocles appears to rely on the view that radical portions have intrinsic properties.

That roots or radical portions have intrinsic properties is explicit at B 17, 28: 'each [root] has a distinct prerogative [τύπωσις] and its own character [ήθος].' Empedocles' attribution of distinct τύπωσις to the roots is an adaptation of traditional theological beliefs. Wright comments: 'Empedocles' description of the individual τιμαι of the roots . . . recalls directly Homer's language on the . . . allotment of powers enjoyed by Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades.'\(^{122}\) Some of the specific intrinsic properties of the roots are described at B 21, 3–6:

... the sun, bright to look upon and hot in every respect . . . and rain, in all things cold and dark; and there flow from the earth things dense and solid.

Additionally, the Armenian translation of Philo's *On Providence* contains the following claim about an intrinsic property of aither:

Moreover, aither, being much lighter (than earth) moves all around it without diversion.\(^{125}\)

These passages encourage the view that the order of concentric spheres under the dominion of Strife is to be explained, among other things, by the relative weights of radical portions, with earth at the centre because heaviest and fire at the periphery because lightest.\(^{121}\) This interpretation of such intrinsic properties further complicates the account of the motivation of radical portions. For instance, do the intrinsic properties of radical portions imply that these portions have intrinsic kinetic tendencies, say, towards or away from the centre of the sphere? If so, should we also distinguish the intrinsic kinetic tendencies of radical portions from their intrinsic combinatorial dispositions? If so, how should we distinguish their intrinsic combinatorial dispositions from the influences of Love and Strife upon their mixings and dissolutions?

It is not clear to me how to resolve these questions, but I would like to consider several fragments relevant to them, beginning with B 91:

[Water is] more easily fitted to wine, but with oil it does not want [ἐκδέξαν] to fit.

In explaining the ease and difficulty of fit among water and wine, on the one hand, and water and oil, on the other, Empedocles might appeal to the intrinsic properties of these substances. However, the use of ἐκδέξαν complicates this interpretation. The verb might, instead, encourage the attribution of the motivation of a radical portion such as that of water to the influence of Love or Strife upon it. In short, while water evidently has an aversion to mixing with

\(^{122}\) Müller continues: 'denn wäre Haß gegen sich selbst, eine Vorstellung, für den Griechen ebenso absurd, wie ihm die Eigenliebe selbstverständlich und natürlich ist' (Gleiches, 30). But we have at least seen that in certain mixtures Eigenliebe is relinquished.

\(^{123}\) Note that this implies a further cosmological asymmetry: at the apex of Love's influence, Strife is ostracized to the periphery of the sphere (B 35; 10; B 36); however, at the apex of Strife's power, Love should still inhere within the segregated concentric spheres. If Love were ostracized to the periphery in turn, then radical portions would lack homogeneous desires and thus a mottled universe would result. At B 35; 4 (cf. 17, 58=ensemble a (ii), 19) Love is described as in the midst of the whirl (ἐν τῷ μέσῳ κύκλων ἐρυθρωόν), but the context of the verse does not imply that Love is constrained to the centre because Strife is at the apex of its power. (Alternatively, Empedocles may be inconsistent.)


\(^{125}\) This translation, by Abraham Terian, is based on an Armenian prose translation of Philo's work (Inwood, *Poim.*, 236–7).

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oil, it is unclear whether this aversion is due to intrinsic properties of water and oil or whether it is due to Strife.
Consider also B 22. 4-5:

In the same way ὁσ αὕτως, as many as are more apt to blend [κρίσαν ἐπαφέα] love come to be loved by one another, made alike [ὀμοιωθέν] by Aphrodite.

The adverbial phrase ὁσ αὕτως indicates that the account in B 22. 4-5 relates to a preceding account. The preceding account (B 22. 1-3), discussed above, concerns the conjunction of homogeneous radical portions in the great masses of the sun, sky, sea, and earth.
As I suggested, following Müller, Empedocles’ use of ἀρμοια in B 22. 1 indicates that Love is responsible for the conjunction of the homogeneous radical portions in these great masses. The phrase ὁσ αὕτως, therefore, indicates that the contents of B 22. 4-5 refer to a different set of entities. I assume that the entities in question are mixtures, as my interpretation of κρίσαν above would suggest, and thus that they are non-elemental stuffs. Presumably, they are stuffs out of which, for instance, animals and plants are composed.
I suggest that the claim that the radical constituents of such stuffs are ‘more apt to blend’ is a claim about the intrinsic properties of the radical constituents, as, for instance, water and wine are more apt to blend, whereas water and oil are less apt. But, as in B 91, it is difficult to draw a distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of the radical portions’ motivations here. Indeed, at B 22. 5 Love is explicitly said to participate in the blending.

At B 22. 5 Love is also said to make the radical portions alike (ὀμοιωθέν). There are two other fragments in which the word ὁμοιοις or it cognate is used. At B 62. 6, discussed above, a portion of fire is said to seek its like (ὁμοιοι). In this case ὁμοιοίς is understood in terms of the homogeneity of radical portions. At B 17. 35 Empedocles says of radical portions throughout the cosmic cycle: ‘they become different at different times and are always perpetually alike [ὁμοία].’ In this case, ὁμοιοίς is being contrasted with ἀλλοιώσεις to convey the idea that although radical portions undergo certain changes during the cosmic cycle, their intrinsic properties remain the same. This use of ὁμοιοις is, then, either identical or very close to the use of ὁμοιοι in B 62. 6. However, my interpretation significantly differs from Müller’s, on which see Gieze, 36-8 n. 35.

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In contrast, at B 22. 5 heterogeneous radical portions are said to become alike. Consequently, this use of ὁμοιοίς cannot be identical to the other two uses. To explain the use of ὁμοιοίς at B 22. 5, I suggest drawing a distinction between the intrinsic properties of a radical portion, which never change, and what may be called the ‘expression’ of these intrinsic properties, which can be affected by the radical portion’s relation to heterogeneous radical portions. For example, the expression of heat of a radical portion of fire is limited when that portion is mixed with a portion of intrinsically cold water. I suggest that the ὁμοιοίς or assimilation of the heterogeneous radical portions in B 22. 5 entails that the expressions of the intrinsic properties of the heterogeneous radical portions are suppressed when these portions become participants in mixtures. Rather than expressing their intrinsic properties, the heterogeneous radical portions constitutive of the mixture express what we might call emergent properties of the mixture. Since the emergent properties are products of the conjunction of the heterogeneous radical constituents, the heterogeneous portions are thereby conceived as becoming alike. In other words, in mixtures heterogeneous radical portions share a common expression.

This view, that mixtures involve constraint of the expression of certain intrinsic properties of radical portions, finds support at B 26. 2, where radical portions are said to ‘decline [φθέγξεις] into one another’. Again, at B 26. 7 it is said that as radical portions grow together they ‘become subordinated [ὑπομενέων]’. In so far as the emergent properties expressed by mixtures differ from the intrinsic properties, which would otherwise be expressed by the constitutive radical portions, the declining and subordination of the radical portions within mixtures refers to constraints upon the radical portions’ expression of their intrinsic properties. An example illustrative of this condition may be derived from Katerina Jerodokanou’s discussion of Empedocles’ view that the mixture of various proportions of two particular radical portions, brilliant
fire and dark water, produces the full array of colours. Part of Ierodiakonou’s explanation refers to the fact that Greek painters, to whom Empedocles himself refers at B 23, often blended their colours, not prior to application, but in layered washes; for instance, they layered a blue over a yellow wash, rather than mixing blue and yellow and then applying the mixture to the surface. This is a good example of the way the expression of a single coloured layer is constrained and subordinated through its combination with another layer and, more generally, of the way the expression of intrinsic properties of radical portions becomes limited when those radical portions congregate with heterogeneous portions.

The preceding account of ḍ̄μωθές at B 22. 5 relates to the problem of the motivations of radical portions as follows. We may now wonder whether a radical portion has an intrinsic motivation to express its intrinsic properties. If it does not, then a radical portion’s motivation to express its intrinsic properties would appear to be due to Strife. In short, it is unclear, in this respect, what is responsible for the individuation of radical portions.

Finally, in closing this discussion of the motivations of the roots, I want to focus on the way Love is characterized as influencing the desires of radical portions. Aristotle himself might have understood the principle of homogeneous elemental attraction as a physical rather than a psychological principle since he viewed material elements as lacking ψυχή. However, on the basis of Empedocles’ fragments such a depersonalized conception of the motivations of radical portions is untenable. Empedocles’ roots are living gods, not mindless matter. By ‘living’, I mean that the roots engage in functions of living things. In particular, at B 110. 10 Empedocles says that ‘(all the roots) have thought and a share of understanding’. And at B 17. 9 the roots are said to ‘have learnt [μεμάθηκεν] to grow as one from many’.

B 17. 9 indicates that radical portions learn to mix through the influence of Love. The concept of learning (μάθησις) suggests rational persuasion. Indeed, numerous fragments associate persuasion

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with reasoning. Thus, Love influences the behaviour of radical portions, at least partly, through informing their understanding. But although Love rationally persuades radical portions to congregate, we hear nothing of Strife persuading radical portions when she influences their aversions. Thus, it appears that Empedocles understands the natures of desiderative influence and aversive influence differently. Indeed, it is questionable whether the aversive influence of Strife has a rational aspect at all. The fragments provide no evidence to make us think so. If this is correct, it suggests that the cosmic and microcosmic struggles between Love and Strife can be understood as struggles between rational persuasion and brute compulsion.

II.3. Empedocles’ fragments on the motivations of stuffs

I turn now to the motivations of non-elemental entities. The topic is crucial for evaluating the doxographers’ attribution to Empedocles of the view that desire arises through deficiency and more specifically of Empedocles’ explanation of nutritional desire and physiology.

In addition to the homogeneous desires of radical portions, B 90 includes the congregation of non-elemental stuffs: ‘Thus, sweet grasped sweet and bitter rushed to bitter, sharp approached sharp, and hot was borne to hot.’ B 90 derives from book 4 of Plutarch’s Dinner Conversations. The guests are discussing the question whether a variety of foods are more easily digested than a single kind. Phileus has argued that a simple diet is more easily digested. Marcom retorts that in digestion the body naturally distributes the various components in the various foods to the various bodily parts as needed. The result, he says, is as Empedocles describes it. B 90 now follows, and Macrion continues: ‘when the vital heat dissolves the compound, kindred things [Ἄτελες] approach those of their own kind [τοῖς ἰκανοῖς]’ (653 b).

On the basis of Plutarch’s use of Empedocles’ verses to explain digestion, it may be assumed that the context in which the lines

128 Cf. Trépanier, Interpretation, 32: ‘for Empedocles, “matter has mind.” This panpsychic creed . . . immediately distinguishes his physics from its standard modern counterpart.’
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In addition, we have pseudo-Galen’s and Galen’s testimonies that Empedocles conceived of digestion as the rotting (σφίδια) of food:

How do Hippocrates, Erasistratus, Empedocles, and Asclepiades say that concoctions of nourishment occur? ... Empedocles by rotting (σφίδια). (A 77 = Galen, Def. med. 99)

'Verse men had an ancient custom of calling 'unroasted' (ἀρνηταὶ) 'what we call 'unconsoled'. (A 77 = Galen, In Hipp. Aph. 1)

Empedocles evidently conceived of this aspect of the process of digestion as being akin to decomposition. Presumably he thought that the body must decompose food to make appropriate use of its basic constituents. In this respect, the so-called putrefaction of food in digestion appears to be akin to the work of Strife, separating complexes rather than conjoining simples.

Wright agrees: 'It would seem that food is broken up by σφίδια in the stomach.' However, this is merely one aspect of the process of digestion, the decomposition of food. What of distribution of nutritional elements through the body? Wright continues: '[The decomposed food] then passes to the liver, where it is transformed into blood.' The blood moves through the body and gives to each part what is necessary for nutrition and growth.' Support for the claim in the final sentence derives from the Greek tradition's rendition of pseudo-Plutarch 5. 27: '[According to Empedocles,] animals are nourished through the setting of that which is appropriate [διὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ὀλίκου]. The Greek word ὑπόστασις refers to sedimentation or the distribution, by separation, of a portion of a solution. τὸ ὀλίκον presumably refers to the stuff or element that is distributed in the body as needed.

But we have an interpretative problem: we are relying on pseudo-Plutarch's account of Empedocles' view of nutrition in the broad context of explaining Empedocles' conception of nutritional desire, although we have already found good reason to suspect the contents of pseudo-Plutarch's report of Empedocles' view of nutritional desire.

140 Cf. Plato's reference to Empedocles in 688 a.
141 On this point, cf. B. 121: 'And parching diseases and rots (σφίδια) . . .', and ensemble δ. 2, where rotting (ἐρυθροφέρον) is associated with wracked necessity.
142 Empedocles, 231, with references to [Galen], Def. med. 99, xii. 371 K., and Plato, Phaedo 66 k–9.
143 Wright (Empedocles, 232) refers to Simp. In Phys. 372 5 Diels τὴν δὲ γαςάρα πέτουσα, τὸ δὲ ἅπα τραχύτατον; and Plut. Quaest. conv. 683 ε ἐνκαθημέρον τὸ ἅπαρ.

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The account does not, however, explain, at least not obviously, the nature of nutritional desire. In the light of the preceding, it is perhaps reasonable to speculate as follows. Assume that, for instance, thirst arises through the depletion of radical portions constitutive of physiological stuffs, in this case water. In one sense, then, a deficit of water evokes the desire for water. Thus, Stobaeus reports correctly: '(nutritional) desire is for that which is like because of that which is lacking'. Similarly, pseudo-Plutarch: 'deficiencies (ἀλλάτια) in those elements that complete (ἀνατελέσθησα) each' animal. The concepts of deficiency and completion imply precisely that the subject and object of desire stand in a relation of mereological, if not more precisely quantitative, complementarity. Similarly, Stobaeus' formulation speaks of a 'refilling (ἀνασυμβολὴ) in accordance with the deficiency (τὸ ἀλλάτιον)'.

A further question now arises. Assuming that physiological stuffs are subjects of desire, in accounting for nutritional desire on the basis of depletion it might seem rather paradoxical that strength of desire would increase with the diminution of the desiring subject. The desires of diminished stuffs should be weaker than those
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Of undiminished stuffs. Given our account of physiological stuffs qua mixtures as subjects of desire, the problem may be resolved as follows. Take the case of thirst again. Although thirst arises from a deficit of water, it is not the quantum of water in the body per se that desires its quantitative complement. Rather, some physiological stuff such as the blood or flesh is the subject of desire. Thus, although the stuff in question is dehydrated, the other elements constitutive of the mixture appeal through desire, so to speak, for hydration. Now if the body is starving, at some point physiological stuffs will naturally become weakened to the point that their motivational appeals for nutrition themselves diminish. But this is consistent with the experience of famine, with which the Greeks were certainly familiar.

II.4. Empedocles’ fragments on pleasure and pain

Among Empedocles’ fragments we hear a good deal about the miseries for which Strife is responsible: exile from the gods (B 11),

disease (B 11.10),

unhappiness (B 9.4),

ill will (B 26.7),

anger (B 37.9),

evil quarrels (B 38.4),

and lamentations (B 124).

In contrast, we hear relatively little about pleasure or joy. At B 35.13 the rush of Love is described as gentle (μακρὰ). At B 17.24 we are told that mortals refer to Aphrodite as Joy (Τυχε). At B 128.1–6 we get a pleasant image of the worship of Aphrodite, in a sort of prelapsarian age, before animal sacrifice and the ascendency of Strife:

[Humans then] had no god Are or Battle-Din... (Instead, they worshipped) Queen Cypris... with pious images, painted pictures, and perfumes of varied odours, sacrifices of pure myth and fragrant frankincense... (B 128.1–6)

On the basis of these fragments, we are perhaps entitled to infer that, among plants, animals, and humans—that is, during the zoological phases of the cosmic cycle—Strife is responsible for or plays a salient role in the suffering and pain of these entities, while Love is responsible for or plays a salient role in their joy and pleasure. Indeed, at the apex of Love’s influence the cosmos is described as ‘fixed in the dense cover of harmony, a rounded sphere, rejoicing [συνον] in its joyous [τεργημὴν] solitude’ (B 27). Granted this, Strife dissolves mixtures, whereas Love engenders them. Therefore, the doxographers’ claim that according to Empedocles pleasure derives from the conjunction of elementally homogeneous entities, while pain derives from the conjunction of heterogeneous entities, is misguided.

One further fragment includes the concepts ἠρέμως and ἀνέρμως (words I leave untranslated for the moment) and deserves more careful consideration. In Section I.3 I introduced and discussed Theophrastus’ treatment of B 107. Recall that in this fragment Empedocles claims: ‘all things having been fittingly conjoined, and by means of these [τούτοις] they have knowledge and experience pleasure [ήγονται] and pain [ἀνήγονται]. I previously translated ἠγονται and ἀνήγονται as “experience pleasure” and “experience pain”—in other words, as referring merely to sensations or perceptual states of pleasure and pain. This translation conforms to Theophrastus’ own conception of B 107 and is supported by the fact that Theophrastus’ discussion of Empedocles occurs within a treatise on the physiology of perception.

Yet it is doubtful that Empedocles would have so understood ἀνέρμως and ἠρέμως in B 107. More likely, he used these verbs to mean “suffer distress” and “enjoy or take pleasure in (something)”, in other words, as emotional states and not merely sensations. Two considerations encourage this interpretation. First, there is no reason to think that at the time Empedocles composed his poem Greek thinkers had distinguished or been theoretically motivated to distinguish pleasure and pain as perceptual states from pleasure and

animals, says that they do not yet show any “lovely (πανδείκτης) frame of limbs”. This suggests that completely formed animals have lovely limbs and thus that Aphrodite fashions attractive creatures. On ἀνέρμως, cf. B 64.

105 Theophrastus’ own conception of perceptual pleasure and pain (cf. Sent. 32.1–2) seems consistent with, if not identical to, Aristotle’s, viz. the ἐνέργεια of the natural state, which occurs when the perceptual organ, in its optimal condition, is activated by the optimal perceptual object, under optimal environmental conditions.
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pain as emotions. Second, the verbs ἀνασθαλαι and ἐσθαλαι are consistently used in other archaic texts to mean 'suffer distress' and 'enjoy or take pleasure in (something)'. We should therefore translate B 107 as follows:

... all things having been fittingly conjoined, and by means of these [τοῦτων] they have knowledge and experience joy and suffer distress.

Further support for this rendition of B 107 is the association of ἀνασθαλαι and ἐσθαλαι in this fragment with cognition. As Inwood, following Barnes, has suggested, Theophrastus begins his quotation, 'out of these things' all things having been fittingly conjoined', in mid-verse; the words 'out of these things' (ἐκ τοῦτων), which immediately precede the quotation, are Theophrastus' own. These things (τοῦτων) refers to the six principles or rather portions of them, which, as Theophrastus suggests, are constitutive of the blood and thereby enable cognition of like by like. Thus, as we also noted, many scholars have followed Theophrastus and placed B 109 ('... with earth, ... we recognize earth, with water, water...') before B 107. I had also noted Theophrastus' comments on B 107: 'Therefore, it is principally by means of the blood that we know [φρονεῖν], for in the blood the elements [ἐρεχεῖα] are blended more fully than in our (other) parts.' Indeed, in B 108 blood is characterized as composed of more or less equal quantities of radical portions, and B 105 claims that 'human understanding [νοημα] is blood around the heart'. Consequently, it is reasonable to follow Theophrastus' suggestion that understanding occurs by means of blood because blood contains all of the elements of things that are to be understood.

Now, at B 17. 21 Empedocles' exhortation to Pausania to behave with his mind (νοήω), not with his eyes (δύναμις), encourages

For instance, consider the uses of ἀνάσαν at Hom. Il. 2. 291; Od. 1. 133, 2. 115, 3. 177, 15. 335; Thgn. 553, 691. Uses of ἔσθαλαι are less common in archaic literature (e.g. Anax. 148), but, as LLS indicates, in classical literature (e.g. Hdt. 1. 69, 3. 34; [Aesch.] Frv. 1. 75; Ar. Ec. 523, 693; Soph. Phil. 715, 1344) the verb is used, in various constructions, to convey the idea of enjoying or taking pleasure in something, not simply experiencing a sensation of pleasure.

There is a lacuna of 14 letters in MS P preceding νάσαν πεντήμνωμα ἀμφόθετα. Karsten, 'Empedocles' Religion', followed by Diels, Fragmata, adds ἐκ τοῦτων from Theophrastus and then supplies ἀνασθαλαι. Inwood (Poem, 285), following Barnes ('Review', 1993), takes ἐκ τοῦτων to be Theophrastus' words and simply leaves a lacuna.

I emphasize that the nature of such understanding remains obscure. R. Kantek, 'Empedocles on Knowledge by Likes' (under review), has proposed a novel interpretation of B 110 and Empedocles' conception of knowledge by affinity.

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the view that Empedocles conceives of Love, and presumably Strife, as objects of understanding, rather than objects of perception. Note that Heracles and in particular Parmenides provide Empedocles with precedents for such an epistemological distinction, and that Melissus, Zeno, and Democritus are examples of other fifth-century thinkers who recognize such a distinction. In the light of this, I suggest that the concepts ἄριστος and ἀνάσαν at B 107. 2 are understood not merely as perceptual states, but as richly emotional states more closely allied to cognition than mere perception.

II.5. Conclusion to Empedocles' fragments

Examination of the doxographical material that purports to give Empedocles' opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain in relation to Empedoclean fragments in which related concepts occur suggests the following central conclusions. First, regarding the topic of desire, in the doxographical material desire occurs between homogeneous elements; in the fragments desire occurs between heterogeneous and homogeneous roots or radical portions. Thus, the doxographical material simplifies and misleads. Second, the fragments suggest that it is sensible to distinguish two types of motivation, desire and aversion, corresponding to the influence of Love and Strife respectively. The doxographical material gives no indication of this. Third, the fragments indicate that most, if not all, desires are extrinsic, both in the sense that Love, not the roots, is responsible for desires and in the sense that neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous desires, for which Love is responsible, are ever-present in radical portions. Again, the doxographical material

64 Cf. J.-C. Picot, 'Les cinq sources dont parle Empédocle', Reves des études grecques, 117 (2004), 457-460, which argues for a novel epistemological interpretation of B 114, according to which the five sources (ἐπηγγέλας πέντε) are the five senses from which wisdom may be derived.

65 I do not mean to suggest that in B 107. 2 Empedocles claims that all ἄριστος and ἀνασθαλαι derive from the mind; I simply mean that Empedocles here uses the concepts of joy and suffering as mental. Granted this, it still remains unclear how joy and distress are to be understood. Perhaps joy is a response to the recognition of Love, its manifestations and effects, while distress is accordingly a response to the recognition of Strife. Yet in order to clarify these emotions, we need a better explanation of the cognition of Love and Strife themselves.

66 Note, however, that Aristotle at least recognizes that Empedocles conceives of Love as responsible for aggregating and Strife for segregating things, for at Metaph. 986b he criticizes Empedocles for inconsistency on this point.
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is silent on this point. Fourth, the fragments indicate that radical portions have intrinsic combinatorial dispositions and kinetic tendencies. This may imply that the roots or radical portions have some intrinsic motivations, but that is unclear. The principle of homogeneous elemental attraction in the doxographical material may be said to overlap with the notion of intrinsic properties; however, the doxographers precisely do not distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic sources of motivation in the cosmological principle. Fifth, the fragments indicate that homogeneous elements do not mix or blend, but simply congregate. In contrast, the doxographical material suggests that homogeneous elements mix or blend. Moreover, the doxographical material does not distinguish between mixture or blending, on the one hand, and conglomeration or conjunction that does not involve mixture or blending, on the other. Sixth, the surviving fragments mainly concern the motivations of roots, not stuffs, or organisms. This is probably a function of the surviving evidence rather than of Empedocles’ own interests. No doubt, the roots play a central role in Empedocles’ poem, but Empedocles’ poem clearly has considerably more to say about animals, plants, and their physiological and psychological processes. As we have seen, the doxographers inform us that Empedocles’ poem contained content on nutrition, including appetite, and that appetites were attributed to plants. This is a genuine contribution of the doxographical tradition to our understanding of Empedocles’ poem. In Section II.3 our discussion of the motivations of stuffs, which included the physiology of nutrition and appetite, primarily focused on examples from and considerations specific to animals. But, again, this is a function of the surviving fragments; there is very little among the fragments alone from which to reconstruct an account of the psychological functions of plants. Finally, although evidence for an Empedoclean account of nutrition is slight, on the basis of the doxographical evidence plus the material concerning motivation in the fragments, it is possible to reconstruct some aspects of a plausible account: the object of nutritional desire is not merely an elemental portion, but one in a certain quantity; and the subject and object are not necessarily elementally homogeneous.

Regarding pleasure and pain, first, the fragments suggest that, broadly speaking, Love is saliently responsible for harmonious conditions and to that extent for pleasure, while Strife is correlatively responsible for inharmonious conditions and thus for misery and suffering. However, this does not imply, as the doxographical material claims, that pleasure arises through the blending of homogeneous elements,\(^1\) while pain arises through the blending of heterogeneous elements. Second, the fragments do not suggest that Empedocles was interested in the physiology of hedonic experience. This is Theophrastus’ misinterpretation. In particular, in B 107 ἄνευθαι and ἀνέαθαι refer to the emotions of joy and distress, not simply to the sensations of pleasure and pain.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

I began this paper by distinguishing three approaches to doxography: reconstructionism, receptionism, and the dialogical approach. Regarding reconstructionism, this study’s results corroborate the work of many scholars, beginning most significantly with Harold Cherniss,\(^2\) who argue that Aristotle’s accounts of the Presocratics are misleading. Since Diels, scholars have generally been more sympathetic to Theophrastus.\(^3\) But, at least with regard to the doxographical material examined here, this attitude appears questionable. Consequently, the reconstructionist project is fraught with obstacles, some insurmountable. In the absence of primary evidence to serve as a touchstone, I incline towards the harsh verdict of, for example, R. D. Dicks, who criticized as extravagant Charles Kahn’s reconstruction of Anaximander’s astronomy on the basis of Theophrastus.\(^4\) Similarly, in the case of Empedocles’ views of desire, pleasure, and pain, those few scholars who have treated this cluster of topics have relied on the doxographical material uncritically and been misled by Diels.\(^5\)

Some may find this negative conclusion regarding reconstruc-

\(^1\) Again, the doxographers do not distinguish between congregation and blending.

\(^2\) *Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1935).

\(^3\) Most recently, see Bahnussen, *Theophrastus*.


tionism unacceptable. But it should at least cast a cloud over their hopes of rescuing the earliest philosophical-scientific thought from oblivion. However, it is only when the study of doxography is bound to the reconstructionist agenda that such results must be received negatively. Doxographical studies need not be bound in this way. For example, it is increasingly appreciated that the commentators of late antiquity make rich philosophical contributions of their own. Generally speaking, the study of the reception of Presocratic philosophy is a fruitful enterprise, and much work remains to be done.

David Runia, commenting on the questions of the sources and reliability of just books 4 and 5 of Aétus' Placita, writes: 'a limited section of this huge task has been carried out, the rest remains to be done.' As we await the second volume of Mansfeld and Runia's Aétiana, I hope, in Sections I.5–9 of this paper, to have shed a little more light on the pre-Aetian doxographical tradition. In doing so, I hope also to have underscored the value of non-Graeco-Roman sources. In general, greater collaboration between Hellenists and Arabists is needed.

Finally, as far as I know, a professedly dialogical approach to doxography is novel. Of course, such an approach is only feasible where a substantial body of both primary and secondary materials exists. Thus, Empedocles provides an excellent field for enquiry. But Heraclitus, Parmenides, and perhaps Xenophanes and Anaxagoras offer additional opportunities for dialogical study. And of course this paper has examined only a small set of Empedoclean doxographical passages.

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