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CLARK M. CLIFFORD
ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW III PREFERRED CITATION
Transcript, Clark
M. Clifford Oral History Interview III, 7/14/69, by Paige Mulhollan, Internet
Copy, LBJ Library.
INTERVIEWEE: CLARK
CLIFFORD (Tape 3)
INTERVIEWER: PAIGE
MULHOLLAN
July 14, 1969
M: You indicated that
the second Wise Men Meeting, the one in March of 1968, had definitely been
your idea whereas the first one had not been. Did you have some reason
for thinking the outcome of this second one might be different from the
first one?
C: I
had two reasons for making the suggestion. Of course the President receives
a lot of suggestions, some he adopts, more often he declines the suggestions.
In this particular instance I do recall at one of the regular Tuesday luncheons
when we were engaged in this reexamination and reevaluation of our posture
in Viet Nam, I had the feeling at the time that it would be very valuable
to him to meet with the same group with whom he had met before--that had
been perhaps in October or November of 1967. He'd gotten a great deal from
the meeting, the fact that out of a group of eleven or twelve men who had
met toward the end of '67 only one, that is George Ball, expressed opposition
to the continuation of our policy in Viet Nam, had comforted him a great
deal. He felt sustained
and fortified by the judgment of these so-called
senior advisers. So the first thought I had was, we were going through
this rather difficult debate, it seemed reasonable because some were urging
a change in the President's position for him to ascertain if this senior
group felt the same way, or had changed their minds--or some of them might
have. I did know, and it is entirely possible that the President knew,
that there was some new thinking on the part of at least some of them.
I knew that Dean Acheson and McGeorge Bundy were in the process of reevaluation;
that Tet had had a substantial impact upon the thinking of both of those
men. I knew that not because I had sought them out to ascertain it, but
in mere casual contact, either seeing them at a reception or talking with
them at luncheons on some other subject, I'd received the impression that
they were going through a period of reevaluation. The President considered
that thought, and I believe the next I knew of it was when the President
had informed Walt Rostow that the President did wish to take this course
of action and Walt called me to advise me the date and time and place that
the meeting would occur and all the details.
M: Was
it organized, or did you organize it differently than the one that had
organized in late 1967?
C: No,
the fact is I did not organize either one of them. I'd been invited to
the first one and took part in it, and went along with the majority view
in 1967, without raising a question at the time. Tet had had a very substantial
impact on me as it had on others. The first meeting of the senior advisers,
I'm almost sure, came after the return visit of Ambassador Bunker and General
Westmoreland. They had come back, it seems to me maybe a week, two weeks,
or three weeks before the meeting of senior advisers in '67, and those
two men had been quite optimistic about our posture in Viet Nam. As I recall,
Ambassador Bunker
said that "we could now see light at the end
of the tunnel," and General Westmoreland indicated that he thought it entirely
possible that we could begin to bring American boys home in 1968. Well,
Tet changed all that. The fact that the enemy could mount a simultaneous
offensive against fifty or sixty cities, towns and hamlets at one time
and that the effect of such an offensive, even though blunted militarily,
could result in our military asking for an additional number of troops
amounting to over 200,000, changed the complexion entirely. After Tet,
I assure you, there was no suggestion that we could see any light at the
end of the tunnel, nor was there any thought of sending any American boys
home. The whole thrust was exactly the reverse. After Tet the actual request
that was made was that we send over 200,000 more out there to help the
525,000 we already had there. With reference to the organization of the
first group, I had nothing to do with that,
all I knew was that the President had come up
with the idea and I was invited. I wasn't in government then, I was just
one of those who was considered in the senior group. However, so much had
happened between the time they met, which may have been October or November,
and toward the middle of March, and so much had changed because of Tet,
that I remember specifically thinking that it would be valuable to the
President if he called this group in again to see whether or not Tet had
had the impact on these men that I knew it had had on me and had on some
others within the Administration. So after having made the suggestion,
he then decided, perhaps others made it to him, I don't know, or he may
have been thinking of it himself, but he then decided the manner in which
he wanted it to be held. He's the one who decided who he wanted, I had
nothing to do with that, and he's the one who decided the manner in which
they would come in and
meet together first that evening at the State
Department for dinner and be briefed and how he would see them the next
day. All those details the President handled himself.
M: Did
the advice change? Was it as unanimous the second meeting the opposite
direction as it had been the first meeting--
C: No,
it was divided. There were a number, however, who had changed opinion.
Keep in mind, making it relatively simple, let's say there were twelve,
and the first time as we discuss the whole matter after the first senior
group, I know Mr. George Ball who was Under Secretary of State was one
of those present, the vote was about 11 1/2, to 1/2, because even George
Ball did not level too determined an attack on the attitude of the others.
He did raise questions and he was performing more in the capacity of the
devil's advocate. The second time, after the briefings and all, it would
be my estimate that Dean Acheson had changed his mind, McGeorge Bundy had
his, Cyrus Vance had changed his mind, Douglas Dillon had changed his.
I think at the first meeting, I can't be sure but I believe we did not
have Matt Ridgeway, General Matt Ridgeway at the first meeting, but I think
he came in at the second meeting and he had great misgivings about our
posture in Viet Nam. Art Goldberg had not been at the first meetings as
I remember, but he was at the second meeting, and he was strongly opposed
to the continuation of our policy, that is, the adding of more and more
men. That was, to a great extent, one of the major issues. Should we continue
on with the policy that had already been adopted, that is, of putting more
men in at any time that the military asked for them. There were still some
who adhered to the same position that they had before. I would say that
General Maxwell Taylor had not changed, Ambassador Robert Murphy had not
changed, I think Justice Fortas had not changed in his attitude, so
that--I know you'll have the specific records
on it--but if there were twelve at the first senior advisers meeting, there
may have been fourteen or fifteen at the second. Whereas it had been say
eleven to one at the first, it seems to me the vote had shifted and if
there were fourteen the second time the vote would have ended up something
like ten to four the other way, so--
M: That's
a substantial change.
C: Oh, you could
just feel it, you could just sense it, it was just a great big swing all
around from an almost unanimous belief in the rightness of our cause in
the first group and a substantial shift in the meeting of the second group,
the thrust of which was that we should not continue to pour blood and treasure
into Viet Nam but that we should give the most careful consideration to
seeing if we couldn't find some way to negotiate ourselves out of Viet
Nam. Putting it another way, the consensus of opinion of the senior advisers
in the first group was that military victory was attainable. By military
victory I mean that we would through force of arms pressure the enemy into
some kind of favorable results. It was the consensus, I believe, at the
second meeting of the senior advisers that military pressure was not going
to gain the disengagement which we really should begin to think about seriously.
M: In
between those two meetings, you had given some testimony to the Senate,
I believe, regarding the meaning of the San Antonio formula as you saw
it.
C: I did.
M: Was
there genuine division in high places in government about the conditions
under which we would actually go to the negotiating table in the pre-Tet
period there?
C: Yes,
very briefly on the San Antonio formula problem, I came back from that
trip that General Maxwell Taylor and I made in the late summer and early
fall, late summer I guess it was of '67, disturbed and worried at the lack
of feeling of immediacy or concern on the part of our allies. Here we were
in the United States taking the position that we could sacrifice the lives
of American boys in South Viet Nam because our national security and our
national interest were so vitally involved there, that if we did not make
this sacrifice, other nations would very likely fall under Communist rule
and that could spread throughout Southeast Asia down in the sub-continent
of India and Pakistan and out into the Western Pacific to the Philippines
and Indonesia and then to Australia and New Zealand, and if it were to
occur in that manner then the safety of our country and the safety of our
ships throughout that area would, of course, be vitally affected. In that
trip that we'd taken, I wondered quite a lot, I started off wondering after
a first visit or two and ended up with a deep concern over it. Some illustrations.
The President wanted us to go to the Philippines to talk to President [Ferdinand]
Marcos about what more he was going to do. When President Marcos got word
that we were coming, he got a message to President Johnson saying he preferred
that we not come at all. Now, mind you, we didn't mean anything, but we
were personal emissaries of the President of the United States and President
Marcos said, no, he did not want us to come at all, because it would be
unwise politically from the standpoint
of the Philippines. Now the Philippines, although
only 700 miles from South Viet Nam, whereas we've over 7,000 miles, they
had not sent a single combat man to South Viet Nam and to this day they've
not sent a single combat man. They did send engineering corps and a hospital
unit amounting to some two thousand men, but because of the pressure within
the Philippines, they've now drawn them down until they may have only a
thousand or twelve hundred. They haven't had a real combatant in South
Viet Nam; this makes a man wonder. Thailand, which has a population of
thirty million people and is a very short distance from Viet Nam, it's
just over Laos and Cambodia, they had only two thousand troops there, and
when we suggested that they might want to consider more, oh, my Lord! They
had a list as long as a man's hopes as to why they couldn't send any more.
They finally did send an additional light division, some six thousand troops,
but we had to
arm them, equip them, train them and also deliver
a substantial amount of other equipment to the Thais in order to persuade
them that it was in their own best interest to send some more men to South
Viet Nam.
M: Even
six thousand.
C: Even
six thousand. Today they've got eight thousand men there out of a population
of thirty million people. The attitude was, well, if you feel that this
would be helpful to you, Uncle Sam, we'll consider it, it's goirg to be
rather costly to you.
M: If you want to
buy it--
C: Sure,
if you want to step up and pay for it all, I guess we can manage it. What
proved to be such a shock to me was that it was our war! And if we were
to get the help of the nations most intimately involved why we certainly
have to look at the quid pro quo on it, because otherwise they would find
it very difficult to help us. I had started off with what was probably
the rather ingenuous and unsophisticated thought that we were helping them.
M: It
was their war!
C: It
was theirs, you see, and we were helping them because they were the first
line and we were assisting them, but it didn't turn out that way. We went
on to Korea; spent two days there. They do have a substantial investment
in South Viet Nam, maybe 50,000 troops. We thought that they might do better
than that, and their attitude was, well, they were under more pressure
from North Korea. They did, however, consider sending a civilian group
that would number as many as 5,000 to 10,000 civilians who would take over
a number of tasks that were then being performed by the military--supply
and logistic functions, maybe road building functions and all that--but
they would do that only if we paid them.
M: Again, if you
can buy it you can get it.
C: Right,
if we paid them and the price as I remember was very steep for what we
would pay these persons per day if they sent them over there. I felt a
sense of growing concern and even some discouragement.
I thought, well, when we get to Australia and New Zealand, things will
be better. I remember we started early, about nine o'clock one morning,
at the home of the Prime Minister. He had the chief members of his Cabinet
there, and we stayed in session all that day, ended up having dinner together.
We were together I guess until eleven or twelve that night. And Prime Minister
Holt was thoroughly competent, a
gracious gentleman, as all the others were. He
was prepared for us. He had a thick brochure [which] must have been an
inch and a half thick. We would raise a point, and he would turn to a certain
letter and there held have a complete answer to the point that we raised.
They indicated that they might
give some consideration. I did not bring this
up at the time because it seemed impolitic, and I certainly didn't wish
to be rude, but I knew that in the second World War, Australia which then,
in the second World War, had only a population of eleven million, at one
time had 340,000 troops in the various theatres of World War II. At the
time we were there they had 7,000 troops in South Viet Nam. Now since that
time I think they've added two thousand more, so I think maybe they have
9,000 now as compared to 340,000 that they had in the second World War
when they were a much smaller nation. They're almost twice the size now,
it seems to me, or 50-60 percent larger. Then we got over to New Zealand,
and I knew that having looked it up that New Zealand had 70,000 troops
in the second World War. They had 500 troops in South Viet Nam.
M: Hardly a vital
interest.
C: They only have
500 now!
M: Right.
C: And
I wondered as I flew back from New Zealand whether or not the attitude
of the countries represented their evaluation of the comparative danger
to which they were subjected in the second World War as compared to the
danger that confronted them in the South Vietnamese War. I assumed that
it did because they rose up when the Japs were on the march and made this
enormous contribution from a rather small population and yet when the South
Vietnamese War started, which was by some interpreted to be the beginning
of the fall of a long line of dominos, I could not find any sense of urgency,
no feeling of emergency that they ought to get men over there and stop
this conflict before it reached their shore. New Zealand with 500 men--that
was just a token force, you see.
So I came back concerned at that time, concerned
as to whether or not these nations who were much more familiar with that
part of the world than we, might not be
looking at it entirely differently than we, and
it put the question in my mind whether possibly they were right and we
were wrong. We'd been approaching it from the
standpoint that our national security was involved.
That's really the only basis on which you can ask American boys to go to
another country and die. And these nations were sending very few men and
the men they sent were taking a very limited part in any combat in South
Viet Nam.
M: And
many times we were paying them.
C: And we were making
a very substantial contribution in a number of ways to those nations who
were sending some men.
M:: Now
was this before the San Antonio formula, when you returned? This hadn't
yet been delivered, is that right?
C: Right.
I got back, I guess the end of July or early August. I think the San Antonio
speech was made in October.
M: I believe that's
right.
C: And
in it the President stated, in his speech in San Antonio, that he was ready
to stop the bombing and that he would assume that the enemy would not take
advantage of a cessation of the bombing, because if they did so, it could
increase the jeopardy of our troops that were there, particularly those
that were in I Corps or in the northern part of South Viet Nam. I remember
feeling a sense of very real encouragement. I got a great lift out of the
San Antonio speech--I had nothing to do with it--I think I did not even
see an advance copy. But I got a great lift out of it because it indicated
that the President was directing his attention toward an amicable settlement
of the matter rather than continuing on for a military victory. Now with
reference to that portion of the San Antonio formula there began to
grow up an interpretation in some quarters, both
at the State Department and within the White House, the interpretation
that if the President stopped the bombing of North Viet Nam, then North
Viet Nam would have to stop sending men and material into South Viet Nam,
that that would be the quid pro quo. I must say that that made no sense
to me because the North Vietnamese had perhaps 120,000 men in South Viet
Nam and to suggest to them that we would stop the bombing and they would
have to stop sending supplies, that is, food, ammunition, material of war,
replacements and all, in consideration of that, would in effect mean that
they would abandon 120,000 men they had in South Viet Nam.
M: We wouldn't do
it.
C: Of
course we wouldn't do it and to assume that they would do it I thought
was wholly unrealistic. So I appeared before the Senate Arms Services Committee
in January, 1968, after my nomination had been sent up by President Johnson.
I was asked then for my interpretation of the San Antonio theory. I stated
that what I thought the President clearly had in mind was that if he stopped
the bombing they would not take advantage of the cessation of the bombing
by increasing the flow of men and material. I used the word that was picked
up by a number of papers and all. I used the word "normal" that I thought
the obligation on them was not to exceed the normal flow, and if that were
done then that would be compliance on their part with his suggestions.
M: Had
he ever made this explicit to you?
C: He
had not. It was my interpretation because it seemed to me that that gave
force and effect and reality to the San Antonio theory whereas the other
interpretation I thought made it a nullity. Because it made it so unreal
from the standpoint of possible acceptance as to make it valueless, so
I think possibly I used that question as an opportunity of projecting my
view which I honestly thought was the President's view. I later learned
that my answer at that time caused considerable consternation in some quarters
in the White House and in the State Department.
M: That was my next
question. That's about the time the press began its reporting which it
continued on about the differences between your advice and Secretary Rusk's
advice. How much substance and how deep did that tension get before the
end?
C: As
far as interpretation of the San Antonio theory is concerned, after having
made that statement in January, I later learned that same day or the next
morning that State was very put out about it, and that there were some
in the White House who thought that this statement had not correctly stated
our policy. However, I noted with interest although I was not in contact
with anybody, I think the day after I'd said it, a statement was issued
by the spokesman of the State Department saying, "Yes, this was the correct
interpretation," and then some statement came out of the White House saying,
"Yes, this was the correct interpretation." So I was gratified at that,
so that I wouldn't start in with a controversy already on my hands. You
talk about my relationship with Secretary Rusk. A word on that. I worked
with Secretary Rusk back in the Truman Administration.
I served in the White House from 1945 to 1950. During part of that time,
my recollection is, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs or Southeast Asian Affairs, or whatever it was called then. I came
into contact with him. I thought he was exceedingly intelligent; the times
that we would need help from State and he came in, he was always enormously
helpful, and I developed a very high opinion of his ability and judgment.
He is a thoroughly dedicated, patriotic, intelligent American, who has
made an enormous contribution. We were friends a long time; I still consider
that we are friends today. The fact is, however, that I believe we disagree
on Viet Nam. I believe he continued--or at least when we were last working
together--I believe that he continued to feel just about as strongly as
he had ever felt that our interest in Viet Nam really constituted our interest
in Southeast Asia, and that if we did not see the war through in South
Viet Nam that Southeast Asia could fall, and I think his feeling was that
we would end up in a bigger and
costlier and more deadly war later on if we didn't
see this one through. I got to the point where I differed almost 180 degrees
with him in that regard. We
had a number of debates before the President
in the year 1968. Time and time and time again, conducted I think with
the most gentlemanly consideration; I do not recall any of them ever becoming
bitter or vitriolic. Neither of us made any effort when apart from the
other to undermine the other's position with the President. I know I didn't,
and I know that he didn't. I respected him as a man who'd made a great
contribution. I thought in this particular instance, I thought that changes
had taken place and that he was not giving sufficient importance to those
changes. I think his attitude toward me to some extent was that I'd come
in rather late in the whole picture; here these men had suffered through
it for seven years before I'd gotten there; I didn't understand a great
many facets of it that he and others understood, and I think that constituted
his attitude on it.
M: What
about the President? Did he let your advocacy of the different positions
affect your relationship with him at all?
C: I believe it did,
yes. In that regard I think that when he felt that Secretary McNamara was
vacillating on Viet Nam and was becoming concerned about the efficacy of
our bombing and was rather irresolute in our whole posture in Viet Nam,
I think the President got concerned about that. And when the opportunity
opened up for Secretary McNamara to go to the World Bank, it seemed to
me there was rather general agreement that perhaps
that was a good move. I believe one of the reasons
the President selected me to succeed McNamara was that he felt I supported
his policy strongly. I did support his policy and he had known me for a
good many years, and I think what he wanted was a man who would stand there
strong and forthrightly and resolutely and the President wouldn't have
to worry about that particular fellow. He'd know right where that man was
all the time. I was perfectly prepared to do that. The trouble with it
was that as I went through that inquiry into the whole subject of Viet
Nam my opinion changed.
M:You'd have been
dishonest not to say so then.
C: Two days I believe
it was before I went in as Secretary of Defense on March 1, 1968, General
Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, returned from
a trip to Viet Nam with the request of the military that 206,000 more men
be sent over and additional helicopters be supplied and some other equipment.
The President then named a task force to go into the subject of how these
additional men would be provided and what the effect would be upon our
military posture in this country and upon our economic position. So I recall
being sworn in at the White House on the morning of March 1 and getting
over to the Pentagon and getting the desk in operation, and I think it
was that very afternoon that we started these task force meetings. And
we went day after day after day. It was our function to provide the President
with a plan showing the logistic means by which these men could be sent
over. We were not to get into the discussion of whether
they should be sent--
M: Not whether but
how.
C: It was how. And
we spent hours determining which units could be sent, what the mix would
be, that is, how many Marines, how many Navy, how many Army, what the impact
would be upon our reserves situation. Definitely we were going to have
to make a substantial call-up of reserves. My recollection is now the plan
contemplated a call-up of 280,000 reserves.
M: Substantial number.
C: Very!
We spent hours estimating what the impact would be on our economy. Secretary
Fowler of Treasury was deeply disturbed by it; they were considering the
possibility of the imposition of credit control and even possibly wage
and price control.
M: Desperate measures,
indeed.
C: Oh,
very, very. I remember we got an estimate of what the additional costs
would be of this kind of program, this was in March of '68, the estimate
was that in the balance of that fiscal year which ended June 30, it would
cost an additional two billion and for the fiscal year starting July 1,
1968, it would cost an additional twelve billion. Now this on top of the
already enormous burden we were carrying, the dollar had gone through a
period of vulnerability in the early part of '68, and in the spring this
would put a lot more pressure on it, put a lot more pressure upon our balance
of payments problem, which was already acute, so that all these matters
began to come in that day by day caused me growing concern. But what bothered
me the most was the feeling of frustration and growing discouragement over
what the future was in Viet Nam. I had the opportunity, to ask a great
many questions on a subject I'd never gotten into before and as a quick
illustration, one naturally would ask, well the military--by the military
I'm referring to the whole Joint Chiefs, I'm not just referring to General
Westmoreland, the request came really from the
Joint Chiefs for this additional increment. I
would naturally ask the question, Now if we send an additional 200,000
men will this do the job? Need we not consider sending any more? Well,
nobody could tell me that that number would do the job. Well, so I said,
We send this 200,000, can anybody give me any idea, even in their opinion,
when we could bring the war to a conclusion on a military basis? Couldn't
get an answer. Six months? Well, no, couldn't do it in six months. A year?
No, that doesn't seem right. Two years? Well, we would have made a lot
of headway in two years, but would we have concluded it? Well, nobody could
say. Well, here was just an open-end commitment that seemed to get us in
deeper and deeper and deeper. We had long discussions and inquiries into
air power. I concluded that with the limitations that the President naturally
had set upon our conduct of the war so it wouldn't spread and inflame all
through the whole area that air power would not limit the enemies' supply
function sufficiently so as to choke them off. And finally I got down to
the point of asking the Joint Chiefs, "What is our plan for military victory
in Viet Nam?" Well, we got into long discussions, and I don't know how
many times I asked it but finally it became very apparent and I think,
maybe I worded it perhaps as tactfully as I could, but I said, "The fact
is we do not have a plan for military victory." And that turned out to
be the case. All that we had was the advice of the military that if we
continued to pour troops in at some unknown rate and possibly in an unlimited
number that for an unknown period of time that ultimately it was their
opinion that the enemy would have suffered that degree of attrition that
would force the enemy to sue for some kind of peace.
M: How quickly did
you begin to relay this new impression to the President after you took
office?
C: I
would think within eight or nine or ten days.
M: By
the middle of March.
C: By
the middle of March the debate was on in earnest.
M: The reason I asked,
one of the events that took place sort of coincidentally here was the Robert
Kennedy-Theodore Sorensen suggestion for a peace commission of some kind
that they asked you to relay to the President. Can you give some detail
on that and what impact if any it had on the President's thinking?
C: Senator
Edward Kennedy phoned me late one night at home, it was about eleven o'clock.
This is some time in the month of March, the dates of course will be very
clear, and said that Senator Robert Kennedy wanted to come see me to talk
about his concern about Viet Nam, and Robert Kennedy had discussed it with
Edward Kennedy, and Edward Kennedy said, "Why, sure, what you ought to
do, I'll be glad to call Clifford and make the appointment." So he made
the appointment for some time the next day, maybe 11 a.m. or so. Senator
Robert Kennedy arrived and he had Ted Sorensen which was perfectly all
right with me. I'd known them both for a great
many years. They came in, sat down, we had a few pleasant words, then the
substance of the purpose of their call came out. Senator Robert Kennedy
said he had been going through a very difficult and agonizing period which
he'd been attempting to reach certain decisions himself, that he had a
lot of people urging him to get in the presidential race. He felt that
we should conclude our venture in some manner in South Viet Nam and that
would be the only reason that he would get into the race. He'd said before
that he wasn't going to get into it. He had meant it at the time, the only
reason he would get into it would be if it was necessary in order to find
peace in Viet Nam, that if President Johnson were willing to take a serious
and forward step toward peace then Senator Kennedy would not have to get
in it, that he would have accomplished what his candidacy might accomplish.
So I said, "Well, that's interesting," and then he and Ted Sorensen talking
together said, "Well, if the President will appoint a commission to make
a thorough investigation of Viet Nam and then report back to the President
and if that could then be a public report," and although it was not quite
so clear the strong presumption was that the President
would agree to follow the recommendations of
such a report, that Senator Robert Kennedy felt that if the President would
agree to do that, then Senator Kennedy would have met his obligation to
his country and he could advise all these people who are urging him to
run that there was now no occasion for him to run because President Johnson
was going to go ahead on a plan which he felt could very well lead to peace.
M: Was Senator Robert
Kennedy envisioning a role for himself on this commission; did he
make that clear?
C: There
was some ambiguity. I had a written memorandum with reference to that hearing,
and it seems to me that there was some ambiguity. At one time earlier in
the meeting I got the distinct impression that Senator Kennedy expected
to be a member, but by the time our meeting ended, which may have lasted
an hour or hour and a half, I got the impression that he thought better
of it as he had thought it over while we talked. But they listed a number
of persons who would have to be members of the commission. It wasn't that
the President would appoint a commission of his own choosing; these were
the men he would have to appoint and in effect he would have to abide by
the decision on Viet Nam reached by these men hand-picked by Senator Robert
Kennedy.
M: So
it did have overtones of an ultimatum in that sense.
C: I
was never in any doubt that what it was an ultimatum. It just seemed as
clear to me as it could be. That if the President were to follow this course
of action he would stay out of the race; if the President chose not to
follow this course of action then, without saying it definitely, the inference
was that the pressures would be irresistible on Senator Robert Kennedy
to get into the race. So when it was over I phoned the President and said
I would want to talk with him and deliver a full report on this matter.
I made some quick notes after they left so I'd be sure to have all the
different facets. I went to the White House about the mid afternoon, which
was when the President was free to see me. We talked the matter over at
great length, and the President's attitude was that this is just an abandonment
of his responsibility as President of the United States. The President
of the United States can't select a group of citizens--
M: Chosen by somebody
else.
C: Hand-picked
by somebody else, and apparently agree in advance that these men could
come in, study a problem, make a recommendation which would in turn be
the President's decision. The President obviously was just as right as
he could be. You wouldn't need a President of the United States if that's
the way our government worked.
M: You'd
run the government by committee.
C: You'd
run it by committee and by series of committees selected by different Senators
in the United States Senate. So all the decisions would be made on that
basis. So the President was very clear in his own mind, I think, right
through the entire discussion, and it was talked out in great detail that
he could not possibly continue to meet his responsibility as President
and agree to any such offer; and whatever result might ensue from his refusal
to comply with the suggestion, he would just have to face up to that. That
is also part of the responsibility of a President of the United States.
So I was instructed to call Senator Kennedy, or I think my instructions
were to call Ted Sorensen, that's the way we had left it. Ted Sorensen
said he would be in Senator Robert Kennedy's office and whenever I had
gotten the President's answer I should phone him. I left the President's
office, went to another private office, got Ted Sorensen on the phone.
He was then in Senator Robert Kennedy's office, and he said, "Well, wait
just a minute; Bobby is here, and I'll put him on an extension." So they
were both on the phone when I reported to them the President's reaction,
and I may have taken ten minutes or so to do it. I went through the Presidentts
reasoning right down the line, the result of which I thought to reasonably
objective men was inescapable; but I wanted them to know that his rejection
was not a casual or cavalier one, but that he'd given it thought and here
was his reaction and here was his decision. They listened, they asked a
question or two, and the general purport of their remarks is well, this
is too bad because this would have been a way to have avoided what now
appeared to be a major conflict and controversy that lay ahead.
M: This
also coincides roughly with the time the speech of March 31 was prepared,
and of course there's been considerable speculation in the press and elsewhere
about the circumstances behind that. Perhaps you could clear up--
C: This
was a good deal earlier, it seems to me, than that. Your file will show
clearly. I think the visit from Senator Robert Kennedy must have come within
the first two weeks of March; that would be my off-hand recollection.
M: So
it would be the two weeks prior to the March 31 speech.
C: Whereas
the speech, of course as you know, was on March 31. The early stages of
the preparation of that speech which I suppose clearly is the most important
speech that President Johnson made in five years, is shrouded in some mystery
as far as I am concerned. It seems to me long toward the middle of March
I had some consciousness that a speech was being considered. I certainly
didn't see a draft. I think when I first saw a draft, which may have been
the third week or fourth week in March, I think Harry McPherson told me
it was the sixth draft of the speech. I know we were thinking along the
lines of the President reaching a decision and making a decision known
to the American people because all this time there was pending he request
of the military for this very substantial additional increment of troops,
and the President was going through the process of thinking it out before
reaching a decision. In the middle of March, sometime around the middle,
maybe between the fifteenth and the twentieth or somewhere in there, the
President made two speeches. One of them seemed to me was out in Iowa.
One of them was some place else, and they were really very hard-nosed speeches.
They were stern, they were facing up to the commitment that we had made,
which incidentally, let me say parenthetically, I believe was another area
of some disagreement between Secretary Rusk and me. He felt very strongly
that we had a positive, inescapable obligation under the SEATO agreement
to come to the aid of any signatory to the SEATO agreement or any protocol
nation. South Viet Nam had not been a signatory but it was a protocol,
and I never quite could get myself to go along with that. It was a different
interpretation than the other signatories of SEATO placed upon that particular
document. Returning to the two speeches in the middle part of March, they
were very determined speeches; we were to meet our responsibility, they
were in effect, something of a restatement of our intention to seek and
achieve military victory in Viet Nam. I was deeply concerned about those
two speeches.
M: Do
you know who wrote those, incidentally?
C: I
do not, I do not.
M: I just wondered
if McPherson--
C: Nol I don't know.
I would think it was entirely possible that Mr. Walt Rostow had a hand
in them because he naturally would. They would fall in his field within
the White House, but I didn't ever remember seeing either of those speeches
before they were made. But by the time those two speeches were made I had
the strongest feeling that we ought to be moving in the other direction,
and it looked as though this was the kind of setback from which, perhaps,
we could not recover. I would say that in the last week in March I saw
the first draft, maybe it was the week before, say the twenty-third, fourth
or fifth of March. The speech I saw, the draft I saw, was a very hard speech.
M: Another
in the line.
C: Another
very much like the two that had been given around the middle of March.
Determined, calling on the American people for unity behind this effort,
an effort to justify the sacrifice of lives and treasure that we had already
spent in South Viet Nam. And I was afraid that we were heading down that
same road that we'd been going down. And I believed so deeply the time
had come to get off that road and get on another road. So about three days
before the thirty-first of March, again this has been written about, we
met for a speech conference in the office of Secretary Rusk, and there
were present Walt Rostow, William Bundy, Harry McPherson, Secretary Rusk,
and I. I think we met about ten o'clock in the morning and the purpose
of the meeting was to go over the speech and polish it and then later I
suppose the next day or so I had a meeting with the President. As we got
into the speech, it seemed to me to be more and more warlike. Again, it
was stern and unbending and I remember taking the position on that occasion
that I thought it would be a calamity for the President to make that speech.
M: Were you alone
in that view?
C: I
had the feeling that Harry McPherson supported that view. In a meeting
of that kind Harry could not speak out very well, as just an Administrative
Assistant at the White House. But I remember stating that after we'd been
through the whole speech and talked about it a good deal and instead of
taking it up page by page, which was the plan, we just let it lie on the
table and got into this very spirited discussion about what we hoped to
accomplish--that is, what we hoped the President could accomplish--by the
speech. And I recall making the statement that this was a speech about
war, and what I thought the President should do was make a speech about
peace. I now knew after what I'd gone through the preceding twenty-seven
days, and I went into that in some detail, that we were headed down a road
that had no end, if what we were going to do was go after military victory.
I went into that in some detail, and I think it was persuasive and then
here we were just talking about the President going further down that road,
sending more men to Viet Nam. There's going to just be more American boys
killed. I suggested that
when we announced, as we would have to, another
200,000 were going, I thought that probably the enemy would match it, they'd
put another 200,000 in, and the war machine would continue to crush and
destroy these young men. Then we'd have to raise the ante and I guess they'd
call us, and this was the road down which we were going. So instead of
our spending an hour or an hour and a half polishing the speech, I remember
we stayed right there for luncheon and continued on with the debate on
into the middle afternoon and the late afternoon. It was a curious, curious
meeting and everybody got in it, everybody had a chance to say his piece
and by the time that day ended I believe that speech had changed to where
it was hardly recognizable. And Secretary Rusk, although deeply troubled
by it, by the whole debate that had taken place, indicated his general
approval of this shift in direction. That was enormously important, because
I feel that President Johnson very likely would not have made the change
in policy had not Secretary Rusk been broad enough and intelligent enough
to have swung around on it. The idea was, McPherson was to work that night
and get up another draft based on a lot of the discussion we'd had that
day and he did so. And I think we met with the President
the next day, and I think the President had two
drafts by that time--
M: Excuse
me. When did the idea for stopping the bombing above a certain point creep
into this consideration?
C: It
was discussed that day and there had been some previous discussion of it,
and I felt it had been discarded. There'd been discussion all along about
not sending any more men, cutting back the bombing, considering a number
of different decisions that would indicate that the President was moving
toward negotiation instead of continuing down the road of only military
force.
M: But
this was back in there by the time it got to a draft to the President the
next morning?
C: It
was in there, right. And the fact is we actually had it in the draft at
one time that the twentieth parallel, that the President would stop the
bombing north of the twentieth parallel and then State came along saying
that was too clear-cut and would be too clear a signal, they could move
right up to the twentieth parallel and then State's desire was that that
language be not so clear, but that it be left in such a posture that we
would have some degree of flexibility. I should have fought harder against
that latter notion because it caused a great deal of confusion and almost
got the whole affair off the track because of the different manner in which
different people interpreted the language of the limited bombing halt.
But finally by the time we got another draft and began to meet with the
President there was coming into existence a degree of unanimity regarding
the position the President should take that I think was very comforting
to him. Any President is worried by differences between his senior advisers,
and President Johnson was deeply concerned at the differences that existed
between Secretary Rusk and me. Let me reiterate, those were not personal
differences. They were, however, deep-seated differences in our attitude
toward policy.
M: But
if you can agree to recommend this course of action, I can see it would
be very comforting.
C: This
was comforting to him because we were able to report to the President,
I think the next day, that we'd spent almost that other full day on the
draft, that it was felt it was better to work on another draft rather than
to try to go through that draft that had been handed to us, that there
was now another draft. He had two drafts in his possession and it was recommended
by both Secretary Rusk and me. He took the lead in this, that we devote
our attention to what we'll call draft number 2. And that was done, the
President accepted it, we went through lots of conversation about how we
happened to agree on this, why this was that and so forth and so on, and
that then became the speech.
M: After the speech
was made and was favorably received by Hanoi, was there any question at
all during the difficulties over arranging a site as to whether or not
we would go ahead with the talks and get engaged in something serious with
the North Vietnamese?
C: During that month
that took us--there were mutterings and grumblings on the part of some
that the talks were never going to lead anyplace and that it was a mistake
to suggest even the lessening of military pressure on the enemy.
M: That's
the important point through the rest of the period, really.
C: There were still
those who felt, and I think to this day feel, that the only course of action
was to keep the enemy under constant unceasing pressure militarily and
that would finally force some type of capitulation. The trouble with that
theory in my opinion was that that's what we'd been doing for so many years.
M: Really no change.
C: That's
what we did, and started doing in '65 when we began to get troops in there
in substantial number, we did it all through '66, all through '67, we started
the same thing in 68. Then the Tet hit us and all, and I thought we'd had
enough of that particular course of action. It had not produced results
before despite the most sanguine and optimistic predictions from time to
time by those who would visit Viet Nam.
M: When
the North Vietnamese reduced their military activity, for example, as they've
apparently done again recently, during the summer of 1968, was there advice
to the President to stop the bombing entirely then as a reciprocal gesture
on our part?
C: The enemy launched
an August-September offensive in 1968. It really did not get off the ground.
We had a good deal of advance information about it. General Abrams was
very effective in keeping the enemy off-balance, but they started to mount
this offensive and I think he just kept them in such a position that they
really didn't ever get it started. After that so-called August-September
offensive, they withdrew. They withdrew some units even back up into North
Viet Nam; they withdrew some over into Laos and Cambodia. I know at that
time Ambassador Harriman, who was in close contact with the North Vietnamese
through Xuan Thuy and Ha Van Lau in Paris, thought then and still feels
to this day that that was a signal that Hanoi was giving us that if we
would reciprocate, then we might really begin to get some place in the
peace negotiations. Now he reaches that conclusion because of the personal
talks that he had and it's entirely possible that he's right. I don't know
because I wasn't having talks with those men in Paris, we had to rely on
his judgment, but in any event, there was no change in our posture in the
fall of '68.
The instructions to our military commanders were
still to maintain incessant pressure on the enemy.
M: Which
you've said in your article that we talked about earlier should now be
rescinded; was there a good reason for not rescinding them in the fall
of '68?
C: Well,
yes. The fact is and this is a matter of interest, in the fall of '68 and
through that summer, there were those who were urging the President to
call a halt to this business in Paris. It was proving to be a snare and
a delusion. No progress was being made they contended, which was correct.
Hanoi would not even agree to permit a Saigon representative to sit at
the table, and therefore we could not get into discussions of substantive
matters; there were only procedural questions being discussed. So some
became impatient and said this isn't getting anywhere. This is typical
of the way Hanoi would handle it. This is a stall; they're getting a lot
of benefit from this partial cessation of the bombing, they're building
all their forces up, they're rebuilding bridges and roads and factories
and so forth that had been destroyed, so this suits them fine. Now, let's
recognize that we've been entrapped and let's get back to the bombing and
let's turn the pressure on them again because that's the only way we'll
get anywhere. So those of us who believed we were on the right course were
fighting all the time to hold what we had gained, so that we might not
slip back down the hill. We weren't making much progress going up the hill
but we were fighting hard to hold that degree of progress that we'd already
attained. Now then later on in October the discussions start and we had
very spirited times then about stopping all the bombing.
M: The delay--you
mention a three-week delay between the thirteenth and the thirty-first
roughly, during which time Saigon was not wanting to come and so on, but
was that delay perhaps longer than it might have been or could have been
before the final halt was made. It's very important from a domestic political
standpoint, particularly, that it took so long.
C: Yes,
in there--let me give you this view of it. It was--perhaps the record shows--maybe
it was the thirteenth of October for the first time Hanoi indicated through
its representatives in Paris, that it was willing to permit a representative
of the Saigon government to come in and join the conferences and that discussions
of substantive matters could start. That was a great lift to us, we were
all delighted. Finally the time had come after months and months--it went
clear back to May--during which the parties had been going through the
motions but no real progress. Now there was a factor in there that does
not seem important now but was really very important then. Hanoi wanted
a substantial period of time to pass between the stopping of all the bombing
in North Viet Nam and the beginning of substantive discussions. My recollection
is they wanted two weeks--two or three weeks--to pass. The reason for that
was they did not want the stopping of the bombing to be tied in with the
beginning of substantive talks because they had said over and over a hundred
times, you see, that you've got to stop the bombing without any understanding
from us--
M: Unconditionally.
C: That's
right. There will be no quid pro quo. If you once stop the bombing, then
we will discuss with you what will follow then, but we'll make no agreement
with you. Well, they finally decided they could reach an understanding
with us but they didn't want it to appear as though those two important
occurrences were connected. President Johnson on the other hand was placed
in an impossible position by that, because we'd been saying all along that
the bombing, certainly south of the twentieth parallel, was important in
protecting our men, those up at I Corps. And he did not feel that he could
stop the bombing and say absolutely nothing to the American people and
have everybody say, "Well, what are you stopping the bombing for?" "Well,
I just decided to stop the bombing," and then two or three weeks later
announce, "Well, now wetre going to start some talks." He felt he had to
associate them. So the debate went on for ten or twelve days or two weeks
in there. They say start with two weeks--he wanted twenty-four hours, he
wanted to say, "I'm stopping the bombing tomorrow, Wednesday, and on Thursday
the talks start," and they said, "No."
M: And ultimately
that agreement was reached then.
C: Finally
the agreement got down to the point--the record will show this--where he
was going to stop the bombing on November 1 and the talks were to start
I believe on November 6, which I think was the day after the election.
And that's his coming up from twenty-four hours to five days, and their
coming from two weeks down to five days. It perhaps seems a little foolish
now, but it was not foolish then, because he wanted very much to get them
to agree to permit Saigon to be present and to get the substantive talks
started and this was a complete block to it because of their time factor.
M: And
nobody thought the South VIetnamese would throw a monkey wrench in at that
point, is that right?
C: The South Vietnamese
were kept informed on a daily basis as to exactly what was going on. They
knew every facet of it. As we began to make progress--by progress Hanoi
began to say well, not two weeks, thirteen days, then twelve days, then
eleven days--it's
very difficult dealing with them. The Saigon
government was kept posted all the time and as we were making progress
we could begin to see that finally we're going to get to some point to
where we could agree. So, a statement even was prepared for release in
Saigon and release in Washington, exactly the same wording, announcing
the day that the bombing was to stop and that the substantive talks were
to begin and that the Saigon government was to have a representative there.
And I remember specifically that they had some suggestion at the first
about the wording and then it was all arranged and the only one other point
they had was, would it be all right in our release in Saigon, if instead
of saying the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, could
we reverse the order and put the Saigon government first, and the United
States second. And we said, "Sure!"
M: A very minor point.
C: Inconsequential. That was the only one point, and we said, "Sure,
in our statement here we'd naturally put the United States first and the
Saigon government second but in your statement you put the Saigon government
first and the United States second." And as soon as the cables went back
and forth on that everything was set and I had the feeling then that an
exceedingly important major step had been taken and that the announcement
would be made, then the talks were to get started and we were really headed
down the right road, we were certainly off that other road we'd been on.
M: Then it
all blew up.
C: It all blew up because the President was to announce this very important
development on the evening of October 31 and it was either the late afternoon
the day before or the morning of that day, somewhere along in there, suddenly
out of a clear sky the Saigon government says no. It was the day before.
They said, "No, we can't agree to the timetable," was their first excuse.
And they said "the reason we can't agree to it is that we cannot get a
delegation to Paris by November 6, so we can't agree to it so we must not
go on with it." So the message shot right back there saying, "Well, that
isn't important, you can let your Ambassador in Paris at least attend the
first meeting, then pass it for a week or whatever period you want and
get your delegation there." Which was an obvious answer, and to which they
had no real reply, so they came back--the next cable my recollection is
had three additional objections to it. One, they said on thinking it over
we've decided that we must take this up with our National Security Council
before we can agree to it. Second, we must not make this decision without
recalling our Ambassador in
Paris back to talk it over with him, and third, also on further reflection
we think this should be taken up with the legislative branch.
M: Did
our people think by this time there might, as has been alleged, some Republican
activity in dealing with the South Vietnamese government, hoping to get
them to take this delaying tactic?
C: At the very first, no. Within a day or two thereafter, it seems
to me, evidence began to appear that the Saigon government was in contact
with persons in this country who were persuading them--maybe the word is
pressure instead of persuade--that this whole matter should be sabotaged.
The man who knows that story in all its details and ramifications is President
Johnson.
M: It
came to him direct.
C: He got the information direct. He had talks with some leading Republicans
that nobody else had, and the sensitive nature of that whole proceeding
was such that I never did know all the details. I knew enough of it--I
was told enough by him and others that a very determined effort was being
made by certain elements in this country to sabotage the beginning of the
substantive peace talks in Paris.
M: Is
this other than the Madame Chennault one, which is fairly well known?
C: No, that's the one I am referring to.
M: That is the one,
dealing through the Nationalist Chinese, I presume.
C: How she dealt I do not know, but it came to the President's attention
that she was very much involved. Now in whose behalf she was acting, the
President would be more likely to know about that than anybody else.
M: You
have been quite patient, and I don't want to keep you much longer this
afternoon, and on Viet Nam you've told me everything I think that's not
in one of your several articles. You did make a number of speeches in 1968
sort of pressuring Saigon to come on and get the table shape business settled.
Were any of those inspired by or cleared through President Johnson?
C: No,
they were not formal speeches. Toward the end of 1968, I was deeply disturbed
at what was taking place. We'd worked awfully hard to get the substantive
peace talks going. They were the hope. They could end the killing in Viet
Nam and here now the Saigon government was dragging its feet. First, when
we were so anxious for them to send the delegation to Paris so we could
get the talks started they delayed day after day after day, weeks went
by, and they wouldn't even send the delegation. And all the time American
boys were dying in Viet Nam. I went on a television program and I think
I also had a press conference and in the press conference one might say
I was critical of the Saigon government. It wasn't worded in such a manner,
I think, as to be characterized denigrating but what I did was go through
the facts with reference to the understanding we had with them, the details
even of agreeing on the wording of the joint release and why suddenly without
there being a recognizable excuse they decided not to send the delegation.
M: But
you did this on your own authority?
C: I did it on my
own and then even after they sent a delegation then they got there and
day after day and week after week was spent on the shape of the table.
So again I went to the TV medium and again, as I recall, I had a press
conference and I think that maybe some of the wording was pretty stern
about the fact that they couldn't agree on the shape of the table; and
all during the time they couldn't agree on that, American boys were dying
in Viet Nam and that we as a nation had to make up our minds about what
our policy was going to be, and I did not think that we could get ourselves
in a position where we were subject to a veto by the Saigon government,
and that's the position we were in. This was a matter of the deepest concern
to the Saigon government. They hated the appearances that made and
were very concerned about it--
M: President Johnson
didn't object?
C: President
Johnson at no time said he either approved or disapproved. When he was
asked at a press conference one time, I think his answer was merely that
"Secretary Clifford has a right to state his own views on matters of this
kind." Vice President Ky of South Viet Nam was very disturbed. His answer
was, "Well, this is typical because Clifford had shown a propensity for
saying the wrong thing at the wrong time," and from his standpoint I'm
sure it was. It is my hope that it helped the American people understand
what I had come to see as clearly as any equation I have ever seen, and
that is by the end of 1968 the goal of the Saigon government was utterly
antithetical to the goal of the United States. One, the Saigon government
did not want the war to end. Number two, they did not want
the Americans to pull out. Number three, they
did not want to make any settlement of any kind with Hanoi or with the
Viet Cong or the NLF. They preferred it the way they were. With 540,000
American troops--they were in no danger whatsoever, and if we stayed there
long enough ultimately perhaps we could exhaust Hanoi and then maybe they
wouldn't have to make any settlement at all. In addition to that, when
you've got 540,000 troops in a country and thousands of civilians, it's
just as though you had a golden pump running, and were pumping the money
in there, and they certainly all liked that fine. And the whole concept
was, don't let these
fellows either get us to Paris, don't let the
talks start, delay in every way you can, so that it is my conviction today
that the Saigon government does not want to make any settlement. That's
why I recommended in the article and that's why I'm absolutely convinced
beyond doubt they will never try honestly to make a settlement with the
enemy until they know we definitely are going to pull out and that's why
I think it's important to tell them, "Here's our timetable, South Vietnamese,
100,000 combat troops out in '69, all the rest of our combat troops out
in '70, and this is it no matter what. So now that you know it, get to
work and make a settlement." And I believe that they have a very good chance
of making a settlement but they'll never give any consideration to a settlement
as long as there is some hope that a development will take place that will
cause our country to say, "Well, I guess we'd better leave our troops there
for awhile."
M: That's about as
good a summary as I could think of you could give on Viet Nam, and that
exhausts our interest in the Viet Nam topic.