G: Let me ask you
about pacification. g. How would you define the pacification program?
B:Well, the pacification
program had two sides at least to it. One was the question of the hamlet
and village security. That was the primary objective. The second objective,
also equally important, was the economic aspect. And third, the political.
So that pacification was, you see, a well-rounded program in which the
rural self-defense forces were involved, training of civilians in defense.
Economic development was equally important. And you remember the village
elections, council elections, were held all over the country also beginning
in 1967. So that it was the development of a conscious part in the government
of the people at the local level that really was involved in the pacification
program, self-help program. (Interruption)
G: Let me ask you
about the CORDS program, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support, as part of pacification. Do you recall that?
B:Yes. Oh, yes, very
well. That was the principal part of pacification as far as Komer was concerned
and his duties. That was really a very essential part of our whole program
in Vietnam.
G: What specifically
did this involve?
B:Self-government
at the local level. Revolutionary development is really a misnomer; rural
development would be the better [name] for it. We called it revolutionary
development, but I think we got changing it as it went along. [We called
it] revolutionary development because in the beginning it was developing
local political self-consciousness and self-government at the local level.
But the reason I say it was rural development in this other sense was it
involved agriculture, too, fisheries, agriculture, all of the economic
activities involved at the village level, at the local level. So that it
was a comprehensive program and a very important one. It involved, as I
say, security first, the training of the local citizenry. One indication
of the confidence the government had in support of the citizenry was the
fact that they distributed, if I remember correctly, six hundred thousand
weapons at large in the countryside. Well, if you felt uncertain about
the loyalty of the people, you wouldn't give them arms they could use against
you. I mean, I think it was a mark of confidence that the government had
that they had the support of the citizenry. Anyhow, that was an important
part, training both men and women, too, in this hamlet and village self-defense.
G: Did you have any
feedback to the extent or evaluation to determine if in fact that the arms
were falling into friendly hands rather than potential Viet Cong?
B: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.
Except where the Viet Cong could come in and capture them, we never had
any indication they were ever turned over to the Viet Cong.
G: How about the
Phoenix program?
B:The Phoenix program
I think was an important program in unearthing the underground. It was
criticized I know here, saying it was an assassination program. It was
not an assassination program. People were killed when they resisted arrest,
yes, of course. But the great majority of those people were imprisoned
and were not executed. There were casualties, of course, because there
was resistance, but it was an important program. You see, what happened
at Tet was, Tet was a military defeat, a very significant military defeat
for the other side, but a psychological victory for them here in the United
States because of the press reaction and the way it was reported. And that
I think is brought out by Peter Braestrup in his books. But what happened
was that the communist side was so confident that the Viet Cong surfaced
for the first time, the underground all came up and were identified, many
of them killed. I mean, [they] virtually suffered such severe losses at
Tet they never recovered from it. But it made them more vulnerable, more
identifiable, and hence the Phoenix program became more effective.
G: Was it tied into
the Chieu Hoi program at all, the returnee program?
B:Yes. Well, yes
it was, where ralliers would come in. In my earlier messages to the President,
I think every week I reported about the Chieu Hoi.
G: Do you think that
these people who came over and were evidently reimbursed for doing so and
joining the South Vietnamese army, do you think they ever slipped back
into the jungles and rejoined the Viet Cong?
B:Not many so. Maybe
a few, but not many.
G: Really? Our intelligence
indicated that--
B:That's right, they
didn't go back.
G: Did you talk to
many of these people and determine why they were changing sides?
B:I never talked
to them personally, no. Our people did, of course. Well, lots of stories
came in about the hardships and the North and the difficulty there, and
the hardships of fighting in the South, this kind of warfare they were
carrying on. Most of these Chieu Hoi people were guerrillas you know, not
many of them were the regular military who were living hand-to-mouth and
fighting in the jungles.
G: What was Edward
Lansdale's role in the pacification program?
B:Well, principally
as an adviser, based on his long experience there in that part of the world;
principally as an adviser on the local scene--which he knew, I suppose,
perhaps better than most of us, most of the people who were there; he'd
been there longer--and I think the native culture, psychology, so forth.
G: Was he controversial
in official circles?
B:Not with me or
there at the time. I think he had been at some time. But I had no problem
with him. I thought he was quite effective really.
G: Was he critical
at all of pacification, the implementation of it?
B: I don't think
he was.
G: I
gather this was one of the ARVN's weakest areas, pacification.
B:Well, it may have
been. Yes, I suppose perhaps so. They were more concerned really about
fighting the war and the enemy. However, I think they cooperated pretty
well.
G: William Corson,
who was over there, made the criticism that the pacification project should
not have to be cleared through the Vietnamese officials. Do you recall
this issue?
B:Corson? Now, when
was this, do you remember?
G: This would have
been I think in the 1967-68 period.
B: I don't even remember,
was Corson stationed there?
G: He
was with the marines. He was a . . . .
B:Oh, yes, marines.
In the North. That's interesting, shouldn't have to be cleared with the
Vietnamese? I'd forgotten that. That's interesting. Do you remember how
that came out?
G: He wrote a book
called The Betrayal.
B: That's right,
that's right. I haven't read it. Have you read it?
G: No.
I have some notes on it here though.
B:What was the thrust
of it?
G: Well, I'm not
going to elaborate, since I haven't read it, but I gather he was critical
of Komer's performance.
B: Komer's handling
of it?
G: Also another issue
that seems to have been raised was the method of evaluation of various
hamlets.
B:Hamlet evaluation
security, yes.
G: The A-B-C-D [rating
system].
B:A-B-C-D, yes. A-B-C-D
and the communists. Yes, well, like all evaluations it's inexact, of course.
It's an approximation, really. But it was an approximation and gave a pretty
good idea I think of the general situation. I say, like all evaluations
based on judgments, it was not exact, but it did by 1972, end of 1972,
you could travel anywhere in the country you wanted to go without any security
protection or anything at all.
G: The press argued
at the time that the C category, which was the designation of hamlets under
government control, were really sort of a toss-up and would thereby in
the evaluation total reduce the government control to less than 50 per
cent of the population.
B:Well, depending
on I think what year you took the evaluation, because the situation kept
changing steadily for the better.
G: Did it?
B: Yes.
G: Was this a direct
result of pacification, do you think, rather than just military advances?
B: It
was a combination of both. No question, a combination of both. The military
situation improved and the pacification situation.
G: What did we learn
from that pacification experience that you would apply in other situations?
B:Well, I think we
did learn the importance of getting the local population people involved
in their own situation, not only their own protection, their own economic
development, their own political development. This was the whole thrust
of the pacification program. It was government at the local level involving
defense, involving the political situation, involving the local councils,
hamlet chiefs, and the local economic development programs. So it was a
rounded approach. I think it applies not only to Vietnam but to other situations
in the less developed world.
G: It seems that
apathy was a great problem, that so many of the Vietnamese people were
not interested in the Viet Cong or the other side, but on the other hand
they seemed apathetic about the Thieu-Ky government.
B:A great bulk would
prefer to be left alone, obviously. I mean, prefer not to be involved in
the war on one side or the other. But I think this is true anywhere in
the world you go. I mean, many of them just wished the war would go away.
Sure, no question.