G: Let's go on into
the subject of Tet. Let me ask you first of all if you had any significant
warnings of Tet, of the offensive ahead of time?
B: Yes.
We had warning that the enemy was preparing for an offensive, but we didn't
have the timing pinpointed. The fact that he was preparing was well known,
and we were preparing accordingly to meet it. But the nature of the offensive,
particularly the timing of the offensive, we didn't have hard information
on that. But we did know, we did expect an offensive was coming and did
make some preparations to meet it, particularly in III Corps. General [Frederick]
Weyand had command there and pulled back his troops in order to strengthen
the defenses of Saigon and that part of the country, which is very fortunate
that he did.
G: Weren't they being
ordered away at just that time? Wasn't it almost a fortunate circumstance
that--
B: Well,
he withdrew the troops, pulled back his troops, because we knew an offensive
was coming for some time. I say, we didn't know the day it was coming,
but we knew it would be coming. It was a matter of I think very good judgment
on his part.
G: What
about the cancellation of the truce in I Corps?
B: Well,
after the attack?
G: I
thought it was right before the attack, a day or two before.
B: I
don't know, I've forgotten that.
G: Didn't
the Viet Cong attack a day early in some areas of I Corps?
B: It's
possible. I don't recall it now. I think it was. There was continual pressure
on I Corps anyway at that time. I Corps and III Corps were places where
there was strong enemy pressure as well as some up in the highlands in
II Corps. Of course, with Tet the pressure came everywhere.
G: Do
you recall your first awareness that the offensive was being launched?
B: Yes,
I was in bed when it was launched about one o'clock in the morning, three
in the morning, whenever it was. The marines woke me and told me that Saigon
was being attacked, and took me out of the house in an armed personnel
carrier to a safe house, the security people's safe house in Saigon, where
I could keep in touch with Westmoreland and everybody else to know what
was going on.
G: Were
you in touch at all with the Chancellery during this period?
B: I don't recall
that I was in communication with the Chancellery, except as I got information
through Westmoreland or Colonel [George] Jacobson. He was holed up in his
house in the compound itself. But I kept in touch with the military and
with what was going on and the progress.
G: Did
most of it come through General Westmoreland's office?
B: Yes, yes.
G: Did
you report back to Washington during the time of the siege?
B: Not during the
siege itself, not until morning. I didn't personally report to Washington
until, well, I guess it was the morning of the [attack]. I suppose I got
out of the safe house around nine or ten o'clock I guess, went back to
my own house, found it full of tear gas.
G: Oh,
really?
B: Yes.
G: Why
was that?
B: Well, we'd let
some tear gas go in case the enemy got in.
G: Oh,
I see.
B: The marine guards
were in the house and I had a safe there with classified material in it,
and they burned up the material, burned my briefcase in the process.
G: Really?
B: Some holes in
it, I've still got it; it's in the attic. I came back. There wasn't much
tear gas in it, it's enough just to smart your eyes and so forth. [I] changed
my clothes and went down to the Embassy. Then we got word off pretty promptly
to Washington.
G: Was
there much damage done to the Chancellery?
B: No.
Very little. They blew a hole in the wall, you know, got in through the
wall.
G: You know, to me
an amazing thing is that after they got inside the wall they didn't attack
the main building really, did they?
B: They
tried to get into it, but they didn't succeed.
G: Anything
else on the attack on the Embassy itself?
B: Well,
the attackers were killed. There were twenty-one of them.
G: Well, now I thought
one or two were captured.
B: Yes, I guess you're
right. I guess a couple of them were captured. Yes, I think that's correct.
G: That was going to be my next question. What happened to the one or two
that were captured, do you recall?
B: Well, I don't
know, other than their interrogation. You see, it was a very well coordinated
and very well planned attack, but the enemy's expectations were disappointed
because it was clear that they had hoped for a general uprising of the
people and felt that there would be defections from the ARVN forces as
well as from the populace generally.
G: Do
you think they also expected more support from North Vietnam than they
received?
B: No,
I think they got plenty of support from North Vietnam.
G: Really?
B: It was a combined
North Vietnamese attack with conventional weapons and supported by the
Viet Cong. The Viet Cong surfaced at that time for the first time really,
generally all over the country, and were identified. And consequently it
made their eradication much easier in the long run. Westmoreland's theory
is that we won the war then in 1968. In a sense I think he's right because
the enemy did get a very severe setback and had to recast their plans.
It took them four years again to mount another major offensive; 1968 to
1972 was the next big offensive. I mean, they kept on trying in 1968 in
various places, but never country-wide again until 1972.
G: Did
you learn anything about the raid on the Embassy from the interrogations
of the
captives?
B: I
don't recall anything specifically.
G: Did
they have inside help?
B: No.
Well, I say no. I think there was one instance of a driver who was suspected,
yes, and was picked up. That's the only instance that I'm aware of.
G: Surely
with all of the mobilization going on right before these widespread attacks
more people knew where it was coming and when it was coming than seemed
to have told. I'm just wondering why there was no more alarm sounded than
there was.
B: Well, I think
that probably it's because of the fact that there never had been an attack
on Tet and it was generally assumed that the Tet truce would be observed.
That even the other side would respect the Tet truce, which proved to be
incorrect, of course. One result of Tet--a minor result--was the fact that
I finally got a good secure bunker. (Laughter)
G: The
South Vietnamese were really charged with protecting the Embassy, weren't
they? I mean, wasn't that a part of their role?
B: Well,
we had security people there at the Embassy. We had our own security people,
too.
G: I
mean, in terms of the defense arrangements in Saigon, weren't they charged
with the [protection of the Embassy]?
B: Oh, with Saigon
itself, yes. But we had also our own security people at the Embassy.
G: Well,
in [Don] Oberdorfer's book on Tet [Tet!] he describes the laxity of the
Vietnamese police around the Embassy at the time of the attack.
B: Yes.
They were not very effective. That's right.
G: Were changes made
as a result of this to beef up the [security]?
B: Yes.
G: What
specifically did you do?
B: Well,
the Vietnamese government shook up their own police outfit. Our security
people were on the job, there was no problem with them, but the problem
was with the Vietnamese and trying to get the police battalion commander,
who had charge of the Embassy being in his area, as I recall, [and was]
quite lax about reacting, slow to react and loath to react in a good many
cases. I brought about a change in that situation.
G: Was it a sustained
improvement?
B: Yes.
G: What
were the communists trying to accomplish in the Tet offensive?
B: Oh,
the collapse of the Vietnamese government. I think there's no question
that they felt this was the major push, really going to bring them success
and victory. I think there's no question, from prisoners, everybody else,
the testimony that was taken, that they were convinced there would be an
uprising of the people who would come over to their side, and that there
would be desertions among the military and that the Thieu government would
collapse.
G: To
what extent was the offensive a surprise? You mentioned earlier that you
knew that it was coming but not when.
B: Yes.
It was the timing that was a surprise, really, not the fact of it. But
certainly the timing was misjudged.
G: Do you think the
fact that they failed to be able to broadcast over the Saigon radio made
a difference in terms of popular uprising. Or do you think that even if
they had been able to gain control over the airways that there would have
been no more popular support?
B: No. No. No, I
think, as I said the other day, there were no instances or very few instances
where people on the South Vietnam government side went over to the North.
They voted with their feet and they ran away from the communists. That's
why we had so many refugee problems to deal with.
G: What
was the impact of the Tet offensive on the U.S. personnel in the Mission?
B: I think the impact
of the Tet offensive was to make U.S. personnel realize that the problem
was probably going to be bigger and more difficult than we had anticipated
beforehand, that obviously there was a great deal of damage done throughout
the country as a whole. There would have to be a period of reconstruction
and repair. The effect on the morale, the attitude of the personnel was
extremely positive. I mean, they were all more determined than ever to
get on with the job and to get in to it and did with great energy and great
vigor.
G: What
sort of effect did it have on the minds of the South Vietnamese people?
B: Well, there again,
I say there were no defections. I think the South Vietnamese people as
a whole stood firm on the government side, and I think also set about the
task of rebuilding with a great deal of vigor and a great deal of energy.
There was a lot of rebuilding of course by the people themselves, it wasn't
just a government project. The people were brought into it, were given
supplies, roofing, siding, timber, [that] sort of thing, to rebuild their
own houses and did in a very big way and in a relatively short period of
time. We did set up a joint US-GVN team which was headed up for a while
by [Nguyen Cao] Ky to get on with the pacification job and the reconstruction
that was needed in that area.
G: How
did President Thieu respond to the Tet crisis?
B: I think he responded
well. He certainly didn't lose his nerve and set about the organization
of the recovery program very well.
G: Do
you recall your meetings with him during this?
B: Oh, yes. We met,
and I recall particularly joint meetings we had with him, Westmoreland,
Komer, our political counselor, our AID people, and with him and Ky and
some of his own people, to lay out plans for the organization of the recovery
program and the pacification program. We worked very closely together and
very well together I think.
G: Weren't some of
the South Vietnamese commanders replaced as a result of their lackluster
performance in Tet?
B: I think some of
them were replaced. I'd have to refresh my memory on that. They were replaced
from time to time. I'd say there was no wholesale replacement certainly,
and I think one or two of them may have been replaced then. But later as
we went on, there were replacements made in the interest of greater effectiveness
and efficiency. There was concern here--I remember in the 1972 offensive,
the siege of An Loc and III Corps. An Loc was out toward the border, surrounded
by a much larger force of communists and put on a remarkable defense, but
there was dissatisfaction here at the slowness of General [Tran Van "Little"]
Minh in his relief operations and pressure to replace him. Minh was an
able general but apt to be cautious, and we felt too cautious. I think
he was finally replaced. But the siege was lifted. Our general who was
in command in III Corps--I'll think of his name I hope before we get through--was
quite a character, a very able fellow,
but a great admirer of what the Vietnamese had
done at An Loc. He said to someone, "It's the greatest victory in the history
of warfare." (Laughter) He's living in Texas now, I must really find out.
G: He
is in Texas you say?
B: He's
retired and living in Texas I think. Oh, gosh. I'll get his name.
G: Apparently
there were rumors of U.S.-Vietnam collusion during Tet and perhaps these
were promoted by the Viet Cong broadcasts and whatnot. But you went on
radio or television I think in Vietnam and refuted it.
B: Yes.
G: Do you recall
the circumstances here?
B: No.
I do not.
G: Well, first of
all, do you think many South Vietnamese believed these rumors to begin
with?
B: I don't
think so.
G: Really?
B: No.
G: Did
you ever get any suggestion from the South Vietnamese government officials
that they suspected it?
B: No.
G: Someone evidently,
one of our diplomats, in an interview with Thieu heard him say something
to the effect that we had to have more knowledge ahead of time about it.
Do you recall Thieu ever expressing this?
B: That
we must have had more?
G: Yes.
B: No,
I don't.
G: He never said
that to you?
B: No.
He never said it to me and there was no reason why we should have had more
advanced knowledge than they. They ought to have been able to have as much
or more than we, being Vietnamese, but they didn't have any better information
on the timing than we did.
G: Well,
how did you make the decision to publicly deny the rumors?
B: Well,
I thought if the rumors were allowed to spread that they might have some
effect, but I wanted to make it clear that as far as we had any knowledge
at all, there was no truth in the report, and that it was obviously spread
by the enemy to try to undermine our morale.
G: What
was the President's reaction to Tet?
B: Well, from my
vantage point, which was remote, I think the President's reaction was very
strong. I'm sure he must have been disturbed by all the reports that he
got about it, but certainly never gave us any indication of any wavering
on his part as to what we were doing or the purpose of our being there.
So I mean I would say that while I think the President like everybody else
was concerned by what had happened, by the extent of the damage and also
naturally in the first few days, wondering what effect this might have
on the South Vietnamese, on their morale, and on their determination. But
certainly I think all of us who were there were at pains to reassure the
President and our people here at home that we felt, as I've said, that
the enemy suffered a very severe blow, a very severe defeat, very heavy
losses, lack of success anywhere. Of course, it took a longer time to get
the enemy out of Hue up in the north, that was the toughest spot, up there.
It did take
a longer time, but in all the rest of the country
within a few days the enemy were out of the cities and out of the towns.
G: Did
you advocate any changes in U.S. policy or strategy as a result of the
offensive?
B: I
don't think so. I think I felt that we were on the right track as far as
our program, the contents of our program went, on pacification, on the
economy. We had problems, of course, as one has in wartime anywhere. We
had problems of inflation; we had economic problems as well as military
ones. But I felt that the course we had charted was a correct one, and
if we stuck to it we could come through successfully, that of all, of course,
the crucial factor there was whether the public here would support the
war effort. But I felt that what we had laid out there was a good course,
a right one, and could succeed.
G: There
were reports at the time that after Tet you pressed for more bombing.
B: Yes, I think that's
true. More bombing to cut down the flow of supplies to the South.
G: Were
you and/or General Westmoreland or the President surprised that the enemy
could launch such a widespread attack, that they had the capability to
do it?
B: Yes, I was certainly
somewhat surprised. I think we all were. Yes, I don't think that any of
us expected the breadth of the attack. We expected it would be more concentrated
against the cities. But it was much wider than just the cities, it included
the villages and hamlets. So it had a wider range than we anticipated.
G: Did
General Westmoreland discuss with you his need for additional troops to
deal with the Tet crisis?
B: Yes. At that time
he asked for a moderate increase--I've forgotten--amounting to about
twenty or twenty-five thousand troops, and I
did support that. I did not support his later
request for a much larger increment of troops.
G: Did
he discuss the reasons for needing the troops?
B: Yes.
The needs were to meet the threat--his feeling that he had to move troops
up into I Corps from the south to meet the enemy threat there where the
pressure was building up. You see, the enemy, during the summer months,
tried to follow up in specific places, and I Corps was one of them and
he felt he had to move troops up north and therefore reduce his force in
the south in III Corps, IV Corps, which made it more vulnerable to the
enemy. He needed several more battalions and a brigade or two or something.
The total would have brought the force up, with my recollection, to five
hundred and twenty-five thousand, which was a ceiling we'd established.
It didn't exceed the established ceiling at that time. It was later that
he asked for a much larger increment.
G: This
was not part of the large troop request?
B: No.
This was separate, immediate, for immediate reinforcements.
G: Do
you recall the circumstances of the larger request that followed?
B: I think that Westmoreland
felt that with this additional request--which I think the figure came close
to two hundred thousand troops--that he could really finish up the war
more quickly and get it behind us. I didn't favor it because, and I said
in my message back, I think that I felt that it would simply make the South
Vietnamese feel that they didn't need to do as much. It would be a disincentive
as far as they were concerned. It would relieve them of responsibility,
which I thought was not wise.
G: Was
there evidence that the more we did the less they did, and did you have
something to base this on?
B: Well, I think
that's human nature, yes. I think that if somebody else will do it for
you, well, you let them do it. I think it's true of us, true of the Vietnamese
or anybody. I simply thought if we kept sending in another big increment
of troops they'd think, "Well, hell, the Americans are going to fight this
for us, so. . . ."
G: President
Thieu has said in the last year or so in, I suppose, bitterness that we
actually did more harm than good for this reason, because if we hadn't
been there they would haveretained the incentive and would have been able
to [win].
B: Well, that's hindsight,
of course. He wanted us there when we were there, no question about that.
But he has a point, too. There's always a temptation to call the shots
our way, and that's natural. The Vietnamese, Oriental way is not our way
very often. Americans are can-do people and they can't envisage fighting
a thirty-year war as the Orientals can and do and did.
G: During
this period, I think it was late 1967 or early 1968, General [James M.]
Gavin said that our involvement there would probably last or require ten
years, and I think at the time you regarded that as excessive. Assuming
that we had stayed in with the same levels, how long do you think it would
have gone on? Do you have any speculation there?
B: Well, I'm not
quite clear. Do you mean, if we had stayed in at the same [level]? You
mean, if we hadn't withdrawn our troops?
G: Yes.
B: It's hard to tell.
I don't know. I don't know what Gavin meant, whether he meant that we'd
have to keep our full force there for ten years. The fact is, you see,
my view is we didn't have to keep our force there. We did get them out,
and we got them out in what I think was a reasonable way, correct way,
and then we let the thing fall apart by our refusal to continue assistance.
While the Soviets and the Chinese kept on supplying the North fully, we
didn't. We made a commitment to the South to come to their aid in the case
of a major violation, by the Paris agreements of the other side, and they
violated the agreements from the day they signed them, which is normal
communist procedure and which we expected. That's why we made a commitment,
why the President made a commitment. But Congress, because of public opinion
here, refused to appropriate money to resupply adequately the South Vietnamese.
The Paris agreements provided that each side could replace on a one-for-one
basis equipment used up, lost or destroyed, but we never did it, whereas
the other side was being fully supplied. Well, the result was inevitable.
The effect on the morale of the South Vietnamese obviously was catastrophic.
If you know every day that you're going to have fewer weapons with which
to fight while
the enemy is going to have a full complement
of weapons, what can you do? It's a sad chapter in our history.