Strategies

The Carter acceptance speech exhibits an argumentative structure common to other speeches of its type, which Ritter (1980) has labeled the political jeremiad. Like the religious jeremiads delivered during colonial times by Puritan preachers, the political jeremiad presents an image of America as having a special destiny and an image of the candidate and his party as having a special role in the fulfillment of that destiny. It draws sharp contrasts between "us" and "them," maintaining that the other party is responsible for much that is wrong with America and that the election of their choice of candidates would lead America further astray from its divinely inspired mission. The election, then, is a Judgment Day, a critical moment in history when, from the vantage point of the "in-party" nominee, the people must decide between a continuation of the progress made by the party toward fulfillment of America's historic purposes, or a retrogression paralleling the fall from grace that occurred when the opposing party was last in power.

That Carter should have opted for a political jeremiad made good strategic sense. Its use was consonant with audience expectations for occasions of this type and was particularly well suited to the public's image of Carter as a deeply religious man. Most listeners would no doubt have judged Carter as sincere when, in the characteristically religious vocabulary of the political jeremiad, he described his experience as a political campaigner as "a total immersion in the human reality of America."

The question, however, is the manner in which Carter constructed his jeremiad. The speech was long--much longer than Reagan's and much longer than most speeches of its kind. For the largest part of the speech, Carter provided numerous one- or two-line contrasts between Democrats and Republicans, preferring evidently to appeal separately to each voting bloc within the Democratic party, rather than hammering away at a few unifying themes. This contributed to the excessive length of the speech and probably was responsible for the obvious lapses of attention among many in the convention hall.

Moreover, the overall form of Carter's "cafeteria" approach stresses a difference between "two futures," with Carter playing the dual roles of campaigner and prophet. That Carter should have chosen to contrast futures rather than actual records of accomplishment was understandable, given his low ratings at the polls. But by the same token, his low credibility combined with his obvious biases as a candidate, should have made his vision of the future somewhat suspect.

I question, too, whether Carter should have avoided attacking Ronald Reagan by name. Reagan was popular, but he was also vulnerable to attack as an actor and political extremist. Surely the occasion of an acceptance speech at a political convention permits, even encourages, hard-hitting personal attacks. And surely the Democrats needed someone to rally against if they could not find someone to rally around. Remember too that many in the television audience would be judging Carter's speech by the reaction it received from those present at the convention. The convention audience would react favorably to a biting attack by Carter, as they had to Kennedy's attack.

That Carter's attack on Reagan was muted was part of the overall hesitant tone of the speech. In place of crisp comparisons that would project an image of decisiveness, Carter drew out his sentences, often selecting two nearly synonymous terms in place of a single well-chosen one. Carter found it necessary, for example, to question the "commitments and policies" of his opponent as though policies did not entail commitments. He pledged defense increases that would be "prudent and rational," as though a prudent increase could ever be irrational.

Carter's murky tone is nowhere more evident than in his references to Kennedy. In this, the most crucial moment of the speech, Carter could have brought the audience to its feet with an eloquent plea for Kennedy's support. The salute to Kennedy need not have been exaggerated, but it should not have been garbled--as Carter's was. Carter first places Kennedy in the company of an also-ran, Governor Jerry Brown, a tactic unlikely to win the hearts of the Kennedy people. His subsequent references are complimentary, but they lack zing. Kennedy is said to be a "tough competitor and a superb campaigner"--note the redundancy once more. After praising Kennedy's speech before the convention--again in multiple terms--Carter declared himself to be "reaching out" to Kennedy and his supporters, as though the fact of his appealing for their support needed to be announced and not just demonstrated. The next lines are trite and perhaps a bit condescending. Carter himself, and not simply the party, needs Kennedy's "idealism and... dedication working for us." And, in an allusion to Kennedy's continuing presidential ambitions, "there is no doubt that even greater service lies ahead of you." He then follows these cliche expressions with the vaguest possible images of America's future-- "good life," "secure nation," "just society," and so on, to which he and Kennedy are committed and which presumably warrant their forming a "partnership" together. The reference to a partnership founded on a shared commitment to vague generalities would be self-deprecating were it believable, but it surely is not believable.

I conclude that Carter failed to respond appropriately to the demands of the situation. Carter appealed for the support of his former opponent, but he did so unconvincingly. He directed energies away from past conflicts within the party, but he did not provide a credible object to rally around or against. He neither sounded like a winner, nor made Reagan sound like a loser. In attempting to mobilize party stalwarts, Carter sounded too many themes. In attempting to win over the highly heterogeneous television audience, he spread himself too thin. Carter was ultimately done in by the problem of image. In attempting to overcome his initial image problems, he probably compounded them by sounding defensive, indecisive, and unconfident.