Problems

The rhetorical problems of persuaders consist of competing pressures arising from the need to fulfill conflicting rhetorical requirements and other constraints on goal accomplishment that stem from characteristics of the persuader, audience, topic, or occasion. Having a clear grasp of these problems makes the rhetorical choices of persuaders more comprehensible and provides grounds for evaluating alternative message strategies.

Many of the competing pressures on the presidential acceptance speaker are already implicit in the foregoing analysis, but these and other cross-pressures need to be identified in greater detail, as they apply to the particular case. As you have seen, the acceptance speaker has to perform multiple roles as party leader, election campaigner, and dignified statesman. These roles may not be entirely harmonious, and they were not in Carter's case. For, in attempting to placate opponents within his own party, he risked humiliating himself in the eyes of the voters.

For each such role, moreover, there are the familiar problems of balancing ethics and effectiveness, long-range versus short-range objectives, the need for flexibility and the need to appear consistent. Having cultivated an image of truthfulness and consistency, would Carter create unwittingly an image of insincerity and inconsistency by shifting from positions previously taken to those that might have greater appeal in the upcoming campaign? Or in hewing, uncompromisingly to positions previously taken, would he leave voters with an impression of inflexibility, thus endangering his reelection chances even more?

Compounding these problems is the fact of having to deal with multiple audiences. The Democratic party is heterogeneous enough--a loose and uncomfortable amalgam of forces that includes "boll weevil" conservatives from the South, northern liberals, feminists, blacks, Hispanics, the remnants of a blue-collar, Catholic constituency, retirees, and other such voting blocs. Appealing through representatives of these groups to a larger and even more diverse television audience is a rhetorical nightmare. It is no wonder that Carter looked and sounded nervous as he appeared before the podium. At one point, his intended reference to that "great man who should have been president" became "Hubert Horatio Hornblower," rather than "Hubert Horatio Humphrey." This, quite clearly, was one ritual Carter did not handle appropriately

Our knowledge of the rhetorical requirements for the acceptance speech genre helps point to the problems Carter faced, but it could not help us to predict their severity: his extraordinarily low approval rating as president; his inability to resolve the festering problems of inflation and of American hostages in Iran or to reverse the long-term trend toward conservatism in America. In crafting an effective oration, Carter was constrained further by the apparent popularity of his chief opponent--so much so that he rarely referred to Ronald Reagan by name, choosing instead to speak of "others," or of "the new leaders of the Republican party," or of "the Republican nominee."

But the chief problem for Jimmy Carter was in the person of his archrival for the nomination, Senator Kennedy. Kennedy had refused to capitulate during the primaries after it had become clear that Carter had the nomination sewn up. He had embarrassed Carter by coming on strong in the late primaries. He had demanded and received the opportunity to mold significant portions of the Democratic platform. And he had exploited the unusual occasion of a rival's speech to the delegates to upstage Carter with what everyone agreed was a brilliant oration, a simulacrum of the acceptance speech he would have given had he been nominated, and perhaps a model of the type of speech Carter himself should have given. Now Kennedy was demanding as the price of even token cooperation that Carter publicly plead for his support and register his endorsement of those portions of the Democratic platform with which Kennedy was most identified.

I suggested earlier that the acceptance speaker must enlist the cooperation of past opponents. This, it should now be clear, is not always easy. Kennedy had good reason for remaining distant. Carter had scorned Kennedy in the past, even to the point of bragging to the media before the primaries that "I'm going to whip his ass." Kennedy, quite legitimately, was concerned lest the principles he stood for be abrogated. And he was anxious to preserve a power base for 1984 and beyond. Carter was aware that the price for cooperation from the Kennedy forces would be high. But how high?