Comparing Modes of External Influence

1. Those who seek change from the "bottom-up" confront excrutiating dilemmas, especially if their conception of the "good" society leads them to press for structural reforms or other radical changes in the status quo. Entrenched elites are unlikely to use "win-win" conflict resolution strategies with these movement groups. Rather, they are likely to be blind to problems, or to try to ignore them, or to blame others, or to combine sham cooperation with counteraggression, or to propose substitute solutions rather than needed solutions.

If even these attempts prove unsuccessful, the "have-not" group may have to risk using tactics perceived by "haves" and third parties as threatening and illegitimate. These include boycotts, strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, traffic tie-ups, ensnarling bureaucracies in their own red tape , and being excessively friendly and cooperative.

2. To sustain the commitments of constituents, a hierarchy of internally consistent goal statements is needed. Movements that appear to press only for easily attainable goals tend to lose their followings once these goals are met. Movements that press only for extreme measures are unlikely to demonstrate progress. Movements that press simultaneously for a wide variety of goals tend to factionalize and to dilute their efforts toward realization of any one set of homogeneous goals.

3. There are few reported instances of oppressed groups that have been able to secure significant benefits for themselves without outside support.

4. Movements cannot rely on coercion alone to achieve their ends. Appeals to principle are needed, if only as rhetorical rationales for selfish motives. So too should movements create the impression that they are willing to negotiate.

5. The rhetoric of a reform group should contribute to favorable definitions of the group by the public. The definitions should identify the group as engaged in "protest" rather than in "deviant" acts or in "rebellion."

6. Synchronization among militant and moderate factions of the same movement is conducive to reform. The extremes help to define the "middle." Militant groups have helped to legitimize more moderate groups and their methods. However, militant groups may also taint moderate groups, divert attention from the efforts of moderates, and prompt repression of the entire movement.

7. The reform group should apply persistent pressure on adversaries.

8. Given the negative sanctions associated with violation of law, it has generally been expedient for reformist groups either to operate within the limits of the law or to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience in the "classic" manner: challenging only the law considered offensive; justifying disobedience in the name of higher law; taking pains not to infringe on the rights of innocent third parties; disobeying publicly rather than secretly; and acceding voluntarily to judgments by the courts. Classic civil disobedience has been a powerful instrument for reform, but it is unlikely to prove successful against highly repressive regimes.

9. The more sweeping the changes being sought by a movement group, the more militant it must be in exerting pressure for change.

10. The more militant the movement's pressure tactics, the more effort must be expended to minimize the potential for backlash.