The Rhetoric of Social Problems

The shift from objectivist to social constructionist perspectives on social problems opens wide the door to investigation of what might be called "the rhetoric" of social problems, considered as a whole. Chief among the claims-makers are "moral crusaders" who function as movement activists aimed at combating one or another perceived social evil (Victor, 1993), the "troubled persons professions" that service social problems (Gusfield, 1989), and the "image-making institutions," such as schools and mass media, that report on and dramatize them (Gusfield, 1989). A full-scale rhetorical analysis would also concern itself with the voices of alleged perpetrators and victims, of lawmakers, judges, bureaucrats, and law enforcement officials, and of those, like the sociologists, who, in writing about all this rhetoric, contribute their own.

Some preliminary work on patterns of claims-making across social problems has already been done (Best, 1990; Gusfield, 1989; Hacking, 1991; Victor, 1993). What little we know suggests that social problem labelings are products of modernity (Gusfield, 1989). Implicit (sometimes explicit) in claims about social problems are conceptions of causation, of categories, of rights and responsibilities, and of boundaries between normal and deviant (Hacking, 1991). Whether the particular type of evil being attacked is environmental pollution or pornography or sexual harassment, says Victor (1993), the rhetoric of moral crusaders tends to have similar kinds of content. It includes atrocity stories as well as testimonials by "reformed sinners" and alleged victims, and others purporting to have first-hand knowledge of the evil. It also includes typologies of various levels of sinfulness; this, according to Victor (1993), as a way of creating the appearance of expert knowledge of the problem. And, of course, no moral crusade is complete without the proffering of "expert" estimates of the size of a given problem. As regards Satanic ritual abuse (Victor's own area of expertise), for example, estimates have come from clergymen, police investigators and psychotherapists, each a part of the moral crusade and yet credentialed as professionals.

Beyond calling attention to a social problem, moral crusaders offer explanations for what they allege are the causes of the problem, and they also offer remedies. In recruiting new activists and in attempting to garner favorable responses from other audiences, moral crusaders must also give definition of the problem consonant with dominant cultural frames, but in a way that pulls together varied concerns from within the movement. As regards the "Satanic scare," says Victor (1993), creating a single, integrated movement out of the disparate concerns and values of activists ranging from ultra-conservative Christian fundamentalists to secularly oriented mental health professionals is no simple matter. From investigations, such as Victor's, of the claims-making activities of moral crusaders, we get valuable insights into the social construction of social problems, but what can we learn about the "reality" of social problems? By virtually all accounts, claims-making on social problems cannot be taken at face value (e.g., Best, 1990). Moral crusaders tend to exaggerate the magnitude of social problems. Worst case problems tend to be presented as typical cases and blown up even further by the news and entertainment media. Definitions tend to be expanded or treated elastically. "Experts" are invoked to legitimate definitional and statistical claims or to present exaggerated claims of their own. Their descriptions and explanations intermix fact and value, yet tend to submerge or minimize the value aspect by scientizing the problem.

Moreover, estimates of the nature and magnitude of social problems are often highly discrepant, reflecting differences in definitional criteria. What Prelli calls "empirical diversity" in regard to spousal abuse statistics is manifest across a range of social problems. Are one in seven college women victims of date rape during any given year in college? So concludes a 1985 survey conducted under the auspices of Ms magazine that had a major influence on Congressional legislation (Gilbert, 1991). But these figures are based on the investigator's definition of rape. When queried, 72% of the college students classified as rape victims by the researcher did not think they had been raped. More than 40% of these women reported having sex again with the men who had supposedly raped them (Gilbert, 1991).

The importance of definitional criteria is illustrated once again in respect to child abuse. David Gil (1970) conducted the first U.S.-wide survey of abused children and their abusers. For this survey he defined "child abuse" as "non-accidental physical attack or physical injury, including minimal as well as fatal injury, inflicted upon children by persons caring for them." By this definition, he estimated that there were roughly 7,000 cases of child abuse per year in the United States.

A few years later, Gil presented testimony to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Children and Youth. Having been roundly criticized for underestimating the problem in his survey, Gil was perhaps persuaded to revise his definition. Now child abuse was defined as "inflicted gaps or deficits between circumstances of living which would facilitate the optimal development of children, to which they should be entitled, and their actual circumstances, irrespective of the sources or agents of the deficit" (Gil, 1975). By these lights, practically all of us were child abusers!

Both child abuse and missing children have been linked to Satanic cults. In his book, The Edge of Evil: The Rise of Satanism in North America, evangelist Jerry Johnston (1989) cites a Dr. Al Carlisle of the Utah State Prison system as claiming that between forty and sixty thousand people are killed through Satanic ritual homicides each year (Victor, 1993). Yet an FBI study failed to find a single body (Bennetts, 1993).

As for the data on children missing from home each year, this too turns out to be subject to widely varying definitional criteria. The term "missing children" can include: abductions by family members as in divorce cases; runaways; children who have been abandoned or thrown out of their homes by parents; children accidentally lost; and children abducted by strangers (Victor, 1993). It was widely reported in the media that some fifty thousand children annually were victims of stranger abductions. But a 1990 study by the Department of Justice turned up figures of 200 to 300 "stereotypical kidnappings" of children by strangers for 1988 (Victor, 1993).

We have seen repeated evidence thus far that claims-making about social problems tends not to be disinterested; that it tells us as much about the claims-maker as about the object labeled. Yet it would be unreasonable to conclude at this point that a given problem was "unreal," or that no estimates of its magnitude were reliable. There seems little doubt that social problems are socially constructed and not simply "out-there," but perhaps we can find a way to reconcile realism and social constructionism. In what follows I propose such a reconciliation after first making cases for strict and contextual constructionisms.