Concluding Comments

In one brief nod to a globalized view of rhetoric, Gaonkar allows that the contributions of "implicit" rhetoricians like Shapin, Latour and Woolgar have enriched "the conceptual resources of RS." (74).

I wish he would have done more of that. Too much of IRRS is about disciplinary recognition, visibility, reputation, status--with "discipline" being narrowly defined. The "discipline" being both criticized and helped to defend itself in this Foucaultian struggle for institutional legitimacy and public recognition is that component of rhetorical scholarship and pedagogy gathered under the professional umbrella of NCA and the institutional mantle of Communication Studies departments. It is a remnant of our discipline's preoccupation with oratory. How else explain Gaonkar's history of rhetorical criticism as beginning with Wichelns' "inaugural essay" (30) and continuing from Black to Leff? How else account for Gaonkar's parallel history of contemporary rhetorical theory as moving "from Bryant through Bitzer to Farrell"? How else explain Gaonkar's concentration on RS studies within speech communication?

Were it the case that the lion's share of RS scholarship was done by NCA-affiliated scholars, then Gaonkar's "reading strategy" (as he calls it) might be understandable. But as Gaonkar is clearly aware, the rhetorical turn applied to scientific inquiry (and to scholarly inquiry more generally) is spread across a dozen or more disciplines. (7) Were it believed outside NCA circles that contemporary rhetorical theory, criticism, and pedagogy began and continues primarily within the NCA orbit, then Gaonkar's interest in the potential payoff of a globalized rhetorical hermeneutics might legitimately focus on NCA-affiliated scholarship. But, as even the three NCA-affiliated authors of Current Perspectives on Rhetoric acknowledge, some of the most interesting perspectives on rhetoric have come from outside NCA (Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 1985.) These authors devote chapters to Richards, Weaver, Toulmin, Perelman, Grassi, Burke, Foucault, and Habermas. They might as justifiably have listed Barthes, Booth, de Man, Fish, McKeon, Kennedy, McCloskey, B.H. Smith, Vickers, J.B. White, among others, again excluding anyone reared in or directly affiliated with NCA. This ought to tell us something, but instead we revel in the attention we rhetoricians in NCA receive, even the critical attention, so long as it sustains the myth of our centrality to rhetorical scholarship generally.

Gaonkar, especially Gaonkar, knows that we are not central in anything but a quantitative sense and never were. (8) He knows that rhetoric was never just a performative art; that it was "read" into Greek and Roman debates about how "homo rhetoricus" should act, about how to judge wisely under conditions of uncertainty, and about what form of government is best. (9) He knows--or at least seems to agree with Burke--that along with the performative rhetorical tradition centered on oratory, there has been an "underground" hermeneutical tradition (including the likes of Bentham, Marx, Freud, Nietzsche) alive to such matters as "'mystification,' courtship, and the 'magic' of class relationships" (Burke, 1969, xiv). He not only knows these things but he has written about them approvingly, indeed glowingly, especially the "boldly constitutive, well-nigh archaeological" turn toward the rhetoric of scholarly inquiry (Gaonkar, 1990:357). "Rhetoric and its Double" (Gaonkar, 1990) offers a far different take on this truly globalized vision of rhetoric than Gaonkar does in IRRS. Yes its true that this neo-sophistic, neo-pragmatic rhetoric can only hold center stage in the intellectual arena during times of philosophical crisis, but what a performance it can provide! (10) Yes it is the case that some of rhetorical theory's greatest contributions have come from persons who didn't label themselves as such, but so what? Yes it's surely true that some were unschooled in the vocabulary of classical rhetoric, but they may have had "rhetorical sensibilities." (11) Indeed, Gaonkar even goes so far in this essay as to ask what enabled Toulmin, Booth, Perelman to advance rhetorical theory without instruction from us. In "Rhetoric and its Double," Gaonkar does point to some significant problems associated with globalism, not least the elasticity of its concepts, but these problems are not seen as fatal.

I said at the outset that I shared with Gaonkar a sense of dissatisfaction with the progress NCA-affiliated rhetoric has made in rhetorical theory and criticism, Big and Small. At the risk of appearing rhetorically insensitive, and of violating McCloskey's rule (this volume) against public self-flagellation, let me suggest that we rethink our training of the next generation of rhetorical scholars.

(1) Less insularity is needed, more openness to writings explicitly or implicitly about rhetoric from outside the NCA orbit. Operationalized, this would include fewer acceptances of journal or convention paper submissions that exclude significant work on a topic from outside our field. The student of social movement rhetoric, for example, will discover that there is an abundance of relevant material on the topic in sociology under such headings as framing, ideology, symbolic action, protest (e.g., McAdam and Snow, 1997). That same student will discover in sociology a substantial literature on social problems such as child abuse that quite explicitly takes them to be rhetorical constructions (e.g., Best, 1989; Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993); Woolgar and Pawluch (1984).

(2) Less "anti-theoreticism" is needed as well as fewer formulaic tests and applications of theory. Instead, let us attempt to "thicken" our existing critical lexicon as well to propose additions to that vocabulary by way of innovative theorizing and theory-related criticism. On both these counts, see Barbara Herrnstein Smith's (1997) brilliant illustration of peritrope in Belief and Resistance (Chapter 5), as well as her inventive application of a term of her own coinage: "microdynamics of incommensurability" (Chapter 8).

(3) Recognizing that "rhetoric" is inescapably a polysemic term, let us reference our meaning(s) for any given context (thus addressing Gaonkar's legitimate concerns about terminological vagueness and "promiscuity") and prepare to enter into Burke's parlor of conversation as a voice to be contended with, but not necessarily the triumphant one. Case in point: A PBS Frontline documentary on "Gulf War Syndrome" pits science (in the form of carefully controlled studies) against rhetoric (in the sense of compelling narratives by Gulf War vets and media-championed scapegoating). In this documentary, science wins, but rhetoric proves an immensely interesting conversationalist.

In general, let us take seriously the implications for our pedagogy of the move to globalization. This involves recognizing, on the one hand, the limitations of rhetoric-as-discipline. No, rhetoric cannot be a substitute for such specialized fields as marketing, advertising, public relations. Nor do its case studies compete very well with experimental social psychology at yielding predictive generalizations about, say, the use of fear appeals in persuasion. For this, we need to learn from our colleagues on the scientific side of the aisle.

Moreover, rhetoric conceived of as intentional, primarily verbal, persuasion, offers a limited conception of social influence processes in an age of television and film and the latest fashions in popular music. Nor has rhetoric's relation to other influence processes ever been adequately theorized. This includes combinations of persuasion (in the usual sense), information-giving, conformity pressures, entertainment, intimidation (and other forms of coercion), and material inducements. A globalized rhetoric may have little to say by way of explanation of the globalization of the economy, for example, or of the McDonaldization of world culture.

Still, rhetoric-as-discipline has a history and a tradition and a set of conceptual tools that prepare us to speak on the great issues of the day: e.g.: on the possibilities for intelligent life after deconstruction; on apparent incommensurability and its remedies; on the relationship between the "real" and the socially constructed; on the reappearance in contemporary times of the controversies over rhetoric that divided ancient Athens.

Additionally, rhetoric in the global sense can be the great borrower and synthesizer of insights from one area of persuasion that are applicable to others. And in providing this integration it is unencumbered by the need to appear purely scientific. As it synthesizes it can also criticize, recalling in its examination of the new sophistics, rhetoric's ancient connections to ethics and politics.

Rhetoric-as-discipline can do these things and a great deal more, but to do so it must reinvent itself pedagogically. Have we in NCA-affiliated rhetoric a special responsibility, as guardians of a tradition, to instruct our students in the histories of arcane rhetorical theories and eminently forgettable public addresses?

So be it! But let us also introduce our students to philosophy, intellectual history, science studies, and social theory. With Burke as our guide, let us attempt to teach our students (and first ourselves) what Burke learned about rhetoric from its "underground" history (Gaonkar, 1990). With POROI as our guide (Nelson and Megill, 1986), let us direct our students to the "implicit rhetorical turn," so celebrated in "Rhetoric and its Double" (Gaonkar, 1990), so "depreciated" (as Farrell put it) in Gaonkar's IRRS.

Above all, let us prepare our students to become public intellectuals, skilled not just in the rudiments of public speaking, discussion, debate, and criticism, but also in carrying forward the continuing, centuries-old conversations about how to judge wisely and communicate eloquently on issues for which there is no--and perhaps never can be--demonstrable truth. This, as I see it, is the central mission that binds Big and Little rhetoric. Should we become capable of performing this mission well, we need worry no longer about disciplinary legitimacy.