Situational Analysis: Towards a Theory of the August 17th Event

Poll data, media commentary, political reaction, apologia theory and crisis management theory are useful starting points for assessment of any given apologia, but they are insufficient. Needed is a theory of the rhetorical event in all its singularity, one which provides a clear sense of what is required (Simons, 1970; Simons and Aghazarian, 1986 ) or at least strategically indicated (Andrews, 1973) in that situation; of the factors impelling and constraining the speaker; of the resources (i.e., opportunities) available to cope with the situation (Bitzer, 1969; 1980) and perhaps even to transform it rhetorically (Vatz, 1973); and, finally, of the likely implications of any given resource selection for other rhetorical choices--how, for example, an attack on Starr might influence audience perceptions of Clinton's expressions of remorse.

Minimally speaking, a theory of apologia must be sensitive to situational variations if it is to be found useful for the particular case. By way of clarifying what I mean by a situationally sensitive theory, consider the following propositions. Here we get at least the rudiments of a useful theory of apologia--useful in the sense of suggesting a situational logic of strategic response.

Theoretical Propositions

1. Deny if you can; that is, if the case against you is unproven (6)  and is unlikely to be proven.

2. Differentiate if you can between acts committed on your watch and acts for which you are personally to blame. Do so if your personal culpability is unproven and is unlikely to be proven. Combine denials of personal culpability with corrective action or pledges of corrective action.

3. Bolster if you have bragging rights; that is, if you can point to notable achievements in the past and the potential for more in the future.

4. Attack your attackers, particularly if the case against you is weak and/or the credibility of your attackers is suspect.

5. Minimize, if you can, the significance of the wrongdoing, but do so only if its significance is open to question.

6. Minimize, if you can, the relevance of the wrongdoing to your public position, but do so only if its relevance is open to question.

7. Admit only what you have to admit: i.e., wrongdoing, personal culpability, significance, relevance.

8. Justify, if you can, questionable means in terms of the worthy ends they accomplished or were designed to accomplish. Do so only if the argument is likely to appear credible.

9. Differentiate, if you can, between the impulsive you or momentarily distracted you or otherwise forgivable you who committed the wrongdoing and the normally trustworthy, competent "real" you. Do so only if the excuses you offer are credible and if they won't unduly tarnish your reputation and ability to do your job.

10. Express contrition in proportion to the perceived significance and relevance of your personal wrongdoing, and combine expressions of remorse with corrective action or pledges of corrective action.

11. Appeal, if you can, for closure/termination of the case in the interests of getting on with more important affairs of state. Do so only if the argument is likely to appear credible. The Making of Clinton's Dilemmas.

The foregoing seems straightforward enough, but plots have a way of thickening and rhetorical problems of deepening. What happens if the affair you thought would remain unproven is evidenced, subsequent to your denials, by such reliable indicators as DNA traces on a semen-stained dress? What happens if the cover-up you staged and attempted to keep hidden is exposed to public view? What happens if the cover-up, once exposed, undermines earlier claims that the alleged wrongdoing is strictly a private matter, and thus irrelevant to the conduct of your office? What happens if your denials and attempted cover-up are linked by the media to previous patterns of evasion and are thus seen as characterological? What happens if your defects of character--including, per haps, an addiction to illicit sex and to risk more generally--are not readily forgiven and could, if offered as excuses, further tarnish your reputation and ability to govern? What happens if the legal appeals and objections devised by your attorneys to spare you from further embarrassment are repeatedly turned down by the courts? What happens if, having been compelled to admit to some degree of wrongdoing after prolonged denials and delays, your expressions of contrition in leaked grand jury testimony a re not believed? What happens if, in exploiting the vulnerability of your attackers to attack, you risk undermining the apparent sincerity of your expressed remorse? What happens if complete candor at the point of exposure could place you in severe legal jeopardy, while a legalistic defense risks alienating you from the citizenry? What happens if, in light of the circumstances, your pleas for closure, for getting on with the nation's business, are likely to be seen by many as transparently self-serving? What happens if those who are on your side or who are at least reluctant to remove you from office are themselves divided as to what sort of apologia would satisfy them?

Out of such "hypothetical" problems--quite real in Clinton's case--dilemmas are created, and it becomes the rhetor's central task to grapple with them successfully.