Transitional Rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders in
the Post-Mao Reform Period: Dilemmas and Strategies
Xing Lu and Herbert W. Simons

Quarterly Journal of Speech, 2006, 92:3, 262-286

For roughly the period since Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to power in 1976, China has moved increasingly toward capitalism and formed a strategic partnership with its former enemies in the West.[1] Political transformations are always rhetorically problematic, involving tensions between the old and the new. Rhetoric is “transitional” in the sense that old rules and verities no longer hold sway while new ways of thinking and doing are not yet firmly in place. This has been particularly the case in China, where its leaders have needed to introduce major changes—in China’s economic system, in its relations with the West, and in governance—all the while as they have been rhetorically required to honor tradition, deify Mao, champion socialism, give lip-service to dialectical materialism, and maintain party control. How, asked A. R. Kluver, have China’s political leaders been able to “introduce a stock market and call it Marxism?”[2] How, in general, have they managed to renegotiate the basis for their legitimacy?

Kluver maintains that top-down rhetoric has played a central role in re-crafting China’s dominant political ideology, and in thus providing a new basis for promoting economic and political reforms. In this study, we will engage a rhetorical analysis of top-down reformist rhetoric in the post-Mao era, namely the regimes of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao (beginning in 1978 and concluding in March 2004).[3] Heisey points out “The political communication in China offers an excellent resource for studying the constraining and incentive components at both the structural and ideological levels of the culture.”[4] Through the rhetorical analysis of top-down rhetoric, we will identity the constraining and incentive factors encountered by Chinese leaders. In particular, we attend to distinctive features of the Chinese context, examining the requirements that top-down leadership rhetoric must fulfill in times of transition, the types of inventional resources available to accomplish these requirements, and the kinds of problems that impede accomplishment. The paper will be divided in two parts. Part One delineates dilemmas and strategies the Chinese leaders face. Part Two focuses on selected slogans and catchwords in speeches by each regime leader in making the transition possible.

We believe it is important to consider salient features of Chinese culture and its history in the understanding of contemporary Chinese political rhetoric. Our analysis will give particular attention to such backgrounds. However, we also believe that a cultural lens alone will not allow us to examine the intricacies and complexities of contemporary Chinese rhetoric in the global context. In today’s world, rhetorical strategies of Chinese leaders are often shaped by international demands and global economy; Chinese leaders tend to face multiple audiences in their deliberation of messages as well as the pressure to balance the internal and external requirements. A good understanding of Chinese transitional rhetoric must also consider the role China plays in the world and the challenges placed upon them.

Our analysis will be guided by Simons’ theoretical framework of the RPS (Requirements, Problems, and Strategies) approach for analyzing leadership rhetoric.[5] The approach allows us to take a holistic view of China’s transitional rhetoric in the understanding of rhetorical situations, identifying dilemmas and challenges, and evaluating rhetorical strategies the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) leaders have been facing and experiencing. Our primary interest is in relations between recurring patterns of rhetoric and the situations that give rise to them--less with individual acts of rhetorical artistry and their audience effects. In addition, this essay draws on works by Sinologists, many of them providing contextual information and cultural analyses of China’s economic and political transition.[6] Communication scholars such as Randy Kluver, D. Ray Heisey, John Powers, Xing Lu, and Shaorong Huang have done studies on Chinese political discourse and offered rhetorical analyses of Chinese political texts from different time periods in China’s recent history.[7] Of the limited studies explicitly about top-down rhetoric in the period of reform, we have found Kluver’s particularly useful for our own purposes.

Part I: Dilemmas and Strategies in the Chinese Context

Dilemmas of the CCP Leaders

According to Simon’s RPS theory, political leaders are constrained by situations in their efforts to accomplish certain persuasive tasks or ends. In other words, what they say and do rhetorically is in many respects prescribed and proscribed. Leaders of every kind may be rhetorically inventive, but their work is also in an important sense cut out for them. The strategies they select for seizing and wielding power are variants, says Burke, “of what, in the Grammar, we called the scene-act ratio.”[8] Just what is required rhetorically in any given situation will ultimately depends on local, here-and-now considerations, but situations recur and the theory may prepare the ground for rhetorical analysis by suggesting in broad outline what is rhetorically required in given types of situation.

In the Chinese context, rhetorical requirements are principally derived from its culture and history, and from the leader’s role within a collectivity—i.e., the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP), and more broadly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as nation-state--but are further shaped by factors external to the collectivity, such as China’s place in the world economy, its geopolitical position vis-à-vis other nations, and the actions of other world leaders. Having joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, China is under increasing pressure to play by its rules. Having hitched its fortunes to global competition, it must be increasingly concerned about the competitiveness of its product in foreign markets, and the availability of markets in China for foreign goods. Having flexed its muscles as regional and even global political player—asserting its views on Iraq in the Security Council, for example, it must defend against current and future threats from potential rivals and antagonists, some of whom would already like to construct China as an enemy nation.[9]

Among the internal pressures on China’s leaders are the weights of tradition, including the influence of Confucian thought; the continuing deification of Mao despite years of misrule; and Marxist/Leninist ideology, on which the revolutionary state was founded. Each is a constraint on reformist rhetoric, yet each is also an inventional resource that can be appropriated to the cause of reform. As Tsou Tang states well, “. . .one may see Chinese political development as the outcome of the interaction of a series of strategic choices made by the various actors in conflict or in cooperation with each other. The available alternatives are shaped by the perceived and/or actual structures of constraint and opportunity. . .”[10]

Our analysis underscores the convergent pressures upon the regimes of Deng, Jiang and Hu to bend Marxist ideology to the needs for reform. Much as the leaders themselves may have continued to identify with the revolutionary doctrines on which they were nurtured, pragmatism has required that they subordinate Marxist ideology to fulfillment of such service functions as feeding their people and protecting the nations’ borders. This is apparently true of other regimes with Marxist origins which have taken on the responsibilities of governmental leadership.[11]

In the post-Mao period of economic and political reform, more pragmatic thinking has been promoted by the Party. This kind of thinking is characterized by Burke as melioristic—concerned, as he puts it, with better and worse rather than best and worst.[12] Pragmatism has by no means replaced socialist idealism, but the CCP’s rhetoric has become increasingly de-radicalized after its succession of failed social experiments. Moreover, in the face of public pressures to improve the standard of living, Maoist/Marxist principles have had to be subordinated to its domestic service functions. Thus those within the Party who have held out for ideological purity have been destined to play a losing hand. Economic reform requires more sophisticated economic structures than those they had countenanced and a more rational, more transparent regulatory apparatus. Primary reliance on ideological appeals is no longer sufficient for what Andrew Nathan calls China’s “post-mobilization phase.”[13] Likewise, China’s foreign policies have become more pragmatic, moderated by internal and external pressures to avoid prolonged confrontation.

In their efforts to balance competing interests and appeal to multiple audiences, The CCP leaders face formidable dilemmas and challenges in the transitional period. A summary of some of the dilemmas are:

1. CCP leaders have faced the disparity of seemingly holding to an acclaimed Marxist/Leninist/Maoist ideology while moving increasingly to a semi-capitalistic economy which its ideologists had long maintained would lead to increased corruption, moral decline, and a widening of the gap between rich and poor. Because at least some of these prophecies have already come true, the CCP leadership has needed not only rationales for proposed change but also skillfully crafted apologetics for changes gone awry. Of course further reform has been theoretically possible, but has often proved difficult against powerful elites. It could not have been easy, for example, for Jiang Zemin to deal with evidences of corruption at the highest levels of his administration, including allegations that Deng Xiaoping’s family members had been enriching themselves under the Jiang Zemin regime.[14]

2. CCP leaders have needed to adapt to multiple audiences in China, each with their own interests and perspectives. These include such “new winners” as entrepreneurs, educated professionals, and technocrats, as well as such “new losers” as the urban unemployed, underemployed state-owned factory workers and peasants displaced by mammoth hydroelectric projects. The list includes of course the ideologically orthodox as well as the ideologically pragmatic within the CCP itself. Needless to say, what pleases one audience may well offend another.
3. CCP leaders have had to balance internal pressures against external pressures. Whatever the current success or failure of the opening to the West, CCP leaders are increasingly hostage to external pressures and demands—e. g., for greater conformity with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, for privatization of property and respect for property rights, for greater accountability, for greater attention to the West’s human rights concerns, for political and military support against what are alleged by the West to be international threats. Yet they are also under pressure to pursue their own course.
4. CCP leaders have had to weigh the need for continued Party control against pressures for liberalization of the society and increased autonomy for its people. As China competes in global markets, it also opens itself to new ideas, some of which may threaten the established order. “Mr. Science” seems to have been accepted by the leadership without significant opposition, but what about “Mr. Democracy?”[15] Party leaders have, since the Tiananmen Square uprising, increasingly talked about democracy, but they continue to exercise tight political control, and some times ham-handed control, as in the case of internet use. At least for the sake of its image as a modernizing nation, increasingly responsive to its people, CCP leaders face the challenge of balancing the need for political control against demands for democracy from within China and from the international community. This includes not just demands for free elections, but also for greater transparency in administrative and judicial deliberations.
5. Finally, political leaders of all kinds are engaged in non-zero sum games, involving admixtures of what Burke calls the “competitive use of the cooperative.”[16] Trade negotiations epitomize the “mixed-motive” character of such conflicts; i. e., counter-posing the need to compete against the need to cooperate. The CCP leaders have played out such mixed motives in the trade with the United States, shifting between “ideological enemies” to “strategic partners,” from “competition” to “cooperation,” manifesting an interplay between moralistic and utilitarian rhetoric in trade relations with the West.

Rhetorical Strategies of the CCP Leaders

Political leaders of every kind face daunting rhetorical dilemmas, but they are not bereft of rhetorical resources, both for public performances and for behind-the-scene maneuverings. While political communication often served to change the national culture, it is through their culture, political leaders draw wisdom and formulate their rhetorical strategies. Many rhetorical studies have shown that culture is an important factor in shaping the rhetorical discourse.[17] Based on a number of studies he has done on Chinese political communication, Heisey observed that “National leaders use their own cultural backgrounds and cultural arguments unique to their histories and national identities in the construction of their political messages.”[18] This has been the case with China’s rebuttal to the human right charges of the U. S. in that China defined the concept of human rights as serving the collective interest and basic rights of living rather than the American notion of individual rights in the domain of political freedom.[19]

Kluver also shares the view with Heisey that political discourse is a manifestation of cultural criteria and history. In his study of Post-Mao rhetoric in the legitimation of economic reform, Kluver has observed that the CCP leaders used the rhetorical strategies of national myth and reinterpretation of the language of orthodox Marixism to persuade the Chinese audience for a new political consciousness and to pave the way for economic policy change. National myth would include national heroes like Mao in liberating China in 1949 and the “Eminent Personage of Deng” in leading China out of poverty after Mao’s death. Party slogans like “socialism,” “historical progression” have given new meanings to suit the new economic and political agenda.[20] These strategies, according to Kluver, serve as effective rhetorical tactics in making the political transition and “function to articulate the deepest aspirations and hopes of the nation.”[21] . Throughout Chinese history, the belief of legitimacy of the rulers has been one of the Chinese cultural characteristics. To establish and reestablish the governmental legitimacy, as Kluver’s study concludes, Chinese leaders must “carefully redraft the national myth as to guarantee a place for the Chinese Communist Party in a market-driven, decentralized, politically volatile future.”[22] Our study examines some of these redrafted party slogans employed by Chinese leaders in their efforts to legitimize the transition. Interesting enough, this strategy of “renaming and redefining the environment” has been also employed by Mussolini’s discourse in his transition from a Socialist agitator to a Fascist dictator” evident in his appropriation of the rhetoric of struggle for the purpose of instilling social order and a new sense of Italian identity.[23]

Rhetorical strategies can include time-honored and highly malleable storehouses of maxims, aphorisms, lines of arguments, forms of appeal, and modes of self-presentation which together offer repertoires for potentially effective rhetorical response within a culture to difficult situations.[24] Chinese history and culture supply an extraordinarily rich repertoire of rhetorical possibilities and strategies, including Confucian moral appeals, advice to rulers by Han Feizi on statecraft, tactical schemes as substitutes for force in Sunzi Bing Fa (The Art of War), and strategic thoughts and persuasive techniques in the famous Gui Guzi (The Master of Ghost Valley).[25] Much as Mao broke from the Confucian tradition, he also cleverly exploited its conventional wisdom, as leaders of the transition have also been required to do.[26] No Chinese leader who seeks change can dishonor tradition. In that sense every effective Chinese leader must be something of a dialectician and a chameleon.

Of particular interest to this paper are selected slogans and catch phrases that have had a pivotal role in the top-down rhetoric of transition. Slogans have been a longstanding rhetorical tool used by Chinese leaders, ranging form Sun Yet-Sen, Chiang Kai-shek, to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and the current leaders. All these leaders used slogans to push social change as well as using them as vehicles for legitimizing their rule. The use of slogans can be traced to the Confucian concept of zheng ming 正名(rectification of names). For Confucius, every name (e. g. slogans, set phrases, catchy words) carries with it a concept and a behavior. The new names initiated by the ruler and propagated by the government lead to a rectification of the social order and new way of thinking. Through the practice of zheng ming or invention of new terms, a new set of social norms are prescribed and new policies or actions are implemented. [27]

Slogans have the virtue of suggesting a lot in a very few words. They can be ideological potent by simplifying complicated ideas. They are usually easy to memorize and repeat. For political purposes, they tend also to be ambiguous, amenable to multiple interpretations and adaptable to multiple audiences (while also providing opportunities for reframing by opponents).  Further, popular slogans and catchwords may also be known to contain “code words,” a useful form of communication when there is need to convey hidden political agendas while appearing to conform to the official ideology. During Mao’s period, Chinese political discourse was characterized by what Schoenhals called “formalized language,” a type of language in the form of slogans, clichés , jargon, and code words.[28] The post-Mao regimes have continued employing these rhetorical tools in maneuvering for economic and political reforms in China.[29]

Yet another set of strategic tools consists of bargaining chips. China’s economic fortunes, together with its strategic geopolitical position and globalized economy, give it considerable bargaining power on the world’s stage. In international relations, including trade relations, persuasion often takes place, implicitly or explicitly, within a context of power. Rhetoric, then, is not just about words, and the power of the carrot and the stick can add (or subtract) meaning to words. To Kenneth Burke’s credit, his sense of rhetoric as “symbolic inducement”[30] included actions, not just words. The former include purely symbolic acts, such as ceremonial salutes to the flag, and actions that are at once symbolic and non-symbolic such as currency devaluations/appreciation, military deployments, crackdowns on corruption, and punishments for violations of intellectual property rights that are recently undertaking in China.

Nor is rhetoric by political leaders inherently deceptive. Of the texts to be analyzed later in this study, critics ought to entertain the possibility that what is said cannot be taken at face value: for example, that it is designed to be vague or ambiguous, and perhaps to be taken differently by different audiences; or that the rhetor’s strategy is to talk one way, but act in another way. But yet another alternative present itself: that the leader means what he or she says![31] After all, according to Burke, rhetoric is an advantage-seeking activity. But to those prepared to dismiss rhetoric as immoral for just that reason, Burke adds that the gaining of advantage need not be at the expense of the other; it may be to their mutual advantage.[32]

Complicating matters for the analyst and the political leader is that rhetorical strategies often create new problems in the process of resolving old ones. When strategies succeed, they change the rhetorical landscape. China today is far more prosperous than it was in 1978, far better able to exercise power by use of the carrot rather than the stick, and far more powerful internationally as well as a result of successes in the global marketplace. And, too, the CCP is far more institutionalized than it was when Deng Xiaoping assumed power in 1978. Finally, the new, better educated middle class presents new opportunities for China but it could, with its increasing influence and capacity to voice its discontents, pose greater challenges for the CCP than by those, such as the peasantry and the urban unemployed, who have many more reasons to complain but have far fewer resources with which to mount effective protests.[33] The general point here is that the transition is itself a process, its leaders subject to ever-changing rhetorical requirements and problems, but also equipped with new rhetorical resources for meeting those demands.

Part II: Transitional Rhetoric in the Economic Reform Period

Kluver contends that Chinese leaders introduced new linguistic formulations as a way to control and legitimize ideological innovation.[34] As of this writing there have been three transitional regimes, each associated with a memorable slogan or catch phrase to guide the process of transition. The first, led by Deng Xiaoping, is most notable for Deng’s simultaneous rejection of capitalism in theory and embrace of important components of capitalism in practice, under the banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色的社会主义). The second regime, presided over by Jiang Zemin and ably assisted by Premier Zhu Rongji, propelled China forward at a dizzying pace in economic development, but it may also be remembered for the severe problems it could not overcome and may have exacerbated. These problems are given short shrift in the Jiang regime’s most celebrated manifesto “The Three Represents” (三个代表) which also comes in for our rhetorical scrutiny. The problems themselves are currently receiving considerable attention from Jiang and Zhu’s successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Put forward under the banner of “Putting People First” (以民为本), theirs is an effort to redirect priorities, from economic growth at any price to developmental balance, from encouraging entrepreneurship to crackdowns on corruption. Rhetorically speaking, it is an immensely challenging effort, and by no means guaranteed of success. But that the effort is being made at all, and not just behind closed doors, is itself a sign of China’s progressive development.

Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”

As a long-term revolutionary comrade of Mao, Deng Xiaoping had been both loyal to Mao during his political career and resistant to some of Mao’s idealistic schemes. He was persecuted once prior to 1949 for his “wrongful doings” and purged twice during the Cultural Revolution for being a “Capitalist Roader,” epitomized in his famous saying “No matter whether the cat is black or white, it is a good cat so long as it catches mice.”[35]

Since Mao’s death in 1976, Deng had been regarded as “China’s architect of economic reform.” Deng’s own tragic experience made him realize the disastrous consequences of holding onto ideological orthodoxies and won him sympathy and support from other communist officials and populous. The Cultural Revolution, launched by Mao in 1966 and ended in 1976 after his death, brought the collapse of the state economy, along with disillusionment with many of Mao’s precepts—especially the principle of continuous class struggle. Mao’s failed social experiments also brought an aversion to the stridency of revolutionary-style rhetoric. Tu Wei-Ming notes that during this time China was “at an ideological crossroad, confronting a profound identity crisis which [would] fundamentally restructure her national character.”[36] Deng was required by his role as China’s paramount leader to address this exigency within the framework of acceptable norms and values.

On his resumption of power in 1976, Deng took a series of actions under the banner, “rectification of disorders” (or zhengdun in Chinese). In a series of speeches addressing transitional issues, he urged a shift in emphasis from ideological battles to economic development, repeatedly citing Mao’s own words as the source of his ideas. For example, in a speech entitled “Upholding the Flag of Mao Zedong Thought; Adhering to the Principle of Seeking Truth from Facts,” Deng unabashedly criticized a Mao’s idolater named Hua Guofeng for his indiscriminate support of the so-called “double whatevers”[37]:

We all know that there is a popular talk of “double whatevers:” Whatever comrade Mao Zedong has endorsed cannot be changed; whatever comrade Mao Zedong has done cannot be changed. Is this considered upholding the flag of Mao Zedong thought? No! If we keep doing this, we actually distort Mao Zedong thought. The basic principle of Mao Zedong thought is seeking truth from facts and is to apply the general principles of Marxism and Leninism to the practical situation of Chinese revolution.[38]

In subsequent speeches and writings, Deng reiterated his belief in using practice as the sole criterion for measuring truth and emphasized the need for China’s modernization. Then, as though to insure his bona fides with the old guard, Deng, on March 30, 1979, responded to charges of ideological laxity with what he called the “Four Cardinal Principles”: (1) adherence to the socialist road, (2) adherence to the proletarian dictatorship, (3) adherence to the Communist Party’s leadership, and (4) adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. Scholars have different interpretations on the rhetorical implications of the “Four Cardinal Principles.” Sujian Guo considers it an act of preventing the CCP from losing its power and a signal to remain an authoritarian structure.[39] Tsou Tang regards this as Deng’s strategy of taking a “middle course” to balance between the Party’s ideological legitimacy and his own economic agenda”[40] Chang observes that Deng’s insistence on the Four Cardinal Principles was indeed a strategic response to Mao’s loyalists and to the lingering influence of communist ideology. It was a “political necessity,” said Chang, the purpose of which was to “disarm internal resistance.”[41] By doing so, Deng could gain support from the old guard, unite the nation, and pave the way for rapid economic reform and an open-door policy.[42] Further, Deng’s insistence on the Four Cardinal Principles serves as a rhetorical strategy to create a stable environment for economic reform. Said Deng, “China’s stability is the overriding principle. Without a stable environment, nothing can be accomplished; the achievement once gained can get lost.”[43] The enforcement of the Four Cardinal Principles would allow China to maintain stable under the Communist Party’s control.

Deng’s rhetoric to this point illustrates what was required to reconcile the new push for reform with the old Maoist/Marxist doctrine. Using Mao to depart from Mao, as in his critique of the “double whatevers.” Deng reframed the problem, such that, in Burke’s terms, what had been “apart from” could now be “a part of.” By his insistence on the Four Cardinal Principles, Deng probably sought to win over the ideologically orthodox and to provide rhetorical cover for those who welcomed his reforms.

In the early period of the economic reform, Deng is rhetorically required to provide a new slogan that would indicate a departure from Maoist idealist/utopian path, and yet still legitimize the Party’s rule. This new terms is “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” first appeared in a speech Deng presented to Chinese visitors on June 18, 1983. The term soon became the mantra for Deng-style reform, its all-encompassing “God” term—used repeatedly by Chinese media and politicians alike. Its coinage called to mind the Confucian concept of zheng ming, discussed earlier.

Several meanings of the term can be identified by examining various Deng speeches. First, Deng explains that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” means making decisions with consideration for Chinese contexts. Implicit here is a claim to Chinese distinctiveness and, by implication, an appeal to Chinese nationalism. In his words, “We can learn from other countries, but we cannot impose different social systems from foreign countries on to China.”[44] China must work out its own path to modernization and prosperity. Second, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” means combining a socialist system with a market economy. He states, “Market economy is not owned by capitalism only. Socialism can have market economy as well.”[45] For him, what really matters is to improve productivity and the Chinese standard of living, not ideological correctness. Yet implicit in the framing of Deng’s argument is an ideological appeal to a right of ownership. At the same time, staying on the path of socialism gives the CCP legitimacy to continue its rule. Third, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” means selectively borrowing from the capitalist countries “the good stuff,” primarily their scientific methods and management techniques.[46]

While acknowledging China’s need to borrow selectively from capitalist countries, Deng nevertheless reiterated Maoism’s longstanding objections to capitalism as an economic system. “A capitalist system is profit-driven; it cannot rid itself of exploitation, pillage, and economic crisis,”[47] Deng asserts. In another speech Deng reiterates that “China must adhere to socialism. Capitalism will not work in China. If China took the path of capitalism, its chaotic situation would never end; its poverty would never be changed.”[48]

Deng recognized the repercussions of deviating openly from ideological orthodoxy,[49] and wisely undertook the task of redefining socialism rather than repudiating it. During Mao’s era, socialism, understood as a system of state ownership and control of “productive forces” for the benefit of all, constituted the true path to a classless, stateless communist utopia. It was Mao’s belief that with correct conformity to Marxist-Maoist ideals, endless energy would be released for the production and subsequent distribution of the newly created economic wealth.

Deng’s definition of socialism deviates from Mao’s version. Deng argued that socialism should aim at improving the standard of living of the Chinese people. Living in poverty is not the characteristic of socialism.[50] He made it clear that the primary task of socialism is the development of productive forces and moving out of poverty.[51] Moreover, socialism, by definition, could not fail, even if success for a time meant increased inequalities through the selective appropriation of capitalist practices.

The slogan was sufficiently ambiguous, yet strikingly effective to characterize Deng’s reform in that it enabled the nation to maintain a largely state-owned economy, while allowing for some capitalist innovation. In a significant way, Deng’s coinage of the phrase, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” was designed to rescue the CCP from its weakening mandate and reset the political agenda in China, from ideological purity to the improvement of the material well-being of the Chinese people. [52]

Can a slogan as effective as Deng’s be taken at face value as a direct expression of his privately held beliefs? Probably not. All the while that he voiced support for the Maoist system, he managed to de-collectivize farms, reduce dependence on failing, government-owned industries, or permit some degree of private enterprise—under the ambiguous banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” On the one hand, Deng promised that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” would benefit the majority of Chinese people, not create wealth for the few. On the other hand, Deng was against absolute equalitarianism; he allowed that some people and some regions could get rich first.[53]

The economic reform launched by Deng Xiaoping and its initial success gained him a world-wide reputation for having lifted millions Chinese out of poverty and was viewed in the West as a step toward democracy. Deng was invited to visited the U. S. and made the “Man of the Year” twice by Time magazine. Besides moving toward a market economy, Deng introduced other reforms, At the international front, Deng took the path of opening up relations with the West. His policy was one of “non-alignment and equi-distance” from the world’s powers.[54] Deng’s foreign policy has set the guidelines for China’s international relations in years to come.

Jiang Zemin’s Succession to Deng: Explication of “Three Represents”

Deng Xiaoping passed away in 1997, leaving China, as promised, with a booming economy, including vast improvements in per capita income, but also increased corruption, mounting unemployment, environmental degradation, and a widening gap between rich and poor.[55] China’s economy, and especially its private enterprises, continued to grow, making up over 50% of GDP.[56] The biggest winners from the reforms, largely entrepreneurs and educated professionals, posed a potential threat to the Party’s authority with their accumulated wealth and increasing demands for political participation. The new losers, mainly workers and peasants, began to lose faith in the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s leadership.

For Deng’s successors, the burden of defending economic reforms as ideologically correct has been progressively lessened. However, they still must pay lip service to Marxist theory and Maoist thought. In his speech to China’s 16^th Party Congress, Jiang Zemin recalled ten chief lessons from the reform period, presenting them as having been consensually arrived at through a process of objective analysis. He began with a ritualistic tribute to his ideological predecessors, singling out Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as the new guideline for the CCP,

Uphold Deng Xiaoping Theory as our guide and constantly bringing forth theoretical innovation. Deng Xiaoping’s Theory is our banner; and the party’s basic line and program are the fundamental guidelines for every field of our work. Whatever difficulties and risks we may come up against, we must unswervingly abide by the party’s basic theory, line, and program. We should persist in arming the entire party membership with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory and using them to educate our people. We should continue to emancipate our minds, seek truth from facts, keep pace with the times and make innovations in a pioneering spirit. We should respect the creativity of the general public and test and develop the party’s theory, line, principles, and policies through practices.[57]

This is the first of the ten principles Jiang articulated, and it serves both to honor the old orthodoxies and to display Jiang himself as a Party loyalist whose reforms, like Deng’s, have been continuous with longstanding doctrine, rather than departures from it. The rhetorical style Jiang used is similar to the Party’s conventional clichés and catchy phrases in that it waves the flags of predecessors in justifying new moves.

The ”new moves” or his new political agenda were subtlety camouflaged in Jiang’s coinage of the so-called “Three Represents,” first introduced in a speech on February 25, 2000 during his trip to Guangdong Province. The slogan aimed at redefining the mission of the CCP under his leadership. The Party represents, he said, (1) the demands for the development of advanced productive forces; (2) the forward direction of advanced culture; (3) and the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the Chinese people. Jiang regarded the “Three Represents” as innovations for party building, principles of governing the country, and a source of strength for party members.”[58] China’s official media has called the “Three Represents” “Jiang Zemin’s Thought,” which has been written into the Party’s Constitution.

Having paid homage to Marxist theory, Maoist thought, and Deng’s theory, Jiang’s subsequent enumeration of lessons learned is relatively free from ideological strictures and focused on the Party’s first represent: the development of productive forces. For example, Principle Two defends economic reform in a pragmatic, straightforward manner: “Development is the final word. We must seize all opportunities to accelerate development. Development calls for new ideas. We should stick to the principle of expanding domestic demand and implement the strategy of national rejuvenation through science and education and that of sustainable development.”[59]

Comparing with Deng’s rhetoric, Jiang’s remaining speech is more pragmatic and technocratic. Changes in rhetorical content and style reflect changed circumstances, not least changes in norms of governance.

In Jiang’s speeches, he frequently used the term “keeping pace with the times” in reference to making adjustment to the changing situation. One of the new situations Jiang referred to is the rising wealth and social power of the new capitalists. One of the actions Jiang took under his second Represent: “The Party represents the forward direction of advanced culture” is to recruit capitalist class members into the Party. Jiang first proposed to recruit private entrepreneurs to the CCP in his speech of July 1^st, 2001 in celebration of the 80^th anniversary of the CCP, but met with resistance from the veteran party members who signed a petition of ten-thousand words” (wanyanshu in Chinese) to accuse Jiang of violating the Party’s cardinal principles in its representation of the working class.[60] In the speech at the 16^th Party Congress, Jiang replaced the phrase “private entrepreneurs” with a new phrase “role models from other social strata.” In his words, “We should unite with the people of all social strata who help to make the motherland prosperous and strong.” . . . “We should recruit members of other social strata to the Party in order to increase the Party’s influence, adapting to the new situation, and explore new systems and new ideas in management.”[61] Strategically, “other strata” was far less offensive to the old guard than the term “private entrepreneurs” which is an equivalent of “capitalist” to the Chinese mind. In Wu’s view, Jiang’s move is a strategy to ensure his power position as well as the leadership of the Party. As the economic reform had created accumulated wealth, the Party had to represent itself as the vanguard of both the working class and the entrepreneurs/capitalists. This signaled the changing nature of the Party’s original goal and its mission, which was to serve the peasants and working class.[62]

Apparently, this contradictory nature of the Party’s mission is Jiang’s innovation to “advance the culture” and a strategic move to rebuild the Party. The term “advanced culture” can be interpreted as a code word for forward thinking and learning from the West in the political reform. It allowed him to address problems of governance and stressed the need for “socialist democracy,” involving participation by ordinary citizens in governance, supervision of the government, and increased democracy within the Party, including elections to party posts and a greater degree of intra-party discussion and consultation. As to the third “represent,” –serving the interest of the vast majority of the Chinese people, was not really a Jiang invention. It was the fundamental principle of the CCP as articulated by pioneer communists and carried out by Mao’s revolution.

In a nutshell, “Three Represents” does seem to aim at redefining the Party’s mission so as to strengthen its authority in the pursuit of economic development (representing advanced productive force), at infusing the Party’s ideology with capitalist members and practices (representing advanced culture), and at re-legitimizing the moral position of the party (representing the vast majority of Chinese people). Strategically, it has provided a rhetorical vehicle by which to further shift the Party from an ideological guardian to a service-oriented institution.

Reaction to the “Three Represents” has been mixed. Jiang’s proposal for inclusion of the capitalist class into the Party was met with severe criticism by those who felt the CCP’s ideology has been betrayed and the Constitution violated. Even the Economist magazine characterized Jiang’s proposal as an “ideological distortion.”[63] Many Chinese have viewed the “Three Represents” as just another set of party clichés. Wang and Zheng interpreted as a political strategy to rebuild the Party’s image as constantly adapting itself to China’s changing economic and social reality as well as to expand its political support for the regime.[64]

Heisey (2004) observes that while Deng Xiaoping had found a way to build “economic pragmatism,” Jiang Zeming pursued a “path of development’ that would be based upon ‘strategic partnership’ with the West.”[65] Jiang’s growth as a diplomat has been widely acknowledged[66] most notably in collaborating with other nations to deter America’s hegemonic impulses while at the same time making China indispensable in the U. S.-led efforts to combat terrorism and halt North Korean nuclear proliferation. But Jiang was no slacker at public diplomacy, even when he ascended to the presidency of China. Lam grudgingly credits him with having brought ties with the United States back to pre-Tiananmen levels, this as the result of a “media-savvy” eight day visit in late 1997. Jiang made headlines at home and abroad when he “played guitar, sang Karaoke, debated with Clinton, and harangued anti-Chinese students at Harvard.”[67] In a subsequent visit to the West in 2000, Jiang presented himself as a liberal thinker, with a friendly, co-active style, eager to smooth over political differences. In his concluding remarks on Sino-American relations, Jiang made a plea: “China and U. S. should look at and deal with our relationship from a strategic and long-term point of view. . . . Chinese and American governments should act with the tide of history, listen to the voice of two peoples, seek commonalities while keeping our differences, expand our cooperation and make mutual efforts toward a constructive strategic partnership in the 21 century.”[68] As in his initial visit, Jiang’s ameliorative rhetoric helped alter the dictatorial, tyrannical image of Chinese leaders, formed by news of human rights violations and by television footage of the Tiananmen massacre.

Hu and Wen’s “Putting People First”

Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as the Party’s General Secretary in November 2002 and became the President of China in March of the following year. Wen Jiabao took on the premiership in March 2003 as well. Just how far they diverged from their predecessors could not have been immediately apparent at the time of their appointments, for they were rhetorically required, as underlings, to hew to the Party line on most matters. It was especially important for Hu and Wen to demonstrate acts of deference toward Jiang and his “Shanghai” faction, currying their favor, for example, on the issue of one-party rule.[69] Like their predecessor, Hu and Wen exalted Marx, Mao, and Deng Xiaoping, but also testified repeatedly to the importance of Jiang’s “Three Represents.” However, Hu and Wen have distinguished themselves from Jiang by appealing to traditional Chinese values, by proposing a more cautious scheme for what they called “balanced” economic development,[70] and by championing the cause of the poor and dispossessed.

A. Making the Case for “Putting [Poor] People First”

Depending on which statistics one looks at, China’s turn toward capitalism has been an unqualified success or a mixed blessing. Jiang’s regime could legitimately boast that the rising tide of economic growth has brought China out of dire poverty, with per capita income having reached $1,000 U. S. in 2003. But per capita averages mask income disparities, and China’s have been as large, or greater, than any in the world. A report, issued by the Chinese government’s own poverty task force acknowledged that China’s poverty rate increased in 2003 for the first time since 1978 with 85 million Chinese residents living on less than $77 per year.[71] Using income distribution as a measure of a country’s economic inequality, China is apparently more unequal than most countries in the world. In the 2004 bestseller, An Investigative Report of China’s Peasantry, Chen and Shun reported shocking cases of the poverty of peasants in Anhui province as a result of heavy tax burdens imposed by local officials as well as unfair government policies.[72] Moreover, a recent study by the Chinese Academy of Social Science concluded that China’s urban-rural income gap, factoring in education and health, is the worst on earth.[73]

While Jiang continued Deng Xiaoping’s course of economic and political reform by prioritizing economic growth and Party restructuring, he did not give much attention to the third of his “represents,” slighting, in effect, the interests of the poor. Given the increasing disparity between rich and poor, Hu’s government chose to focus on Jiang’s third represent. However, instead of repeating Jiang’s term, Hu made repeated reference to the Confucian phrase, “Putting People First” in Chinese as the manifesto of his government. In a speech on the 82nd anniversary of the CCP, Hu elaborated on this new/old term to party members:

Party officials at every level should solidly establish the mindset of serving the people and the spirit of honesty to and responsibility for the people. They must exercise their power for the people, build an emotional bond with the people, and seek benefits for the people. They must solve concrete problems for the people, make every effort to handle difficult situations for them, persistently doing good deeds for the sake of people, and always place people’s interest above everything else.[74]

The slogan, “putting people first,” echoes Confucian values, in particular those of Mencius (390-305 B.C.E.), a devout follower of Confucius, who applied the Confucian notion of ren or benevolence to ren zheng (benevolent government) and advised the state’s kings to think and act in the interests of the people. Hu repeatedly quoted Mencius’s sayings that “hardship and plain life can rejuvenate life; comfort and luxury can lead to death”[75] as a way of aligning himself with the people against official corruption. Huang agrees that Hu’s rhetoric has exemplified “Mencius’ heart-rooted and people-centered government”[76] whose rulers must care about the sufferings of the people and stay benevolent in order to sustain their legitimacy and control. In his book, The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective, Guo notes, “In modern Chinese political thought, the notion of benevolent government is related to at least three central components: social equality, wealth of the people, and national greatness.”[77] This thought has been exemplified in Hu’s government which clearly had in mind the masses of Chinese, and especially those from the hinterlands, whose lives had not been materially improved by China’s rising GDPs, relative to the Eastern urbanites, and who could, in absolute terms, have suffered declines.[78]

Like their predecessors, Hu and Wen had to exhibit lip-service adherence to Marxist/Maoist principles as a precondition for moving ahead, but now they were also rhetorically required to cite Deng and Jiang. Having identified problems that emerged as the result of the economic reforms, Wen Jiabao offered a declaration of intentions for 2004 that began by taking “Deng Xiaoping theory and the important thought of “Three Represents” as our guide.”[79] Only then could Hu and Wen place their own stamp on the reform process. It was at once technocratic and egalitarian, incorporating new scientific knowledge in support of old Maoist value of “serving the people.” Their rhetoric was both new and old as well.

The disparity between the rich and poor, along with problems of corruption and moral decline has created nostalgia for Mao’s era among many Chinese. Hu and Wen’s words also bespeak Maoist ideals, and so too have their symbolic actions. Significantly,

Hu traveled to Xibanpo, Mao’s revolutionary base, in December, 2002, where he used both traditional and Maoist slogans in calling for “arduous struggle” and “plain living.” Hu quoted Mao’s “two musts:” “[The party members] must keep the virtues of modesty, caution, humbleness, and calmness; [they] must continue to maintain the party’s tradition of plain living and arduous struggle.” [80] Mao gave these admonitions to party officials when they took over China in 1949.

Hu and Wen’s examples brought about copycat visits to historic revolutionary sites and poor sections of China by other officials. Besides linking the new order with its revolutionary ideals and thus gaining increased support, these visits sent an implicit warning to officialdom about complacency and corruption in high places.[81] Their demonstrations of concern stood in sharp contrast with Jiang’s regime. In aligning themselves with Maoist values, Hu’s regime not only got out from under Jiang’s shadow, it also established its legitimacy and paved the way for policy change.

Hu and Wen’s leadership style also exemplified the Confucian value of “matching your words with action”[82] They have made a series of policy moves favoring the poor, in addition to engaging in sympathetic symbolic actions. By such measures as the “Number One” decree eliminating a major tax on farmers, they have taken concrete steps to improve the living standard of peasants.[83] Since 2006, they have initiated the “New Socialist Countryside” program for peasants, including completely eliminating agricultural tax for farmers, free education for rural students, and free medical care for peasants. Along with the peasantry they have registered unmistakable compassion for other constituencies, including those displaced from inefficient state-owned factories. Hu was shown on Chinese television visiting a herder’s tent in Inner Mongolia, voicing concern for the poor and the unemployed, spending New Year with peasants. Wen did likewise, celebrating the Lunar New Year with mine workers down a 720-meter coal-mine shaft in China’s bitterly cold northeast. During the SARS epidemic, Hu and Wen were reported risking their own lives in paying frequent visits to local hospitals and SARS patients, and giving concrete instructions of how to control the epidemic. Wen was covered in the media visiting the campus of Beijing University during the SARS epidemic. All these left the students an impression of “Wen as ‘a people’s premier’ and built their confidence in the government.”[84] Moreover, Wen’s image of “people’s premier” was further shaped by the reported story of him growing up in an ordinary family, having visited 1,800 counties out of 2,000 throughout the country, and having helped migrant workers to have the default wage recovered. More recently, Wen was shown visiting an 83-year-old elementary school teacher on China’s Teacher’s Day.[85]

B. Impact of Rhetorical Strategies

Watts has labeled Hu and Wen as “left-wing interventionists” and their predecessors, by comparison, as “right-wingers.” [86] These designations are currently used by some Western observers to highlight the rhetorical problems faced by Hu and Wen in achieving their respective goals. Indeed, Jiang’s agenda seemed to favor the winners of the economic reform and lead to a larger economic disparity while Hu/Wen’s rhetoric and actions appealed to the losers of the reform and aimed to bridge the gap between the rich and poor.

While Hu and Wen still maintain one-party rule and government control, ordinary Chinese people enjoy unprecedented levels of freedom of speech in private and in limited public settings, particularly in their criticism of the Party and government. In fact, for the first time in Chinese history, the line ”the government must respect and protect human rights” has been written into the Constitution. Dong called this a milestone in the development of Chinese human rights and a move from treating human rights as a political entity to a legal concept.[87] In a recent press conference, Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized that the Party leadership and its members must comply with the law and be made accountable for their actions. Such a move is compatible with Hu’s tenet of “putting people first” while at the same time promoting political reform within the Party.[88] Hu’s efforts to overcome the moral bankruptcy of some Communist Party members can only have effect when they are combined with legal accountability and penalty.

Fortunately for Hu and Wen, they seem to be operating in an international climate conducive to internal reform. On the international front, they have followed their predecessors with a pragmatic, reconciliatory, and accommodating approach, which appears to have paid off. During their visits to the U. S. they garnered warm receptions, and were able once again to celebrate improved relations with the West, emphasize commonalities, urge mutual respect and call for dialogue to resolve future differences.[89] As Heisey points out, “Hu’s rhetoric in foreign affairs follows “the established policy of strategic partnership through more effective and extensive dialogue with the U. S. and other regions of the world. Hu’s emphasis on dialogue with the U.S. as equal partners is a rhetorical strategy that constructs a sense of social cohesion, advancing the interests of the entire international community.”[90]

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has presented a trajectory and analysis of China’s transitional rhetoric during the period of economic reform. The CCP leaders’ rhetoric in this period was characterized by reconciliation of the old and the new through coinage or redefinition of Party slogans in response to the domestic dilemmas/requirements and global circumstances. Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” epitomized his effort to reconcile Maoist ideals with the economic initiatives. Jiang Zeming pushed economic development forward while opening the CCP to entrepreneurial and managerial elites in the name of “advancing the culture” and “keeping up with times.” And Hu furthered Party legitimacy and the interests of the poor in his efforts at “putting people first.” All of these slogans created rhetorical space to facilitate the economic/social transition as well as justifying continued party rule. On the international front, CCP leaders have made at least temporary peace with China’s former enemies in the West. As this is written, China and the U. S. are joined together in mutually advantageous trade relationships and in a “strategic partnership” on matters of mutual concern.

Over the years, the language of capitalist appropriation has become less tentative, less qualified, less ambiguous, consistent with the reality of a private sector now responsible for at least half of China’s economic growth.[91] In the early 1980s capitalism was smuggled in rhetorically under the banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the private sector was officially recognized as a “complement to the state-owned economy. In 1993, the term “market economy” became enshrined in the Constitution. By 1999, private enterprises were constitutionally elevated in status as an “essential part” of China’s economy.[92] As this is written the CCP’s new leaders are seeking to diversify exports to more regions in the world and aiming to achieve what they call “balanced development.” They are doing so in a highly professionalized, transparent manner, utilizing pragmatic, “win-win” arguments in place of ideologically strident appeals for class struggle.

The dilemmas and strategies identified here have included some that are common to political leaders—e. g., those stemming from the need simultaneously to compete and cooperate with others; to appeal simultaneously to audiences with sharply divergent interests or opinions, and to appear principled and consistent while remaining flexible and even opportunistic. Yet the Chinese case seems in some ways unique, given the extreme disparities between the Marxist/Maoist ideology that brought the CCP into power, and in whose name the transition to capitalism has had to be justified.

In general, during the transition period, China’s leaders have had to wrestle with contradictions and paradoxes. Their rhetoric has exhibited an interplay of moralistic and utilitarian. intentions. On one hand, it appears to be consistent with time-honored principles in its invocations of Marxian dialectical theory; Mao’s “truth from facts,” and the general principle that policy judgments must be “correct” or “incorrect” and not simply wise or imprudent. On the other hand, CCP leaders have encouraged innovative thinking in the pursuit of economic prosperity and political reform. Ironically, the rhetoric of consistency with time-honored principles has coincided with deviations from those principles in practice. And in the face of these recurring tensions the leaders have communicated vaguely and ambiguously at times, only hinting at goals and meanings, while at other times offering offsetting benefits to different constituencies, and thus blunting opposition. The CCP have had to make use of a wide array of rhetorical strategies, including deception, deliberate ambiguity, behavioral modeling, symbolically freighted moves, and, not least, straight talk. China’s transition has been a dynamic, ever-changing process, both internally and internationally. As China continues its course toward economic and political reforms, its leaders will invent new rhetoric and employ new strategies to address problems and meet the situational requirements.

Notes

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[1] The “opening to the West,” signified by the famous handshake between Premier Chou En-Lai and President Richard Nixon in 1972, took on added meaning by the normalization of relations, undertaken by President Jimmy Carter in 1979.

[2] A. R. Kluver, Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy (Albany, New York: The State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 2.

[3] The year of 1978 is considered the beginning of a new historic era in China, marked by the Third Plenum of the Eleven Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which officially endorsed the shift of Party’s agenda from emphasis on ideological correctness to the economic reform and adoption of an open-door policy.

[4] D. Ray Heisey. “Cultural Influences in Political Communication.” In Alberto Gonzales and Dolores V. Tanno (eds.) Politics, Communication, and Culture (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), p. 23.

[5] H. W. Simons, “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements,” in Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970):1-11. H. W. Simons, “A Dilemma-Centered Analysis of Clinton’s August 17^th Apologia: Implications for Rhetorical Theory and Method” in Quarterly Journal of Speech (2000), 438-453.

[6] See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Andrew, J. Nathan, China’s Transition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997); Tsou, Tang. The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); David C. B. & Herbert S. Yee (eds.), China in Transition: Issues and Politics (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987).

[7] See Part II “Chinese Political Rhetoric” in D. Ray Heisey (ed), Chinese Perspectives in Rhetoric and Communication (Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 2000); Randy Kluver and John H. Powers (eds.), Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities (Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1999); Shaorong Huang, To Rebel Is Justified: A Rhetorical Study of China’s Cultural Revolution Movement 1966-1969 (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1996); Xing Lu, Rhetoric of the Chinese cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004).

[8] Burke turns to Machiavelli’s The Prince.” for support. It says, in effect, “Here is the kind of act proper to such-and-such a scene.” Machiavelli acknowledges that people “may also act in accordance with their own natures, or temperaments,” but he underscores the importance for rulers of acting “in accordance with the requirements set them by scenic conditions.” A Rhetoric of Motives, (pp. 162-3).

[9] See R. Bernstein and R. H. Munro, The coming conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997);

B. Gertz,, China threat: How the People’s Republic target America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000); M. Sieff, “What Chinese Don’t Know about America,” in United Press International June 4 (2003): 1-2.

[10] Tsou, Tang. The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective, pp. xxi.

[11] A desperately impoverished country boy who rose from peasant to union leader to celebrated firebrand to President of Brazil, Lula, finally in power, says Bearak “now has to contend with the many forbidding obstacles in the sightline of a genuinely egalitarian vision.” . . . “This is everywhere the case for leftist leaders in developing countries. “Their urge for reform is most often constrained by a dependence on international creditors. Default would be a debacle. Investor confidence would plummet, capitol would flee, the poor would take an abrupt beating.” B. Bearak, “Poor Man’s Burden” in New York Times, June 27 (pp. 1-3) 2. 3.   

[12] Burke, Attitudes Toward History.

[13] A. Nathan, China’s Transition, 62.

[14] See W. Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin ( New York:Prentice-Hall, 1999); J. Wong, Red China Blues (New York: Anchor, 1996).

[15] The slogans of “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy” were advocated during the New Culture Movement (1910s-1920s) by Chinese intellectuals. The movement aimed to reject completely traditional Chinese culture and introduce Western science and democracy to China. Even though the CCP endorsed the discourse of science, it was not based on the interpretation of western scientific reasoning characterized by induction. Kexue, the Chinese word for science is loosely used to refer to the truthfulness of Marxist theory on social change. Also, the term minzhu (democracy) is used in a limited sense of seeking opinions of the majority as opposed to a political system and free speech.

[16] K. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives.

[17] S. C. Lee and K. K. Campbell . “ Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s 1988 Inaugural Adress: Campaigning for Investiture. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 80, 37-52, 1994. D. Ray Heisey and M. A. Brockett. “Nelson Mandela and F. W. De Klerk: Visions of a New South Africa” Paper presented at the First African Symposium on Rhetoric, Persuasion, and Power, Capetown, South Africa, 1994.. D. R. Heisey,. “George Bush and Operation Desert Shield: Peace by Force, American Style.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association. Atlanta, 1991. M. Zhong and D. R. Heisey. “China’s Apologia on the Human Rights Issue: An Intercultural Conflict with the United States>” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, New Orleans, 1994.

[18] D. Ray Heisey. “Cultural Influences in Political Communication.” In Alberto Gonzales and Dolores V. Tanno (eds.) Politics, Communication, and Culture (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997, pp. 9-26.), p. 14.

[19] M. Zhong and D. R. Heisey. “China’s Apologia on the Human Rights Issue: An Intercultural Conflict with the United States>” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, New Orleans, 1994. John Powers. “Civic Discourse with the International Community: China’s Whitepapers on Human Rights.” In Randy Kluver and John Powers (eds.) Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities. Stamford, Connecticut: Ablex Publishing, 1999, pp.237-250.

[20] Kluver, 1996.

[21] A. R. Kluver “Political Identity and the National Myth: Toward an Intercultural Understanding of Political Legitimacy” In Alberto Gonzales and Dolores V. Tanno (eds.) Politics, Communication, and Culture (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997 pp. 48-75), p. 59..

[22] A. R. Kluver, 1997, p. 73.

[23] Elizabeth Jean Nelson. “Nothing Ever Goes Well Enough”: Mussolini and the Rhetoric of Perpetual Struggle” Communication Studies, Spring , 1991, Vol. 42, pp. 22-42.

[24] Culture-specific rhetorical repertoires are probably variants of cross-cultural and perhaps even structural possibilities, inherent in the pragmatics of symbol use. See for example, Burke’s introduction to the Grammar of Motives. Also See M. Billig, Ideology and Opinions (London: Sage, 1989); H. W. Simons, Persuasion in Society (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), ch. 6.

[25] See Xing Lu, Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B. C. E.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998). Many of the strategies in Sunzi Bing Fa and Gui Gu Zi have been applied to statecraft, trading and business negotiation, and interpersonal relationships. For English translation and studies of these texts, see Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. & trans. James Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983); W, K. Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu (London: Arthur Probsthan, 1939); Daniel Coyle, Guiguizi: On the Cosmological Axes of Chinese Persuasion, diss. (University of Hawaii, 1999)

[26] Sinologists have noted the striking similarities between Maoism and Confucianism in that both emphasize the role of ideological conformity and the moral integrity of the individual. For example, Mao appropriated the Confucian concept of self-examination as a process of cultivation and moral perfection in the endless communist campaign of thought reform since 1942. See J. Fairbanks, “The Chinese Pattern,” in Comparative Communism, ed. G. Bertsch and T. Ganschow (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976, 59). Also see G. Chu, Radical Change through Communication in Mao’s China (Honolulu, Hawaii: the University Press of Hawaii, 1977); L. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psycholocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1968).

[27] Confucius (551-479 B. C. E. ). Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, trans. Simon Leys (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997). The famous quote on Confucius concept of zheng ming is “, “If the names are not correct, language is without an object. When language is without an object, no affairs can be effected. When no affairs can be effected. . ..(13.3. p.60)

[28] M. Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992).

[29] Chinese history has been laced with slogans and memorable sayings ranging from peasant rebellions to classic Chinese writings.

[30] Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives.

[31] How is the rhetorical analyst to know what the rhetor intends, let alone to assess what has been said? The answer is that others’ intentions are notoriously difficult to ascertain, and perhaps never fully knowable, but still subject to better and worse “readings.” By “readings” we refer to assessments not just of the text, but also of its context, and we advise assessments of “grand” strategies such as are reflected in major policy pronouncements and micro-analyses of seemingly innocuous details that add nuance and meaning to the “grand” pronouncement. Such is the work necessary to discern rhetorical intentions and assess consequences, and it applies as well to rhetoric addressed to domestic audiences.

[32] Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives.

[33] A number of regional strikes and peasants uprising have been staged in China demanding for fair treatment and salary compensation in the past few years. However, some are not reported as the media are still controlled by the government.

[34] Kluver , Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reform, p. 8.

[35] While Mao labeled Deng “a rightest,” yet considered him “a rare talent,” “softness melded with toughness” and invited him back to office in charge of China’s economy and state affairs in 1973. According to Dr. Li’s account, Mao appointed Deng as the Vice Premier of China, assisting Premier Zhou Enlai who was seriously ill on state affairs. China’s economy was collapsed due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. After two years in office, Deng was denounced again for not following Mao’s revolutionary path and was forced to step down. After Mao’s Death, Hua Guofeng, Mao’s appointed successor, become the interim CCP Chairman. Hua resigned in 1978 and was replaced by Hu Yaobang (1978-1987). During this time, Deng Xiaoping was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the most powerful position in China and Vice Chairman of the CCP. See Zhisui Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (Taiwan: China Times Publishing Company, 1994).

[36] Wei-Ming Tu, “Introduction: Cultural Perspective,” in China in Transformation, ed. Wei-Ming tu (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994).

[37] Following upon Mao’s death, Hua Guofeng, the appointed successor of Mao, had declared himself in support of the so-called “double whatevers”: “whatever decisions Chairman Mao had made, we should firmly support, and whatever Chairman Mao had instructed, we should always observe.” The slogan represents Mao’s loyalists’ attempt to adhere to Maoist ideology of class struggle and continued revolution.

[38] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. II (Beijing: The People’s Press, 1983), p. 126.

[39] Sujian Guo. Post-Mao China: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism? (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2000).

[40] Tsou Tang , Cultural Revolution & Post-Mao Reform, p. 222.

[41] D. Wen-Wei Chang., China under Deng Xiaoping: Political and Economic Reform (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), p. 50.

[42] Deng drew support from fellow victims of the Cultural Revolution, many of whom he had helped to resuscitate. Not insignificant were his close ties to the army. And Deng brought with him his reputation as a loyal comrade to Mao during the pre-1949 revolution.

[43] Deng, Vol III., (1993), p. 284

[44] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. II. (Beijing: The People’s Press, 1983), p.141. All the translations of Deng Xiaoping’s speeches are done by the first author.

[45] Deng, Vol. II., (1983), p. 236.

[46] Deng, Vol. II., (1983), p. 236; Vol. III., (1993), p. 149.

[47] Deng, Vol. II., (1983), p. 167.

[48] Deng, Vol. III., (1993), p. 63.

[49] There was a power struggle within the Party between the more conservative revolutionary old guards trying to control the reform and the younger generation of party officials led by Deng Xiaoping trying to promote change. See M. Goldman and R. MacFarquhar “Dynamic Economy, Declining party-State” in The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms, eds. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 1-29, Andrew J. Nathan, China’s Transition; H. Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution.

[50] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. III., 91993), p. 265.

[51] Deng, Vol. III., (1993), p. 265.

[52] Two years after Deng re- gained power, China’s GNP growth jumped from 1.4% in 1975 to 11.9% in 1976, a remarkable turnaround from the previous year . See Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political Biography (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 1998), p.188.

[53] Deng, Vol. III. (1993), 52. Deng endorsed the development of special economic zones in South China as the site for the “experiments.” These experiments have proved to be successful in improving the average standard of living.

[54] Ting Wai, “Sino-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era” In China in Transition: Issues and Policies, eds. David Theather & Herbert Yee (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 93-115.

[55] During the four years before Deng’s death, the number of officially laid-off workers quadrupled. See X. Hu & G. Lin, Transition Toward Post-Deng China. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001). Counting superfluous hands in the countryside, said Willy Lam (1999), more than 200 million Chinese were unemployed or underemployed. For China’s corruption problem, see Xiaobo Lu. Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).

[56] According to the source from the Chinese government in 2001, there are 1.5 million private business and 31 million self-employed industrial and commercial households with a total of 130 million employers, contributing 50% of China’s GDP in 2000. In east China’s coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces, where private economy is highly developed, the private sector contributes more than 60% to GDP. (www. Chinagate.comcn/English/2345.htm)

[57] The People’s Daily, (August 9, 2001). All the sources cited from the People’s Daily are from its overseas Chinese version. The major news, especially political messages between the overseas and inland versions, is the same.

[58] The People’s Daily (August 9, 2001).

[59] The People’s Daily, (August 9, 2001).

[60] In the petition, Jiang is also criticized for his failure to address the issues of economic disparities and for his promotion of a personality cult. However, after Jiang’s July 1^st speech, more than 100.000 private entrepreneurs submitted their application to join the party. See Wang, John & Zheng Yongnian. “Embrasing the Capitalists: The Chinese Communist Party to Brace itself for Far-Reaching Changes.” In Wang Gungwu & Zheng, Yongnian eds. Demage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era, London: Eastern Universities Press, 2003, pp.365-376

[61] The People’s Daily (November, 18^th,2004) 3.

[62] Guoguang Wu. ‘From the July 1 Speech to the Sixteenth Party Congress: Ideology, Party Construction, and Leadership Transition” in China’s Leadership in the 21^st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation, eds. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (Armonk: New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003)167-203.

[63] Economist (2002)

[64] Wang and Zheng, “Embrasing the Capitalists: The Chinese Communist Party to Brace itself for Far-Reaching Changes.”

[65] D. R. Heisey. “China’s president Hu Jintao’s Rhetoric of Socialization.” In Intercultural Communication Studies XIII:3, 4-7.

[66] T. Johnson, “China’s Premier Heads for U. S. in Era of Contradictions” in Philadelphia Inquirer (November 27, 2003) P. A17.

[67] Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, p. 2.

[68] The People’s Daily (Sept. 9^th) 1.

[69] The process by which the entire replacement team was selected is itself a measure of Jiang’s contribution to the CCP’s institutionalization. These leaders did not run for public office but they were considered carefully by their predecessors, who were able to draw upon detailed, confidential dossiers on each of them that had been compiled by the CCP’s secretive, highly trusted Organization Department. They then got as close as China has ever come in the transition period to merit-based selection. See X. Hu & G. Lin, Transition Toward Post-Deng China. (2001).

[70] In a state-affaire report to the nation, Premier Wenjiabao proposed “Five Balances” in regard to the economic development. They include: balancing urban and rural development, balancing development among regions, balancing economic and social development, balancing development of men and nature, and balancing domestic development and opening wider to the outside world. Wen Jiabao, “Report on the Work of the Government” March, 17^th, 2004. www.chinaview.cn

[71] See J. Watts, China’s Growth Flickers to a Halt. The Observer, (July 4, 2004) 1-4 . http;//www.guardina.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,125345,00.html.

[72] Guili Chen and Tao Shun, An Investigative Report of China’s Peasantry (Beijing: The People’s Press, 2004). Wenran Jiang reports that biggest worry is the ever-growing tax burden placed on the rural population. While average agricultural income grew by 90% in the 1994-7 period, the rural tax burden jumped 800%. More than 300 taxes and fees have been imposed by all levels of government. For example, some townships demand 14 kinds of fees to register marriage. Wenran Jiang, “China’s Silent Rural Revolution” Project Syndicate, (April, 2004) 1. http://www.project-syndicate.org/article_print_text?mid=1529&lang=7

[73] Cited in Watts (2004)

[74] The People’s Daily (July 2^nd, 2003) 1. This statement has been labeled by Chinese scholars as the new “Three People Principles” (xin san min zhu yi) as opposed to the “Three People Principles” (nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood) proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the 1911 revolution. See Shaorong Huang “Strive to Build a Modern Humane Government: A Study on China’s President Hu Jintao’s Rhetoric and Symbolic Actions.” Presented at the National Communication Association Convention. November, 11-14, 2004. Also see Heisey (2004).

[75] The People’s Daily, Jan. 3^rd, 2003 p. 4

[76] Huang (2004), 4.

[77] Guo, Xuezhi. The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective (Westport, Connecticut: Pradger, 2002) p. 18.

[78] See Chai Chan, “China Acknowledges First Rise in Poverty in 25 Years,” U. N. Wire, ( July 20, 2004a pp.1-2. http:/unwire.org/UNWire/20040720/449_26017.asp; Chan, “China’s ‘Putting People First’ Development Model: Commentary, People’s Daily Online, (2004b) 1-3; http://english.people.daily.co.cn/20040318_137814.shtml.

[79] Wenjiabao, “Report on the Work of the Government” March, 17^th, 2004. www.chinaview.cn

[80] The people’s daily, 1/3/2003.

[81] Economist 2002; Guardian Unlimited, 2003; The People’s Daily, Jan. 3^rd, 2003.

[82] Confucius, Analectes, ch.. 13, 20 p. 64.

[83] Number One Document issued by Hu and Wen’s government has three major components: (1) eliminating the tax of peasants; (2) promoting urbanization in the rural area; (3) improving the living standard of peasants. The document is not published, but is circulated among government officials at all levels.

[84] Luming, Lin, Eulogy of the Unity’s Strength: An account of the Anti-SARS Campaign of the Chinese People, (Beijing: Xuexi Publisher, 2003) 34.

[85] See Guili Chen and Tao Shun, An Investigative Report of China’s Peasantry (2004) 217-224 on Wen’s visits to rural areas. See People’s Daily Online, Nov. 12, 2003 on the report of Wen Jiabao helping the migrant worker getting the delayed payment back from their employers. Migrant workers are peasants working on the cities. The employers tend to delay the wage payment and use the money for further expansion of their business.

[86] See Watts (2004)

[87] Yunhu Dong, “renquan ruxian: zhonguo renquan fazhan de zhongyao licheng bei” (Including human rights in the constitution: Important development of Chinese human rights). The People’s Daily, 2004, March 15^th.

[88] Hu and Deng are much tougher on cracking down corruption than Jiang. Since they took over the position, a number of high ranking officials have been charged and imprisons with corruption crimes.

[89] Hu Jintao, in the People’s Daily, May 1., 2004; Wen Jiabao, in The People’s Daily, Dec. 10, 2003

[90] Heisey (2004), 6.

[91] Chan (April 2, 2004).

[92] Chan (April 2, 2004).