Ben Stavis
Director, Asian Studies Center
Temple University
Philadelphia PA 19122

September 9, 1999

When Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui said in July that Taiwan should be considered a "country," he created a serious crisis.   Lee's statement shattered the foundations of peace in East Asia for the past half century, namely that Taiwan is not a country but is nominally within the Chinese realm, even if it functions autonomously.  The Taiwan leader's statement taunted China, because China has said it will use force to prevent Taiwan from becoming a formal, independent country.  The United States, driven by historical ties, human rights concerns, and domestic politics, would almost certainly use military resources to protect Taiwan.   This scenario leads directly to war between China and the United States over the status of Taiwan.

Just how dangerous is the situation?  Some analysts, both Chinese and American, think it can blow over easily.  They consider the China-Taiwan conflict more like a theatrical martial arts performance, carefully choreographed to terrify the observers but perfectly safe for the skilled participants.

Others fear that after both China and the United States make threats, they could compelled to use force so that threats would be credible.  In both the United States and China, domestic political competition may create pressures towards simplistic nationalism and may undermine appeals for patience and tolerance of ambiguous arrangements.  In both countries, there is a serious lack of understanding about the cultural values that are shaping the other's actions and responses.   These factors create the conditions in which the United States and China could blunder into a terrible war that neither wants.

No matter who "wins" or who "looses," a war would be very costly to everyone.  A new cold war would replace the past quarter of a century of peace in Asia.   Not only would it depress the spectacular economic growth and political development of the recent past.  It would make management of critical global issues almost impossible for decades to come.  It is far better to avoid such a war than to try to recover from its impact.  Urgent, creative diplomacy is needed.

Background

From the Chinese perspective, Taiwan's effort to upgrade "autonomy" to "independence" is simply not allowable. Historically and culturally, Taiwan is part of China, certainly more so than Hawaii is part of the United States.  Moreover, independence in Taiwan might have a domino effect in Tibet and Muslim regions of West China, reinforcing separatist ideas.  Chinese consider that the Taiwan question is the final part of China's revolution, and that how to manage the Taiwan issue is a domestic matter, exclusively with China's sovereign right.  With two decades of dramatic economic and technological progress and with some military expansion, China feels more confident in asserting its concerns about Taiwan.  China rejects the idea that the United States has any legitimate connection to the Taiwan issue at all.  Moreover, without having visited Taiwan or even having spoken with Taiwanese, many Chinese are convinced most Taiwanese are yearning for national integration.  China has been very clear that it will use force to prevent Taiwan from achieving the status of independent country. There seems to be very broad support in China for war, whatever its costs, to keep Taiwan part of China, at the symbolic level.  A Chinese government that tolerates Taiwan's successfully becoming an independent country would loose legitimacy and could fall.  (This does not mean that China would use force to "liberate" Tawian, as long as Taiwan respects the status quo of "One China" without formal statehood.)

Despite China's warnings, Taiwan has steadily been pushing for more international recognition.  It has been gradually amending its constitution, step by step, to leave behind its old constitution as a province of China and to create the constitutional foundation for statehood.  Given its position as a major global trader, Taiwan's desire for unfettered access to the international environment is understandable.  There is a domestic partisan reason for Taiwan's change too.  Taiwan's ruling Nationalist Party has historic roots on the mainland, and was unpopular for decades with native Taiwanese.  Now that Taiwan has beccome  democratic and the Nationalist Party is campaigning for votes of Taiwanese, it seems to be over-compensating by playing the Taiwan patriotism card.

The United States does not (now) support Taiwan's effort of independence.  However, if China does use force, there will be very powerful domestic pressures to protect Taiwan and great support for Taiwan in congress.  The historic ties of the United States to Taiwan are far greater that to Kuwait or Kosovo, and indeed are written into law, the Taiwan Relations Act.  After decades of argument over "who lost China?" no politician or political party can invite the question "who lost Taiwan?"  Nor will America ignore its own values of self-determination, democracy, and human rights.  These elements of U.S. culture and policy are not well understood in China.

If war begins, the losses would be great for everyone, no mater who wins.  Apart from the immediate cost in lives, property, and money, war would shatter the Asian peace of recent decades.  If China "wins" and absorbs Taiwan, the vigorous trade, investment, and technical exchange with the United States that has been so beneficial would dry up.  A new cold war would descend on East Asia for decades.  US economic sanctions against China lasted roughly a quarter of a century after 1949.  Vietnam languished that much time after its "victory." China's economy would stagnate, with dangerous consequences.  Global issues (environmental, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic trade, etc.) would be unsolvable.

Alternatively, if China "loses," it will loose Taiwan for the indefinite future and the Chinese political system would be weakened.  For at least many years, economic relations with China would be frozen, to the disadvantage of both China and the United States.  A cold war would ensue, driven by China's efforts to try again to regain Taiwan (much as Germany in the inter-war period).  A post war Chinese reconstruction plan would seem unlikely, unless one imagines the unlikely demise of communism in China, in a Russian pattern.  For Taiwan, the cost of victory could be very high also. With this outcome also, management of global issues would be stalled indefinitely.

One would think that rational politicians would avoid such disasters, but history has too many examples of politicians recklessly going into war, despite the costs. Those who blundered into World War I paid tremendous personal and national costs.  It took Europe two world wars and half a century to realize it needed to develop a better way.  Can the Pacific region learn from this experience or must it repeat such a tragedy?

Resolving the Crisis

There seem two diplomatic approaches to avoiding a conflagration, the quiet, indirect way and the direct way.  At the moment, the quiet way is being followed.  Its key is to reassure China that Taiwan is not on the road to becoming a country, regardless of what Taiwan wants.  Most of the major countries have formally reiterated that they accept the view that there is one China, and that Taiwan is legally part of China (even if it functions autonomously).  The United Nations leadership has said the same thing.  In addition, perhaps there is some quiet diplomacy being undertaken to discourage Taiwan from amending its constitution in the direction of formal country-hood.  The "quid" for this "quo" is presumably very substantial.  Whether "quiet diplomacy" might succeed is not yet clear.  Will China be satisfied that Taiwan is not a "country" even if Taiwan proclaims otherwise?  Can Taiwan's aspirations be constrained to avoid a conflagration?

A more direct approach to diplomacy might be some sort of multilateral formal agreement.  The  following Four No's suggests one way of moving towards a peaceful future:

1. No threats of force.  China will renounce the use of force to integrate Taiwan for at least 50 years.

2. No declaration of independence or statehood.  Taiwan will continue to endorse the status-quo principle that there is one China, and that it remains part of China, even if it has and retains functional autonomy.

3. No interference in each other's internal or external affairs.  China will not impede, but in contrast will encourage, Taiwan's international representations as a part of China.  Other parts of China (such as Shanghai) might have their own international representations as well.  Both sides will encourage international organizations to create modalities for non-state participation.

4. No inclusion of Taiwan in an American Theater Missile Defense. Taiwan should not be put permanently within a defensive system of any other country.

If Beijing and Taipei could agree on these four points, East Asia would be assured of continued peace, stability, and development for decades.  Under these principles, China would preserve the principle that Taiwan is part of China, and Taiwan could continue its very successful autonomous economic and political development. Taiwan's economic and cultural exchanges with Mainland China would continue to expand in mutually beneficial ways.  Moreover, U.S.-Chinese relations could improve without the perpetual obstacle of the Taiwan question.  The United States would not need to include the defense of Taiwan in its military preparations; China would not need long range nuclear missiles to provide a strategic deterrent against the United States.  Japan's defense needs (including U.S. forces in Japan)  would similarly be simplified, and with these reductions in military resources, all of Asia would be unburdened of its incipient arms race.  North Korea would have less ability to manipulate one country against another.

No one can predict what the world will look like after 50 years.  China may well be richer and more democratic.  Maybe it will seem less threatening to Taiwan.  Maybe it will be more supportive of the value of self-determination.  Maybe the concept of nation state will have changed and new forms of union and confederation will develop that blend sovereignty with interdependence, as in the European Union.  Of course, maybe China will have more military power and be more threatening.  Who knows how Taiwan's identity will evolve, between the pulls of Taiwanese, Chinese, and global identity. While the future is far from certain, there is a good chance that a better solution to the Taiwan question can be found in the future than today.